The Big Picture

It’s A Google Problem

 

 

So let’s say you want to buy a concert ticket. You search in Google and you see a multitude of offers. All from the secondary market, i.e. scalpers, i.e. brokers. And if it’s a superstar, you may have the ability to purchase a ticket to what is supposedly a sold out show. However, many times the secondary market is offering tickets when primary tickets are still available on Ticketmaster, AXS, whatever ticketing company the promoter is using.

Watch this video:

@thefinanceinfo Rory Sutherland on the We Have a Meeting podcast explains why Google search is getting worse — and why being “#1” on Google isn’t even a win anymore. Search results are now stuffed with ads, so the first thing you click is rarely the best… just the highest bidder. He even paid more for a CTA because it appeared higher on the list, while the Canadian government offered the same thing for far cheaper. And if you search for a hotel? Google shows you five competing hotels before the one you actually wanted. The platform that once simplified the internet is now overwhelming it with options and charging businesses for the privilege. #business #google #marketing ♬ original sound – The Finance Info

1. This is Rory Sutherland, an English advertising executive who proffers wisdom on TikTok. He didn’t sit down and try to become a famous influencer, it all happened by accident. During Covid one video of him was posted and the public was hungry for his insights and his following burgeoned. This is what we call “pull” instead of “push.” Pre-internet marketing was all about pushing things on people, making them aware of them and getting the public to buy/partake. However, to succeed in the internet world, people must desire you. Push doesn’t work. There are too many marketing messages which are transparent hucksterism and people are turned off. But when they find something they like, they want more and tell everybody about it. This is the essence of success. Something that has been lost in the music business. We’ve got all these acts complaining they’re not getting paid, but if they were great, the public would desire them, they would pull their songs and more, make them a success. But nobody wants to own the truth.

2. Earlier this week I sent a TikTok video of Big Jim’s review of Yang Chow, a restaurant in Chinatown that a group of us go to on a regular basis. One of the recipients said she was not on TikTok. To quote:

“I’m barely engaged in social media. I don’t want to spend more time watching people I don’t know and will never meet. I can barely keep up with my friends and family!”

This is an old school, Facebook/Instagram view of social media. That it’s all about connecting with old friends, people bragging, trying to create FOMO. But no, on TikTok, a lot of the videos are informational. You learn. The algorithm divines what you are interested in and serves it up. You know I’ve got a bug up my ass about this, but I will say it once again, to counter the tide of oldsters…I’ve never heard a youngster complain about TikTok. It’s the oldsters who think it’s the devil. Social media is like AI, it’s here to stay. Furthermore, it has distinct advantages. Why are all the Boomers and Gen-X’ers so self-satisfied? They were addicted to television, but when there’s a new platform they pooh-pooh it. It would be laughable if traditional news and the so-called elite didn’t rail against technology constantly. The internet is the best thing that ever happened to me, I’m connecting with you right now! I can find information in niches that was previously unavailable to me, I can connect with people all over the world. Please change your perspective and get a TikTok account, to watch the videos in this piece, if nothing else.

2.a. Big Jim is a restaurant reviewer who popped up in my feed. He tends to review holes in the wall, unknown places in the San Fernando Valley, the ones no one talks about. I haven’t heard of most of the locations, but he’s piqued my interest. However, he gives a positive review to everything. This is the video on Yang Chow:

@bigjimsbabybites Yang Chow Chinese Restaurant in Los Angeles, CA. Since 1977 Food Review Yang Chow 819 N Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 90012 #Yangchow #chinesefood #losangeles #foodreview #fyp @Jisela Ordaz ♬ original sound – Big Jim

So Google is a B2B enterprise where the consumer gets screwed. Here’s another Rory Sutherland clip that talks about this:

@wehaveameetingpod Google is scamming you – Rory Sutherland I searched for a hotel. I wanted that hotel, not six others. There’s a fine line between being helpful and being annoying, okay Google? Full Podcast out soon. Don’t miss it. #RorySutherland #MarketingInsights #EthicalMarketing #AttentionEconomy #SmartAdvertising #HumanMarketing #Google ♬ original sound – We Have A Meeting Podcast

 

Bottom line… Google is in cahoots with advertisers who are oftentimes using subterfuge to make their money. Google doesn’t police this whatsoever. As a matter of fact, Google is proud of the fact that it’s all done automatically, online. But, the truth is Google has a responsibility to the consumer to deliver accurate information. However, the secondary market spends a fortune on ads with Google and the tech company looks the other way. The primary market is buried and can’t compete.

All this talk about the secondary market vs. the primary market… How can the primary market succeed if Google is helping the secondary, looking the other way?

The music industry must change its focus. It’s myopic, i.e. the secondary market is bad. It is, but it’s being enabled by Google, which should be shamed into changing its policy.

It’s not only concert tickets. Advertisers purvey all kinds of things for sale at exorbitant rates, far beyond the price the original seller is offering them at. But the original seller can’t compete, because these secondary market enterprises without the underlying costs of the original sellers spend a fortune on Google ads and dominate mindshare.

This can be changed.

Google said “Don’t be evil.”? It’s actively harming the concert industry, and many more verticals to boot!

