The Big Picture

Transcript: Zach Buchwald, Russell Investments CEO and Chairman 

 

 

The transcript from this week’s MiB: Zach Buchwald, Russell Investments CEO and Chairman, is below.

You can stream and download our full conversation, including any podcast extras, on Apple Podcasts, SpotifyYouTube, and Bloomberg. All of our earlier podcasts on your favorite pod hosts can be found here.

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Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio News. This is Masters in business with Barry Ritholtz on Bloomberg Radio.

Barry Ritholtz: This week on the podcast, I have yet another extra special guest. Zach Buckwald is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer at Russell Investments. They run about $370 billion. I found this to be a fascinating conversation. Russell has been at the forefront of a number of really interesting innovations, indexing and outsource, CIO and smart beta. They were way ahead of the rest of the investment world. Now they’re putting together really interesting active portfolios, including private investments. They work with both wealth clients as well as institutions. You may not know Zach’s name, but he’s got an absolutely fascinating background at BlackRock, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers. I thought this conversation was fascinating, and I think you will also, with no further ado, my conversation with Russell Investments. Zach Buckwald. Zach Buchwald, welcome to Bloomberg.

Zach Buchwald: Delighted to be here, Barry. Thanks for having me.

Barry Ritholtz: Thank you so much for joining us. I spoke to your predecessor about three years ago, right after the pandemic, but let’s start talking a little bit about your background. Undergraduate bachelor’s degree at Harvard. What were you studying there?

Zach Buchwald: I Studied English, so this was not on the, on the docket that I was gonna have a career in finance.

Barry Ritholtz: Not, not the plan, huh? So, so you come outta school in 96. What was your first gig?

Zach Buchwald:  So outta school, I applied to law, law school, not sort of knowing where I was going. And I, and I decided to have a little break before I, before I went back to school. And I got recruited by, by Lehman Brothers. So I spent two years working in structured finance at, at Lehman Brothers, and it became apparent to me right away, I didn’t wanna become a, a corporate lawyer ’cause I worked with lawyers. And that was, that was not the job for me, but I had a knack for it. I enjoyed it. I always liked math, even though I was an English major. And, you know, you can find other ways to put your writing and your reading acumen to, to work as well.

Barry Ritholtz: And I’m gonna say late 1990s, nobody had any clue what was coming a decade later.

Zach Buchwald:  Not at all. No. Lehman Brothers was a great place to, to start my career, but after two years, I went to Morgan Stanley and that, that’s how I think at the beginning of my career. ’cause I spent 10 years at Morgan Stanley, I was very invested in the firm, and the firm was, was invested in me. I learned about, you know, the capital markets top to bottom. And I, I had a, a career there that took me from, you know, from a starting associate role to running a business that became the CLO business, which now is like a real, you know, really important part of capital markets. What,

Barry Ritholtz: What were your titles there? What’d you do there?

Zach Buchwald:  Yeah, well I started as an associate within, within fixed income. I, you know, I was in sales, I was in trading, I was in structuring. I always worked within the credit derivative space. And then ultimately credit derivatives started getting wrapped up in different ways. And I, and I worked on the CLO platform and Morgan Stanley had a leading CLO platform that by the end of my my time there, i, I ran. And that was about, you know, I think about the role that CLOs play in the, you know, in the, in the markets today. It’s a, an enormous origination function that helps, you know, finance a lot of corporate America.

Barry Ritholtz: John Mack was CEO at the time, is that right?

Zach Buchwald: I was there for Phil Purcell and I was there for John Mack.

Barry Ritholtz: Wow. Those are two legends in, in the industry. What inspired you to head over to BlackRock?

Zach Buchwald:  I went to BlackRock with the guy that I was working for at Morgan Stanley. And we created a business that was essentially an advisory practice. This was 2008. And BlackRock was hired to work on a lot of these situations that were, you know, at the, at the start of the crisis. So we worked with the Federal Reserve, we worked with the treasury, a lot of the big financial institutions that had, you know, problematic portfolios. And BlackRock was very well positioned as a buy-side firm, as a company that sort of had an underwritten a lot of like the problematic derivative products.

Barry Ritholtz: I mean, did they, they, did they even have an investing banking division back then?

Zach Buchwald: No, we, I mean, we called it advisory, but essentially it was like an investment banking function. I mean, it was really consultative providing advice, running portfolio analytics, thinking about, you know, if you can separate like the liquidity crisis from the actual credit risk and, and, and the, you know, sort of the expected cash flows on these securities, what could you expect to get back? And we, you know, we created a roadmap for, for the government on how to invest in these securities that they took away. You know, that they essentially backstopped from these big organizations and tried to create a roadmap to bring them back to par to repay all the taxpayers with interest. And, and in almost every respect over, over time, the government was successful in doing that. And BlackRock really played a very special role in, in creating those roadmaps. And, you know, it wasn’t what I would think of as like a highly profitable business, but in terms of like the aura that was created around BlackRock as being like a solutions provider, you know, sort of a force for good in the world. That’s, that’s what we did. And it was a, it was a, it was a great role for me.

Barry Ritholtz: I recall that era that BlackRock essentially had become the street’s bond desk. Like every brokerage firm used to have a fairly substantial bond desk. And it seemed like BlackRock has just sucked up all that paper and, and all those traders.

Zach Buchwald: Well, that sounds like an HR strategy and I don’t, I don’t know that I had any, anything, any part of that, but, but there was a lot of talent for, for sure. And there continues to be a lot of talent. You know, some of those, you know, some of the folks that worked on those, you know, on those assignments are, are essentially running BlackRock now. And it was, you know, it was the consultative nature of thinking about, you know, thinking about the challenges, how we can create solutions to those challenges, thinking about the aspirations and the ambitions and, you know, that doesn’t just apply to workout situations. That applies to all, you know, kind of all the clients. And it’s something that I’ve tried to import, you know, into my current role at, at Russell.

Barry Ritholtz: So you’re there for 15 years, eventually you become head of their institutional business. Yep. That’s, that’s a $2 trillion silo. And you also helped establish BlackRock Retirement Solutions. Explain what these groups do. Yeah,

Zach Buchwald: Barry Ritholtz: So after, after the consulting practice, I, I went on to run the insurance business at BlackRock. That was a $200 billion business at the time. A little sleepy, not, you know, what I would say is like a growth center. And, and it was housed with the, the business itself was housed with true insurance experts, asset liability experts, people who really understood like the nuts and bolts of, of insurance companies. And I, I did not have an insurance background and, you know, for the first year, I had an insurance guy sort of stapled to me every time I went to a client, make sure I didn’t get out over my skis. But, you know, but you know, this, being an outsider sometimes can actually really, you know, help you think, think externally about some of the things that might be impacting the, the, the, the clients, the industry, the sector, the business itself.

And early on when I was in that role, we ran an analysis of the whole US insurance industry. Every company that was bigger than a billion dollars of general account assets. And we asked ourselves the question, what are some of the external factors that could impact these companies that they might not be expecting or prepared for? And, and where could BlackRock play a role in helping them deal with those kinds of challenges? And we came up with seven situations, Barry, that we thought were gonna have like seismic type impacts on the companies. And four of them happened. And in three of those cases, BlackRock went on to, to play a really big role and, and run the general accounts. And that was more than a hundred billion dollars of assets. And we put on another a hundred billion dollars along the way. So that was the case where the business started growing like very meaningfully. And I think BlackRock sort of paid a lot of attention to that and realized, gee, we could play a bigger role with these insurance companies. They’re gonna do a lot more interesting things than just invest in, you know, sort of high quality fixed income over time. You also had some interesting stuff happening with Apollo and Athene. They were kind of remaking the model a little bit. And, and BlackRock, you know, pays a lot of attention to what’s going on in the, in the outside world. And we, we, we grew the business

Barry Ritholtz: To say the very least, what are they, 12, $13 trillion now in assets.

Zach Buchwald: It’s a good business. Yeah.

Barry Ritholtz:  So 10 years at Morgan Stanley, 15 years at BlackRock, what lessons did you take from those experiences to Russell Investments? Yeah,

Zach Buchwald: Well, first and foremost, it’s all about the client. And if you lose sight of that understanding the, what the client is dealing with, their challenges, their ambitions, their aspirations, being a consultative provider, if you start from a push out, like, here are the products that I have, here are the things that I’ve done before, it almost never works. And it also, that’s not the, the age that we’re living in today. The age that we’re living in is how can I, how can I help you achieve the outcomes that you’re trying to get to? How can I anticipate some of the challenges that you’re gonna experience? How can I help you learn from some of the things that I’ve, you know, I’ve seen in the sector or the industry? And you start from there and it builds a foundation with the client that is just ir sort of irreplaceable. So that’s, I mean, that was one really important learning. Now, I, I, I came into Russell because Russell had like, first of all, it’s a 90 year legacy. Thank you for starting with that 1936.

Barry Ritholtz: that’s a, that’s a, you’re coming up on a century soon.

Zach Buchwald: Yeah, exactly. I’m really proud to, to run, I’m the eighth CEOO by the way of, of in 90 years of Russell Investments. I mean, that’s, so for a US asset manager that’s old. And I think about the things that Russell has done in that time, Barry, I mean, it’s been a real innovator and category creator. Everybody knows the Russell indexes, which were, you know, sort of cultivated and innovated in all sorts of cool ways. And we all have it in our pensions and our 4 0 1 Ks. You know, Russell was the original pension investment consultant. We created that category. Rus Russell was the original OCIO and we’re still a, a leader in, in OCIO. These are, these are really, you know, sort of important categories that have a big impact on, on the investment ecosystem. And what was, what was special to me about Russell, and the reason I wanted to join is Russell’s approach to doing all of these solutions is it’s entirely open architecture.

So the view is we build and implement portfolios at Russell, which is, you know, something I worked on at BlackRock and to some extent in Morgan Stanley too. But the idea is we use best of breed managers and strategies from around the whole investment universe. So if I put together an OCIO portfolio at Russell, I’m building, you know, fixed income manager, you know, the best quality fixed income managers, the best private assets managers, the best cash and, and so on, and best index products. You know, we can kind of, it’s, it’s, we can kind of go everywhere within the ecosystem. And that was a model that I was very excited about because it became more about, like, thinking through the lens of what the client is looking to achieve and how can I use all of the tools and the ingredients available as opposed to sort of a set, you know, set of tools that I, that I had at, at hand from the company that I worked for.

Barry Ritholtz: We’re gonna talk about pensions. OCI we’re gonna talk about a little later. I didn’t realize this till I started doing my homework. Russell is effectively credited with inventing smart beta. I mean, who, who knew that? I think of a, a couple of other firms as taking the leadership in that recently. But 40 years ago you guys were on the, on the cutting edge of that. What is it like running a firm that has a near century long legacy? How does that affect how you think about risks and opportunities?

Zach Buchwald: Yeah, it, I mean, the legacy is a, is a wonderful thing. But you know, you can’t rest. Like we all know we can’t rest on our laurels. It’s, you know, the, the, the job for me is to make sure that I’m taking sort of the best parts of the history and the legacy, the innovative spirit, all these cool things that we’ve done, and then evolving them for the world that we’re in today, our, our, our mainline business, we have, we have sort of two central businesses. It’s OCIO and it’s model portfolios that we do on the retail side, which is essentially same kind of ideas of the institutional business, building great portfolios and implementing them. 90% of our business is those, is falls into those two categories. What I need to do today is make sure that I’m using all of the tools available. So as the market moves from, you know, active products to passive products, as the market starts integrating private assets with public assets, all of that is part of our portfolio today. And, and so the goal, you know, as the leader is to make sure that the strategy is incorporating, we’re open architecture. It’s, it’s truly incorporating the entire ecosystem into the, into what we build for our clients.

Barry Ritholtz: I want to get your feedback on a quote of yours. I found in my, in my homework quote, financial security is a central challenge for this industry. How did your experiences at BlackRock, at Morgan Stanley and way back when at Lehman Brothers, how did it affect your, your concept of financial security,

Zach Buchwald: Financial security and retirement security especially? Took me a little bit of time to hone in on Barry. I mean, I think back to my years at Morgan Stanley, and, you know, the job there was very much about sort of like finding the arbitrage and the markets. It’s where can we make money on as a sales and trading function? And we help clients along the way, you know, by delivering the products and services that they want. But first and foremost, it was about the investment bank. And, and that changed for me. I had a, I had a review with my boss at the time, and she said to me something that she meant as a compliment. She said to me, Zach, you can really smell the money. And I went away. And that was not the legacy that I wanted from my career. And, you know, I moved to BlackRock shortly after that where I was helping, you know, the, the government, the taxpayers deal with like, really critical issues, like really big thorny problems that were gonna have an impact on, you know, on the quality of life of the people in this, in this country.

And it, it was a complete reset of my perspective. You know, now we build portfolios at Russell, but you know, if I’m working for a pension or a 401k or an insurance company, at the end of the day, I’m serving individuals. I’m helping them. And we don’t lose sight of that. I’m helping them have a secure retirement. Now, by the way, they have to do their part too, because it’s also about, you know, saving, early, contributing, making sure that you’re, you know, learning about the, the plan and making the right decisions. But the role that we play within the industry is a make or break in terms of whether they’re able to, whether they’re able to achieve that. Now you also have something going on in the background that’s, that’s gonna have a very big impact in the next couple of decades with retirees in America. And, and that is that really the risk has shifted. Now, the retirement security risk has shifted from, you know, organizations like the companies and the government

Barry Ritholtz:  Companies in defined benefits, correct. To defined contributions to defined contribution.

Zach Buchwald: So the standard model, the standard pension model is shifting to the 401k and today still about half of retirees have access to a pension. And that plus, plus social security, more or less gets the job done. But in another decade it’s gonna be less than a third. And in another two decades it’s gonna be very little at all. So that means that now the 401k is the staple that’s gonna, you know, result in a, a secure comfortable retirement or, or not. And you know, the, the, the big challenge with a 401k is that the risk of saving, investing and also decumulation, taking that pot of money and knowing how long, you know, the longevity risk, knowing how, thinking about how long you’re gonna live and how to allotted over time, all of that risk will now be borne by the individual. And we have not fully processed that in the, you know, within, within the country that this is a crisis that’s coming, that people aren’t prepared to, to own that responsibility. And the system today isn’t set up in such a way that sort of, the decisions are very easy to, you know, to make at the, the onus is really still on the individual.