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If you would like to subscribe to the LefsetzLetter

~~~

Originally published by Bob Lefsetz at the Leftsetz Letter

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Valuation with Aswath Damodaran

Aswath Damodaran is on sabbatical this academic year, and while he is away, the full versions of nearly all of his classes, with lectures, class material and tests/exams are accessible online.

This is an incredible resource; when people discuss the impact of the internet, this is a perfect example.

If you are a student who is serious about learning about stock valuations or simply a curious person, I urge you to check this out.

 

 

Hard to imagine this sort of asset was unavailable a decade or so ago…

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MiB: Masters in Business: Samantha McLemore, Patient Capital



 

 

This week, live from the Phillips Collection in Washington D.C., I speak with Samantha McLemore, founder and CIO of Patient Capital Management. We discuss how value investing has changed, investing in crypto, and the AI revolution.

We also discussed long-term investing and the ways her firm is using AI.

A transcript of our conversation is available here Monday.

You can stream and download our full conversation, including any podcast extras, on Apple Podcasts, SpotifyYouTube, and Bloomberg. All of our earlier podcasts on your favorite pod hosts can be found here.

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business next week with comedian Jay Leno, former Tonight Show host, and creator of Jay Leno’s Garage.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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At The Money: Stock Market Stories via the Narrative Machine

 

 

At The Money: Stock Market Stories via the Narrative Machine. (December 17, 2025)

 

Full transcript below.

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About this week’s guest:

Ben Hunt is founder of Perscient, a firm that studies how narratives and stories shape markets, investing, and social behavior through the lens of information theory, game theory, and unstructured data analysis. His work analyzes the language, story arcs, and viral spread of explanations in media

For more info, see:

Persient

Personal Bio

Website: Epsilon Theory

Masters in Business (Coming soon!)

LinkedIn

Twitter

 

Find all of the previous At the Money episodes here, and in the MiB feed on Apple PodcastsYouTubeSpotify, and Bloomberg. And find the entire musical playlist of all the songs I have used on At the Money on Spotify

 

 

 

TRANSCRIPT:

Investors regularly consume all sorts of financial news, opinion commentary, but they hardly ever consider. Who’s driving those narratives and whether they’re helpful to their portfolios? I’m Barry Ritholtz and on today’s edition of At The Money, we’re gonna discuss the narrative machine To help us unpack all of this and what it means for your portfolio, let’s bring in Ben Hunt of Percient.

Ben’s firm uses linguistic pattern recognition and media network mapping. To identify narrative clusters that might create investment opportunities. So Ben, you’ve written about narrative constructions and everything from politics to markets, even public health. How are narratives being weaponized in everyday practice?

Ben Hunt: Narratives have always been weaponized, meaning good politicians or effective politicians have always understood the power of a good story.

They answer the question, why? Why should you vote for me? Why should you favor this policy? That’s what good politicians are great at. They’re great at presenting their vision of what. Reality is what’s changed today is that everyone is in on that act. Everyone is now trying to tell a story. About how to think about their company’s earnings this central bank’s monetary policies.

You really saw this change with the great financial crisis (GFC) and the Fed starting to use forward guidance – starting to use their words – to impact markets. That’s a great example of narrative construction.

Then you saw so many CEOs follow suit. To tell a good story, to get a multiple on your stock rather than tell something about operation leverage or, or anything like that. It’s all about telling a story today. We can call it weaponization, but to me it’s just a natural evolution of how storytelling goes.

Barry Ritholtz: So if everybody is a storyteller, doesn’t that just create a sea of noise? How can we identify which of those stories are worth paying attention to and what’s just background noise and normal media discourse?

Ben Hunt: I think you can tell the difference between storytelling that is describing what happened. That’s just filling the, the airtime, if you will, of giving you a reason why stocks went up or financials went down today. I think what you wanna look at though carefully. Is the effort that’s made by Federal Reserve, by CEOs, pundits who are trying to be prescriptive. They’re trying to tell you a story about what should happen in the future.

It’s an indication of the effort that that company, that central bank. That institution or that, uh, investor who’s talking their book, they’re trying to give you an indicator. They’re trying to convince you of a certain course of action in the future, and you should pay attention to it because if it’s a well told story and it gets traction, it works.

Barry Ritholtz: I’ve heard you use the phrase “missionaries” to describe the small set of actors that shape narratives. Everybody else consumes. Who are these missionaries and where do they work? What do they do?

Ben Hunt: I use the word missionary because there’s a famous thought experiment around what we call the common knowledge game and around how narratives and stories spread through a crowd.

And it really goes back to old fashioned missionaries who go to some, some other country, some foreign country, and stand up and start preaching the word. That’s what a missionary is. That’s what spreads the word of a story. A missionary is someone who people are paying attention to.

Barry Ritholtz: That’d be anyone, anyone from the Chief Economist at Goldman Sachs or the Federal Reserve Chair to Roaring Kitty, that that defines missionaries.

Is that the missionary power of Powell today is a fraction of the missionary power of Powell four years ago.

Barry Ritholtz: I’m so glad you said that because ever since Kane’s, we understand the playback. You have a financial crisis or recession. The federal government stimulates with fiscal stimulus. That really did not happen to any substantial degree Following the financial crisis, how much did the sort of abdication of fiscal authority by Congress allow the Federal Reserve chairperson? To become missionary number one.

Ben Hunt: That was an enormous part of it. It was also desired by the White House. It, it was absolutely desired by the White House because –

Barry Ritholtz: by the Obama White House ?

Ben Hunt: 1 hundred percent. Because the Federal Reserve has again, this is the presentation. The presentation is that they are largely an apolitical entity. Mm-hmm. So something coming from the Fed, whether it’s a narrative, whether it’s actual policy, doesn’t get the same sort of immediate, raw, partisan pushback. That policy from the White House, the Obama White House received. So it was entirely desired that the Fed take the lead and Bernanke, Yellen now Powell. After that, they certainly rose to that challenge.

What’s changed today is that this White House has very intentionally tried to bring the Fed to heal. So if you’re looking at who are the dominant missionaries today, I’d put Bessant over Powell by a significant margin today,

Barry Ritholtz: Let’s roll back to 2020 during the first Trump presidency and into 21 during the first year or two of the Biden presidency. That seemed to be a massive regime change where if Congress previously had abdicated the fiscal stimulus – That Boomeranged with a vengeance and Cares Act one and two under President. Then first term, president Trump was the single largest fiscal stimulus, at least as a percentage of GDP, since World War ii.

And then Biden comes in and you have CARES Act three and the infrastructure bill and the semiconductor bill. It seemed like giant regime change from monetary stimulus to fiscal stimulus. Is that simply because we had a once a century pandemic and the government was scared out of its mind? Or are there other forces driving that shift, be it narrative or otherwise?

Ben Hunt: I think it’s all true. You know, that’s what, that’s what, uh, uh, Hemingway said about religions. He said, “They’re all true”. So these things are always overdetermined

What the mix is between, you know, response to the plague, what was driven by partisan politics, trying to stay in office stimulus for stimulus sake. It’s all of a piece

What’s what’s impactful here is that the Fed’s job was to avoid inflation and it was the fiscal side that drove the inflation, the helicopter money, but that, that veneer of impartiality of apolitical, I think was really damaged. During that Biden administration and so gave the opening for Trump to come in ad say, they’re all just political anyway, so I want my political guys to call the shots.

It’s all true.

Barry Ritholtz: It’s kind of fascinating that the first year of the Biden administration, and the same thing with. Both this Trump administration and the prior Trump administration, essentially you had pretty much a single party rule. The pandemic might have been an exception ’cause panic, was ruling.

You roll back to 09 with Obama, you had a divided government. The crisis was more or less over, and you just didn’t see the same level of fiscal stimulus that you saw in either ‘20 or ‘21 or arguably 2017 as well.

How much does politics. Drive partisan politics, drive narratives, um, and how significant is it to the market?

Ben Hunt: Answering the question, why? Why should you vote for this policy? Why should you support that policy? Those are the narratives that really drive our whole world and society. I always like to say that everything ultimately gets cashed out in politics. The market narratives at a very high level, at a t maybe a low level at that tectonic plate level of fiscal dominant dominance or monetary policy dominance, stimulus being, you know, the, the policies that, that are trying to reverse that hard money policies.

These are always at their core political arguments, political narratives

They absolutely are ultimately responsible for the big shifts we see in markets.

Barry Ritholtz: Let’s talk about something you’ve written about recursive social loops. Explain what that is and, and is the modern form of, let’s call it social media or decentralized media, making those loops tighter and faster?

Ben Hunt: Without a doubt, the half life of stories is declining, which makes actually kind of better for narrative analysis because you can, if not ignore, you can safely assume that the stories of today that are very specific to today; a very specific political issue or the, like, they’re not gonna be around.

The issues that stick around the ones that have a longer half-life, that have a more secular pattern, right? As opposed to, oh, we’ve just got a recursive loop and you’re just kind of done. So a, a recursive social loop simply means that we tend to all of these, these stories tend to get into their. I like to call ’em, they, they get auto-tuned into a certain audience where your echo chamber and they just go back and forth.

But in markets, the ones that are, the narratives that are longer lasting and hence more investible, are the ones that don’t get trapped into, I mean, they’re obviously impacted by political auto tuning, but they go beyond that.

Barry Ritholtz: You’ve described the narrative machine as distinct from traditional sentiment analysis. Explain the ways that that is the case.

Ben Hunt: Sentiment is, I think, a very weak read to try to understand what changes people’s minds. And this gets back to the, the initial idea of, well, how do you measure information? And a narrative is information. A story is information. The way you measure it is not.

By its truthfulness or its accuracy, you measure its strength by how does it, does it change your mind? Does it, does it? Does it make you think something differently than you thought before? Sentiment? Whether you use nice words or mean words to talk about something, it never changes your mind. It never changes your mind.

The only thing that can change your mind is a better story.

When somebody tells you a story, they put it in that story arc that has the “Truthiness” – Doesn’t have to be truth, it has to be the truthiness – And you go, oh, that makes sense.

Barry Ritholtz: I’m glad you used that phrase, truthiness. Uh, again, you, you’ve explained that narratives are not truth claims, but rather they’re coordination tools. Give us a little more details on, on what a narrative as coordination tool looks like.

Ben Hunt: A coordination tool simply means that the speaker, the opinion giver, is trying to shape opinion and behavior to a certain outcome. That’s all it means. A politician wants to shape your behavior to vote a certain way. Central bankers typically want to get you to go farther, take more risk with your portfolio than you otherwise would.

A coordination tool simply means using your words for effect – not as a accurate description of what you actually think, but to use your words to change behavior.

That’s what forward guidance is all about. That’s what advertising is all about. It’s not to share with you the actual workings, inner workings of their mind. It’s to try to change your behavior. That’s what a coordination tool is.

Barry Ritholtz:  You, you’ve used the phrase captured by a prevailing market story. Some investors get captured mm-hmm. And they get sucked into it. Some of the more common themes have been: “Bitcoins as a inflation hedge; gold as a substitute for fiat currency.”

How can any investor detect when they’ve been either consciously or unconsciously captured by a narrative?

Ben Hunt: It’s difficult. You remember the X-Files? Sure. Where Fox Molder was saying, you know, I want to believe, and that’s true for, for all of us humans, we want to believe.

And so when somebody tells us a believable story and they’re a, a believable source, then our preelection is to say, oh, huh, that’s interesting. I believe what’s crucial to do. It’s so hard.

I’ve been doing this professionally for 35 years and I, I still get, will get wrapped up in a story. I’ll read a tweet or it’ll make me really mad, or I’ll read a story and go, oh, that’s really interesting.

I gotta look up companies to invest in that theme. The crucial thing is not to think this stuff is, “It’s always a lie, or they’re trying to fool you.” It’s just to maintain some critical distance. The words are being spoken to you to get you to change your behavior. They’re trying to change your mind. They’re trying to convince you of a story that’s not bad. That’s what we humans do, and it may be a story that you do end up believing that’s fine too.

The crucial thing is always though to step back and just ask yourself, why am I reading this now? Why is this story being presented to me now? Just do that. Just do that simple step, and it will give you just give you a beat. It’ll give you a beat just to step back so you don’t rush headlong into believing a story because you want to believe it. That’s all you need to do. Why am I reading this now?

Barry Ritholtz: To wrap up, the narrative machine is everywhere. It is creating storylines for stocks, for asset classes, for markets, for politicians, for individual companies. It takes a little bit of common sense to step back, take a beat. Give yourself a moment. Ask yourself. Is this a reliable storyteller? Do they have a good track record? Are they the sort of storyteller that is worth believing or perhaps, uh, they’re selling something and we should be a little, uh, more circumspect before we buy?

I’m Barry Ritholtz; You are listening to Bloomberg’s at the Money.

 

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Find our entire music playlist for At the Money on Spotify.

 

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The Psychology of Human Misjudgment by Charlie Munger

 

Charlie Munger – 24 Cognitive Biases – Human Misjudgement full speech (Improved Audio & Captioned)

 

Full transcript below

 

Charlie Munger’s 24 Cognitive Biases:

1. Reward and Punishment Super-response Tendency

2. Liking/Loving Tendency

3. Disliking/Hating Tendency

4. Doubt-Avoidance Tendency

5. Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency

6. Curiosity Tendency

7. Kantian Fairness Tendency

8. Envy/Jealousy Tendency

9. Reciprocation Tendency

10. Influence-from-Mere-Association Tendency

11. Simple, Pain-Avoiding Psychological Denial

12. Excessive Self-Regard Tendency

13. Overoptimism Tendency

14. Deprival-Superreaction Tendency

15. Social-Proof Tendency

16. Contrast-Misreaction Tendency

17. Stress-Influence Tendency

18. Availability-Misweighing Tendency

19. Use-It-or-Lose-It Tendency

20. Drug-Misinfluence Tendency

21. Senescence-Misinfluence Tendency

22. Authority-Misinfluence Tendency

23. Twaddle Tendency

24. Reason-Respecting Tendency

25. Lollapalooza Tendency—The Tendency to Get Extreme Consequences from Confluences of

 

 

See also:
The Psychology of Human Misjudgment, by Charlie Munger

Transcript

 

 

 

 

I am very interested in the subject of human misjudgment, and Lord knows I’ve created a good bit of it. I don’t think I’ve created my full statistical share, and I think that one of the reasons was I tried to do something about this terrible ignorance I left the Harvard Law School with. When I saw this patterned irrationality, which was so extreme, and I had no theory or anything to deal with it, but I could see that it was extreme, and I could see that it was patterned, I just started to create my own system of psychology, partly by casual reading, but largely from personal experience, and I used that pattern to help me get through life.

Fairly late in life I stumbled into this book, Influence, by a psychologist named Bob Cialdini, who became a super tenured hotshot on a 2,000 person faculty at a very young age. And he wrote this book, which has now sold 300 odd thousand copies, which is remarkable for somebody. Well, it’s an academic book aimed at a popular audience that filled in a lot of holes in my crude system. When those holes had filled in, I thought I had a system that was a good working tool, and I’d like to share that one with you.

And I came here because behavioral economics. How could economics not be behavioral? If it isn’t behavioral, what the hell is it? And I think it’s fairly clear that all reality has to respect all other reality. If you come to inconsistencies, they have to be resolved, and so if there’s anything valid in psychology, economics has to recognize it, and vice versa. So I think the people that are working on this fringe between economics and psychology are absolutely right to be there, and I think there’s been plenty wrong over the years.

Well let me romp through as much of this list as I have time to get through. 24 Standard Causes of Human Misjudgment.

First. Under recognition of the power of what psychologists call reinforcement and economists call incentives. Well you can say, “Everybody knows that.” Well I think I’ve been in the top 5% of my age cohort all my life in understanding the power of incentives, and all my life I’ve underestimated it. And never a year passes, but I get some surprise that pushes my limit a little farther.

One of my favorite cases about the power of incentives is the Federal Express case. The heart and soul of the integrity of the system is that all the packages have to be shifted rapidly in one central location each night. And the system has no integrity if the whole shift can’t be done fast. And Federal Express had one hell of a time getting the thing to work. And they tried moral suasion, they tried everything in the world, and finally somebody got the happy thought that they were paying the night shift by the hour, and that maybe if they paid them by the shift, the system would work better. And lo and behold, that solution worked.

Early in the history of Xerox, Joe Wilson, who was then in the government, had to go back to Xerox because he couldn’t understand how their better, new machine was selling so poorly in relation to their older and inferior machine. Of course when he got there he found out that the commission arrangement with the salesmen gave a tremendous incentive to the inferior machine.

And here at Harvard, in the shadow of B.F. Skinner, there was a man who really was into reinforcement as a powerful thought, and you know, Skinner’s lost his reputation in a lot of places, but if you were to analyze the entire history of experimental science at Harvard, he’d be in the top handful. His experiments were very ingenious, the results were counterintuitive, and they were important. It is not given to experimental science to do better.

What gummed up Skinner’s reputation is that he developed a case of what I always call man-with-a-hammer syndrome, to the man with a hammer, every problem tends to look pretty much like a nail. And Skinner had one of the more extreme cases in the history of Academia, and this syndrome doesn’t exempt bright people. It’s just a man with a hammer and Skinner is an extreme example of that. And later, as I go down my list, let’s go back and try and figure out why people, like Skinner, get man-with-a-hammer syndrome.

Incidentally, when I was at the Harvard Law School there was a professor, naturally at Yale, who was derisively discussed at Harvard, and they used to say, “Poor old Blanchard. He thinks declaratory judgments will cure cancer.” And that’s the way Skinner got. And not only that, he was literary, and he scorned opponents who had any different way of thinking or thought anything else was important. This is not a way to make a lasting reputation if the other people turn out to also be doing something important.

My second factor is simple psychological denial. This first really hit me between the eyes when a friend of our family had a super-athlete, super-student son who flew off a carrier in the north Atlantic and never came back, and his mother, who was a very sane woman, just never believed that he was dead. And, of course, if you turn on the television, you find the mothers of the most obvious criminals that man could ever diagnose, and they all think their sons are innocent. That’s simple psychological denial. The reality is too painful to bear, so you just distort it until it’s bearable. We all do that to some extent, and it’s a common psychological misjudgment that causes terrible problems.

Third. Incentive-cause bias, both in ones own mind and that of ones trusted advisor, where it creates what economists call agency costs. Here, my early experience was a doctor who sent bushel baskets full of normal gallbladders down to the pathology lab in the leading hospital in Lincoln, Nebraska. And with that quality control for which community hospitals are famous, about five years after he should’ve been removed from the staff, he was.

And one of the old doctors who participated in the removal was also a family friend, and I asked him, I said, “Tell me, did he think, here’s a way for me to exercise my talents,” this guy was very skilled technically, “And make a high living by doing a few maimings and murders every year, along with some frauds?” And he said, “Hell no, Charlie. He thought that the gallbladder was the source of all medical evil, and if you really love your patients, you couldn’t get that organ out rapidly enough.”

Now that’s an extreme case, but in lesser strength, it’s present in every profession and in every human being. And it causes perfectly terrible behavior. If you take sales presentations and brokers of commercial real estate and businesses, I’m 70 years old, I’ve never seen one I thought was even within hailing distance of objective truth. If you want to talk about the power of incentives and the power of rationalized, terrible behavior, after the Defense Department had had enough experience with cost-plus percentage of cost contracts, the reaction of our republic was to make it a crime for the federal government to write one, and not only a crime, but a felony.

And by the way, the government’s right, but a lot of the way the world is run, including most law firms and a lot of other places, they’ve still got a cost-plus percentage of cost system. And human nature, with its version of what I call incentive-caused bias, causes this terrible abuse. And many of the people who are doing it you would be glad to have married into your family compared to what you’re otherwise going to get.

Now there are huge implications from the fact that the human mind is put together this way, and that is that people who create things like cash registers, which make most behavior hard, are some of the effective saints of our civilization. And the cash register was a great moral instrument when it was created. And Patterson knew that, by the way. He had a little store, and the people were stealing him blind and never made any money, and people sold him a couple of cash registers and it went to profit immediately.

And, of course, he closed the store and went into the cash register business. With results which are … And so this is a huge, important thing. If you read the psychology texts, you will find that if they’re 1,000 pages long, there’s one sentence. Somehow incentive-caused bias has escaped the standard survey course in psychology.

Fourth, and this is a superpower in error-causing psychological tendency, bias from consistency and commitment tendency, including the tendency to avoid or promptly resolve cognitive dissonance. Includes the self-confirmation tendency of all conclusions, particularly expressed conclusions, and with a special persistence for conclusions that are hard-won.

Well what I’m saying here is that the human mind is a lot like the human egg, and the human egg has a shut-off device. When one sperm gets in, it shuts down so the next one can’t get in. The human mind has a big tendency of the same sort. And here again, it doesn’t just catch ordinary mortals, it catches the deans of physics. According to Max Planck, the really innovative, important new physics was never really accepted by the old guard.

Instead, a new guard came along that was less brain-blocked by its previous conclusions. And if Max Planck’s crowd had this consistency and commitment tendency that kept their old inclusions intact in spite of disconfirming evidence, you can imagine what the crowd that you and I are part of behaves like.

And of course, if you make a public disclosure of your conclusion, you’re pounding it into your own head. Many of these students that are screaming at us, you know, they aren’t convincing us, but they’re forming mental change for themselves, because what they’re shouting out they’re pounding in. And I think educational institutions that create a climate where too much of that goes on are in a fundamental sense, they’re irresponsible institutions. It’s very important to not put your brain in chains too young by what you shout out.

And all these things like painful qualifying and initiation rituals, all those things, pound in your commitments and your ideas. The Chinese brainwashing system, which was for war prisoners, was way better than anybody else’s. They maneuvered people into making tiny little commitments and declarations, and then they’d slowly build. That worked way better than torture.

Sixth. Bias from Pavlovian association, misconstruing past correlation as a reliable basis for decision-making. I never took a course in psychology, or economics either for that matter, but I did learn about Pavlov in high school biology. And the way they taught it, you know, so the dog salivated when the bell rang. So what? Nobody made the least effort to tie that to the wide world. Well the truth of the matter is that Pavlovian association is an enormously powerful psychological force in the daily life of all of us. And, indeed, in economics we wouldn’t have money without the role of so-called secondary reinforcement, which is a pure psychological phenomenon demonstrated in the laboratory.

Practically, I’d say 3/4 of advertising works on pure Pavlov. Think how association, pure association, works. Take Coca-Cola company we’re the biggest share-holder. They want to be associated with every wonderful image, heroics in the Olympics, wonderful music, you name it. They don’t want to be associated with Presidents’ funerals and so forth. When have you seen a Coca-Cola ad, and the association really works.

And all these psychological tendencies work largely or entirely on a subconscious level, which makes them very insidious. Now you’ve got Persian messenger syndrome. The Persians really did kill the messenger who brought the bad news. You think that is dead? I mean you should’ve seen Bill Paley in his last 20 years. He didn’t hear one damn thing he didn’t want to hear. People knew that it was bad for the messenger to bring Bill Paley things he didn’t want to hear. Well that means that the leader gets in a cocoon of unreality, and this is a great big enterprise, and boy, did he make some dumb decisions in the last 20 years.

And now the Persian messenger syndrome is alive and well. When I saw, some years ago, Arco and Exxon arguing over a few hundred millions of ambiguity in their North Slope treaties before a superior court judge in Texas, with armies of lawyers and experts on each side. Now this is a Mad Hatter’s tea party, two engineering-style companies can’t resolve some ambiguity without spending tens of millions of dollars in some Texas superior court? In my opinion what happens is that nobody wants to bring the bad news to the executives up the line. But here’s a few hundred million dollars you thought you had that you don’t. And it’s much safer to act like the Persian messenger who goes away to hide rather than bring home the news of the battle lost.

Talking about economics, you get a very interesting phenomenon that I’ve seen over and over again in a long life. You’ve got two products, suppose they’re complex, technical products. Now you’d think, under the laws of economics, that if product A costs X, if product Y costs X minus something, it will sell better than if it sells at X plus something, but that’s not so. In many cases when you raise the price of the alternative products, it’ll get a larger market share than it would when you make it lower than your competitor’s product.

That’s because the bell, a Pavlovian bell, I mean ordinarily there’s a correlation between price and value, then you have an information inefficiency. And so when you raise the price, the sales go up relative to your competitor. That happens again and again and again. It’s a pure Pavlovian phenomenon. You can say, “Well, the economists have figured this sort of thing out when they started talking about information inefficiencies,” but that was fairly late in economics that they found such an obvious thing. And, of course, most of them don’t ask what causes the information inefficiencies.

Well one of the things that causes it is pure old Pavlov and his dog. Now you’ve got bios from Skinnerian association, operant conditioning, you know, where you give the dog a reward and pound in the behavior that preceded the dog’s getting the award. And, of course, Skinner was able to create superstitious pigeons by having the rewards come by accident with certain occurrences, and, of course, we all know people who are the human equivalents of superstitious pigeons. That’s a very powerful phenomenon. And, of course, operant conditioning really works. I mean the people in the center who think that operant conditioning is important are very much right, it’s just that Skinner overdid it a little.

Where you see in business just perfectly horrible results from psychologically rooted tendencies is in accounting. If you take Westinghouse, which blew, what, two or three billion dollars pre-tax at least loaning developers to build hotels, and virtually 100% loans? Now you say any idiot knows that if there’s one thing you don’t like it’s a developer, and another you don’t like it’s a hotel.

And to make a 100% loan to a developer who’s going to build a hotel. But this guy, he probably was an engineer or something, and he didn’t take psychology any more than I did, and he got out there in the hands of these slick salesmen operating under their version of incentive-caused bias, where any damned way of getting Westinghouse to do it was considered normal business, and they just blew it.

That would never have been possible if the accounting system hadn’t been such but for the initial phase of every transaction it showed wonderful financial results. So people who have loose accounting standards are just inviting perfectly horrible behavior in other people. And it’s a sin, it’s an absolute sin. If you carry bushel baskets full of money through the ghetto, and made it easy to steal, that would be a considerable human sin, because you’d be causing a lot of bad behavior, and the bad behavior would spread. Similarly an institution that gets sloppy accounting commits a real human sin, and it’s also a dumb way to do business, as Westinghouse has so wonderfully proved.

Oddly enough nobody mentions, at least nobody I’ve seen, what happened with Joe Jett and Kidder Peabody. The truth of the matter is the accounting system was such that by punching a few buttons, the Joe Jetts of the world could show profits, and profits that showed up in things that resulted in rewards and esteem and every other thing that human being. Well the Joe Jetts are always with us, and they’re not really to blame, in my judgment at least. But that bastard who created that foolish accounting system who, so far as I know, has not been flayed alive, ought to be.

Seventh. Bias from reciprocation tendency, including the tendency of one on a roll to act as other persons expect. Well here, again, Cialdini does a magnificent job at this, and you’re all going to be given a copy of Cialdini’s book. And if you have half as much sense as I think you do, you will immediately order copies for all of your children and several of your friends. You will never make a better investment.

It is so easy to be a patsy for what he calls the compliance practitioners of this life. But, at any rate, reciprocation tendency is a very, very powerful phenomenon, and Cialdini demonstrated this by running around a campus, and he asked people to take juvenile delinquents to the zoo. And it was a campus, and so one in six actually agreed to do it. And after he’d accumulated a statistical output he went around on the same campus and he asked other people, he said, “Gee, would you devote two afternoons a week to taking juvenile delinquents somewhere and suffering greatly yourself to help them,” and there he got 100% of the people to say no.

But after he’d made the first request, he backed off a little, and he said, “Would you at least take them to the zoo one afternoon?” He raised the compliance rate from a third to a half. He got three times the success by just going through the little ask-for-a-lot-and-back-off.

Now if the human mind, on a subconscious level, can be manipulated that way and you don’t know it, I always use the phrase, “You’re like a one-legged man in an ass-kicking contest.” I mean you are really giving a lot of quarter to the external world that you can’t afford to give. And on this so-called role theory, where you tend to act in the way that other people expect, and that’s reciprocation if you think about the way society is organized.

A guy named Zimbardo had people at Stanford divide into two pieces, one were the guards and the other were the prisoners, and they started acting out roles as people expected. He had to stop the experiment after about five days. He was getting into human misery and breakdown and pathological behavior. I mean it was awesome. However, Zimbardo is greatly misinterpreted. It’s not just reciprocation tendency and role theory that caused that, it’s consistency and commitment tendency. Each person, as he acted as a guard or a prisoner, the action itself was pounding in the idea.

Wherever you turn, this consistency and commitment tendency is affecting you. In other words, what you think may change what you do, but perhaps even more important, what you do will change what you think. And you can say, “Everybody knows that.” I want to tell you I didn’t know it well enough early enough.

Eight. Now this is a lollapalooza, and Henry Kaufman wisely talked about this, bias from over-influence by social proof, that is, the conclusions of others, particularly under conditions of natural uncertainty and stress. And here, one of the cases the psychologists use is Kitty Genovese, where all these people, I don’t know, 50, 60, 70 of them just sort of sat and did nothing while she was slowly murdered. Now one of the explanations is that everybody looked at everybody else and nobody else was doing anything, and so there’s automatic social proof that the right thing to do is nothing.

That’s not a good enough explanation for Kitty Genovese, in my judgment. That’s only part of it. There are microeconomic ideas and gain/loss ratios and so forth that also come into play. I think time and time again, in reality, psychological notions and economic notions interplay, and the man who doesn’t understand both is a damned fool.

Big-shot businessmen get into these waves of social proof. Do you remember some years ago when one oil company bought a fertilizer company, and every other major oil company practically ran out and bought a fertilizer company? And there was no more damned reason for all these oil companies to buy fertilizer companies, but they didn’t know exactly what to do, and if Exxon was doing it, it was good enough for Mobil, and vice versa. I think they’re all gone now, but it was a total disaster.

Now let’s talk about efficient market theory, a wonderful economic doctrine that had a long vogue in spite of the experience of Berkshire Hathaway. In fact one of the economists who won, he shared a Nobel Prize, and as he looked at Berkshire Hathaway year after year, which people would throw in his face as saying maybe the market isn’t quite as efficient as you think, he said, “Well, it’s a two-sigma event.” And then he said we were a three-sigma event. And then he said we were a four-sigma event. And he finally got up to six sigmas, better to add a sigma than change a theory, just because the evidence comes in differently. And, of course, when this share of a Nobel Prize went into money management himself, he sank like a stone.

If you think about the doctrines I’ve talked about, namely, one, the power of reinforcement after all you do something and the market goes up and you get paid and rewarded and applauded and what have you, meaning a lot of reinforcement, if you make a bet on a market and the market goes with you. Also, there’s social proof. I mean the prices on the market are the ultimate form of social proof, reflecting what other people think, and so the combination is very powerful.

Why would you expect general market levels to always be totally efficient, say even in 1973, 4 at the pit, or in 1972 or whatever it was when the Nifty 50 were in their heyday? If these psychological notions are-

Fifty were in their heyday. If these psychological notions are correct, you would expect some waves of irrationality, which carry general levels to … ’til they’re inconsistent with the reason.

Nine. What made these economists love the efficient-market theory is the math was so elegant, and after all, math was what they’d learned to do. To the man with a hammer, every problem tends to look pretty much like a nail. The alternative truth was a little messy, and they’d forgotten the great economist Keynes, whom I think said, “Better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.”