Barry Ritholtz: So that’s really fascinating. H how does that affect what you see within your role as CEO at Russell Investments? Yeah,

Zach Buchwald: Well thanks Barry. Our whole mission is built around helping people achieve financial security. And we do that on the institutional side by partnering with corporate sponsors and helping to, you know, ensure that the plans that they’re, you know, putting in place and the role that they play through matching through, you know, providing lifetime income, whatever the set of benefits are is gonna be, is gonna serve the participants in the way that we think is gonna help them have, you know, retire with confidence and with with security. But as the, you know, as the machine shifts and it moves more toward a, a 401k and then, you know, a lot of folks end up with a nest egg that they have to manage on their own. The goal is to make sure that on the wealth side, we also have sort of the right kinds of products and services and solutions that help them, you know, understand the income, help them understand decumulation, help them get the right diversification, help them get fair fees. I mean, the goal is to make sure that we’re, we’re really delivering sort of a set of products and services that’s gonna allow them to live the kind of retirement that they all they’ll hope for.

00:16:12 [Speaker Changed] Hmm, really, really interesting. So whenever I talk to people about Russell, everybody knows the Russell 2000. The question is, what does Russell do? How do they make money on they, they must do something more than the Russell 2000. Tell us a little bit about the different business lines at, at Russell Investments. Sure.

00:16:31 [Speaker Changed] So the index business is now owned by London Stock Exchange, and they, they do a magnificent job with it. And we still have a little bit of the, you know, the aura. Every time I’m in the elevator I see the advertisements for Russell and I think I didn’t have to pay for that ad. We get, we get the benefit. The business is predominantly an a, it’s an active asset management business. And, and we really have one main function, Barry. It’s about building and implementing great portfolios. And we do it for institutional clients and we do it for retail clients. So building the portfolios is really about sort of, you know, it’s portfolio construction, it’s strategies and managers. For 90 years we’ve done manager research at, at Russell we have, you know, a huge team of people. Now it’s augmented by AI and technology helping us look at 16,000 different managers and figuring out, we invest with about 225 of them, you know, figuring out which managers and strategies we think make sense in the different portfolios we create. And then the implementation is one of the coolest parts. ’cause that’s, we actually do the investing on behalf of the managers. They, they typically give us model portfolios and, and then all the things around the portfolio that can, you know, be very incremental. It’s the, the transitions, it’s the, the hedging completion exercise, completion mandates, overlays, and, you know, those things can be alpha generative, they can be very important for risk management. You can add a values overlay for for clients. And so it’s a, it’s a full portfolio delivery at the end of the day.

00:17:54 [Speaker Changed] Coming up, we continue our conversation with Zach Buckwald, chairman and CEO of Russell Investments discussing exactly what Russell Investments does for its clients. I’m Barry Ritholtz, you’re listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. I’m Barry Ritholtz. You are listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week is Zach Buckwald, he’s chairman and chief executive officer of Russell Investments. The firm was founded in 1936 and runs about $370 billion. Zach joined Russell in 2023 coming from his previous career at BlackRock. So you mentioned you’re researching 16,000 different managers and internally you’re generating just a fire hose of data. How do you analyze that? What value is that data to the firm?

00:18:59 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, I mean, the data is everything and we, we have, we do have a, you know, historical trove of, of data, but it changes quickly. You think about how quickly the, you know, the investment ecosystem e evolves and, you know, managers have strategies that make sense on one day and then things change and, and those strategies don’t make sense. So it’s, it really has to stay current even though we, you know, we certainly value the, the historical data and, and performance and use it. We start with 16,000 and the first layer is largely technology driven. So it’s, you know, we have huge feeds that take into, you know, that, that take in and analyze all of the available information that’s provided to us by managers directly. And also that we can find out there in the, in the public domain.

00:19:44 [Speaker Changed] When you say managers, are these mutual fund managers, ETF managers, private managers, or all the above?

00:19:50 [Speaker Changed] It’s, it’s all of the above. I mean, typically because of our size and scale, we don’t, we don’t invest in a ton of direct like shared products. We do much more sep sort of separate accounts and, but we do invest in mutual funds. We do invest in ETFs or index products where, where that makes sense and that can help, you know, drive down cost or, you know, help with the diversification. But, but the managers is for the act, the active strategies and active represents, I’m gonna guess probably 85% of the assets in that that we manage overall. Remember we’re using different active strategies as the building blocks to create these portfolios. So predominantly it’s not Russell managed, although, you know, we can talk about the smart beta that you, you, you brought up predominantly. These are externally managed strategies that we bring together and then we collapse the whole thing together in one portfolio. And we look enterprise wide because you might have, you know, three active equity managers and they’re not paying attention to what the other ones are doing. And so you can end up with outsized positions or underweights, you can end up with, you know, people on opposite sides of trades and we look to, you know, to correct or make adjustments where it makes sense.

00:20:57 [Speaker Changed] So you guys were very innovative and helped create the concept of outsource chief investment Officer o CIOs. Tell us a little bit about that business line. Who are the clients and, and h how much assets are, does that run?

00:21:13 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, so OCIO represents the lion’s share of the 370 billion that that we manage. And it’s a fast growing segment, not just at Russell, but it’s growing because a lot of companies are, are outsourcing their pensions or their 4 0 1 ks to, you know, folks that live and breathe the markets and that think about retirement security like we do all, all day long. So, you know, a typical day at Bloomberg might have one top story about a big corp, you know, big US corporate that’s chosen to outsource their retirement portfolio. Now we work with a lot of in-house teams as well. We help by bringing in, you know, any of those implementation services like transitions and hedging. We do that for a lot of, a lot of companies that have internal teams. But sometimes sponsors decide to, you know, to hire retirement experts to, to run their, to run their retirement portfolio and that’s when they would bring in an outsourced chief investment officer. We’re a top five provider and it’s some of the big, you know, the other big asset managers that, that also provide that we’re the ones who do it with an open architecture framework. So the goal is not to, you know, have Russell run the whole portfolio. It’s to bring in best of breed managers and to bring those together.

00:22:16 [Speaker Changed] Huh, really, really kind of interesting. When you talk about hedging, are you hedging equity, hedging fixed income? What, what is the hedging business like?

00:22:25 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, it can be all of the above. Also a foreign, you know, foreign currency, you know, it can be hedging individual sectors. You might have a sponsor that’s in the technology sector and they feel like they already have enough exposure to technology. And so you can, you know, make some adjustments to the portfolio. That way you can also build in a values orientation for, you know, organizations that have a particular, you know, view of the world that they wanna express in their investment portfolios.

00:22:50 [Speaker Changed] So let’s talk a little bit about smart beta, which Russell helped pioneer in 1985 way before your time or my time for that matter. Is this still something that’s a key part of what you’re doing?

00:23:03 [Speaker Changed] So we still have a strong footprint within systematic Barry and you know, Russell manages on average between 10 and 20% of the portfolios that, that we look after. And systematic typically is within that, that 10 to 20% we use it not to make, you know, credit decisions or stock picking decisions. Like that’s not, that’s not our game. That’s why we hire external managers who are, you know, true experts in that we use it to like round out the portfolio to make adjustments to make sure that the portfolio is complying with why the client hired us or whatever their investment, you know, their stated investment strategy says. But smart beta is, you know, one of the many places where Russell was an innovator and you know, these things can sort of take on a, a life of their own as the, as the industry adopts those practices.

00:23:46 [Speaker Changed] We mentioned artificial intelligence earlier. Tell us how you’re using AI and either risk management portfolio construction or just data analytics.

00:23:55 [Speaker Changed] So Barry, we have a list this long of sort of, you know, desired use cases that we’re working on for, for ai. And I, I think we’re still in, in early innings here, but the kinds of things that we use AI for today very effectively are more task oriented. You know, we have it fill out our RFPs, we have it build pitch decks. We have actually, we use AI to, you know, read 500 page filings, you know, which we used to have a human being do back in the day. And it’s very effective at that. The real goal for, you know, for this company is that I want AI to actually help us with investment insights, with manager research insights that’s gonna actually drive performance at the end of the day. And I think we still have a fair amount of, we’re making progress, but I think we still have a fair amount of work before, before that happens. But, you know, that’s the view where having, you know, having a, a portfolio where we look after 16,000 different strategies and, and managers, we’re starting from a place where we, like, as you said, we have troves of, of information, of historical information that we’re relying on and that we’re using AI to sort of help build out that framework.

00:24:59 [Speaker Changed] So I’m, I’m always fascinated by, you know, the old joke is no one’s ever seen a bad back test and AI and those sort of things are o only capable of looking at what’s already occurred and built into all, all of those back tests and to some, some degree built in to AI is that the future is gonna resemble the past. How do you navigate around that? Because sometimes the future doesn’t resemble the past, just look at AI and how it’s changing so many aspects of, of various businesses. Yeah,

00:25:34 [Speaker Changed] Well that’s a place where, you know, I’m still pretty optimistic that there’s an enormous amount of value creation to come Barry, because the, you know, what we’ve seen from AI so far, at least how it’s, how it’s shown up in terms of, you know, in the, in the market performance has been almost entirely Harvard in the technology sector. It’s where, you know, sort of where ai, EEE exists. What we haven’t seen yet is all of the other sectors that we know are gonna be sort of enormously impacted by the proper use of ai, the creative and innovative use of ai. So, you know, you see a little bit of it in like healthcare and life sciences, but you know, logistics and shipping and consumer goods and in investments, asset management, they’re all gonna get transformed by AI because it’s changing things. And you know, this is where I’m, I’m really optimistic that we have a lot more room to run in, in, in the markets today is because you’re still not seeing like all the, you know, the potential and the benefits of, of AI showing up in some of these, you know, what we think of as sectors that are peripheral to technology.

00:26:37 But you know, in truth technology is like critical to how we, you know, how we all exist.

00:26:42 [Speaker Changed] Hmm. Makes makes a lot of sense. Let’s talk about private markets. How can Russell Investments help their clients access private markets between AI and privates? Those are probably the two hottest topics we’ve been talking about this year.

00:26:57 [Speaker Changed] So privates represents about 7% of the portfolios that we manage. It’s heavier in, in the institutional portfolios. It’s lighter right now within wealth portfolios. There’s a lot more growth that’s, that’s gonna happen, especially in wealth. I think the average wealth client has something like one or 2% of their portfolio outside of their real estate holdings about one or 2% in private. And that number is going to grow and, and should grow, right? Because this is a really important source of, you know, re return and risk diversification. And if you rely on the historical precedence, it’s been an enormous outperformer writ large. And so, you know, kind of delivering, you know, access is a, it’s a very important, you know, function that we do at Russell, but also that we work with our financial advisor partners to, to figure out the best ways. ’cause it’s, you know, how you deliver privates to to, to institutional investors is, is different, right?

00:27:48 There’s tax considerations and reporting considerations, liquidity considerations that all need to be considered with, with individuals. So we’re trying to do this, you know, really judiciously within wealth portfolios, wealthy people, wealthy families, there’s a lot of room to run here. You know, I’m being extra cautious when I think about, you know, sort of 4 0 1 ks or you know, 401k graduates, you know, middle class people nest eggs. ’cause that’s where, you know, I think about are these appropriate investments? Do they help with financial security? Can you get your money back when you need it? Are the fees, you know, fair and appropriate? And, and so I think you need to be extra careful with, with, you know, sort of true working people, working families and their, their retirement nest eggs. But wealth at large, there’s a, there’s a ton of room for, for private markets.

00:28:36 [Speaker Changed] So, so you mentioned 7%. Where could this possibly go? Is this 10%, 15%, 20%? I, I’ve heard people say 60 40 is out, it’s now 50, 30, 20 or whatever the numbers add up to.

00:28:52 [Speaker Changed] I don’t know where it gets to. It’s certainly gonna be north of, of 7%. You know, I think it’s, I think you have to think not only about what’s appropriate for the portfolios. Listen, if you do a backward looking analysis of private equity and private credit, you know, which I, outside of, you know, specific real estate investments that people choose themselves. Those are like the two biggest food groups. If you run an analysis of what those investments looked like over the last 20 years, Barry, it’s gonna be different than what you’re gonna get in the next 20 years for a lot of reasons. But, you know, I’ll tell you from my personal perspective right now, you know, in the last two years my vet’s office has been bought by private equity. Wow. My landscaper, my garbage collection, my dentist, they’re all owned by private equity now.

00:29:36 And you know, they’re doing these rollups and there’s lots of efficiencies to be created on bringing these, you know, these practices together. But, you know, that’s a pretty different investment than buying a company, right? And making a company better and selling that company, which historically is, you know, where, where private equity made its name and its reputation and the, and the return stream that we’ve seen. So, you know, another thing I think about is how am I gonna make sure that the, you know, risk and return profiles I’m putting into these portfolios that we can, you know, reasonably predict what they’re gonna look like and that we can manage them, you know, sort of appropriately given that the asset pools might look a little different than what we were, you know, what we were investing in 10 years ago.

00:30:16 [Speaker Changed] Hmm. Really, really interesting. So let’s talk a little bit about some of the things that are going on in the market today. Fee compression has been a giant factor really since the financial crisis. You recently decided to reduce some of the fees on your flagship fixed income products. Tell us a little bit about what drove your decision and what are you thinking about in terms of fees generally?

00:30:44 [Speaker Changed] I mean, the governing precept Barry is always to make sure we’re providing value to the clients. And, you know, we do that by charging a fair and appropriate fee for what it is we’re doing. If, if I’m gonna focus on anything, it’s less about what’s the fee that I can charge and more about making sure that I’m invaluable to these clients and that we’re really, you know, helping them achieve their goals. When you, the truth is, when you do a great job for the client, the fee almost becomes not an issue. Now having said that, we have some businesses that are scaled businesses and that I compete with, you know, with other good providers and I have to make sure that we’re staying competitive. So we’re not in any way immune to fee compression. But, you know, but if you can provide a really good value proposition, it’s not such a big deal.

00:31:28 [Speaker Changed] So this has been an ongoing factor in, in the industry, particularly for active managers. And, and Russell is primarily an active manager. Are you seeing any changes in this trend globally? I mean it started very much in the United States with, with entities like BlackRock and, and especially Vanguard, your global firm. What does this look like overseas?