Nine. Bias from contrast caused distortions of sensation, perception, and cognition. Here the great experiment that Cialdini does in his class is he takes three buckets of water. One’s hot, one’s cold, and one’s room temperature. And he has the student stick his left hand in the hot water and his right hand in the cold water. Then he has them remove the hands and put them both in the room temperature bucket, and of course with both hands in the same bucket of water, one seems hot, and the other seems cold because the sensation apparatus of man is over-influenced by contrast. It has no absolute scale. It’s got a contrast scale in it, and it’s scale with quantum effects in it, too. It takes a certain percentage change before it’s noticed.

Maybe you’ve had a magician remove your watch, I certainly have, without your noticing it. It’s the same thing. He’s taking advantage of your contrast type troubles and your sensory apparatus. But here the great truth is that cognition mimics sensation, and the cognition manipulators mimic the watch-removing magician. In other words, people are manipulating you all day long on this contrast phenomenon.

Cialdini cites the case of the real estate broker. You’ve got the rube that’s been transferred into your town, and the first thing you do is you take the rube out to two of the most awful over-priced houses you’ve ever seen, and then you take the rube to some moderately over-priced house and then you stick ’em. And it works pretty well, which is why the real estate salesmen do it. It’s always gonna work.

And the accidents of life can do this to you, and it can ruin your life. In my generation when women lived at home until they got married, I saw some perfectly terrible marriages made by highly desirable women because they lived in terrible homes. And I’ve seen some terrible second marriages, which were made because they were slight improvements over an even worse first marriage.

You think you’re immune from these things, and you laugh, and I wanna tell you you aren’t. My favorite analogy, I can’t vouch for the accuracy of. I have this worthless friend I like to Bridge with, and he’s a total intellectual amateur that lives on inherited money. But he told me once something I really enjoyed hearing. He said, “Charlie,” he says, “If you throw a fog into very hot water, the frog will jump out. But if you put the frog in room temperature water and just slowly heat the water up, the frog will die there.”

Now I don’t know whether that’s true about a frog, but it’s sure as hell true about many of the businessmen I know, and there again, it is the contrast phenomenon.

These are hot-shot high-powered people. These are not fools. If it comes to you in small pieces, you’re likely to miss, so you have to … if you’re gonna be a person of good judgment, you have to do something about this warp in your head where it’s so mislead by mere contrast.

Bias from over-influence by authority. Well here the Milgram experiment is it’s caused … I think there have been 1600 psychological papers written about Milgram. He had a person posing as an authority figure trick ordinary people into giving what they had every reason to expect was heavy torture by electric shock to perfectly innocent fellow citizens. And the experiment has been … he was trying to show why Hitler succeeded and a few other things. So it has really caught the fancy of the world. Partly it’s so politically correct and …

Over-influence by authority has another very … this’ll … you’ll like this one. You got a pilot and a co-pilot. The pilot is the authority figure. They don’t do this in airplanes, but they’ve done it in simulators. They have the pilot do something where the co-pilot who’s been trained in simulators a long time. He knows he’s not to allow the plane to crash. They have the pilot to do something where an idiot co-pilot would know the plane was gonna crash, but the pilot’s doing it, and the co-pilot is sitting there, and the pilot is the authority figure. 25% of the time, the plane crashes. This is a very powerful psychological tendency.

It’s not quite as powerful as some people think, and I’ll get to that later.

11. Bias from Deprival Super Reaction Syndrome, including bias caused by present or threatened scarcity, including threatened removal of something almost possessed but never possessed. Here I took the Munger dog, lovely harmless dog. The one way, the only way to get that dog to bite you was to try and take something out of its mouth after it was already there.

Any of you who’ve tried to do take-aways in labor negotiations will know the human version of that dog is there in all of us. I had a neighbor, a predecessor, on a little island where I have a house, and his nextdoor neighbor put a little pine tree in that was about three feet high, and it turned his 180 degree view of the harbor into 179 and three-quarters. Well they had a blood feud like the Hatfields and McCoys, and it went on and on and on. People are really crazy about minor decrements down.

Then if you act on them, you get into reciprocation tendency because you don’t just reciprocate affection, you reciprocate animosity. And the whole thing can escalate, and so huge insanities can come from just subconsciously over-weighing the importance of what you’re losing or almost getting and not getting.

The extreme business cake here was New Coke. Now Coca-Cola has the most valuable trademark in the world. We’re the major shareholder. I think we understand that trademark. Coke has armies of brilliant engineers, lawyers, psychologists, advertising executives, and so forth. And they had a trademark on a flavor, and they’d spent better part of 100 years getting people to believe that trademark had all these intangible values, too. And people associate it with a flavor, so they were gonna tell people not that it was improved ’cause you can’t improve a flavor. If a flavor’s a matter of taste, you may improve a detergent or something, but telling you’re gonna make a major change in a flavor, I mean … So they got this huge Deprival Super Reaction Syndrome.

Pepsi was within weeks of coming out with Old Coke in a Pepsi bottle, which would have been the biggest fiasco in modern times. Perfect, pluperfect insanity. And by the way, both Goizueta and Keough are just wonderful about it. They just joke. They don’t … Keough always says I must’ve been away on vacation. He participated in every single … he’s a wonderful guy. And by the way, Goizueta’s a wonderful, smart guy, an engineer.

Smart people make these terrible blunders. How can you not understand Deprival Super Reaction Syndrome? But people do not react symmetrically to loss and gain. Now maybe a great Bridge player like Zeckhauser does, but that’s a trained response. Ordinary people subconsciously affected by their inborn tendencies.

Bias from envy/jealousy. Well, envy/jealousy made what, two out of the 10 commandments. Those of you who’ve raised siblings or tried to run a law firm or investment bank or even a faculty. I’ve heard Warren say a half a dozen times, “It’s not greed that drives the world but envy.”

Here again, you go through the psychology survey courses. You go to the index: envy, jealousy. Thousand page book, it’s blank! There’s some blind spots in academia. But it’s an enormously powerful thing, and it operates to a considerable extent at a subconscious level, and anybody who doesn’t understand it is taking on defects he shouldn’t have.

Bias from chemical dependency. Well we don’t have to talk about that. We’ve all seen so much of it, but it’s interesting how it always causes moral breakdown if there’s any need, and it always involves massive denial. It aggravates what we talked about earlier in the aviator case, the tendency to distort reality so that it’s endurable.

Bias from gambling compulsion. Well here, Skinner made the only explanation you’ll find in the standard psychology survey course. He, of course, created a variable reinforcement rate for his pigeons, his mice, and he found that that would pound in the behavior better than any other enforcement pattern. He says, “Ah ha! I’ve explained why gambling is such a powerful, addictive force in the civilization.” I think that is, to a very considerable extent, true, but being Skinner, he seemed to think that was the only explanation.

The truth of the matter is the devisers of these modern machines and techniques know a lot of things that Skinner didn’t know. For instance, a lottery … you have a lottery where you get your number by lot and then somebody draws a number by lot? It gets lousy play. You get a lottery where people get to pick their number, get big play. Again, it’s this consistency and commitment thing. People think that if they’ve committed to it, it has to be good. The minute they’ve picked it themselves, it gets an extra validity. After all, they thought it and they acted on it.

Then if you take slot machines, you get bar, bar, lemon. It happens again and again and again. You get all these near misses. Well that’s Deprival Super Reaction Syndrome, and boy do the people who create the machines understand human psychology.

And for the high IQ crowd, they’ve got poker machines where you make choices, so you can play blackjack, so to speak, with the machine. It’s wonderful what we’ve done with our computers to ruin the civilization.

But anyway, this gambling compulsion is a very, very powerful important thing. Look at what’s happening to our country. Every Indian reservation, every river town, and look at the people who are ruined with the aid of their stockbrokers and others.

Again, if you look in the standard textbook of psychology, you’ll find practically nothing on it except maybe one sentence talking about Skinner’s rats. That is not an adequate coverage of the subject.

Bias from liking distortion, including the tendency to especially like oneself, one’s own kind, and one’s own idea structures, and the tendency to be especially susceptible to being mislead by someone liked.

Disliking distortion. Bias from that. The reciprocal of liking distortion and the tendency not to learn appropriately from someone disliked. Well here again, we’ve got hugely powerful tendencies, and if you look at the wars in part of the Harvard Law School as we sit here, you can see that very brilliant people get into this almost pathological behavior, and these are very, very powerful, basic, subconscious, psychological tendencies or at least partly subconscious.

Now let’s get back to B.F. Skinner, man with a hammer syndrome revisited. Why is man with a hammer syndrome always present? Well if you stop to think about it, incentive caused bias. His professional reputation is all tied up with what he knows. He likes himself, and he likes his own ideas, and he’s expressed them to other people, consistency and commitment tendency. I mean you’ve got four or five of these elementary psychological tendencies combining to create this man with a hammer syndrome.

Once you realize that you can’t really buy your thinking down. Partly you can, but largely you can’t in this world. You’ve learned a lesson that’s very useful in life. George Bernard Shaw said, and a character say in The Doctor’s Dilemma, “In the last analysis, every profession is a conspiracy against the laity.” But he didn’t have it quite right because it’s not so much conspiracy as it is a subconscious, psychological tendency.

The guy tells you what is good for him, and he doesn’t recognize that he’s doing anything wrong any more than that doctor did when he was pulling out all those normal gallbladders. He believed that his own idea structures will cure cancer, and he believed that the demons that he’s the guardian against are the biggest demons and the most important ones. And in fact, they may be very small demons compared to the demons that you face. So you’re getting your advice in this world from your paid advisor with this huge load of ghastly bias. And woe to you!

And only two ways to handle it. You can hire your advisor and then just apply a windage factor like I used to do when I was a rifle shooter. I’d just adjust for so many miles an hour wind. Or you can learn the basic elements of your advisor’s trade. You don’t have to learn very much, by the way, because if you learn just a little and you can make him explain why he’s right. And those two tendencies will take part of the warp out of the thinking you’ve tried to hire down.

By and large, it works terribly. I have never seen a management consultant’s report in my long life that didn’t end with the following paragraph: “What this situation really needs is more management consulting.” Never once! I always turn to the last page. Of course Berkshire Hathaway doesn’t hire them, so … I only do this in sort of a lawyer-istic basis. Sometimes I’m in a nonprofit where some idiot hires one.

17. Bias from the non-mathematical nature of the human brain in its natural state as it deals with probabilities employing crude heuristics and is often mislead by mere contrast. The tendency to overweigh conveniently available information and other psychological rooted mis-thinking tendencies on this list when the brain should be using the simple probability mathematics of Fermat and Pascal, applied to all reasonably attainable and correctly weighted items of information that are of value in predicting outcomes. The right way to think is the way Zeckhauser plays Bridge. It’s just that simple.

And your brain doesn’t naturally know how to think the way Zeckhauser knows to play Bridge. Now you notice I put in that availability thing, and there I’m mimicking some very eminent psychologists … Tversky, who raised the idea of availability to a whole heuristic of misjudgment.

You know, they are very substantially right. Ask the Coca-Cola company, which has raised availability to a secular religion, if availability changes behavior. You’ll drink a hell of a lot more Coke if it’s always available. Availability does change behavior and cognition.

Nonetheless, even though I recognize that and applaud Tversky, Kahneman, I don’t like it for my personal system except as part of a greater subsystem, which is you gotta think the way Zeckhauser plays Bridge. It isn’t just the lack of availability that distorts your judgment. All the things on this list distort judgment. And I wanna train myself to mentally run down the list instead of just jumping on availability. So that’s why I state it the way I do.

In a sense, these psychological tendencies make things unavailable ’cause if you quickly jump to one thing and then because you’ve jumped to it, the consistency and commitment tendency makes you lock in, boom, it’s there. Number one.

Or if something is very vivid, which I’m going to come to next, that will really pound in. And the reason that the thing that really matters is now unavailable and what’s extra vivid wins is … the extra vividness creates the unavailability. So I think it’s much better to have a whole list of things that cause you to be less like Zeckhauser than it is just to jump on one factor.

Here, I think we should discuss John Gutfreund. This is a very interesting human example which will be taught in every decent professional school for at least a full generation. Gutfreund has a trusted employee, and it comes to light not through confession but by accident that the trusted employee has lied like hell to the government and manipulated the accounting system and was really the equivalent to forgery. The man immediately says, “I’ve never done it before. I’ll never do it again. It was an isolated example.” Of course, it was obvious that he was trying to help the government as well as himself ’cause he thought the government had been dumb enough to pass a rule that he’d spoken against. And after all, if a government’s not gonna pay attention to a bond trader at Salomon, what kind of a government can it be?

At any rate, and this guy has been part of a little clique that has made way over a billion dollars for Salomon in the very recent past, and it’s a little handful of people. So there are a lot of psychological forces at work. You know the guy’s wife, he’s right in front of you, and there’s human sympathy, and he’s sort of asking for your help, which is the form which encourages reciprocation, and there are all these psychological tendencies are working. Plus the fact he’s part of group that have made a lot of money for you.

At any rate, Gutfreund does not cashier the man, and of course, he had done it before, and he did do it again. Well now you look as though you almost wanted him to do it again or God knows what you look like, but it isn’t good. And that simple decision destroyed John Gutfreund.

It’s so easy to do. Now let’s think it through like the Bridge player, like Zeckhauser. You find an isolated example of a little old lady in the See’s candy company, one of our subsidiaries, getting into the till, and what does she say? “I never did it before. I’ll never do it again. This is gonna ruin my life. Please help me.” And you know her children and her friends, and she’s been around 30 years and standing behind the candy counter with swollen ankles. In your old age, isn’t that glorious a life? And you’re rich and powerful and there she is. “I never did it before, and I will never do it again.”

Well how likely is it that she never did it before? If you’re gonna catch ten embezzlements a year, what are the chances that any one of them, applying what Tversky and Kahneman called baseline information, will be somebody who only did it this once? And the people who have done it before and are gonna do it again, what are they all gonna say?

Well in the history of the See’s candy company, they always say, “I never did it before, and I’m never gonna do it again.” And we cashier them. It would be evil not to because terribly behavior spreads. … You let that stuff … you’ve got social proof, you’ve got incentive caused bias, you got a whole lotta psychological factors that will cause the evil behavior to spread, and pretty soon the whole damn … your place is rotten, the civilization is rotten. It’s not the right way to behave, and …

I will admit that I have … when I knew the wife and children, I have paid severance pay when I fire somebody, for taking a mistress on a extended foreign trip. It’s not the adultery I mind. It’s the embezzlement. But there, I wouldn’t do it where Gutfreund did it, where they’d been cheating somebody else on my behalf. There I think you have to cashier, but if they’re just stealing from you and you get rid of them, I don’t think you need the last ounce of vengeance. In fact, I don’t think you need any vengeance. I don’t think vengeance is much good.

Now we come bias from over-influence by extra vivid evidence. Here’s one … I’m at least $30 million poorer as I sit here giving this little talk because I once bought 300 shares of a stock, and the guy called me back and said, “I got 1500 more.” I said, “Will you hold it for 15 minutes while I think about it?” In CEO of this company, I’ve seen a lot of vivid peculiarities in a long life, but this guy set a world record. I’m talking about the CEO, and I just mis-weighed it. The truth of the matter is his situation was foolproof. He was soon gonna be dead. I turned down the extra 1500 share, and it’s now cost me $30 million, and that’s life in the big city.

It wasn’t something where stock was generally available, and so it’s very easy to mis-weigh the vivid evidence. Gutfreund did that when he looked into the man’s eyes and forgave the colleague.

22. Stress-induced mental changes, small and large, temporary and permanent. Oh no, no no, I’ve skipped one.

Mental confusion caused by information not arrayed in the mind and theory structures creating sound generalizations, developed in response to the question why. Also mis-influence from information that apparently but not really answers the question why. Also failure to obtain deserved influence caused by not properly explaining why.

Well we all know people who’ve flunked, and they try and memorize, and they try and spout back, and they just … doesn’t work. The brain doesn’t work that way. You’ve got to array facts on theory structures answering the question why. If you don’t do that, you cannot handle the world.

Now we get to Feuerstein, who was the general counsel of Salomon when Gutfreund made his big error. And Feuerstein knew better. He told Gutfreund, “You have to report this as a matter of morality and prudent business judgment.” He said, “It’s probably not illegal. There’s probably no legal duty to do it, but you have to do it as a matter of prudent conduct and proper dealing with your main customer.” He said that to Gu-

… and proper dealing with your main customer. He said that to Gutfreund on at least two or three occasions, and he stopped. And, of course, the persuasion failed, and when Gutfreund went down, Feuerstein went with him. It ruined a considerable part of Feuerstein’s life. Well Feuerstein, was a member of the Harvard Law Review, made an elementary psychological mistake. You want to persuade somebody, you really tell them why. And what did we learn in lesson one? Incentives really matter. Vivid evidence really works. He should have told Gutfreund, “You’re likely to ruin your life and disgrace your family and lose your money.” And is Mozer worth this? I know both men. That would’ve worked. So Feuerstein flunked elementary psychology, this very sophisticated, brilliant lawyer. But don’t you do that. It’s not very hard to do, you know, just to remember that “Why?” is terribly important.

Other normal limitations of sensation, memory, cognition and knowledge. Well, I don’t have time for that. Stress-induced mental changes. Here, my favorite example is the great Pavlov. He had all these dogs in cages, which had all been conditioned into changed behaviors, and the great Leningrad flood came, and it just went right up. The dog’s in a cage, and the dog had as much stress as you can imagine a dog ever having. The water receded in time to save some of the dogs, and Pavlov noted that they’d had a total reversal of their conditioned personality. Well, being the great scientist he was, he spent the rest of his life giving nervous breakdowns to dogs, and he learned a hell of a lot that I regard as very interesting. I have never known any Freudian analyst who knew anything about the last work of Pavlov, and I never met a lawyer who understood that what Pavlov found out with those dogs had anything to do with programming, and de-programming, and cults and so forth. …

Then, we’ve got other common mental illnesses and declines, temporary and permanent, including the tendency to lose ability through disuse. Then I’ve got mental and organizational confusion from say-something syndrome. Here, my favorite thing is the bee, a honeybee. A honeybee goes out and finds the nectar, and he comes back, and he does a dance that communicates to the other bees where the nectar is, and they go out and get it. Well, some scientist who was clever, like B.F. Skinner, decided to do an experiment. He put the nectar straight up. Way up. Well, in a natural setting, there is no nectar way the hell straight up, and the poor honeybee doesn’t have a genetic program that is adequate to handle what he now has to communicate.

You’d think the honeybee would come back to the hive and slink into a corner, but he doesn’t. He comes into the hive and does this incoherent dance, and all my life I’ve been dealing with the human equivalent of that honeybee. And it’s a very important part of human organization to set things up so the noise, and the reciprocation and so forth of all these people who have what I call say-something syndrome don’t really affect the decisions.

Now, the time has come to ask two or three questions. This is the most important question in this whole talk. What happens when these standard psychological tendencies combine? What happens when the situation, or the artful manipulation of man, causes several of these tendencies to operate on a person toward the same end at the same time? The clear answer is the combination greatly increases power to change behavior, compared to the power of merely one tendency acting alone. Examples are: Tupperware parties. Tupperware has now made billions of dollars out of a few manipulative psychological tricks. It was so schlock that directors of Justin Dart’s company resigned when he crammed it down his board’s throat. And he was totally right, by the way, judged by economic outcomes.

Moonie conversion methods. Boy, do they work. He just combines four or five of these things together. The system of Alcoholics Anonymous. A 50% no-drinking rate outcome when everything else fails? It’s a very clever system that uses four or five psychological systems at once toward, I might say, a very good end. The Milgrim experiment. See, Milgrim … It’s been widely interpreted as mere obedience, but the truth of the matter is that the experimenter who got the students to give the heavy shocks in Milgrim, he explained why. It was a false explanation. “We need this to look for scientific truth,” and so on. That greatly changed the behavior of the people. And number two, he worked them up, tiny shock, a little larger, a little larger. So commitment and consistency tendency and the contrast principle were both working in favor of this behavior. So again, it’s four different psychological tendencies.

When you get these lollapalooza effects you will almost always find four or five of these things working together. When I was young, there was a whodunit hero who always said cherchez la femme. What you should search for in life is the combination, because the combination is likely to do you in. Or, if you’re the inventor of Tupperware parties, it’s likely to make you enormously rich if you can stand shaving when you do it. One of my favorite cases is the McDonald-Douglas airliner evacuation disaster. The government requires that airliners pass a bunch of tests. One of them is evacuation. Get everybody out, I think it’s 90 seconds or something like that. It’s some short period of time. The government has rules, make it very realistic, so on, and so on. You can’t select nothing but 20-year-old athletes to evacuate your airline.

So McDonald-Douglas schedules one of these things in a hangar, and they make the hangar dark. The concrete floor is 25 feet down, and they got these little rubber chutes, and they got all these old people. They ring the bell, and they all rush out. In the morning when the first test is done, they create, I don’t know, 20 terrible injuries. People go off to hospitals. Of course, they scheduled another one for the afternoon. By the way, they didn’t meet the time schedule either, in addition to causing all the injuries. So what do they do? They do it again in the afternoon. Now, they create 20 more injuries and one case of a severed spinal column with permanent, unfixable paralysis. They’re engineers. These are brilliant people. This is thought over through in a big bureaucracy. … Authorities told you to do it. He told you to make it realistic. You’ve decided to do it. You’d decided to do it twice. Incentive-caused bias. If you pass, you save a lot of money. You’ve got to jump this hurdle before you can sell your new airliner.

Again, three, four, five of these things work together, and it turns human brains into mush. And maybe you think this doesn’t happen in picking investments. If so, you’re living in a different world than I am. Finally, the open-outcry auction. Well the open-outcry auction is just made to turn the brain into mush. You get social proof. The other guy is bidding. You get reciprocation tendency. You get deprival super-reaction syndrome. The thing is going away. I mean, it just absolutely is designed to manipulate people into idiotic behavior.

Finally, the institution of the board of directors of a major human, American company. Well, the top guy is sitting there. He’s an authority figure. He’s doing asinine things. You look around the board, nobody else is objecting. Social proof, it’s okay. Reciprocation tendency, he’s raising the director’s fees every year. He’s flying you around in the corporate airplane to look at interesting plants, or whatever in hell they do, and you go and you really get extreme dysfunction as a corrective decision-making body in the typical American board of directors. They only act, again the power of incentives, they only act when it gets so bad that it starts making them look foolish, or threatening legal liability to them. That’s Munger’s rule. I mean, there are occasional things that don’t follow Munger’s rule, but by and large the board of directors is a very ineffective corrector if the top guy is a little nuts, which, of course, frequently happens.

The second question. Isn’t this list of standard psychological tendencies improperly tautological compared with the system of Euclid? That is, aren’t there overlaps, and can’t some items on the list be derived from combinations of other items? The answer to that is, plainly, yes. Three. What good, in the practical world, is the thought system indicated by the list? Isn’t practical benefit prevented because these psychological tendencies are programmed into the human mind by broad evolution so we can’t get rid of them? Broad evolution, I mean the combination of genetic and cultural evolution, but mostly genetic. Well, the answer is the tendencies are partly good and, indeed, probably much more good than bad, otherwise they wouldn’t be there. By and large these rules of thumb, they work pretty well for man given his limited mental capacity, and that’s why they were programmed in by broad evolution.

At any rate, they can’t be simply washed out automatically and they shouldn’t be. Nonetheless, the psychological thought system described is very useful in spreading wisdom and good conduct when one understands it and uses it constructively. Here are some examples. Karl Braun’s communication practices. He designed oil refineries with spectacular skill and integrity. He had a very simple rule. Remember I said, “Why is important?” You got fired in the Braun company. You had to have five Ws. You had to tell who, what you wanted to do, where and when, and you had to tell him why. If you wrote a communication and left out the why, you got fired, because Braun knew it’s complicated building an oil refinery. It can blow up. All kinds of things happen, and he knew that his communication system worked better if you always told him why. That’s a simple discipline, and boy does it work.

Two, the use of simulators in pilot training. Here, again, abilities attenuate with disuse. Well, the simulator is God’s gift because you can keep them fresh. Three, the system of Alcoholics Anonymous. That’s certainly a constructive use of somebody understanding psychological tendencies. I think they just blundered into it, as a matter of fact, so you can regard it as kind of an evolutionary outcome. But, just because they blundered into it doesn’t mean you can’t invent its equivalent when you need it for a good purpose. Clinical training in medical schools. Here’s a profoundly correct way of understanding psychology. The standard practice is watch one, do one, teach one. Boy, does that pound in what you want pounded in. Again, the consistency and commitment tendency. That is a profoundly correct way to teach clinical medicine.

The rules of the U.S. Constitutional Convention, totally secret, no vote until the final vote, then just one vote on the whole Constitution. Very clever psychological rules, and if they had a different procedure, everybody would have been pushed into a corner by his own pronouncements and his own oratory and his own … and no recorded votes until the last one. And they got it through by a whisker with those wise rules. We wouldn’t have had the Constitution if our forefathers hadn’t been so psychologically acute, and look at the crowd we got now.

Six, the use of granny’s rule. I love this. One of the psychologists who works with the center gets paid a fortune running around America, and he teaches executives to manipulate themselves. Now granny’s rule is you don’t get the ice cream unless you eat your carrots. Well, granny was a very wise woman. That is a very good system. So this guy, a very eminent psychologist, he runs around the country telling executives to organize their day so they force themselves to do what’s unpleasant and important by doing that first, and then rewarding themselves with something they really like doing. He is profoundly correct.

Seven, the Harvard Business School’s emphasis on decision trees. When I was young and foolish, I used to laugh at the Harvard Business School. I said, “They’re teaching 28-year-old people that high school algebra works in real life?” We’re talking about elementary probability. But later, I wised up and I realized that it was very important that they do that, and better late than never. Eight, the use of post-mortems at Johnson & Johnson. At most corporations, if you make an acquisition and it works out to be a disaster, all the paperwork and presentations that caused the dumb acquisition to be made are quickly forgotten. You’ve got denial, you’ve got everything in the world. You’ve got Pavlovian association tendency. Nobody even wants to even be associated with the damned thing, or even mention it. At Johnson & Johnson, they make everybody revisit their old acquisitions and wade through the presentations. That is a very smart thing to do. By the way, I do the same thing routinely.

Nine, the great example of Charles Darwin is he avoided confirmation bias. Darwin probably changed my life because I’m a biography nut, and when I found out the way he always paid extra attention to the disconfirming evidence, and all these little psychological tricks, I also found out that he wasn’t very smart by the ordinary standards of human acuity, yet there he is buried in Westminster Abbey. That’s not where I’m going, I’ll tell you. And I said, “My God, here’s a guy that, by all objective evidence, is not nearly as smart as I am and he’s in Westminster Abbey? He must have tricks I should learn.” And I started wearing little hair shirts like Darwin to try and train myself out of these subconscious psychological tendencies that cause so many errors. It didn’t work perfectly, as you can tell from listening to this talk, but it would’ve been even worse if I hadn’t done what I did. And you can know these psychological tendencies and avoid being the patsy of all the people that are trying to manipulate you to your disadvantage, like Sam Walton. Sam Walton won’t let a purchasing agent take a handkerchief from a salesman. He knows how powerful the subconscious reciprocation tendency is. That is a profoundly correct way for Sam Walton to behave.

Then, there’s the Warren Buffett rule for open-outcry auctions: don’t go. We don’t go to the closed-bid auctions too because they … that’s a counter-productive way to do things ordinarily for a different reason, which Zeckhauser would understand. Four, what special knowledge problems lie buried in the thought system indicated by the list? Well, one is paradox. Now, we’re talking about a type of human wisdom that the more people learn about it, the more attenuated the wisdom gets. That’s an intrinsically paradoxical kind of wisdom. But, we have paradox in mathematics and we don’t give up mathematics. I say damn the paradox. This stuff is wonderfully useful.

By the way, the granny’s rule, when you apply it to yourself, is sort of a paradox in a paradox. The manipulation still works even though you know you’re doing it. I’ve seen that done by one person to another. I drew this beautiful woman as my dinner partner a few years ago, and I’d never seen her before. Well, she’s married to prominent Angelino. She sat down next to me, and she turned her beautiful face up and she said, “Charlie,” she said, “What one word accounts for your remarkable success in life?” Now, I knew I was being manipulated and that she’d done this before, and I just loved it. I never see this woman without a little lift in my spirits. By the way, I told her I was rational. You’ll have to judge yourself whether that’s true. I may be demonstrating some psychological tendency I hadn’t planned on demonstrating.

How should the best parts of psychology and economics interrelate in an enlightened economist’s mind? Two views. That’s the thermodynamics model. You know, you can’t derive thermodynamics from plutonium, gravity, and laws of mechanics, even though it’s a lot of little particles interacting. And here is this wonderful truth that you can sort of develop on your own, which is thermodynamics. Some economists, and I think Milton Friedman is in this group, but I may be wrong on that, sort of like the thermodynamics model. I think Milton Friedman, who has a Nobel prize, is probably a little wrong on that. I think the thermodynamics analogy is over-strained. I think knowledge from these different soft sciences have to be reconciled to eliminate conflict. After all, there’s nothing in thermodynamics that’s inconsistent with Newtonian mechanics and gravity, and I think that some of these economic theories are not totally consistent with other knowledge, and they have to be bent. And I think that these behavioral economics, or economists, are probably the ones that are bending them in the correct direction.

Now, my prediction is when the economists take a little psychology into account that the reconciliation will be quite endurable. Here, my model is the procession of the equinoxes. The world would be simpler for a long-term climatologist if the angle of the axis of the Earth’s rotation, compared to the plane of the Euclyptic, were absolutely fixed. But it isn’t fixed. Over every 40,000 years or so there’s this little wobble, and that has pronounced long-term effects. Well, in many cases, what psychology is going to add is just a little wobble, and it will be endurable. Here, I quote another hero of mine, who of course is Einstein, where he said, “The Lord is subtle, but not malicious.” And I don’t think it’s going to be that hard to bend economics a little to accommodate what’s right in psychology. The final question is if the thought system indicated by this list of psychological tendencies has great value not widely recognized and employed, what should the educational system do about it? I am not going to answer that one now. I like leaving a little mystery.

The post The Psychology of Human Misjudgment by Charlie Munger appeared first on The Big Picture.

Transcript: MiB: Stephen Cohen, BlackRock’s Chief Product Officer and Head of Global Product Solutions

 

 

The transcript from this week’s, MiB: Stephen Cohen, BlackRock’s Chief Product Officer and Head of Global Product Solutions, is below.

You can stream and download our full conversation, including any podcast extras, on Apple Podcasts, SpotifyYouTube, and Bloomberg. All of our earlier podcasts on your favorite pod hosts can be found here.

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This is Masters in Business with Barry Ritholtz on Bloomberg Radio

Barry Ritholtz: This week on the podcast. Another banger, Steve Cohen is BlackRock’s Chief Product Officer and Head of Product Solutions. BlackRock runs three and a half trillion dollars to the world’s largest asset manager. Their iShares ETF division is over $5 trillion. There are a few people in the world better situated to identify what is happening in the world of asset and wealth management than Steve Cohen. Not just fixed income, active index, bitcoin digital assets. They’re also moving into privates and alternatives. Whether that’s an ETF or just part of that platform is something else entirely. I, I thought this conversation was fascinating and I think you will also, with no further ado, BlackRock’s, chief Product Officer and head of Product Solutions, Stephen Cohen.

Stephen Cohen: It’s great to be here.

Barry Ritholtz: We’re gonna talk a lot about what you do at BlackRock and how the company has been growing, but I wanna start with your background degree in economics from Southampton College. Was the plan always to go into investment strategy or what were you thinking back then?