00:31:53 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, fee compression in our space is, you know, it is, comes through in different ways globally. O-O-C-I-O is the place where we’ve been sort of most susceptible to, you know, to fee compression Barry. And, you know, if I think about who we compete against, the landscape has changed for us over the last 10 years. You know, 10 years ago I competed largely against like the consult the traditional consultants. And we had a very different offering. We actually implemented the portfolio. We weren’t just doing manager research sort of on paper. We were actually trading the portfolio and, you know, doing the risk management and the overlays and the completions things that were a very big value add. And we were unique in that respect. And then along came the really big asset managers that saw OCIO in, in part as sort of a distribution function. You know, if I can deliver the entire portfolio, I can put a lot of my own underlying products into that portfolio. And by the way, that can be a great business for you if you have. But

00:32:45 [Speaker Changed] That, that’s a closed architecture. You guys run a very open architecture.

00:32:48 [Speaker Changed] We run a completely open architecture and we’re unique in that it’s true open architecture, 80 plus percent and sometimes a hundred percent of the assets come from third party managers. But we still have to compete against organizations that are running their own version, which might be closed or semi, semi closed. And you know, if you have a whole lot of underlying products you’re putting into the portfolio, it gives you a lot of leeway to change the fee or to compress the fee at the OCIO level because you’re making money in all sorts of other ways. Russell doesn’t do that. So it does mean that we were susceptible to some of the fee compression and our fees have narrowed. But the way I see the solution here is just to make sure that the value proposition that we’re offering, the way we go about building an OCIO, the costs that it, you know, it takes the, the, the, the human capital that’s required. You know, we put over a hundred million dollars into our technology system that allows us to build these open architecture portfolios. When clients understand what it is that they get from us. Paying a slightly higher fee doesn’t seem to be a big deal.

00:33:47 [Speaker Changed] What about the private markets that we’re looking at? We were talking about private equity, private credit. Yep. First, is it possible that those sort of things can be indexed and then second, they’ve always been pricier than public markets? Are we started to see any fee compression along those lines?

00:34:06 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, so we haven’t seen a ton of fee compression. I mean, those are cases where I think the value proposition is crystal clear and, you know, the high performing managers can charge higher fees or, you know, substantial fees because they’ve really delivered. And you know, in general, they continue to deliver. I think if they stop delivering and the, or, you know, and, and we start seeing what look more like public markets performance or even weak public markets performance, it’s gonna be much harder for them to charge those, those fees. But that hasn’t happened yet. You know, especially within private credit and, and private equity. There’s been, you know, real outperformance, especially at the top of the heap versus the public markets. So it becomes easier to, to justify those fees.

00:34:47 [Speaker Changed] Makes a lot of sense. So let’s, let’s venture into the world of public policy a little bit. You’ve proposed national account programs to help young people start investing early. The most recent big bill that passed in this administration has these accounts for babies e every kid that’s gonna be born is gonna get, what is it, 1500 or $3,000? I don’t know what number?

00:35:11 [Speaker Changed] Thousand

00:35:11 [Speaker Changed] Dollars. A thousand dollars. All right. Better than nothing. But where do you see these sort of programs going? And if you start investing at age one day, what potential compounding can we see 50, 75, a hundred years later?

00:35:28 [Speaker Changed] Now you’re really talking my language. When Trump was elected, I wrote a piece that we put into Barron’s that Barron’s published saying that we should give a thousand dollars to every kid in America and open an investment account and let them actually learn about the power of compounding. Because it’s different when you actually own the assets. And you know, when, when you give people an investment account, you can find lots of ways to create some education, you know, investment education that goes along with it. And

00:35:51 [Speaker Changed] Lemme just interrupt you ’cause it sounds like a lot of money. There are 3 million kids born a year. It’s $3 billion. Yeah. Which to a $31 trillion economy and a six or $7 trillion government spend is, is a rounding error.

00:36:07 [Speaker Changed] It it, it’s nothing in the grand scheme of things. And you know, the, you know, you’re onto something because it got actually got criticized by both the right and the left and the right said, oh, this is another entitlement program. Oh. Anyway, we put this thing into Barron’s and to my surprise and delight, it ended up in, in the big beautiful bill. And it actually got, it actually passed. It

00:36:24 [Speaker Changed] Became passed and funded, right?

00:36:26 [Speaker Changed] It became legislation and, you know, treasury is working hard now thinking through, you know, the implementation and we’re, we’re helping along the way. It’s, it’s an awesome program because fundamentally what it does is it makes investing universal. You know, all of these families in the United States that think that investing is not for them or they never had any exposure to it. And that’s, by the way, most of America right now, to the extent they have a a, you know, have a kid, they’re going to have an investment account that that’s, you know, there is a, there is a thousand dollars to, to kick kickstart it from the government. But there’s gonna be lots of avenues for families to make continued contributions for employers to make contributions for philanthropies to make contributions over time on, on hopefully a tax advantaged basis. And folks are gonna see the way compounding really works.

00:37:17 So it’s not the $1,000 contribution, which as you said is kind of a drop in the bucket, at least as a, you know, as a, as a burden on, on society. It’s the, it’s, you know, what can you pull together from all of the different constituents that are gonna wanna contribute to a program like this. So we’re, we’re really excited. And you know, I think that ultimately, I hope this will dovetail with retirement security. You know, you, you said it when, when you asked what can happen in 50 or 75 years, I think initially, you know, the thought is these might help fund college education. And by the way, with a little bit of contributions on an ongoing basis, it will fund a college education with, with the compounding. But over time there’s six or seven of these programs and eventually, you know, maybe we can pull them all together and create a, a national program that actually funds people’s retirement

00:38:06 [Speaker Changed] Coming up. We continue our conversation with Zach Buckwald, he’s chairman and chief executive officer of Russell Investments discussing the state of markets today. I’m Barry Riol, you’re listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

00:38:35 I am Barry Ritholtz. You are listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week is Zach Buckwald, he’s chairman and chief executive officer of Russell Investments. The firm was founded in 1936 and runs about $370 billion. Zach joined Russell in 2023 coming from his previous career at BlackRock. I, I’m a fan of using milestones as an excuse to give some sort of a gift. You can see sweet sixteens or kid turns 13 or whatever it is. Yep. Grandma and grandpa write a check and put it right into their account. Here’s some Eli Lilly or here’s some whatever s and p 500. Knock yourself out. And that’s gonna just appreciate over the next, you know, x number of decades. It, it could really make a substantial difference in, in the retirement of environment people who have yet to even be born.

00:39:33 [Speaker Changed] It’s absolutely true. And, and by the way, it’s investing in, in the US stock market, right? And

00:39:38 [Speaker Changed] Yes, so I’m assuming the s and p 500 would count and any of the Microsoft or Lilly or whatever, apple, Amazon, whatever big tech company you’re enthusiastic about, I would recommend a broader, more diversified approach than a single stock. Right? I mentioned Lily ’cause I just know a friend just put a bunch of Lily stock in his nephew’s account and I’m like, oh, what are you doing that for? He is like just doing a transfer. It’s tax free and I don’t have to worry about it.

00:40:06 [Speaker Changed] Well, I’m, I’m not a stock picker, but, but Lilly’s a great company. Having diversified exposure in these, in these accounts is, is, is is the way to go. And, you know, listen, a, a generation ago Barry, the version of that was not so much Lilly stock, it was very typically a, a US treasury bond. Right? That’s what you got when you turned 13 or 16 or had that milestone birthday and a treasury bond in the long term. You know, you, you, you’d rather be in the stock market, you get,

00:40:32 [Speaker Changed] You don’t want two, two and a half percent ahead of a above inflation That doesn’t excite you.

00:40:37 [Speaker Changed] I’d rather, I’d rather have the long-term return of the, the s and p for sure.

00:40:41 [Speaker Changed] Especially if it’s a newborn or even a teenager. Their investment window is 60, 70 years.

00:40:48 [Speaker Changed] That’s, that’s exactly right. And and the trick here is you have to get people to actually understand because that 16-year-old, when they’re 22, they’re gonna get a job that’s gonna have a 401k and they have to understand why am I taking 6% out of my, you know, out of my paycheck when, you know, my starting salary might not even be enough to get, you know, to pay my rent and my other bills. Why would I wanna do that? And and they really, if they understand the power of compounding and the long-term implications of that, they’re gonna, they’re gonna buy into it.

00:41:17 [Speaker Changed] I I really didn’t think about my 401k until I was in my thirties. Right. But if I actually had money put in account when I was born, by the time you’re 25, you’re gonna see some impact from compounding.

00:41:31 [Speaker Changed] A hundred percent. Well, I, I’m not too worried about you Barry.

00:41:34 [Speaker Changed] I, I’ll, I’ll be all right. You’ll

00:41:35 [Speaker Changed] Be, you’ll be all right. But you know, but think about all those folks that don’t, you know, the average income in America is still $70,000. Right. All those folks that don’t have access to, to in investments and they’re not thinking about am I gonna be able to make my contribution at age 22? Right. ’cause they’re thinking about can I, can I pay my rent, afford to pay my rent? Right.

00:41:54 [Speaker Changed] That’s right. The bottom half of the economic strata in this country, and we’re having this conversation on election day right. In New York where it looks like at least the leader up until up until today has been someone who describes themselves as a socialist and has made affordability their, their key campaign theme. This is gonna be an ongoing issue, especially for the bottom half of, of earners and savers.

00:42:19 [Speaker Changed] That’s right. We’re, we’re not a political organization at Russell, but I do concur affordability is the issue. And I think it’s not a left issue. I think it’s an issue for, for everybody, almost everybody in this country. And we’re gonna be hearing a lot about it from, from all sides. You know, I wrote a piece after, after the, the, the baby accounts, which they call the Trump accounts, by the way, after that became part of the legislation, I wrote a piece that the Washington Post published that essentially described what these accounts are and the impact that it can have in terms of helping to educate our population about the power of investing and compounding. And it was very interesting to see the commentary, you know, when you publish something in the journal or the post, sure. You get a lot of, you get a lot of comments and by and large, the, the, the vast majority of the comments said, why wouldn’t you just write us a refund check? Which is what we got during COVID, by the way. Right? Like stimulus type checks. Right. And it was the opposite of the point that I was trying to make.

00:43:15 [Speaker Changed] Right? Right. We don’t want you to spend this. Correct. We want you to save this. That’s

00:43:17 [Speaker Changed] The want you to save it and to understand what the difference is from a savings account or a treasury bond and versus investing it into the markets and getting to see long-term, long-term compounding. So it, it, it was honestly, it was a little bit of a, a refresher for me that we have a lot of work to do to help people understand why a program like this can actually help them.

00:43:35 [Speaker Changed] So as someone who’s been writing in public for nearly 30 years, my best advice to you is, is simply never read the comments. There, there was a golden era of blogs in like the early to mid two thousands where the comments were these like fantastic communities. All of that is kind of migrated to Reddit. If you wanna see lightly moderated intelligent debates with some nonsense thrown in along the way, that’s, that’s what’s left of that sort of issue. I, I think even YouTube used to do a better job at moderating the comments, the, the spam and the bots still slip in every now and then. It

00:44:17 [Speaker Changed] Does give you a perspective on what’s on people’s minds though, even though some of the comments are like unhinged, right? You can tell like the what’s coming through, what, what are people’s, you know, fears and worries and concerns. If you can, if you can read it through the, you know, the craziness Yeah.

00:44:31 [Speaker Changed] You have to, you have to fight your way through it. It’s kind of fascinating because I’m gonna just digress for a moment. We all are subject to these cognitive errors and these behavioral biases and, and it very much shows up in, in people’s portfolios and the decisions they, they make. I, I wake up on a day like today where Nasdaq is down 1.5%, I know I’m gonna see a bunch of emails, ah, you told us to stay long and look, we’re down one point a half percent today. I know I should have gotten out of the market. What are you talking about? We’re up 17% for the year and the NASDAQ’s up 23%. This is the price of admission. That’s right. Have to deal with some volatility.

00:45:15 [Speaker Changed] I mean, this is a place, by the way, where technology has not actually served people in their retirement portfolios. Because if you can pull up your phone and in three seconds, you know, you, you work as a teacher or a nurse or, or whatever, and you pull up your phone and in three seconds you see your portfolio is down 1.5% and, and at some level it flips a switch and you think my portfolio is, is, is is in trouble or I should sell. Like, that’s how you get to really bad decisions because we all, you know, we all know long term, like if you’re man, if you’re, do

00:45:42 [Speaker Changed] We all know that? ’cause I’m not sure everybody does. And that’s right, there’s such an inherent bias towards action. Don’t just sit there, do something, right? That, that just seems to be human nature.

00:45:55 [Speaker Changed] It’s anathema to how you’re supposed to manage a retirement portfolio though. You, you, you by the way, you can make adjustments over, over time, but the goal is not to pull out when you think the market is gonna be down. We all know that the bounce backs, by the way, happen faster and stronger than ever. I mean, you’ve, you, you think about like what the bounce back looked like during the financial crisis or during the.com bus, it took years to bounce back. And then you think about COVID or, or

00:46:19 [Speaker Changed] Even April Liberation

00:46:21 [Speaker Changed] Day, right? The bounce back happens. It’s a weak Yeah. Almost instantly and stronger than before. So, you know, this is a case where the phone really does not help you, right? If you’re gonna make a decision to pull out, because you see something going on in the markets on, on an off, on an off day. And, you know, as we’re, as we’re thinking through how to implement new programs like the, the Trump accounts, you know, my goal is you wanna have like lots of transparency, but you don’t wanna make it easy for people to make bad decisions. You have to help them make good long-term decisions.

00:46:47 [Speaker Changed] A a a little bit of choice architecture that prevents those sort of things. Last question before I get to the standard questions. We ask all of our guests, what do you think investors are not talking about, but perhaps should be? What, what are the important overlooked topics, assets, geography, policy, whatever, that, that should be getting a little more following? Yeah.