Stephen Cohen: I’m not sure I had a plan. I, I studied economics at school and then at university and I, I was always, I was always very interested in this kind of concept of the markets. I didn’t have any background, no family background in, in markets or investing, but I always found reading up about markets interesting. And, and what kind of got me in, it was a slight fluke. We were talking about flukes before the show. One of my neighbors was a telecoms engineer, and he used to go round to all the banks installing the dealer boards. And he, one day, and I was talking to him and he, one day.

Barry Ritholtz: Various ATMs, automatic tele machines, we call ’em here.

Stephen Cohen: The phone phone systems that, that you use on the trading floors, you know, that come with all  the hoot and holler and all that kind of stuff, I think meant

Barry Ritholtz: Those were the big, at ATM manufacturers way

Stephen Cohen: , they were. And, and he said, so I got talking about em and I mentioned this interest and he said, well, why don’t you do a day’s work experience with me? We’ll go to a bank. So we went to one of the banks, I can’t remember which one it was, and I walked onto this trading floor, you know, for someone who had no experience or never experienced this before, it was amazing. There was people shouting, there was screens and flashing numbers and stuff like that. And I thought, you know what? This, this looks pretty cool. This buzz was, was so the kind of combination of an opportunity to work in something that, that took economics and markets and the world, and then this kind of feeling of a buzzy environment, that was the thing. And so I applied to a number of banks and outta university got an opportunity to go to UBS.

Barry Ritholtz: So that was your first gig right? Outta school you were working with convertibles and fixed income and something similar at ING Barings. Yeah. Tell us about your, your work at UBS and ING. What, what sort of job was it?

Stephen Cohen: So I worked, I originally started in fixed income and, and then, and then went into convertible bonds. And a lot of what I spent my time doing was kind of more market strategist type of roles. So talking to clients about what was going on in the markets, what was going on in the bond markets, trade, I, you know, developing trade ideas for clients. And, and then that’s also how I got involved in spending quite a lot of time on the Japanese markets, which I found, you know, incredibly interesting and really got to understand kinda the Japanese culture and, and the, the way, the way the country operated. And

Barry Ritholtz: Is that what led you to Nomura? Or did Nomura come first and then the Japanese exposure that

Stephen Cohen:  Yeah, it, it did. So getting involved in Japan kind lent me to, to doing, to doing convertible bonds originally at ING and then with a group of us at Namur. And, and that’s where I spent a lot more time on the Japanese markets. And I think it’s all part of how you, you know, I think back to to those days, you know, Japan was very different to what it is kind of now the market, definitely the market at the time was about nine, the nicko was about 9,009, 10,000 given where?

Barry Ritholtz: Down from 39,000.

Stephen Cohen: Yeah. Now we’re back at 46,000. So there’s like a proper v shape of that market,

Barry Ritholtz: Right. Only took three and a half decades,

Stephen Cohen: Only took three and a half decades. And I, and I managed to do the middle bit, which was not necessarily the most exciting bit, I’ve gotta be honest. But I think, you know, again, it was a, what was interesting about it is you learn about kind of an, an economy and therefore a stock market that is in such a different place as it was then to, you know, looking at the US market or the European markets at the time.

Barry Ritholtz: So that raises a really interesting question. How do you think, how do you think about the 1990s, even the two thousands Euro nomura till 2011? How do you think about those decades versus today? It, that world doesn’t seem like it’s that long ago, but it really feels like it was so different.

Stephen Cohen: It feels incredibly different. I think for Japan it’s completely different. And you know, if you go back to, as you say, the late nineties, early two thousands, you know, the banking crisis that was part of the bubble and the collapse had still not been solved. And it was only really in the early, early to mid two thousands that they finally kind of got their arms around the banking system. And one thing you read about history, and unless you can get the banking system operating properly and lending, you really struggle to get an economy going. The second thing that’s really interesting I think is so different is back then you would, every six months, every year there would be a government led fiscal impulse. Right? And, you know, they used to call it the building the roads to nowhere. Right. You know, paving the entire country. Right. Just gotta kind of spend and spend and spend. And the reaction of the market to that was, this is gonna have no impact. The reaction now to fiscal spending is actually this is, you know, great, this is kind of part of the economy. The, the country kinda being back on its feet. You’re now talking about inflation being potentially an issue in Japan. Whereas there, it was all about deflation. So it’s quite amazing how it has turned around. And you’re seeing that in the bond market and just the yields.

Barry Ritholtz: One, one of the things I’m kind of fascinated about following the Japan, Japan bubble popping in 89 and how long it took to recover from that is the concept, and I’m apologies in advance from my mispronunciation of risu, which is the Japanese concept of these vertically integrated companies, manufacturing, retail, banking, like just every sector, if there’s a banking problem, the entire economy seems to run into trouble. ’cause that whole vertical Hmm. Sometimes it’s Mitsubishi, sometimes it’s whatever. Each of these entities are giant. And if the bank has a problem, wow, you’re really doing some damage.

Stephen Cohen: Yeah. ’cause I think if you look back to the history, and again, this is, this is changing and, and, and different to the way we’d think about kinda western markets and companies, but Japan, historically it was a bank lending market. You, you got financing through bank lending, all the stock market. And so banks were just so central to the way the economy operated. And you see parallels to that in Europe, a little bit less here in the US it’s very different now. You know, there’s the, there’s the banking sector, which is obviously very critical to the way companies and financing. But you have this huge kind of private sector. You have private lending, direct lending, things like that. So again, it’s good. I think one of the things I’ve learned over my career and had the opportunity to work in different markets is you start to see these, the way these economies operate is different and therefore the, the impact on the markets and therefore investors is very, very different.

Barry Ritholtz: So you stay at Mura till 2011. How did you, what brought you from Mura to BlackRock?

Stephen Cohen: I had an opportunity, you know, having had a lot of great experiences. You know, 2011 BlackRock was probably 18 months into the integration of the iShares business or the, the indexing business. And really focused on how do we expand this business, particularly how do we expand iShares this, you know, this ETF business. And back in 2011, Europe European ETFs was still a very nascent industry. You know, now it’s like a two and a half trillion dollar industry. I, European iShares is over a trillion dollars. Back then it was very much still the very early days. And you could see what is, what was happening in the states. And so when I was speaking to BlackRock, you could see this really interesting opportunity to, to kind of take all of what I’d done before in terms of the market’s kinda background and the breadth of experience, and then apply it to this thing that was still pretty new.

And the kind of mission was how do you educate people about what an ETF is? How do you help people start to think about how to use an ETF in a portfolio? And by the way, also, what are the ETFs that don’t exist yet that could exist? And again, you always have to, it’s quite hard. You always have to cast a, you know, Barry, you always have to cast your mind back to what it was then versus your perspective of where you are today. It was still fairly, you know, plain vanilla

Barry Ritholtz: So go back to the 1990s, Im pretty sure the Qs were around then, and SPY might’ve been around, but this is before really iShares was still part of Barclays. But no one really thought that ETFs were a giant market waiting to take place, or I should say very few people thought that the ones who did ended up being at the head of a giant wave. What made you realize 15 years ago that, hey, this iShares thing is gonna be big one day?

Stephen Cohen: Honestly, it was talking to the people in iShares. It was having kind of been introduced to them and having been approached to, to go and talk to them. It was, I learned a lot from just sitting down and, and understanding this. I’d sat in banks, we traded ETFs. They were, to be honest, a very, very small component of what we, of what we did. It was only really when I spoke to the people at iShares and the BlackRock and understood the history of how iShares had grown and where it was then. And the, that sense of mission, that sense of kind of the purpose of giving more access to investing to, to people, you know, and creating more transparency that they had lived as they grow in the US business. And they were growing the European business. And that kind of just captured you. And I think frankly in the last 15 years I’ve seen that and been fortunately been part of kind of driving that. But it was very clear that there was a big opportunity to do something different in an industry, an asset management industry that hadn’t really been shaken up. And I think one thing that ETFs have done, and iShares has led this is really shaken up the industry on behalf of end investors in a couple of ways.

Barry Ritholtz: At at the very least they’re very low cost. And it’s raised questions about our do most, not all, but do most active managers actually justify their fees relative to their performance. And then second, helping to move a lot of mom and pop investors, at least having a core as passive indexing as opposed to an allocation that’s nothing but active managers. I mean, iShares has been the biggest driver of that. When you started at BlackRock, what was, what was the first job?

Stephen Cohen: So I started in the iShares business and I actually set up an investment strategy team. And what we did was go out and talk to clients about what was going on in markets. You know, we were part of BlackRock, now I shares was part of BlackRock. And so there’s, you know, a huge pedigree of investing and how do you take that externally to, to our clients and educate them about how ETFs could be used to implement these ideas, build portfolios. I have to say in the early days, a lot of it was just educating people on what, what is an ETF? Like how does it actually work? How, how, what is a creation? What is a redemption? And what do I need to understand and know? Secondly, how do I then think about putting them in a, in a portfolio? And what’s interesting, I remember a couple of years in probably this probably 18 minutes, months into my time at BlackRock, we did a big study on how do you blend active and indexing. And we were very allergic to the word passive, right? Like, because you know, we used to go out and say to people, which we still do, you know, every decision you make is active, right? That’s right.

Barry Ritholtz: If you market cap weighted, I mean, it could have, it’s a decision been equal cap.

Stephen Cohen: Totally. You know, investing in US equities is a decision, it’s an active decision. Then deciding to use an ETF is an active decision. So we would, you know, we would talk to clients about, and what does it mean to use an ETF? How does it fit with, with active management? Which again, go back to, I think it’s pretty well accepted now. I think BlackRock has, and the ETF industry has played a big, big role in this, but the concept of blending, indexing and active managers and alpha in one portfolio is that’s, that’s kind of very accepted. People gonna get that. It’s pretty standard. It wasn’t back then 10, 14 years ago. And in some respects it was slightly religious in terms of indexing or like, you are either passive or you’re active.

Barry Ritholtz: I recall the phrase that was used in the two thousands core and satellite; And, and you don’t hear that all that much anymore. Now it’s, you have a passive core and you’re, you’re decorating it with active choices around it.

Stephen Cohen: Yeah. It’s kinda how do you get the best out of, out of everything. How, how do you say, you know what, actually, here’s an area where I think that we can deliver alpha, which is really what you’re, when you say active, what you’re really saying is like alpha something, alpha something, something beyond the index. And I come back to a point you made earlier, Barry, about how the industry shifted. I think what ETFs did is they sh shone a light on what is, what is performance, right? And you know, if you can get the index through an etf, it’s very efficient. Then as an active manager, you’ve gotta deliver something more. And many, many active managers of BlackRock do deliver more. But I think that that element of the more became a very important component of the industry and component of how for many investors, they could then blend these, these different tools together to create better portfolios. And I think that’s the journey to me in the last kind of 12, you know, 12, 14 years. It’s been so exciting.

Barry Ritholtz: You said when you began, you went out and spoke to a variety of BlackRock clients. Were these mom and pop investors, were these institutional clients? Were they brokers and RIAs that are investing in ETFs on behalf of their clients? Who were the folks that you first reached out to? It

Stephen Cohen: Was pretty broad actually. It, it tended to be wealth managers and it tended to be institutional investors, which would be, you know, primarily pension funds. But what’s interesting is how that has, how that’s expanded over the last, again, the last kind of decade. You know, if I look at, if I look at the breadth of users now is anything from central banks through to, you know, retail investors in 401k plans or the equivalent in Europe. And I think that’s been one of the secrets to the, to, to why ETFs have grown so quickly is that they actually are very much a product or a tool for anybody and everybody. So it started very much with I would say kind of wealth manages and pension funds. But it grew out and out and out and frankly in Europe we learned a lot from the way the US industry had had grown. We talk all, all the time about how the European ETF industry is probably about 10 years behind the us And so there’s a bit of a roadmap there. And you know, I think we’re seeing that happen in real time.

Barry Ritholtz:  When I over at Europe and, and so especially the UK, it seems like index adoption has been very slow. People haven’t quite bought into the concept of, hey, before you go after alpha, at least start with beta. That hasn’t really found a lot of traction there yet. Or are you seeing that start to change in Europe?

Stephen Cohen: We’ve seen that change. It’s definitely behind the US but it is definitely happening. And I think the same forces and drivers that we’ve seen in the US are very much applicable to Europe and ultimately will be to Asia as well, which I think will go on that kind of same journey. So I think it’s just more of a matter of time or timing as to where we are now versus versus versus the US And there are different country dynamics that everywhere in the world play into why different parts of the industry, you know, move quicker or or slower. But I think the direction’s definitely the same.

Barry Ritholtz: Different regulatory regimes, different tax treatment technology. Is the technology really all that different? You would think that adoption maybe some countries on a lag but not 10 years.

Stephen Cohen: Yeah, I think it’s just, so I, I think the last 10 years in the US if we are today in somewhere like Europe, in the ETF industry where the US was 10 years ago, I think the next 10 years in Europe will be faster than the last 10 years in the us. Makes sense. Yeah, it’s ’cause I think that partly because there is a, there is a roadmap that the US has created, it’s different ’cause of regulation, all the things that you, that you mentioned, but I think that everything is happening so much faster now and, and you’re seeing that in ETFs, you’re seeing that in other parts of the industry as well.

Barry Ritholtz: So let’s talk a little bit about what you’ve been doing at BlackRock for almost the past 15 years. You begin in 2011, the growth must have been explosive. What was that like watching this rocket ship take off?

Stephen Cohen: It’s been fantastic. It’s been an amazing experience. You know, the firm has grown so quickly in the last 10, 15 years and not just grown in terms of assets, which is obviously one way to measure growth, but also just the breadth of what BlackRock does for our clients and the breadth of the number of clients that we talk to. What’s, I think, so for, for someone like me, what what’s so been so great is the ability to be involved in lots of different parts of the firm. And, you know, whether that was, again, growing the European iShares business, whether that was running fixed income iShares, which was a fantastic opportunity and time in, or moment in time I should say, in terms of really not just growing fixed income ETFs, but changing the bond market and the impact we’ve had there to now where, again, the breadth of the company with private markets and things like that. So it has been a, a great journey to be on personally, but also to see it from the inside.

Barry Ritholtz: Can you explain what a chief product officer does at a large asset manager? It’s sort of an unusual title in the world of investing.

Stephen Cohen: Yeah, so there are a number of things that, that I look at and my, my team look at. One is how do we continue to make sure that our product range is at the forefront of innovation in terms of where the industry is going. How do we make sure that what our clients are looking for with delivering in whatever format they’re looking at. And I think one of the biggest shifts that we’ve seen in the industry, we talked before about kind of how you blend active indexing kind of together, how that’s become more commonplace and kind of more, more accepted. I think the other thing that is happening is that the way all of our clients are, you know, consuming investments or accessing markets is also shifting. So this concept that, you know, pretty much for the whole time that we were growing the iShares business, when we talked about growing ETFs, we were really talking about, we, we were also talking about growing indexing.

00:21:29 That was very synonymous, right? When you talk about growing ETFs, now you’re not just talking about growing indexing, you’re talking about lots of different things, active ETFs, digital assets. And so I think this concept of how we ensure that as we look across all of the investment capabilities we have as a firm that we want to bring to our clients, that we’re delivering them in a way that works for our clients, that requires us to think a little bit differently to, to the way we’ve had to in the past and the way I think the way the industry has. And so that’s why we’ve brought all this together in, into my role and my, my group. And that includes driving the iShares business and, and the growth of ETFs, making ETFs more central to, to what we do in the firm, but also looking across all of our liquid active business, our private markets businesses with our investment teams and those business leads to, to ensure that our product range, you know, works for our clients. And then helping them, helping our clients actually get the best out of what we have. I started an investment strategy. We spent a lot of time talking to clients about what’s going on in markets, how to build better portfolios, how to get the best out of the tools that they have that we need to build. And then what’s next? What’s, what’s the next trend or theme that’s that’s on people’s minds.

00:22:47 [Speaker Changed] So, so I’m hearing two approaches. One is a top down, Hey, what’s going on in the world? What’s out there that’s interesting that perhaps we’re not addressing and a bottoms up. What are clients asking for? What do they think they want? What do we think they need? What, what’s the key driver of, of new offerings? We could talk a little bit about ibit, which is a unicorn. The, the Bitcoin ETF approaching a hundred billion dollars in assets. I think it could be the fastest ETF to a hundred billion dollars. I don’t even know what’s, what’s close maybe GLD, but that, that was a long time ago. How, how do you think about coming up with new products? How much of it is driven by client demand? And how much of it is driven by just looking from the top down and saying, here’s a hole that we really should fill.

00:23:45 [Speaker Changed] It’s a, it’s a real mixture. It is, you know, we’ll have a, a lot of ideas, we’ll have a lot of ideas that are driven by investment views we have as a firm by our investment teams by working with other people in the industry. And we will combine that with what we’re hearing from clients and where clients are, you know, we we’re engaging with clients all the time around, you know, their portfolios and seeing where are there kind of gaps in a portfolio or where are there, sometimes it’s, sometimes there are investment opportunities, but there isn’t a way to get to it. Again, come back to what ETFs have done. Like how do you give that access to, to something that was new. If you think about Ibit, you know, Bitcoin obviously had grown already to a pretty sizable kind of industry.

00:24:37 [Speaker Changed] I think when Ibit launched, Bitcoin was a little over a trillion dollars, something like that. Roughly

00:24:42 [Speaker Changed] That, yeah. Yeah. And, and so there was a sizable kinda industry already out there, but for many clients or many potential investors, the ease, the comfort, the knowledge understanding of of an ETF wrapper was a great way of allowing them to buy into crypto Bitcoin in this case and make it again, potentially a bigger part of the portfolio. What’s interesting is the number of, you know, in, in that explosive growth that Ibit has had, the number of buyers, investors of Ibit who were already holders of Bitcoin in, you know, other forms was quite notable. And so I think it kind of tests to this idea of actually how do you access different markets sometimes in quite traditional ways and how do you bridge between this kind of traditional world and this decentralized world? And you’re seeing the same thing with ether as well with our ether fund.

00:25:42 [Speaker Changed] So, you know, the, the classic Bitcoin issue is, wait, I have to make sure that this drive doesn’t get damaged. I have to keep in the safe. What’s my password? Hey, this is a lot of money and it’s a bigger pain in the neck to keep track of then the rest of my assets. I can own this in an ETF. Why do I ever wanna own Bitcoin directly? Seems to be what a lot of people are saying. And

00:26:06 [Speaker Changed] That, and that’s what we heard over and over again. Both again from people who had held or hold Bitcoin in digital wallets and felt that this was a kind of a, an easier, better way to hold it.

00:26:19 [Speaker Changed] Especially when you read the numbers. 25% of all coins ever mined. It might even be 30% have been lost. Either the drives were damaged or the passwords were lost, which is,

00:26:29 [Speaker Changed] There’s some great stories out there. Crazy

00:26:31 [Speaker Changed] Guy who went out and bought a landfill ’cause he’s,

00:26:33 [Speaker Changed] Because he was trying to find the

00:26:35 [Speaker Changed] Of $200 million worth of Bitcoin on the drive that was accidentally Yeah. Thrown away. I mean,

00:26:40 [Speaker Changed] So, you know, putting in an I share probably would’ve been a, an at least an easier way of of right of owning a landfill. It,

00:26:49 [Speaker Changed] It’s, it’s kind of amazing, but it raises a question that I’ve been thinking about for a while. Alternatives and privates, whether it’s private equity, private debt, private infrastructure and real assets are probably the fastest growing segment of the market. Are we ever gonna see something like that in an ETF wrapper, an illiquid alt in an ETF,

00:27:17 [Speaker Changed] Possibly? Look, it’s definitely something that a lot of people are looking at, including ourselves. But there are a lot of ways to, I think the biggest story I think people jump towards the kind of private markets and ETFs and the real story is how do you open up access appropriately for more people to access private markets as part of the portfolio. So if we think about a world which we believe in which you are kinda moving from, call it 60 40, you know, the traditional right portfolio to more of a 50, 30, 20 where 20 is private markets and that’s applicable to somebody who owns a defined benefit scheme. In fact, they’ve got that already probably more through the, the way the scheme’s managed. But actually if you then apply that to say to other pension types, like a defined contribution scheme or a wealth investor, that kind of journey towards incorporating more private markets into a portfolio for all of the diversification reasons that, you know, we’ve talked about a lot that how that happens is, is the real work and that may end up requiring an ETF, but I think there are lots of other ways that, you know, that can open up the door to private markets being a bigger part.

00:28:26 Either either a completely new part or, or a bigger part of a portfolio for, you know, an individual retiree or an individual investor. Again, it comes back to what we were saying earlier on about rather than thinking about different product types, an ETF or a mutual fund being associated with one type of strategy, it’s actually saying what are the strategies that we believe would help a client, an investor have a better portfolio for whatever their goals are? And then how do you best put that together?

00:28:58 [Speaker Changed] So it’s less and what unique, less about the product? More about the solution to the, to

00:29:02 [Speaker Changed] Me it’s about the portfolio. Yeah. What, what’s the solution exactly, what are you trying to achieve and what, you know, and if it’s a, you know, long term retirement or retirement income, whatever, whatever it is. And then what does the portfolio need to look like or should look like and how does it evolve over time? And then how do you do it right? And what are the kind of mixture of tools that are most, most appropriate to, to get you there. So that’s the shift in thinking that I think

00:29:24 [Speaker Changed] People, so let’s dive into that a little bit. You know, the advantage of stocks, bonds, convertibles. Hmm. They all come with a CUSIP number. It’s pretty standard in terms of the custodianship, where, where it’s held, what sort of public information is a about available, the due diligence you can do about it, how to get liquid. When you want to get liquid, all those stocks, bonds, and, and put convertibles as sort of a hybrid. Everybody knows how to operate around that. It seems like when we look at privates, they’re all one-offs. The custodian ships are all a single thing. Doing the due diligence is time consuming and expensive. They’re, the hope is they’re, they’re not correlated and you’re giving up liquidity in exchange for the illiquidity premium. Can that ever be standardized enough that as a wealth manager, I could say, Hey Steven, I wanna move 10, 20% of these clients’ assets to a diversified set of equity debt Yeah. And real assets and I want some liquidity. Like is this a pipe dream? Oh, and I don’t want any K ones ’cause they’re a disaster to deal with. Like, if that were something that was turnkey and available, I would think that every wealth manager in America would rush in that direction. How long might it be before privates look something like public markets, or at least the pain points are, are reduced to Yeah. Something tolerable.

00:31:04 [Speaker Changed] I think we’re on a, we’re on a journey and I think that that is about, first of all, developing investment strategies and therefore, and being able to put them in products that work for a wealth manager. Secondly, there’s a big, you know, the operational lift, right? The, the technology development that is happening. And we’re working, we’re working with a number of firms around how can we make sure that, for example, model portfolios can incorporate private markets in a more efficient, kind of easier to use way. It’s gonna be different to public markets, it should be different to public markets because I think the role of a, of a infrastructure, for example, in a, in a, in a portfolio is different to the role of owning stocks or owning bonds. And I think that part of, you know, part of the way we’ve always thought about the role of stocks and bonds as being different as well, you know, bonds as a ballast to a portfolio, stocks as a growth driver for example. I think you’ve gotta

00:31:58 [Speaker Changed] Think about that. I’m enough when bonds actually generated attractive yields.

00:32:03 [Speaker Changed] Maybe that’ll come back, you know, we might need a bit of inflation, but yeah, one day, one day, Barry, will we be back on the podcast too? Absolutely. To cover that off. But I, I think that different role is very important, but there’s a lot of development to that is happening to be able to make that more efficient than it has been historically. And I think that’s, I think we will see a lot of change in the next couple of years.

00:32:27 [Speaker Changed] You, you mentioned technology, let, let’s dive a little deeper into that. BlackRock acquired pre Quinn and acquired E Front and I’m read about some integration into your Aladdin platform. How significant are those tools when it comes to offering private market investments to the public?

00:32:49 [Speaker Changed] Incredibly important. I think that, you know, for anybody who is for a wealth manager who is running a portfolio for a, for a client, the, it’s not just as, you know, it’s not just about buying the different products or doing the asset allocation, it’s also about the risk management of, of what does that portfolio look like? And that’s really what Aladdin is about. And as more and more investors, whether that is a retail investor or wealth wealth investor, or whether that’s a big pension fund, incorporate private markets into portfolios and blend private and public. And, and I think again, if you go back over that 10 15 year journey, we started with indexing on one side of the floor and you know, active on the other side. And we gradually brought those together and that became commonplace to blend. And I think we’re now in that world of starting to blend public markets and private markets, which historically were completely distinct and we’re starting to kinda blend, blend those because, because the industries are crossing over more companies are staying private for longer, et cetera, et cetera.

00:33:52 So as we bring those together, the need to be able to, you know, risk manage and understand those portfolios in different scenarios is incredibly important. That’s what Aladdin is about. With Preco, what is so exciting is that I think over time the private markets will become more transparent. There will be more data available and around and very similar to what, what Aladdin and BlackRock did with public markets will happen in the private markets as well. And that I think will help more and more investors access private markets in the way and understand what it is that, that they have partly of which is again, understanding the different liquidity and, and being comfortable that they’re different for a reason. And you’re not trying to create a one size fit fits all. You’re trying to create a portfolio that delivers the right, the right outcomes. Aladin I think is gonna be critical for that. So

00:34:45 [Speaker Changed] Let’s talk a little bit about product development. Just in the ETF space this year, over a thousand new ETFs have come out, or at least we’re on pace to do that by the end of this year. This sort of hyper development of ETFs, it, everything we’ve talked about seems to be very thoughtful and very measured with a, a really specific approach. Kind of feels like the rest of the industry is just throwing stuff up against the wall to see what sticks, how, how do you look at this?

00:35:18 [Speaker Changed] We can only focus on what we do, so,

00:35:20 [Speaker Changed] But you have to be aware of what you see, but you

00:35:22 [Speaker Changed] Are aware of what’s going on a hundred percent,

00:35:24 [Speaker Changed] Three x inverse bitcoin. Like what, why, why do I want that? Or why does anyone want that?

00:35:31 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, you’ll have to ask them.

00:35:33 [Speaker Changed] I mean I guess it’s, they want to give people an opportunity to make any type of trade and every type of trade. I’m assuming that’s not your approach.

00:35:43 [Speaker Changed] I think there is a lot out there of throwing things out that sticks. Our approach is very much where do we believe that we can develop products, strategies, exposures that are gonna help create better portfolios, right? And if you look at the evolution of the ETF industry and what’s happened is it started, you know, go back 30, 30 plus 20 years ago. It started very much with how do you give access to kind of broad indices and then it was how do you inequities then how do you give access to more granular exposure like sectors or different countries? Then it was how do you move into different asset classes, like fixed income for example. And then more recently it’s been something like digital assets with, with ibit and that’s really been the journey of iisha s right? And I think that’s been therefore the journey of the industry as we’ve, as we’ve led it that I remains very much our view how we think about continuing to expand the iShares platform.

00:36:42 And that includes now using the ETF technology we’ve built to take things like active funds and wrap them into an ETF because the ETF is a more efficient way for many investors to actually own those different strategies. But again, it ha it starts with the strategy and I think that, you know, for us it’s about how do you, what, what is it that you are developing in terms of an exposure or strategy? Why, how does it fit with the world that we see today in terms of where we think the world is going from a market standpoint and a macro standpoint, how does it fit in terms of kind of a portfolio construction standpoint? You’re gonna have waves of innovation. Right now we’re having huge wave of, of of ETF launches and in particular the last two, three years, you know, the ETF is, it’s, it’s gone from being kind of very much on the side of the industry to being very central. We’re excited about that. You know, that’s what we were, that’s what we’ve built at BlackRock and iShares. But it’s also meant that ETFs are very much kinda being used more broadly and you know, that’s gonna be I think part of how the industry evolves. And then you kinda matures,

00:37:45 [Speaker Changed] Especially on the active side where you get all the benefits of mutual ownership without the capital gains penalty that you get in mutual funds. So it makes sense that a lot of active ETFs would develop where they might’ve been active mutual funds. Yeah. What else do you see as changing or in the midst of, of transforming is, is it by asset class? Is it by, you mentioned geography or sector, what is really in flux these days?

00:38:19 [Speaker Changed] So I think that, you know, when you look at, I’ll give you a couple of good examples. So digital assets I think is kind of fairly early days. Ibit is incredibly fast growing. It was the fastest to 20 to 30 to 40 to 50, and now hopefully to a hundred billion as an ETF. And we, you know, we have an Ethereum ETF there. I think there will be more product development in something like that. And again, for us that’s about bridging this kind of defi world with the traditional kind of finance world. That’s one area. The second area is take something like fixed income. You know, we’ve been building out fixed income ETF industry for 20 years. The industry is now two and a half-ish trillion dollars. We think it’s gonna be 6 trillion by kind of 2030. The growth is huge. Less than 2% of bonds in the world are in an ETF. Wow. So it feels, and having been, I can tell you having been on the journey and, and and been out there, you know, kind of pounding the streets on the, the value of fixed income ETFs over the years, it feels like this has become really, really big. And it has, and yet when you think it in the context of the $140 trillion of fixed income out there, you know, ETFs are still a pretty tiny part of the, the market in terms of how people own bonds.

00:39:39 [Speaker Changed] It’s, it’s relatively large compared to what it was, but in absolute terms. But

00:39:43 [Speaker Changed] In absolute terms, they still, you know, we’re still to use in and out the, the, the sports terminology of given it’s the World series, you know, the first inning, maybe the second inning. And then even if you look at e what’s really fascinating is you, if you look at, and we talked about active active ETFs, and again, that’s still very early stages,

00:40:01 [Speaker Changed] But on fixed, fixed income, they actually seem to do very like the broad, the Bloomberg Ag includes everything good, bad, and different. It seems like it’s relatively easy to capture a little bit of fixed income alpha with a handful of screens. You’re taking out the, the lowest credit quality or you’re taking out the riskiest credit that you’re not getting compensated for. Why does fixed income active seem like it’s a better bet or a higher probability bet than active equity?

00:40:37 [Speaker Changed] I think the historically fixed income, I’ll go back to when I started, was very much a, a world of limited transparency and, and kind of understanding, frankly, I think the understanding for most investors of fixed income relative to, I don’t mean, I don’t mean investors who are doing fixed income all, all every day, but for, for most retail investors in particular, I think people have a much more natural affinity to stocks than they do for bonds in terms of kind of the understanding. Bonds feel complicated at times. It feels like an in, it’s a world we don’t quite understand. Whereas equities, you kind of, you, you know, you know, Google or what, what or whatever it is. And so I think there’s always been a a, a sense of kind of outsourcing those decisions kind of more. So. The other thing is that the, the indices, the indexing market in fixed income has been slower to evolve. So you mentioned the ag and people tend to, when they think about fixed income indexing, they automatically go to the ag. Sure, the ag is one index and it’s a very specific index in terms of what it is. It doesn’t have a huge amount of credit in it, for example. But there are

00:41:43 Other indices with Bloomberg for which we have products like Universal that actually are much more representative of fixed income. So part of it also is, is, you know, what are you benchmarking yourself against? And I think we went through that experience with equities and we are going to go through that, or we are going through that experience with, with fixed income. And the other thing we’re seeing with fixed income is that we’re developing and building the more granular strategies in fixed income. So we’re carving up the market in fixed income the way we did in equities through ETFs. So if you want to own zero to three year government bonds own escar, if you want to own long-term treasuries own TLT, if you want to own bits of the cr, different types of credit crossover, you can now do that through ETFs. So, you know, it is an amazing tool.