00:47:08 [Speaker Changed] Well, Barry, I’m still really positive on, on AI and how much more room to run we have, you know, there’s been so much to talk about, about how we haven’t seen a broadening in the markets. You know, most of the value capture has happened within the, the technology industry. But, you know, but I think every sector is gonna be transformed. Almost every sector transformed by AI as much as it was by, by the internet. And we just haven’t seen that come through yet. But I can tell you every company that we invest in is thinking about this and working on it behind the scenes, even if it’s not showing up yet in their, in their quarterly earnings reports. But it’s all happening and you’re gonna start seeing, by the way, you’ll see winners and losers, both, you know, sort of specific companies and sectors, but there’s gonna be enormous amounts of efficiency gains and enormous amounts of, you know, sort of value creation that happens as a result of that. Now, I don’t think it’s gonna be a straight line, but I do think it’s coming shorter term rather than, rather than just longer term.

00:48:04 [Speaker Changed] Back in 2019, I interviewed Joe Davis, who’s the chief economist at Vanguard. Yep. And they had this fascinating research report. Eventually it became a book that all technological innovations take place in two phases. The first phase is kind of what we’re experiencing right now in ai, which is wild prices. Couple of hand, everybody knows a handful of companies, very boom, boom. Like some people have been too many, a lot of people have been calling it a bubble. The second phase is where the value creation spreads out. That’s right. To the rest of, rest of, rest of the market, rest of the industry, rest of the economy. I see it the same way you do. Right? This is just gonna make all of us more efficient, more productive, more profitable.

00:48:50 [Speaker Changed] Right. That’s exactly how I see this playing out. And you still have to pay attention because, you know, we all remember during the, the first, the first.com phase before every company started incorporating, you know, the internet into its business strategy and, and its operations. There were winners and they were losers and, and the winners are still around and they’re, you know, they essentially, you know, run global commerce today and, and the losers went away. We’re gonna see some of that across sectors and you know, that’s something that investors need to pay close attention to. But, you know, writ large, I see a lot of value creation, huh?

00:49:20 [Speaker Changed] I I, I’m, I’m always like to hear that sort of stuff. So let’s jump into our favorite questions that we ask all of our guests, starting with, tell us about your mentors who helped shape your career.

00:49:32 [Speaker Changed] Sure. I had a great mentor at BlackRock, a guy called Mark McComb, who’s a, a vice chairman of the company. And he put me into a, a couple of jobs and he nurtured me and supported me, but he also, he encouraged me to, you know, think like the outsider that I am, you know, when he put me into the insurance job without having an insurance background, he sort of said, bring, you know, bring all the capabilities and the perspective that you have from all the other things that you’ve done, and that, you know, really helped us, you know, think like an external provider and, and, and grow that business. By the way, I’m a, I’m, I’m a, a gay guy in finance, so I, I, I come at it from a, from an outsider’s point of view, kinda looking in and, and that has informed just about everything that I do at, you know, at Russell. And, and, and before that is thinking about what’s working, what isn’t working, what do I think we might be able to do better, what have we not, you know, the question that you asked, what are people not talking about? What have we not asked about? And that’s, you know, often my, my starting point. And I think if I had come in with the insider status, it would’ve been harder for me to take that perspective.

00:50:36 [Speaker Changed] Huh. That’s really interesting. It, it’s affected your perspective. You, you see the world both as a participant but also an outsider. Yeah,

00:50:45 [Speaker Changed] That’s right. And, you know, this is the first time I’ve been to Bloomberg in a, in a couple of years, but when I, when I took the job at, at Russell, even before I’d started Bloomberg invited me to come speak at a conference, and I was, you know, flattered and, and excited. And then I learned it was their diversity conference, and I, I was the, the KCEO and, and I said, invite me back five times to talk about investing in retirement. And on the sixth time, I’ll come talk about diversity.

00:51:08 [Speaker Changed] Huh. That’s interesting. You know, in all the research we we do that did not come up in anything. It’s not, it’s not anything that bubbles up to the top of search. Although the old joke is, if you, if you wanna hide something, disclose it at the end of an hour long podcast, no one will hear it. But you know what it’s like with all the YouTube, there’s a, there’s a drop off, but I always find that, that amusing. Let’s talk about books. What are some of your favorites? What are you reading right now? Yeah,

00:51:37 [Speaker Changed] So I read a lot of fiction, like, you know, Cormack McCarthy and Tyler. I’m reading a book called The Inheritance right now, which is like a family drama. It’s a escapist for me to get away from. I don’t read a lot of finance books.

00:51:50 [Speaker Changed] I’m the same way every now and then, something will, you know, come across that I have to read that’s finance related. I have a big stack of fiction waiting to go on vacation with me next month. Let’s talk about streaming. What are you watching or listening to you? What’s keeping you entertained? It’s either on Netflix or Amazon or whatever. Yeah,

00:52:09 [Speaker Changed] It’s all toddler fair right now. I’ve got two, three year olds in the house. So we’ve got twins. Twins, yeah. It’s, you know, all full-time. Moana and Frozen and Right. Daniel Tiger Bubble Guppies, that sort of stuff.

00:52:21 [Speaker Changed] Huh. So, so a lot of Moana. That’s, that’s my idea of a nightmare. Just

00:52:27 [Speaker Changed] Moana’s pretty awesome actually

00:52:28 [Speaker Changed] The first three times you see it, the

00:52:30 [Speaker Changed] First three times and frozen about twice

00:52:33 [Speaker Changed] Our So our final two questions. What sort of advice would you give to a recent college grad interest in a career in either finance or investing? What would you tell them?

00:52:45 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. First, like, you know, be yourself. Like, we look for people at Russell from all different kinds of backgrounds, not just economics or finance backgrounds. Study what you wanna study, do well, and, you know, be committed. But, you know, if you come at it from an outsider’s, you know, station or point of view, em, embrace that. That’s, you know, this is a, a world where we, we want folks that have different kinds of backgrounds and, and approaches. You know, I studied English Barry, and one advantage that that actually gave me early on in my career was that I knew how to write. And, you know, you think about how much of our, of our business is done through writing, through email and, and, and other ways. Everything you write, this is the advice now. Everything you write is a reflection of you. And it can come up in, you know, something you put down on paper can come up again and again in all sorts of different ways. We all know that when, when you put something on the internet, it lives forever, truly. And you know, your careers are long. You wanna make sure that you’re, you’re, that you’re properly reflecting the image that you want to create. Hmm.

00:53:43 [Speaker Changed] Good advice. And our final question, by the way, that advice applies not only to writing. Yes. But my wife is a recently retired teacher, and she used to always warn the kids all the stuff you’re putting on Facebook and Instagram and TikTok, be aware the colleges you’re applying to are looking at that and the jobs you’re gonna apply to, they’re gonna find that. That’s right. Especially as you work your way up the, up the corporate ladder, that stuff never goes away.

00:54:12 [Speaker Changed] That’s right. And now I’ll give you a counterpoint. You know, we, we do 360 reviews at, at Russell, and sometimes, you know, people that are relatively new in their careers, 25 or 28-year-old will write a review on somebody that they work for, or a couple levels up that I, that I read. And when I read a review that somebody has put a lot of thought into, and there’s some, you know, praise and constructive criticism, how to make things better, I say to myself, this person would make a good manager. And I, and I think about how can we use them in other places in the company. So it’s not just about like, when you’re writing about avoiding the things that you don’t want out there in the world that can harm you. It’s also making sure that you’re putting the time and the effort into writing things that are really gonna help you.

00:54:51 [Speaker Changed] Hmm. Really, really interesting observation and, and, and good advice for people just entering the workforce. Final question. What do you know about the world of investing today that would’ve been useful 30 years ago when you were first getting started?

00:55:07 [Speaker Changed] I wish that 30 years ago I had the confidence to know that, you know, that as an outsider, as a gay person, as an English major, someone coming at it from a different background that, that I could make it in, in, in this business that I didn’t have to constantly think about how am I gonna prove myself, but just by being a good productive contributor by raising my hand, you know, and, and, and, and showing a little bit of ambition by finding ways to help that, that can be enough. And sometimes that being an outsider can actually be a good thing. You know, that it can help you re-underwrite situations and come at it from a different angle. And if you know that and you’re confident in it and you use it to your advantage, it can really help you in your career. I figured that out along the way. It would’ve been helpful to know when I first started. Huh.

00:55:56 [Speaker Changed] Really, really fascinating stuff. Thank you, Zach, for being so generous with your time. We have been speaking with Zach Buckwald, he’s chairman and Chief Executive officer of Russell Investments. If you enjoy this conversation, check out any of the 589 we’ve done over the previous 11 years. You can find those at iTunes, Spotify, YouTube, Bloomberg, wherever you find your favorite podcasts. And be sure and check out my new book, how Not to Invest the ideas, numbers, and behaviors that destroy wealth and how to avoid them at your favorite bookstore. I would be remiss if I did not thank the crack team that helps put these conversations together each week. Alexis Noriega is my video producer. Sean Russo is my researcher. Anna Luke is my producer. I’m Barry Riol. You’ve been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

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10 Monday AM Reads

My back-to-work morning train WFH reads:

Meme Stocks Turn 5. Will There Ever Be Another GameStop? Five years after GameStop shareholders launched a revolt, Wall Street has adapted and may have won the war. (Barron’s)

UK Telegraph: Trump has crossed all lines: it is time to cut off his global credit card: America has lost its credibility. The only thing that can stop the president is the bond market. (Telegraph) see also The Greenland Fiasco Shows the Stock Market Is the Ultimate Check on Trump: Economic globalization and financial markets encourage the “Trump always chickens out” (TACO) cycle. If you like peace, that’s a good thing. (Reason)

The Wall Street Star Betting His Reputation on Robots and Flying Cars: Morgan Stanley’s former autos analyst has big ideas in his new gig covering the robot economy. (Wall Street Journal)

2026 will be the year Cybertruck dies: Tesla CEO Elon Musk overpromised sales of 250,000 Cybertrucks annually by 2025. The company has reached barely 8% of that target. (Fast Company)

Used Watch Prices Post Broad Gains For First Time In Years: As Secondary Market Strengthens: Morgan Stanley And WatchCharts. (Hodinkee) see also These Are the 100 Most Important Watches in the World Right Now: Nearly 1,000 pages long and weighing in at close to 25 pounds, Taschen’s new Ultimate Collector Watches is the final boss of horological coffee table books. (GQ)

Who Owns TikTok in the U.S. Now? Several big companies and investment firms are part of the new American TikTok. Many have ties to one another and President Trump. (New York Times)

Apple to Revamp Siri as a Built-In iPhone, Mac Chatbot to Fend Off OpenAI: The chatbot will be embedded deeply into the iPhone, iPad and Mac operating systems and replace the current Siri interface, allowing users to summon the new service by speaking the “Siri” command or holding down the side button. The new approach will go well beyond the abilities of the current Siri, with features such as searching the web, creating content, generating images, and analyzing uploaded files, and will be integrated into all of the company’s core apps. (Bloomberg)

New York City’s Worst Highways Can Lead Somewhere Better: The expressways that Robert Moses carved into the city helped inspire the entire American highway system. Now they can be models for community-led reform. (CityLab)

On Greenland, Europe stood up, Trump blinked, and the E.U. learned a lesson: For some in the often fractured E.U., Trump’s retreat on the Arctic territory proves that retaliation — not conciliation — is the answer to his hardball tactics. (Washington Post) see also ‘We Are Learning to Bully Back’ How Europe got Trump to cave on Greenland. (The Atlantic)

Trump Declared a Space Race With China. The US Is Losing If you want to put people back on the moon, don’t gut the agency in charge of getting them there. (Wired)

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business with Zach Buchwald, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Russell Investments. The global investment firm was founded in 1936, and today has ~$370 billion in AUM. Previously, he had a 15-year tenure at BlackRock, where he served as the head of its $2 trillion Institutional Business, leading the company’s Financial Institutions Group and helped establish its Retirement Solutions and Financial Markets Advisory platforms.

 

Over 75% of U.S. homes on the market are unaffordable to the typical household

Source: Axios

 

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10 Sunday Reads

Avert your eyes! My Sunday morning look at incompetency, corruption and policy failures:

I’ve Covered Police Abuse for 20 Years. What ICE Is Doing Is Different. There were no promises of an impartial investigation. There was no regret or remorse. There was little empathy for her family — for her parents, her partner or the children she left behind. From the moment the world learned about her death, the administration pronounced the shooting not only justified but an act of heroism worthy of praise and celebration. (New York Times)

We Are Witnessing the Self-Immolation of a Superpower: With Donald Trump’s actions in Greenland, Minneapolis, and Venezuela, a foreign enemy could not invent a better chain of events to wreck the standing of the United States. (Wired) see also America vs. the World: President Trump wants to return to the 19th century’s international order. He will leave America less prosperous—and the whole world less secure. (The Atlantic) see also This Is the End: Putinism abroad always morphs into Putinism at home. And we chose this path. Why? Because something-something the price of eggs. (The Bulwark)

The rich are powering spending, with the U.S. economy in a danger zone: The health of the economy increasingly depends on rich people spending money, a new analysis of government data finds. That puts the U.S. in a fragile place because consumer spending drives growth — so the entire economy is now relying on a smaller number of people to keep things afloat. (Axios)

When Chicago pawned its parking meters: The deal Chicago made would go down as one of the most notorious miscalculations in the history of city government. It would call into question what the government is even supposed to do, and become a textbook case on the potential pitfalls of privatization.  (NPR)

They’ve bought themselves a Congress: Coinbase calls the shots in the Senate; former New York City Mayor Eric Adams faces rug pull allegations, and a crypto executive is breaking up with Trump. (Citation Needed)

Inside Bari Weiss’s Hostile Takeover of CBS News: The network’s new editor-in-chief has championed a press free from élite bias, while aligning herself with a billionaire class more willing than ever to indulge Donald Trump. (New Yorker)

How Donald Trump Has Transformed ICE: A former D.H.S. oversight official on what, legally, the agency can and can’t do—and the accountability mechanisms that have been “gutted beyond recognition.” (New Yorker) see alsoICE 101″ — How Trump changed ICE and CBP into a fascist secret police: ICE and CBP are fatally flawed products of the post-9/11 War on Terror — now Trump has weaponized those very flaws to occupy America. (Doomsday Scenario)

DOGE staffer signed deal to share Social Security data with election deniers: In an extraordinary court filing, “NOTICE OF CORRECTIONS TO THE RECORD,” government lawyers representing the SSA revealed that in March 2025, a DOGE staffer signed an agreement to share the private data of Americans with a “political advocacy group” seeking to “overturn election results in certain States.” WTF? (Popular Information)

Rejecting Decades of Science, Vaccine Panel Chair Says Polio and Other Shots Should Be Optional: Dr. Kirk Milhoan, a pediatric cardiologist who leads the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, said a person’s right to refuse a vaccine outweighed concerns about illness or death from infectious diseases. (New York Times) see also The Quiet Misogyny of RFK Jr.’s War on Science: The burdens of so many of these proposals fall disproportionately on women, and moms in particular. (Slate)

A Year Inside Kash Patel’s F.B.I. Forty-five current and former employees on the changes they say are undermining the agency and making America less safe. (New York Times)

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business this weekend with Zach Buchwald, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Russell Investments. The global investment firm was founded in 1936, and today has ~$370 billion in AUM. Previously, he had a 15-year tenure at BlackRock, where he served as the head of its $2 trillion Institutional Business, leading the company’s Financial Institutions Group and helped establish its Retirement Solutions and Financial Markets Advisory platforms.

 

The most important chart in US politics

Source: @FredLambert

 

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MiB: Zach Buchwald, Russell Investments CEO and Chairman 



 

 

This week, I speak with Zach Buchwald, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Russell Investments about his career in investing. We discuss the creation of the smart beta philosophy by Russell 40 years ago. The company also pioneered the idea of an outsourced CIO.

We discuss the transition from pensions to 401ks for retirees. Specifically, the onus for investing has moved to the individual. Zach also describes his proposal for a program, that is now in effect, for a $1000 to every newborn who’s parents open a count to show the importance of compounding.

Zach explains why being “a gay guy in finance” impacted his perspective on the industry, giving him a different viewpoint.

A list of his current reading is here; A transcript of our conversation is available here Tuesday.

You can stream and download our full conversation, including any podcast extras, on Apple Podcasts, SpotifyYouTube, and Bloomberg. All of our earlier podcasts on your favorite pod hosts can be found here.

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business next week with Bob Moser, CEO and founder of Prime Group Holdings, a private investor in unique real estate holdings. They created Prime Storage, one of the largest, privately-held self-storage brands in the world, with over 19 million rentable square feet of space and 255 locations across 28 states and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The firm has acquired over $10 billion in real estate assets.

 

 

 

Current Reading

 

 

 

 

 

 

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10 Weekend Reads

The weekend is here! Pour yourself a mug of Danish Blend coffee, grab a seat outside, and get ready for our longer-form weekend reads:

Netflix’s $82.7 billion rags-to-riches story: How the DVD-by-mail company swallowed Hollywood. It’s a story so good it could have been a screenplay. In 2000, Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph sat down across from John Antioco, then CEO of video rental giant Blockbuster, and pitched him on acquiring their still unprofitable DVD-by-mail startup, Netflix, which at the time had around 300,000 subscribers. But when they told him their price—$50 million and the chance to develop and run Blockbuster’s online rental business—Antioco balked. By 2010, Blockbuster had filed for bankruptcy, and Netflix had stormed Hollywood with its entertainment streaming service. (Fortune)

Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger and the Reading Unlock: One Buffett lesson I’ll share with my kid: read, read, read. (SatPost by Trung Phan)

The Multidisciplinary Approach to Thinking. Using a true multidisciplinary understanding of things, Peter identifies two often overlooked, parabolic “Big Ideas”: 1) Mirrored Reciprocation (go positive and go first) and 2) Compound Interest (being constant). A great “Life Hack” is to simply combine these two into one basic approach to living your life: “Go positive and go first, and be constant in doing it.” (Farnam Street)

The Crisis Whisperer: how Adam Tooze makes sense of our bewildering age: Whether it’s the financial crash, the climate emergency or the breakdown of the international order, historian Adam Tooze has become the go-to guide to the radical new world we’ve entered. (The Guardian)

The Shape of Time: In the 19th century, the linear idea of time became dominant, forever changing how those in the West experience the world. (Aeon)

GLP-1s And Your Brain: The Surprising Impact On Addiction, Anxiety, ADHD, And More: What started out as a medication for diabetes and weight loss is offering something unexpected—and completely life-changing—for many women. (Womens Health)

The Education of the Broligarchy: The same sources that inspired tech moguls to bend matter, minds, and markets to their will may also help explain their foray into other forms of power (Colossus)

Can Congress Still Check the Commander in Chief? Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, discusses Venezuela, NATO and the limits of congressional power as global crises multiply. (Bloomberg)

An exclusive look inside the largest effort ever mounted to keep the Great Barrier Reef alive: Australia is doing absolutely everything to protect its most iconic ecosystem — except, perhaps, the one thing that really matters. (Vox)

Mike Macdonald is a genius, but that’s not the only reason his Seahawks are Super Bowl favorites: The Seahawks are arguably the best team in football because they have elite talent. But everyone in the NFL has talent, especially in the postseason. Marrying that talent with the vision and bringing it to life, Macdonald believes, starts with intent and attitude. That’s their foundation for getting players to play fast and free. (New York Times)

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business this weekend with Zach Buchwald, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Russell Investments. The global investment firm was founded in 1936, and today has ~$370 billion in AUM. Previously, he had a 15-year tenure at BlackRock, where he served as the head of its $2 trillion Institutional Business, leading the company’s Financial Institutions Group and helped establish its Retirement Solutions and Financial Markets Advisory platforms.

 

January 2026 set to be a record in Geopolitics

Source: Jim Reid, Deutsche Bank

 

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10 Friday AM Reads

My end-of-week morning train WFH reads:

• Five Reasons Gold Is Surging Toward $5,000 an Ounce: Buying the precious metal has become the antidote for market jitters (Wall Street Journal)

Rich Americans Had a Good 2025. Everyone Else Fell Behind: The top 1% of households now hold almost one-third of the nation’s wealth. (Bloomberg free)

The Economic Legacy of DOGE: DOGE’s legacy is officially the single-largest annual decline in the federal workforce in 75 years—with total federal employment down by roughly 277k, or more than 9%, since Trump’s inauguration; but it failed its supposed budget-cutting goals & broke important agencies. (Apricitas Economics)

The Real AI Talent War Is for Plumbers and Electricians: The AI boom is driving an unprecedented wave of data center construction, but there aren’t enough skilled tradespeople in the US to keep up. (Wired)

Gen X and Millennials Will Inherit Trillions in Real Estate Over the Next Decade How luxury homeowners are preparing their children for the great wealth transfer. (Wall Street Journal)

Fracking Goes Global: The technique, honed over the past 15 years in the US, is now being deployed to unlock hard-to-reach oil and gas reserves from Australia to Saudi Arabia. (Businessweek)

When Elon Musk Came for Michael O’Leary, the Irishman Knew Exactly What to Do: An online brawl between the CEOs of SpaceX and Ryanair has become a lesson in how to monetize a high-profile feud. (Wall Street Journal)

6,000 Truth Social Posts Later, Here Are the Promises Trump Kept—and Broke: From adding cane sugar to Coke to ending production of the penny, some of the president’s notable pledges have happened, but not all. (Wall Street Journal) see also The Real Donald Trump Is a Character on TV: Understand that, and you’ll understand what he’s doing in the White House. (NYT)

The Dilbert Afterlife: Sixty-eight years of highly defective people: This was the world of Dilbert’s rise. You’d put a Dilbert comic on your cubicle wall, and feel like you’d gotten away with something. If you were really clever, you’d put the Dilbert comic where Dilbert gets in trouble for putting a comic on his cubicle wall on your cubicle wall, and dare them to move against you. (Astral Codex)

The NFL solved overtime — and left coaches with a big decision: Teams that win the coin toss now face a 50-50 call about whether to kick or receive. There’s no right answer, and endless debate remains. (Washington Post)

Be sure to check out our bonus edition of Masters in Business interview with Cory Doctorow — science fiction author, activist, journalist and blogger. We discuss the power of large companies over the Internet is “Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It.”

 

Globally, EV sales went up 20% to 20.7 million. North America saw a 4% decrease

Source: Electrek

 

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MiB: Cory Doctorow on “Enshittification”



 

 

On this special, bonus edition of Masters in Business, I speak with Cory Doctorow, a science fiction author, activist, journalist and blogger. They discuss the power of large companies over the Internet, and Corey’s advocacy for data privacy. Barry and Cory discuss platform decay on the Internet, and how companies keep operating profitably while the user experience decays.

His new book is “Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It.”

An transcript will be posted below (shortly).

You can stream and download our full conversation, including any podcast extras, on Apple Podcasts, SpotifyYouTube, and Bloomberg. All of our earlier podcasts on your favorite pod hosts can be found here.

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business this weekend with Zach Buchwald, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Russell Investments. The global investment firm was founded in 1936, and today has ~$332 billion in AUM. Previously, he had a 15-year tenure at BlackRock, where he served as the head of its $2 trillion Institutional Business, leading the company’s Financial Institutions Group and helped establish its Retirement Solutions and Financial Markets Advisory platforms.

 

 

 

Transcript coming shortly…

 

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Transcript

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10 Thursday AM Reads

My morning train WFH reads:

Donald Trump vs. the World: “The bond market cannot be bullied, fooled, or bribed. It does not flatter or make deals. It reveals all.” (The Bulwark)

Greenland Clash Risks Undermining America’s Place in World Economic Order: The U.S. has long been a beacon of safety when uncertainty reigns. That is changing. (Wall Street Journal) see also Canada Flexes on Global Stage: With an Eye to Its Own Survival Prime Minister Mark Carney got a standing ovation in Davos for starkly describing the end of Pax Americana. He is looking for new allies to help his country survive it. (New York Times)

They quit their day jobs to bet on current events. A look inside the prediction market mania: Reminds me of people quitting their jobs to become Day-Traders in the 1990s — and we know how that worked out…. (NPR)

Can America build beautiful places again? Ugliness has more to do with the housing crisis than you think. (Vox)

Chinese EVs Blow Past Tesla and Tariffs En Route to Global Reign: U.S., European Union and Mexico try to quash accelerating demand for China’s hottest electric vehicles. (Wall Street Journal) see also BYD’s Cheap EVs Are Suddenly Everywhere in Mexico as Tariffs Take Hold: Chinese brands find growth in EV, plug-in segment other carmakers bypassed. (Bloomberg)

Maybe we’re all doomed. Or maybe Japanese bonds are getting cheap: Japanese government bonds have been having a monumentally awful time. The yield on 40-year JGBs on Monday sailed clean through 4 per cent for the first time. Investors in ultra-long maturity JGBs have now lost a cool fifth of their money over the past year alone. (FT Alphaville)

Apple lost the AI race — now the real challenge starts: It’s time to turn Apple Intelligence into something people actually care about. (The Verge)

In the AI economy, the ‘weirdness premium’ will set you apart. Lean into it, says expert on tech change economics. The word “weird” didn’t always mean strange. In Old English, descended from a mix of Germanic and Norse concepts, it meant something closer to “destiny” or “becoming” or even “fate.” Once upon a time, human beings in that culture thought that the way someone’s life would turn out was unseverable from the fundamental weirdness of being alive. (Fortune)

What Happened to Pam Bondi? How the attorney general became a person who loves telling Trump yes (also, she has been corrupt since the GFP, so we have that going for us, which is nice) (The Atlantic) see also Lindsey Halligan leaves DOJ as judge calls her use of title ‘charade’ Judges threatening actions against people INDIVIDUALLY— not against the office —is the best way to enforce Rule of Law. (USA Today)

How Gen Z is making millennials look cool again: Gen Z is reimagining the trends of its elders, embracing low-rise baggy and flare jeans, baby doll tops, and sweatpants with numbers. (Washington Post)

Be sure to check out our bonus edition of Masters in Business interview with Cory Doctorow — science fiction author, activist, journalist and blogger. We discuss the power of large companies over the Internet is “Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It.”

 


When Chaos Reigns, So Does Gold


Source: Bloomberg

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10 Wednesday AM Reads

My mid-week morning train WFH reads:

The brunt of US tariffs — 96% — has been paid by US buyers: A Kiel Institute study found US tariffs are mostly paid by American importers and consumers. The study found foreign exporters paid only around 4% of the tariff cost. The research contradicts Trump’s messaging that Americans aren’t paying for tariffs. (Yahoo)

Andreessen Horowitz Makes a $3 Billion Bet: That There’s No AI Bubble A newer fund run by an unconventional team at the venture firm is finding success focusing on infrastructure. (Bloomberg) see also Move Over, ChatGPT: You are about to hear a lot more about Claude Code. (The Atlantic)

How Europe Could ‘Weaponize’ $10 Trillion of US Assets Over Greenland: European countries hold US bonds and stocks, fueling speculation they could sell such assets in response to Trump’s renewed tariff war. Any weaponization of European holdings of US assets would represent a severe escalation, expanding a simmering trade war into a financial conflict that directly impacts capital markets. (Bloomberg free)

Shifting Tides in Global Markets: The Reemergence of International Investing. After more than a decade of US market dominance, 2025 may have marked a turning point for global investors. International equities have surged ahead of their US counterparts, evidenced by strong earnings growth and supported by policy reform momentum and a reassessment of “American exceptionalism.” (CFA Institute)

Zero-Sum Economics Keeps Failing: The world is not a lump of “resources.” (Noahpinion)

Rich people are leaving California, inspired by tech founders’ online campaign: The campaign against a proposed billionaire tax was sparked by industry leaders that have long bashed San Francisco. It has consumed the tech world, and it’s driving some of the state’s richest residents to relocate. (Washington Post)

Trump’s Tumultuous Year Pushing the Limits of Presidential Power: If you had to name a single thing Donald Trump has said that captures his tumultuous first year back in the White House, it might be this: “I have the right to do anything I want to do. I’m the president of the United States.” (Bloomberg) see also How Trump Has Pocketed $1,408,500,000: One year ago, Donald Trump took an oath to serve the American people. Instead, he has focused on using the presidency to enrich himself. (New York Times)

Photos Capture the Breathtaking Scale of China’s Wind and Solar Buildout: Last year China installed more than half of all wind and solar added globally. In May alone, it added enough renewable energy to power Poland, installing solar panels at a rate of roughly 100 every second. (Yale Environment 360)

I Want To Buy A Manual Before I Can’t Anymore! What Car Should I Buy Vineeth lives in Chicago and loves to drive. He grew up overseas and spent most of his life shifting his own gears. Once he came to the states he bought “practical” cars, but he wants to get something fun with three pedals before they all go extinct. With a budget up to $40,000, what car should he buy? (Jalopnik)

Even More Very Good Music Facts: The title of Tears for Fears’ “Everybody Wants to Rule the World” was taken from a line in The Clash’s “Charlie Don’t Surf.” “Charlie Don’t Surf” was taken from a line in “Apocalypse Now.” “Apocalypse Now” was based on Joseph Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness.” (Go Jeff Go)

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business interview this weekend with Nobel laureate Richard Thaler and his University of Chicago Booth School colleague Alex Imas on the update and reissue of his classic book The Winner’s Curse.