00:42:29 And what’s fascinating about fixed income ETFs is that some of the fastest growing users are asset managers. So fixed income managers using ETFs as a way to be better at their job. And I think, again, that’s that blending of, of, of indexing. But even in the equity world, you know, equity indices are evolving. We, we were saying if you look back to 2000, you know, the top seven, you know, the whole kinda s and p was worth the equivalent to what the top seven stocks were worth, you know, six months ago. And so you mentioned earlier in the program equal weight s and p we’re seeing a lot of demand right now for things like equal weight or cap indices. We launched a top 20 fund. Top t we did the same thing with nasdaq. You know, even the s and p 500, owning the top 20 stocks versus owning the 500 stocks is a very, very, very different game. And so even something like large cap US equities, you, which you would’ve thought there was nothing else to innovate in, even that has been the area where we’ve probably done more in the last six months than than many other areas because the dynamics of of the US equity market have shifted so much in the last couple of years and, and investors are looking for different things

00:43:43 [Speaker Changed] Coming up. We continue our conversation with Steve Cohen, BlackRock’s Chief Product Officer and head of Global Product Solutions, discussing what goes into product development in finance. I’m Barry Ritholtz, you’re listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. I am Barry Ritholtz. You are listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week is Steve Cohen. He’s BlackRock’s Chief Product Officer and head of Global Product Solutions. He also sits on BlackRock’s global executive committee. Since, since we’ve been talking about technology and you mentioned the top seven I I I’m legally obligated to ask a question about artificial intelligence and ai. What is AI doing to your business of developing new products? How we thinking about either AI as an asset class or actually deploying AI to help build new products?

00:44:55 [Speaker Changed] I think we’re seeing AI in probably three areas. I, the, the first one is obviously AI as an investment theme, which is very well kind of publicized, et cetera. And we’re seeing that through things like data centers, obviously stocks, credit, et cetera. The second one is AI in terms of investment strategy. For example, BlackRock, we’re very fortunate to have a systematic group investment group that is, has a 40 year track record in history of delivering really great performance. And you know, they would argue they were doing AI well before it was called ai when it was called machine learning or whatever it was called before

00:45:38 [Speaker Changed] That. It’s been around, most people think it’s new thing, you know, it’s been around a while. Watson played Jeopardy and I forgot the one, was it Deep Blue played chess

00:45:47 [Speaker Changed] And go,

00:45:48 [Speaker Changed] Those were 30 years ago.

00:45:50 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. So, you know, it’s gone through its iterations and, and so, you know, and they’ve got some fantastic examples of the way they’ve used machine learning stroke now AI, to really understand, you know, every single day they will pass thousands of reports, earnings calls, et cetera, transcripts for for Right, for sentiment. And it, and, and you know, and the result, the investment results of those, of those signals that they create are, are really quite, quite fascinating and, and very lucrative in terms of investment alpha. And so we’re really seeing a huge demand right now for systematic investing. And this is something that historically people were nervous about because it was a black box, they didn’t understand it. And now people are using things like chat, GPT, et cetera, which is a black box, but they’re seeing the value they’re getting. And so what’s interesting is there’s a psychological shift and a greater acceptance of saying actually systematic investing using ai.

00:46:53 That’s really interesting and exciting and we’re so, so I think the second thing is we’re seeing it through using AI to be better investors. And then the third one is product development. And so how can we use the data that we are able to collect and effectively deploy big data and the AI that that we’ve developed in-house that sits on that to identify what are some of those themes that are coming up? What are some of the things that clients are talking about or being picked up in the, in the news or, or, or whatever it is. And be more kind of systematic, I would say, in being able to see what those those are. And also we are able to use it to test and stress test strategies that are new in different market environments. So it’s a really, again, it’s a really exciting time for, for product development because it’s giving us new tools that we didn’t have before.

00:47:45 [Speaker Changed] So, so BlackRock tends to come out with these very well thought out very rational products. And the question that, that I’ve been thinking about when I first started doing my homework for this is, what are some of the crazy ideas that you looked at and said, yeah, no, that’s just a bridge too far. Like what hasn’t come out? ’cause it was just too, either not solving a problem or, or just too wild and and reckless. Oh

00:48:13 [Speaker Changed] There’s a whole treasure trove of Oh really? Yeah, we could do another podcast, I’m sure. But you know, typically what’s interesting about it is there are two reasons why you might end up like that. One is it’s, it’s a crazy idea, but there’s just really no demand for it. Okay. And, and it for for well

00:48:32 [Speaker Changed] That’s an easy business

00:48:33 [Speaker Changed] Decision, which is an easy business decision, right? The second time. Often it’s, you’re just too early and, you know, I mean there

00:48:39 [Speaker Changed] Could have been an ETF for E and Bitcoin 10 years ago if the SEC would’ve allowed it. If

00:48:46 [Speaker Changed] They were allowed. Yeah. Yeah. So sometimes it’s the regulatory, you know, it could be, it could be that the industry, the industry in the broad sense of the word regulators or what whatever aren’t quite ready, you are not, you’re not able to actually build the thing that you’ve got an idea for. It could be that the market is not quite ready. Fixed income ETFs is a good example. We looked at things 10 years ago and decided that actually that the, that the fixed income market wasn’t ready. We weren’t quite ready to be able to do that in an ETFA decade on. And by the way, we launched a bunch of those as well, right? Knowing that it would take a long time. We didn’t expect to launch it and it’d be a, it would take off straight away knowing that it would take time for the, for the kinda market to get there. But we were comfortable we could manage that fund. And so often you end up in a situation where you’re kind of waiting for maybe the liquidity of the market to be, to be broad enough that an ETF works. So you know it’s gonna work in the future. It’s just a little bit early now, so it’ll come with different reasons why that may be the case.

00:49:46 [Speaker Changed] So, so that raises the question, what’s next on the product roadmap? So we’ve, we’ve talked about digital and, and crypto, we’ve talked about fixed income. Mm. And we’ve also talked about privates. What are you seeing as the next 10 years?

00:50:01 [Speaker Changed] It’s really across the whole waterfront of what you just said. I mean obviously with, with HPS and GIP with our new partners, there’s a lot of opportunity we believe to develop in the private credit and the infrastructure space and also the crossover of, of those kind of areas. I think this, this crossover of public and private markets and what does that look like in, in portfolios, whether that’s within a fund or in a, in a portfolio. I, I think is gonna be a big and very interesting theme. And, and the third area I think is we, you know, we constantly, obviously we’re, we we’re always working with our, our active portfolio managers to, to develop better strategies and, and new ideas they have. But we are always, always looking back as well. ’cause I think you can fall into the trap of thinking you’ve done it.

00:50:49 And I mentioned the example of, you know, US large cap equities and indexing and what, why would you ever look at that as an innovation area? Well, ’cause the, these markets keep changing and I think the world we’re, the world we’re in right now and a good example of the last six months, the number of clients around the world, particularly outside the US who are questioning their US dollar exposure is pretty significant. And what does that mean for time? Look at the move in gold. Suddenly that is, you know, the 4,000. Yeah. And so, you know, you see, you have to, I think you have to be willing to question the environment, the macro, the market environment and say actually what does that mean for, for things that we kind of thought we’d done. And I think that creates a lot of opportunity for our, for our clients to, to reinnovate things.

00:51:34 [Speaker Changed] So before I get to my favorite questions, I have one last broad question for you. What do you think investors and clients are not thinking about, talking about overlooking, but perhaps should be aware of? It could be an asset, a geography, a data point of policy. What is below the radar that really should be front and center?

00:52:00 [Speaker Changed] I think there are things that are kind of half on and half off the radar. Like, you know, the impact of what’s happening in demographics and immigration and changes like that and what does that mean for, for inflation, for the different types of income streams that people are going to need is something that’s, it’s kind of talked about but always slightly in the background. I think that’s gonna come more and more to the fore. We, it ties into the fiscal policy kind of, which is very much kind of talked about. I think that’s one thing. I think the second thing is we’re still, we’re still living through a lot of the post COVID impact and you know, we don’t, co COVID is kind of done and we would, it feels like it was many, many years ago, but there are a lot of industries and luxury is a good example, which is still being impacted by what happened then both in terms of the lockdown and then the immediate kind of boom that happened afterwards. There are still a lot of things that are still trying to work their way through the, through the system as it were. And that tends to be something I think people have kind of forgotten. But from an investing standpoint is actually pretty important.

00:53:03 [Speaker Changed] I I completely agree with you. It’s funny, we were just having a conversation the other day about housing and someone asked why are we have such a shortfall of single family homes in the United States? Hmm. Not even talking about affordability of homes. Yeah. Just sheer number. And the answer was that’s a hangover from the financial crisis 15, 16 years ago following that boom and bust a lot of builders shifted over, pivoted over to multifamily houses and apartment buildings. Right. Not single family. So it’s 15 years ago. Yeah. And we’re still still suffering the effects of it. Yeah. It’s, it’s amazing how, how long a tail some of these things happen. It takes a long time. I I don’t have you all day. I know you have a flight to catch tomorrow, so I have to get you out here at a decent hour. Let, let’s run through some of our favorite questions, starting with, tell us about your mentors who helped shape your career.

00:54:00 [Speaker Changed] So I’ve, I think I’ve been very lucky. I’ve, I’ve in, in each stage of my career, I’ve always had I think somebody who has been, whether a manager or a mentor, but, but really helped me think through and frankly just supported me in my career. I think two particularly jump out. One is the person who actually took me to, to ING Barings and who I first worked with there, who sadly is no longer with us, but was just an incredible friend. And, you know, in quite a pivotal time in my career, really helped me think through what do I want to do next? And, and kind of set me on that next kinda journey. And then the other one, I have to say a shout out to someone who was very early in my career, who I worked with, who I kind of looked up to in terms of their success, who became my wife. So that became a kind of a good man. She continues to mentor me in slightly, you know, different, more direct ways

00:54:58 [Speaker Changed] That, that’s a, that’s a nice couple of mentors. Let, let’s talk about books. What are some of your favorites? What are you reading recently?

00:55:06 [Speaker Changed] Big fan of people like Ian McEwen.

00:55:10 [Speaker Changed] I know the name Martin

00:55:11 [Speaker Changed] Martin Amos. They’re just great, great authors.

00:55:15 [Speaker Changed] Gi give us some titles. Mar Martin, Amos and Ian Mc McKeon.

00:55:18 [Speaker Changed] Ian McKeen. Yeah. There’s a great book Ian McKeen called Sweet Tooth, which is all about, it’s got a great twist, which I won’t go into, but it’s no spoilers. It’s about 1950s, 1960s kind of spies in, in, in the uk. And there’s a book by Martin Amos, which is the first, I can’t remember the full title. It’s time something, but it’s written backwards.

00:55:41 [Speaker Changed] I kind of remember my wife reading something like that from Martin a MI don’t remember the title.

00:55:46 [Speaker Changed] It’s fa, it’s fascinating. He, he writes it backwards so everything happens backwards. So the day starts with the character going to bed and it’s the con, it’s written in the, as the consciousness of the the man. And so it’s brilliant. It’s just,

00:56:04 [Speaker Changed] I I, I’ll dig up the,

00:56:05 [Speaker Changed] The title Very cleverly written, huh? Not a good

00:56:08 [Speaker Changed] Story. Actually, not quite inception,

00:56:12 [Speaker Changed] But it’s in that guise of, of trying to think about how time works and Yeah. I won’t spoil it for you. Read it All right. It, but it, it’s the kind of book where even the most simple paragraph, you kind of reread it ’cause you’re trying to get your head around the fact that it’s being written backwards. Huh.

00:56:30 [Speaker Changed] Let, speaking of inception, what, what’s keeping you entertained these days? What are you streaming either watching or listening to?

00:56:37 [Speaker Changed] So, we’ve been on a bit of a marathon recently. We’ve done Yellowstone 18 83, 19 23, and Landman.

00:56:43 [Speaker Changed] That is all on my, in my queue and a heaven star. I saw the first Yellowstone on a plane and I’m like, oh, I gotta drag my wife into this one.

00:56:51 [Speaker Changed] It, it’s good. You need to commit, but it’s well worth it. Very, very, yeah. Very grip. All very different as well.

00:57:00 [Speaker Changed] So you are, you’re a Brit giving me an American Western recommendation. Let let this New Yorker give you an MI five London recommendation. Have you seen the film Black Bag?

00:57:15 [Speaker Changed] I

00:57:15 [Speaker Changed] Have. You have.

00:57:16 [Speaker Changed] I I saw it on a plane. I spent a lot of time on planes. Okay. I actually saw her on a plane. It was very good.

00:57:21 [Speaker Changed] I very clever. All upside surprise. Holy unexpected.

00:57:24 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. Very good. I’d never heard of it.

00:57:25 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. And then, and

00:57:26 [Speaker Changed] I assume you watch slow horses.

00:57:27 [Speaker Changed] I, that’s where I was about to go is so I, I, I had my wife watching through the second season and she kind of tapped out. I’m trying to bring her in for the most recent season.

00:57:37 [Speaker Changed] You’ve gotta get in. We are very much the, we won’t watch it until it’s all out.

00:57:42 [Speaker Changed] We, we’ve made that mistake not doing that with certain things. It’s, we binge it’s incredibly, we binge like, what, what is this? Watching one show a week? What are we living in the nineties? I can’t, like,

00:57:54 [Speaker Changed] I’m a cave. It’s like when an advert appears. Right,

00:57:56 [Speaker Changed] Right. It really is. Final two questions. What sort of advice would you give to a recent college grad interested in a career in fill up, fill in the blanks, investing ETFs, financial product, developing fixed income? What’s your advice for that person?

00:58:15 [Speaker Changed] Go for it. I, this, I think that, I really think this industry is changing so quickly. I think it’s changing faster than I’ve, in my kind of career in terms of what is happening, which I think creates a lot of opportunity for somebody starting out. My advice I always give to all of our analysts who are starting out, and frankly I give it to pretty much all of our team, is you’ve gotta keep learning. Th this is constantly changing. And, and you’ve got to just, you’ve always gotta be on that kind of learning curve. And, and that’s how you get better. It’s also where the opportunities come from a career standpoint.

00:58:52 [Speaker Changed] Make makes a lot of sense. Our final question, what do you know about the world of investing product development ETFs today would’ve been helpful back in the 1990s when you were first getting started?

00:59:05 [Speaker Changed] Well, if I’d known that Bitcoin was gonna be 120,000, I probably would’ve done Well that’s done something differently.

00:59:09 [Speaker Changed] Well, you could say that, you know, back

00:59:11 [Speaker Changed] The truck, say

00:59:11 [Speaker Changed] About everything. Right. Back up the truck on Amazon in 2002. Or Apple. Apple in 98 Completely. Or Microsoft from the IPO.

00:59:18 [Speaker Changed] No, I think one thing it does lend itself to, and it sounds a bit strange for somebody who started out, you know, on a bond trading floor doing bond maths, is, you realize over time, only when you look back the power of compounding. I know everyone writes about compounding and you learn about it, obviously, but it’s only when you have been around for a while and you look back at what compounding actually means as a, both a an investor, you know, you know, managing your own kind of future retirement and wealth. And then, or as a, or as somebody who works with, with clients about managing portfolios, what compounding actually does imply, and I was thinking about that the other day actually.

01:00:00 [Speaker Changed] It, it’s very counterintuitive. Hmm. There’s nothing in the natural world in your ordinary experience as a mammal that would give you any insight into just exactly how exponential it is. Yes. Yeah. It’s really fascinating. Well, well thank you Steven, for being so generous with your time. Thank you. We have been speaking with Steven Cohen. He is BlackRock’s Chief Product Officer and head of Global Solutions. If you enjoy this conversation, check out any of the 586 we’ve done over the prior dozen years. You can find those at iTunes, Spotify, Bloomberg, YouTube, wherever you find your favorite podcast. Be sure and check out my new book, how Not to Invest the ideas, numbers, and behavior that destroys wealth and how to avoid them at your favorite bookstore. Now, I would be remiss if I did not thank the correct team that helps put these conversations together each week. Alexis Noriega is my video producer, Anna Luke is my podcast, produ producer Sage Bauman is the head of podcasts at Bloomberg. Sean Russo is my researcher. I’m Barry Ritholtz. This has been Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

 

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