 

Solar met 61% of US electricity demand growth in 2025

Source: Ember

 

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Transcript: Richard Thaler and Alex Imas on The Winner’s Curse

 

 

The transcript from this week’s MiB: Richard Thaler and Alex Imas on The Winner’s Curse, is below.

You can stream and download our full conversation, including any podcast extras, on Apple Podcasts, SpotifyYouTube, and Bloomberg. All of our earlier podcasts on your favorite pod hosts can be found here.

~~~

Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio News. This is Masters in business with Barry Ritholtz on Bloomberg Radio

Barry Ritholtz: This weekend on the podcast, two extra special guests, Alex Emus and Richard Thaylor took Richard’s book, the Winner’s Curse and really completely rewrote it and updated it for 2025. I’ve been privileged to speak with Dr. Thaylor number of times over the past few years. He’s been a guest, boas both here and live in Chicago a number of times. Always a fascinating conversation. And Alex Emos is this really interesting professor who I had no idea I have used and relied on his previous research. Selling Fast and Buying Slow is a chapter in my book. Just an amazing coincidence, both fascinating people, and I thought this conversation was a lot of fun. And I think you will also, with no further ado, Alex Imas and Richard Thaler on The Winner’s Curse.

Richard Thaler: Thanks, Barry. Thank you. Great to be back.

Barry Ritholtz: It’s so great to have you. So you started, you wrote this book, it’s 30 years ago already. We’re gonna get to to this in a bit. Before we do, I wanna just talk about both of your backgrounds and how you began collaborating. Richard, you’ve been called the Godfather of Behavioral Economics. Take us back to the beginning when you were a young economist, how did you become interested in psychology and decision making?

Richard Thaler: So when I was in grad school and I was learning standard economics, I kept pausing and saying, really, because the models that we were being taught, the people, well, there are no people in, there are agents, and there are firms, and there are things they call consumers, but they’re not really people.

Barry Ritholtz: Homo economus

Richard Thaler: homo Economicus. And, and I started making a list of dumb stuff people do. And, but that was just to annoy my friends. And, but then somebody introduced me to the work of two Israeli psychologists, Danny Kahneman and AMO Ky. And when I read their papers, I had this big aha moment because what their research showed was not just that people make mistakes, of course we all make mistakes and can’t remember where we left our keys or what have you. What what they showed was that behavior is predictably different from the model that economists use. And that was an aha moment for me because it meant I could say, look, the model is wrong and in this direction. And you can think about that from, from an investment point of view. It, it, it’s fine to say stock prices are wrong, that’s fine, but useless.

If you can say which ones are too high and which ones are too low, then all of a sudden you’re a very rich man. So if, if we could say how people are different than this artificial model, then we could be in business. And then the, so I was doing that for a while, managed to get tenure at Cornell University and spent a year with condiment anderski, and then a second sabba year with Kahneman. And in 1985, the year Alex was born, I came back from sabbatical and decided to start writing a series of columns in a new economics journal called The Journal of Economic Perspectives. That journal, by the way, here’s a free tip. That journal is available free to anyone. And the articles are written to be understandable and people don’t know about it. If you’re really interested in economics, go and read some papers.

Barry Ritholtz: And, and the column you were writing was called “Anomalies” which were all of these things that were supposed to not be possible given traditional economic theory. You mentioned Kahneman and Toky. When you think of psychologists, you don’t think of quantitative data-driven rigorous models. But really that was at the heart of what they were doing, wasn’t it? Well,

Richard Thaler:  Eventually, the, the, their earlier work, you’re thinking of prospect theory, which was 1979. The work they did in the seventies leading up to that was on predictions or judgements. And the, the models weren’t very quantitative. They, they were typically a little scenario and almost like a thought experiment. You know, know there’s a famous experiment about Linda, and they give you a description of Linda, she was an undergraduate active in social movements, went to lots of demonstrations, blah, blah, blah. She’s now, and now you get a list of occupations and you’re asked to say which is most likely. And one of the ones is bank teller, and another one is feminist bank teller. And people think she’s more likely to be a feminist bank teller than a bank teller. Now obviously that cannot be true. I shouldn’t say obviously, because many people are now listening and saying, what does he mean? Obviously, obviously she’s a feminist bank teller. She couldn’t just be a bank teller, but that’s, you know,

Barry Ritholtz: Do the number theory. There are gonna be more bank tellers than from feminst bank tellers…

Richard Thaler: Yeah. Just think of a Venn diagram, right? Right. There’s a, a, a big circle of bank tellers, and then the small one with feminist bank tellers. So that was the kind of things they were doing. There was a little bit of theory. So like they had, the idea was that life is hard. And so people used what they called heuristics rules of thumb to make judgments. One is called the availability heuristic, which is, if it’s easier to think of examples of something, it’s more likely. So if you ask people what’s the ratio of homicides to suicides, people think maybe two or three to one, that homicides are more likely. It’s just the Opposite.  Twice as many suicides. Think about this, before you buy a gun, right? The most likely person to get killed with that gun is a family member. So

But again, notice this is a predictable mistake. And because why? Well, there’s lots of stories in the newspaper about homicides. Suicides tend to be quieter.

Barry Ritholtz:  There’s a wonderful graphic from our world in data, which was Hans Ling’s work that shows here’s how things are reported in the media, and then here’s their actual percentage in real life. Very little reporting on cancer, heart disease, high blood pressure, diabetes. You’re 50,000 times more likely to suffer from that than homicide, terrorism, or shark attacks, which they love to. Right.

Richard Thaler: Shark attacks don’t worry about so, so much. Australia,

Barry Ritholtz: especially in Chicago, it’s probably not a big,

Richard Thaler: , there are very few. So let’s, let’s bring Alex in. So when Richard started out in the field, there really wasn’t any such thing as behavioral economics. You have an advantage a few decades later of entering the field of behavior, of, of economics where behavioral economics is a thing. Tell us a little bit about what brought you into the field and how you found your way over to Booth.

Alex Imas: Well, so behavioral economics was a thing out in the economics journals. And, you know, there were people certainly doing it in various departments, but it wasn’t a thing at, as an undergrad. Like I don’t think. There was a single behavioral economics course offered at Northwestern Econ University while I, and this was 2000, 2003 through 2007. So even though, you know, people were publishing behavioral economics papers, it was all over the journals. People generally in the field knew about it as an undergraduate. It still had not made it into the curriculum.

Barry Ritholtz: 03-07? Danny was 2002 on the Nobel, is that right?

Alex Imas: Yeah. Still no classes.

Barry Ritholtz: So you would’ve thought someone might’ve picked up on that. And yet,  Northwestern is a big school.

Alex Imas: Open up a microeconomics textbook. It’s the same textbook from 1973 basically.

Richard Thaler: And that’s still true today.

Barry Ritholtz: Come on. Really? Yeah. I would’ve assumed at this point…?

Alex Imas: No, open up a textbook.

Barry Ritholtz:  Danny Kahneman, Bob Schiller, Richard Thaler, how many, how many Nobels have to come in this space before starts …

Alex Imas: With perfect competition. Then at the end, maybe you learn something about monopolies and that, that’s pretty much it. So it’s, I actually, I was pre-med. I was a, I’m an immigrant kid from Moldova. So my parents are like, well, it’s, you’re going to the medical school or you’re gonna fail, basically. So I got, I had one option on the table, so I was pre-med, organic chemistry was real hard, and it was eight, eight o’clock in the morning. Right. So I took econ to kind of just boost my GPA, I thought it was kind of fun. Right. And, you know, I didn’t, and it was interesting ’cause I was taking these psychiatry, abnormal psychology classes, learning about human behavior. I was taking economics, which is the study of human behavior. And these were like two completely different worlds, right? Economics is these hyper-rational utility maximizers had never made any systematic mistakes.

And no, I didn’t learn about a single deviation from that principle in the entire four years I was there. And so I was, I was thinking this is kind of, you know, this is fun, but not something I wanted to do. I’m interested in human beings. And then afterwards, I was applying to medical school and I was doing a cross country road trip with one of my friends to Los Angeles, and we were listening to, I think it was NPR, and it turned out ex post, I figured this out, Richard was on the radio right, talking about something called behavioral economics. And I was like, what is this? And as soon as I got to Los Angeles, you know, I, I went on the internet and I was like, I gotta find out more about this field. So I, within two weeks I had, you know, talked to my advisors at Northwestern. I’m, I, I want to get an econ PhD. If I can do something like this where I could combine my interest in economics and bring in human behavior into it, this is what I wanted to do.

Barry Ritholtz: So let’s talk about that. There’s something in the book, and we’ll get to that shortly, where you describe Richard, you describe an economist developing a new model, a new calculation for how consumers should behave in response to certain price incentives. So the first time ever someone creates this calculation, and then immediately afterwards, and therefore this is how all consumers are or should be behaving, when nobody had thought of this previously, how do you square that circle? How do you square the model driven? This is the right way to do it. I just figured this out and therefore everybody should be doing it this way.

Richard Thaler: Yeah. You, you know, maybe just a tiny bit of history will get us there. So economics didn’t use to be that extreme. If you go back and read Adam Smith, he talks about self-control problems and overconfidence. And people think of him as the father of right-wing economics. That’s not the guy. He did talk about the invisible hand, but he was a behavioral economist at heart. And economists were pretty reasonable until about World War ii. And then what happened was people started writing math, doing math, and they wanted to write down models. And if you wanna write down a model, the easiest one to write down is a rational model. And that, that’s because anybody, if you’ve taken high school calculus, you know, you can maximize, you set the first derivative equal to zero, and that’s the model, right? So writing down a model of some ish is hard.

Then during the seventies and eighties, people g started to get ideas for even smarter behavior. And a norm kind of developed in economics, which is, if the agents in my model are smarter than the agents in your model, then my model’s better than your model. Hmm. And that’s kind of crazy. But the, that was the way the, the field was going. And, and there was no real stopping it. So around the time that Alex was thinking about going to grad school, there were troublemakers like me, pointing at certain body parts of this naked emperor. But the, the field was rushing toward an extreme version of homo economicus, where homo economicus is a genius.

Barry Ritholtz: So we were talking a little earlier about the so-called wealth effect, which is something that the economists at the Federal Reserve love. The, the higher the market goes, the wealthier people supposedly feel, and they all go out and spend money. That’s just such a perfect example of a model that doesn’t reflect the real world. A huge amount of stocks are owned by the top 10%. It’s something like 52% of stocks. The average person doesn’t really have a whole lot at stake in the market. And the reality is people are spending more money ’cause the economy is doing well, they have jobs are getting raises, which by the way, all helps the market. How often do we run into these correlation-causation issues in economics?

Richard Thaler: Well, we run into them all the time. Look, the big problem with that, with the wealth effect, there’s a lot of discussion of that in this book. That one thing economists leave out is what I call mental accounting. And if you look at an economic model of the wealth effect, there’s some big W for wealth, and that’s it. And wealth will include your house and your retirement. Money and money you’ve set aside for your kids’ education, and then money that you intend to give to charity and your future expectation and right. And the, of all of the money that you stand to learn in the right. So now the, the people at the fed, if they’re just saying, well, W goes up, then people spend more. No, it turns out, for example, if the value of your house goes up, how much more do you spend? Approximately zero.

Barry Ritholtz: Really?

Richard Thaler: Approximately zero. Whereas if some stock you own gets bought and you get a check, you spend a lot of that. If you win a lottery, you spend like half of it and go bankrupt. So, so where the money sits has a big effect on how much of it you spend.

Barry Ritholtz: Your response to somebody’s question, “How are you gonna spend the windfall from the Nobel Prize?” was one of my favorite answers. You said it, do you recall?

Richard Thaler: Yeah, well, I recall, I mean, this was at four in the morning, they call you and wake you up and then say, go get some coffee because you have a press conference in half an hour. And I had heard enough of these interviews to know that somebody was likely to ask me that question. And my instinct was to say, well, you know, to a real economist, this is a stupid question because how am I gonna know? You know, suppose I go out and buy some fancy new car, Barry likes fancy cars. I like fancy wine. So suppose I go and buy a case of fancy wine, how do I know that’s the Nobel money as opposed to the money I got from selling a book?

Barry Ritholtz: All dollars are fungible,

Richard Thaler: All dollars are fungible. And you know, I, I’ve realized later that what I should have done is opened up a special account,

Barry Ritholtz:  The Nobel Prize money account

Richard Thaler: the Nobel Prize money, and a credit card that’s linked to that. And when I wanna go buy something stupid, just take out the Noble card and life would be more fun.

Barry Ritholtz: You, but the line that you said was as irrationally as I can.

Richard Thaler: I said I’ll just spend it as irrationally as possible. Just, I knew it would be a memorable line. So

Barry Ritholtz: It’s so funny because that line led to a conversation with my CFO about the difference in all of these Chase Sapphire card or the Amex platinum card where you get these points and the rational CFO says, “Hey, I want the money back each month. And my response is always, it’s a $100 or $200; it’s lost in your bank account.  You don’t see it.

When I get the points and want to buy a fancy cappuccino maker that my wife is going to yell at me: “Why are you spending $2,000 on a cappuccino maker? You idiot.” My answer is, oh no, it’s points, it’s free. And she’s like, okay, go, go get it. It’s the exact same concept. If you have that silo, that mental accounting, you could do as much irrationality as you’d like.

Richard Thaler:So, you know, but watch out if she listens to this podcast,

Barry Ritholtz:  She listens to the first five minutes and that’s it! Taps out.

Richard Thaler:  So you’re safe. I’m okay because, so I’ll tell you a story about my daughter Maggie, who lives in Rhode Island, and one of her neighbors grew up to be a pitcher for the Mets. And the Mets were playing in the playoffs in the first round. So

Barry Ritholtz: This is a long time ago. Yeah.

Richard Thaler: And this is an old story. And thi this guy was gonna pitch. So I call Maggie, “Hey, would you guys wanna go to the game? Let me see if I can get tickets. And she says, oh, that’d be great.” So I go online, the, the game is like tomorrow and I find some tickets. And there, there were a bunch, you know, on StubHub or something you could get tickets. So I text her back and said, look, here, here’s the website. It looks like there are lots of tickets to choose from. How about the tickets were about 300 bucks. I said, how about I’ll text, I’ll send you a thousand dollars, buy the tickets you want, spend the rest on hot dogs.

Barry Ritholtz: So you’re, you’re doing an experiment on your daughter to see if she buys the cheap tickets or the expensive ix?

Richard Thaler: No, no. So she texts me back and says, LOL this is just like in your book. If you send me a thousand dollars, I’m not going to use it on baseball tickets. So I’ve learned my lesson recently. She wanted to go to a concert. David Byrne is on tour and he was in Providence where she lives, and she wanted to go and she says, There’s some way you could get me tickets. I sent her the tickets instead of the money.

Barry Ritholtz: That’s so funny. Let’s talk a little bit about the book, the Winner’s Curse. And I wanna start with Alex. So this book has been out since you were a young kid. You go to college, you eventually figure, let me get a PhD in Behavioral economics or Finance and economics. How did you first discover this book? What was your initial response to it?

Alex Imas:  So I discovered it, there’s not really any textbooks and behavioral economics. So you kind of get here through the grapevine, oh, you should read this, you should read that. You mostly read journal articles, like with, if you’re thinking about doing game theory or something like that, there’s like a five or six textbooks that you can read with behavioral economics. There’s not a whole bunch. Winner’s Curse was one of those books that almost everybody recommends because the anomalies columns are just very, very accessible. And then you read the anomalies columns, they got a bunch of references, you look through the references. So I had read the original Winner’s Curse, I think second or third year of grad school. And then I got my first job at Cardi Mellon. I had already known Richard for a while at that point. We met in grad graduate school. His office was, happened to be right next to mine in San Diego.

And at some point I joined Booth and he called me up, I think like four or five months into my, into, into my first year and said, Hey, you know, I got this opportunity. We wanna, we, the publisher asked us to update the book. I’m thinking of doing a little bit more than just an update. You know, the books from 1992, there’s been 30 years of research. Are you interested in working together on this? So I, I mean, I jumped on the opportunity one, you know, I get to, to work with Richard, which is super fun. But two, I mean, you know, I’ve been doing behavioral economics research for a while and I know how much demand there is for a book that people can pick up and read and say, Hey, these are the original anomalies. Here’s the 30 years of research that has happened since. Now. I think at, at that point we were thinking like, you know, six months do a little update.

Barry Ritholtz: This was 2020 ?

Alex Imas: This conversation happened in 2020. The book is coming out now. We, you know, basically the two thirds of the book ended up being brand new. We wrote, we rewrote slightly, each anomalies column is kind of the bedrock. But, you know, 30 years of research has happened since. And it took a while to put all of that together. And essentially what we showed is, look, the original anomalies, when you read them, most of the experiments, most of the findings are from, you know, college students. Sometimes, you know, after a bad night out in the lab for, you know, making decisions over a dollar. And the big kind of pushback from economists was, look, we don’t really care about these people. We care about, you know, institutional investors, CEOs, we care about people who are in the market with money on the line making all these big decisions. And so what, why has behavioral economics become a success? Honestly, largely because of behavioral finance, because of the fact that behavioral economics, behavioral economists said, look, we got access to this amazing data on people making consequential decisions day in and day out. And they’re still making mistakes coming

Barry Ritholtz:  I love what Danny Kahneman once said is, I suffer from all the same behavioral biases that I’ve identified. You mean to tell me that we have 30 years of data, all this research, a handful of books. People still make the exact same behavioral mistakes they used to. Has there been any change in behavior essentially?

Richard Thaler: No. And that’s not that surprising because the stuff we’re talking about has been true as long as there have been humans. Right? So we talk about self-control problems, it’s in the Bible, right? You know, Homer talks about Odysseus tying himself to the mast that that’s like agreeing to have money taken outta your paycheck and put into a retirement plan. So human beings, yes, there’s evolution, but evolution takes thousands of years. Yeah. And 30 years is the blink of an eye.

00:27:05 [Speaker Changed] Since, since you mentioned retirement accounts, let’s talk a little bit about choice architecture and nudge. Before I, I arrived here, I looked up what was the impact of the default setting that you helped change through choice architecture? People used to get a new job, sign up for a 401k, and the money would come into that account and it would sit there in cash. And rather than have the default be cash, we through your work created a default as a, either a target date fund or a balanced fund, something like that. So it’s not sitting in cash. And it turns out there’s about 4.7 trillion with a T trillion dollars in those funds, of which 40%, according to recent research, was the default setting. So you get credit for about $2 trillion in retirement savings that might have otherwise just been sitting around in cash. How does the concept of people aren’t learning from their mistakes? So choice architecture is so important to help people make better decisions. How significant is that?

00:28:20 [Speaker Changed] Well, if you think about what was going on in the, in the early eighties, these defined contribution plans like 4 0 1 Ks were real new. Our parents, w if they, if you worked at a big firm, you had a defined benefit plan. My father worked for Prudential Insurance, you know, and his pension was number of years, worked times some function of his final salary, no decisions to make, kinda like social security. And we bring in these defined contribution plans, you have to decide whether to join and if so, how much to defer and then how to invest it. And people had no clue. And the lot of people just didn’t even join, which is about the dumbest mistake you can ever make.

00:29:22 [Speaker Changed] If you have a company with a match, you’re basically turning down free money. Right? Which, what economic model says that’s rational.

00:29:28 [Speaker Changed] No. Well, right. So I would say to economists, look, you would predict no one would make this mistake. But one early study, half the employees at a company are not joining in the first year. It’s amazing. So how do we fix that? Well, the simplest thing was to change the default. So we say, it used to be you’d get a form to fill out a piece of paper in those days. And if you wanna be in the plan, fill out this form and say you wanna join and how to invest, change that to you’re, you welcome to riddle’s management.

00:30:18 We have a pension plan, we’re gonna enroll you unless you opt out and we’re gonna enroll you into the default fund unless you choose otherwise. So all of that was not possible in the early nineties because there were companies were afraid to do automatic enrollment because they didn’t have permission. And target date funds weren’t legal. Hmm. Ironically, in the George W. Bush administration on one side, they were campaigning to partially privatize social security, but their labor department was forbidding companies from investing in anything that could go down. So there was a bill passed in 2006 that said, okay, you are allowed to automatically enroll and have a, an automatically escalate what we used to call savemore tomorrow and invest in some prudent funds.

00:31:42 And what was what You have to give something up to get that. So what, what I suggested to, there was a Republican senator from Utah who was the running the relevant committee. I said, how about if companies a agree to do all three of those, they’re exempt from some burdensome paperwork of non-discrimination rules. And so that’s what the Republicans got was less paperwork and people who cared about the workers got something. And so, and the workers got something and the the workers got something. And if they just do nothing, then they’re in and their contributions are going up and they’re in a sensible investment PO product.

00:32:40 [Speaker Changed] So this is kind of in nudge is kind of fascinating ’cause in the winner’s curse, you talk about things very much related to what happens in investing. So there’s loss aversion and the status quo bias and a variety of different things. Let, let’s talk about what are the issues that most relate to, as Alex said, behavioral finance as opposed to behavioral economics. What do we think are the, are the biggest factors that explain irrational human behavior in, in stock and bond markets?

00:33:18 [Speaker Changed] So I think there’s a few things that kind of people documented in the late nineties, early two thousands that have just replicated and just became bigger, if anything. So the disposition effect is one of them. So the disposition effect, this is Sheron and Statman. They dec they came up with a paper in 1985 documenting it originally. Terry Ode has this giant data set that he published in 1999, documenting it in a bit of a larger sample. And then now it’s been replicated in Finland all over the world. And it’s this tendency for people, you know, when I, when I buy a stock, it goes up in price. What do I do? I sell it. I wanna realize my gains same stock goes down in price. It, you know, this is now a loss. What do I do? Hold onto it. So it’s this tendency to realize your gains and hold onto your losses.

00:34:08 [Speaker Changed] Peter Lynch, by the way, 40 years ago, used to call that cutting your flowers and watering your weeds. That was his expression for it. So it was, it was visible to a guy running a fund at Fidelity in the 1980s.

00:34:23 [Speaker Changed] Yes. And it’s, and and this is just talking about like, are people learning? I mean, apparently not because it’s like, it’s again, you, I bet you you download Robinhood data from today, you’re gonna see it show up. So that’s the, the, and this is kind of the tendency, you know what feels good when you’re, when when, when you own a stock, selling it at a gain and you know, telling your friends, Hey, you know, I bought that thing for 90, it’s one 20. I just, I just made a lot of money. You know what feels worse, telling your friends, I bought it at 90 and I sold it at 60. So you just kind of hold onto it hoping something happens. Maybe some people even double up buy more shares just to break even. So the disposition effect this kind of tendency for individual behavior to, you know, realize gains, avoid losses.

00:35:08 The other thing is I, and I in my view, this is kind of the bigger, the bigger principle is limited attention. So, you know, there’s a lot of stocks out there, which ones are people buying? And this is not just retail investors, this is, this is bigger institutional investors too. It’s the ones that are covered in the news. We were talking about availability bias earlier. What are the things that are coming to mind? Things that, that have recently been covered. Maybe you heard an earnings announcement call or something like that. These attention grabbing stocks, they’re much more likely to go into people’s portfolios. It’s because people don’t, you know, aren’t evaluating the entire, the entire universe of stocks whenever they think they’re thinking about something to buy. So,

00:35:49 [Speaker Changed] So let’s address that because the United States happens of, of all countries not only has such a large stock market Yeah. But the home country bias is so acute here. And you don’t hear a lot about foreign con companies all that often. You mostly hear about local companies, local CEOs, local products. How significant is that sort of bias in people’s portfolios being not only overloaded with their own country, but hey, if you are in New York, you can have more finance companies. If you’re in San Francisco, you have more tech companies. If you’re in the Midwest, you’re gonna have more manufacturing companies.

00:36:30 [Speaker Changed] It’s, it’s more extreme than that. If I’m working for a specific company, I have more of that stock.

00:36:34 [Speaker Changed] When, if anything, you should have diversified.

00:36:36 [Speaker Changed] Right?

00:36:38 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. I think one campaign that has been moderately successful is I think fewer companies are foisting stock of their own company onto the workers. It used to be the match was often paid in company stock.

00:36:56 [Speaker Changed] Well, GE was notorious and they lost half a trillion dollars of employee investments because of their match.

00:37:05 [Speaker Changed] Well, and Enron.

00:37:07 [Speaker Changed] Enron, so my, one of my, one of my friends, their, their, their father, he was working at Enron, he was a risk manager. FYI and oops,

00:37:19 [Speaker Changed] Just not a very good one. Huge, huge percentage of his p although, although portfolio, although you could be the greatest risk manager there, the bosses were not listening to you.

00:37:27 [Speaker Changed] Right. But they compounded it by putting their employees money in the 401k into and run stock. Run stock. Yeah. So they get fired and their retirement money goes poof.

00:37:41 [Speaker Changed] Right. Unbelievable.

00:37:43 [Speaker Changed] But you know, looking back at what people were owning, I mean there is that, you know, people in the 401k element, but people who were working there were freely buying Enron stock. Right. This according to economic models, you should be diversifying. You already have a bunch of Enron stock in your 401k, you shouldn’t be taking your discretionary spending and buying more Enron stock. And that’s exactly what was happening. Hmm.

00:38:06 [Speaker Changed] Really, you know, this home bias applies all around the world. At least the US is a big country. I wrote a paper once about the Swedish social sec, sort of 401k plan. This was a risky move ’cause I was making fun of it. And there was some award that might happen. But anyway, Sweden is 1% of world

00:38:35 [Speaker Changed] GDP, tiny, tiny GDP tiny stock money. And

00:38:38 [Speaker Changed] They weren’t putting most of their money in Swedish stocks. It’s crazy.

00:38:42 [Speaker Changed] They, they ignored the other 99% of the world. Yeah. But that, that just goes to show you the bias. So the obvious question is, if you two were advising a portfolio manager, what sort of behavioral principles would you emphasize for them to build a robust portfolio?

00:39:01 [Speaker Changed] Well, as you know, I, one hat I have is I’m involved in a company that does this,

00:39:09 [Speaker Changed] That has also has your name on the door. It

00:39:11 [Speaker Changed] Also has my name on the door, fuller Ann Thaler Asset Management. And I, now, let me say I cannot name a single stock wheel and no one at the firm would think it’s a good idea for me to be making suggestions. Were buy small cap stock. So it’s, you know, if we owned Apple or Tesla, I might know it, but we don’t buy any big stock. So they’re mostly companies you’ve never heard of and I’ve never heard of them. But

00:39:45 [Speaker Changed] This is because you’ve identified a behavioral issue that is now reflected in the model that you they use to purchase.

00:39:54 [Speaker Changed] Right. So we we’re not, we’re not a quant shop, which is a little unusual for a firm that’s run by some academics, but each strategy is based on a bias. So there’s one that’s based on overreaction. There’s one that’s based on under reaction. So we are, we try to find stocks that we think the rest of the market is making a mistake about. And then we forbid the portfolio managers from forecasting earnings because we, that they’re gonna be, you know, do we think with our 30 employees that we’re gonna make better forecasts than fidelity? It’s crazy. But we think we have an advantage. ’cause we’re trying to predict something else. We’re trying to predict the mistakes. It’s like you’re a baseball fan. If there’s a pitcher that is a sinker ball pitcher, so the Alex, this means the ball goes down as it approaches the plate, these foreigners. But you know, if there’s a sinker ball pitcher, you and I can predict batters are gonna hit ground balls because they’re fooled. The ball drops. And if you hit it slightly above the center, the ball goes down. So you don’t have to be able to hit a ball to know it’s gonna go down. And so we don’t have to be able to forecast earnings to predict that other people are gonna be predicting too high.

00:41:36 [Speaker Changed] I wanna bring this, this back to the book. ’cause one of the concepts underlying the book was, Hey, there’s a reproducibility issue in, in social sciences, how well have these anomalies and the theories you built around them, how well is this held up? How robust and reproducible are these findings? And it turns out very, talk to us about what, what you guys discovered when you were revisiting all of these principles that were first written about 20, 30 years ago. Yeah,

00:42:08 [Speaker Changed] So as you mentioned, there’s a, there’s a, some I call a crisis of reproducibility and social science more broadly. So this is psychology, some sociology, et cetera. And the worry is that, you know, these anomalies that were published in in the eighties and nineties, these are the bedrock of the entire field of behavioral economics. And you might be worried like, look, maybe these things don’t reproduce and there’s two ways that they can’t, they don’t reproduce one, you run the same experiment again and it doesn’t work. It was p hacked, as I said, like small sample sizes, no incentives. The second way by not reproduce is that it literally only reproduces in the exact conditions. It was run originally with college students at low stakes. You go out in a different population with people who are a bit more sophisticated, know what’s going on and you know, it doesn’t work.

00:42:55 So what we did in the book was to say, look, let first, let’s take the exact same experiments and run them again. Everybody knows about, you know, the, the original anomalies. So maybe they don’t work because people are like, ah, this is a loss aversion experiment. I know what’s going on. I’m not gonna do this. This is the endowment effect. I’m not gonna do this. So we just replicated them directly on a completely different platform. So we used an online crowdsourcing platform called Prolific Basic. Everything works. Everything works. And we, you know, you don’t have to take our word for it. We, if you go on the website of the book, we posted all of the results of our replications, but also instructions on how you can do it yourself. So if somebody’s like, ah, I don’t, I don’t, I don’t know about these guys, I run ’em yourself.

00:43:41 And you know, people are still loss averse. They still have the endowment effect things like the conjunction fallacy, the Linda problem that, that Richard was talking about. All works still. The second part is this external validity part. Does anybody other than college students display these, these effects? And that’s kind of the updates part of the book. And the answer is yes. You know, the loss aversion has been and the myopic loss aversion ver part that’s been used to explain the equity premium puzzle that’s still reproducible. We also do a bunch of outta sample tests of the, of the anomalies that didn’t use experimental data. And you know, that replicates outta sample too. So people aren’t learning. The psychology is the same. You know,

00:44:27 [Speaker Changed] One of, one of the comms was about the equity premium puzzle. We didn’t include this in the book ’cause it’s a little wonky, but the equity premium is just the difference in returns between stocks and bonds. The equity premium puzzle is how big it is. And theory says it should be like less than 1%. And historically it was about 7%. Wow. And the article about that was in the early eighties. So we’ve had 40 years of data since the puzzle was announced. The equity premium exactly the same. It’s, I mean, 1% lower. So, and that’s what we see basically everywhere. Everything’s the same.

00:45:12 [Speaker Changed] So, so one of the concepts that people have challenged is not being very reproducible has been the concept of priming to some sometimes anchoring is, is similar, but that seems to be more reproducible. But when I hear Linda, the bank teller story, that feels like the framing of that is very much a priming when you hear about her as politically active and yeah. Being involved in what, how do you distinguish when you have these theoretical overlapping biases that all kind of interact with each other?

00:45:49 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, so priming is actually a huge literature in cognitive psychology. Basic priming is very robust. So it’s the idea of, you know, I say a bunch of words that start with a k, what comes to mind, a word that starts with a K that’s gonna reproduce any day of the week. There’s a special subset of priming research that was done kind of in the nineties, early two thousands that kind of took this to an extreme, which is, so here’s an example. Let’s say you’re doing word search and there’s a bunch of words that have to do with like oranges, palm trees, hot weather, like vaguely related with Florida, right? And then that’s supposed to prime in your brain old people. And the result, the dependent variable was that those subjects who had those words, they walked a little slower out of the lap. Right? I mean that’s, it’s a little crazy. Right.

00:46:40 [Speaker Changed] Kind of tough to to measure also.

00:46:42 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. So I mean it relied, there’s a lot of degrees of freedom. The researcher can be looking in a certain direction, you know, and those tend to tend to not reproduce the sort of priming that the something like Linda, the Linda problem for example, has, that’s more in the kind of cognitive psychology wheelhouse of like, what do you think about when I describe a person who takes part in radical rallies, what comes to mind? This is, this is a basic concept in memory. Right? So the, and the the second part that, that I wanted to, to say is that priming, as far as like looking at the behavioral economics research, priming is of a really small part. It was actually not really featured much in the book, but, but the type that is, that was used by, you know, know first scan Kahneman, it’s much more in the wheelhouse of just basic cognitive psychology.

00:47:34 [Speaker Changed] More like anchoring. Does anchoring still hold up? Oh yeah. Very well. Yeah. Oh

00:47:38 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And look, one of the things when, when I was writing those columns, the, I could pick anything I picked big effect sizes. And some of the problem, you know, we talked earlier about the norm in economics to make models smarter and smarter. I think there was a norm in psychology for results to get cleverer and clever.

00:48:07 [Speaker Changed] Well, I thought Alex’s paper where you randomly sell versus what was actually sold, that was a very clever setup for a, for a paper.

00:48:16 [Speaker Changed] It was clever, but it wasn’t the, what I was deriving is a norm that the models assume people are being clever as opposed to designing a clever paper.

00:48:28 [Speaker Changed] Gotcha.

00:48:29 [Speaker Changed] We’re all for clever papers.

00:48:30 [Speaker Changed] Okay.

00:48:31 [Speaker Changed] We, we like clever papers. So when I was choosing to what columns to write about, I picked big stuff and think about, there’s a well-known company that makes cinnamon buns and has the strategy of pumping the smell of that out into the airport. Now let’s say you’re on a low carb diet, just hypothetically, hypothetically, you know, if you walk by that thing that’s, that’s priming and that works and it, it’s not, it’s not clever, it’s just works. It’s not right. It’s a big effect size. Yeah. So there are, and so everything I wrote about was big and it’s because I wanted to pick things that I thought were well established. And so, you know, it, I think if I had looked for cute little things, then some of them would’ve failed to replicate. You

00:49:41 [Speaker Changed] Also pick things that people were actively attacking and adversarially trying to replicate at the time that you were writing it.

00:49:48 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. I mean, look, take, take the ultimatum game. Yeah.

00:49:52 [Speaker Changed] Okay.

00:49:53 [Speaker Changed] Right. That’s one of the original columns and one that we include in the book. The game is very simple. I give Barry a hundred dollars, I say share it with Alex. You can give whatever proportion of the hundred you want to Alex, he says yes or no. If, if he says yes, he give, he gets whatever you offer, then you get the rest. If he says no, you both get nothing. Now the standard economic model at the time predicts that Alex will accept anything because something is better than nothing. Barry knows that Alex will accept anything. And so he offers him a dollar and Alex accepts Now real people, only an economist would think that that’s a really good prediction. Anybody who’s not an economist is gonna say, what are you kidding? I’m not gonna take a dollar and give you 99. You didn’t do do anything to deserve that 99. So if you run that experiment, if you offer less than 20%, you’re gonna get rejected. And the profit maximizing offer is about 40%. And most people offer half. Okay. Now there were big fights. There was a professor from Brit who, Ben Moore who Yeah. Who was saying this was challenging game theory and no, it wasn’t challenging game theory, it was challenging the idea that the agents only care about money and don’t care about being treated fairly.

00:51:56 [Speaker Changed] So let, let’s address that. ’cause I, I love the evolutionary biology of this. Humans were cooperative social primates. We have neither fangs nor claws. So we had to come up with some way to stay alive. And it turns out cooperating in a tribe is very useful survival tactic. It seems that an inherent sense of fairness is somewhat built into all of us, as well as social status seeking. So how much of this issue in economics derives from not understanding a little bit of evolutionary history?

00:52:40 [Speaker Changed] You know, it’s a tricky thing. Obviously we have evolved to be who we are. There are some people who then say, well that means whatever we do is optimal.

00:52:53 [Speaker Changed] Well, maybe, maybe not.

00:52:55 [Speaker Changed] No, that’s stupid. I mean, we evolved on the savanna,

00:53:00 [Speaker Changed] Right?

00:53:01 [Speaker Changed] Right.

00:53:01 [Speaker Changed] And nothing about picking muni bonds from a, a large assignment.

00:53:05 [Speaker Changed] Right. You know, AMS Dsky was famous for one-liners and he, he had a a one-liner about loss aversion, which was, there may have been species that did not exhibit loss aversion and they’re now extinct. Right. So if you’re at subsistence, it’s really smart to be worried about losing,

00:53:30 [Speaker Changed] It’s an existential threat.

00:53:31 [Speaker Changed] Right. But, you know, none, the three of us, we could go several days without eating some more, more days than others. Right? Right. So we’re, we’re not a subsistence and yeah, we ha managing our own portfolios is something people have been doing for 30 years, right? Yeah. The rich people, but they had their broker do it. Right? So there’s no evolutionary history of how to manage a portfolio and even saving for retirement. People didn’t live long enough to worry about that. And if you were unlucky enough to reach my age, then you, you hoped your kids would take care of you. And they lived nearby, you know, then people started scattering and penicillin and you know, so now we live long and, and, and our kids are scattered and they have no interest in having us move in with them. So people had to learn a very new thing and they needed some help.

00:54:51 [Speaker Changed] Hmm. Really, really fascinating. So we didn’t talk about the where the, from when the title of the winner’s curse comes from. Why don’t, before we get to the future of behavioral finance, let’s, let’s talk about the winner’s curse. Tell us where the name comes from,

00:55:07 [Speaker Changed] The concept, the, I should say the title of the book comes from the title of one of the chapters. And I picked it as the title back then because it’s sort of a fun phrase and a bit intriguing. And the concept itself is interesting and important. The idea is this. Suppose you have a lot of people bidding for some object that’s worth the same to everybody. And it could be when you do this as a demonstration in the class, you fill up a jar of jelly beans or coins and say it’s 10 cents for each jellybean and it’s a hundred dollars in the jar. Now we’re gonna auction it off. High bidder wins the a hundred dollars, but they don’t know what

00:56:00 [Speaker Changed] They don’t know. It’s worth a hundred dollars. Yeah.

00:56:02 [Speaker Changed] All they see is a lot of coins or jelly beans. What happens? Well, the average bid is less than a hundred dollars because people are risk averse. But the winning bid is always above a hundred dollars if you have enough people. Because the most optimistic forecast is likely the highest bid. And it’s too high. Now, this was not discovered by psychologists in the lab. It was discovered by engineers at Atlantic Richfield

00:56:39 [Speaker Changed] Arco, the, the energy company.

00:56:41 [Speaker Changed] The energy company who discovered they were bidding for oil leases in what I continue to insist on calling the Gulf of Mexico. And they realized that the leases they won one had less oil than they expected. And they said, gee, we thought we had world class geologists. What’s going on? Are they dummies? And then they realized that it’s quite subtle that the, that what you’re trying to do is make a bid that will make you money if you win. And the if you win part, if there’s a hundred people bidding, gee, do I really wanna win? Because maybe I misunderstood something. Right? So that’s the winner’s curse and it, it was found and replicated on bidding for oil leases. It’s relevant in book publishing

00:57:54 [Speaker Changed] When they’re bidding contests for books for

00:57:56 [Speaker Changed] Yes. Yes.

00:57:57 [Speaker Changed] So let me, let me see if I can clarify the, the, the way you’re describing the winter scar. So we’re bidding for oil leases. We don’t know exactly how much oil is gonna come out of this hole for or or area for the next 10, 20 years. And when there’s many people bidding, all of which are advised by geologists, if you make a conservative bet, the odds are you’re gonna lose. But if you make a bet that’s high enough that you’re gonna win, the odds are it’s not gonna be a money maker. Right. Coming up, we continue our conversation with Richard Thaler and Alex Emos discussing the book. They have recently updated the winner’s Curse behavioral Economics anomalies then and now I’m Barry Ritholtz. You are listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

00:59:06 I’m Barry Ritholtz. You are listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guests this week are Richard Thaler and Alex Emos, both of the Chicago Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago. I shared with you an article I saw recently. Some real estate group did a study of tens of thousands of home transactions where there was a bidding war and they found something very similar. The winners of the bidding war ended up paying much more than the subsequent home value was determined by looking at comparable homes in the neighborhood. So is the purpose of an auction to identify something at a fair value where it’s profitable for you? Or is the purpose of an auction to win at any cost?

00:59:57 [Speaker Changed] Well, it, so there are two interesting aspects of that. One is, suppose you’re these engineers and you’ve discovered this, what should you do? And if you’re losing money every time you win an auction, you could not bid. But then you don’t have any places to drill. And what did they decide to do is really clever. They decided to write a paper

01:00:24 [Speaker Changed] In order to get people to stop overbidding. Yeah.

01:00:27 [Speaker Changed] Now that’s different than what the owners of Major League Baseball did.

01:00:33 [Speaker Changed] I was gonna say, why didn’t they just Moneyball it? Why didn’t they just start looking at ugly but productive?

01:00:40 [Speaker Changed] Well, I what the major league baseball owners did is they colluded,

01:00:47 [Speaker Changed] Right?

01:00:47 [Speaker Changed] And they said, look, let’s not bid anymore. Well,

01:00:50 [Speaker Changed] The salary caps that are in all these,

01:00:52 [Speaker Changed] No, no, there was just out outright collusion when baseball players first became free agents. The owner said, Hey, we’re losing money on these crazy auctions, let’s just not bid. And then they got slapped down. Right. So what can you do? I mean, you can try to, a, a good strategy is to bid very low on every site. And in the data there were lots of sites that you could have gotten for a dollar.

01:01:29 [Speaker Changed] Really?

01:01:31 [Speaker Changed] And

01:01:31 [Speaker Changed] Because, ’cause the consensus was there’s no there there.

01:01:35 [Speaker Changed] Right. And

01:01:36 [Speaker Changed] Were any of them productive? Did any of these doubt? Some of them

01:01:39 [Speaker Changed] Will

01:01:39 [Speaker Changed] Be. Really? So now let’s bring this back to sports, because you’ve written papers on NFL drafts.

01:01:48 [Speaker Changed] So the, the, the NFL draft every year there’s, they have a draft for new players. The first pick is given to the team with the worst record the previous year with the idea that that’s gonna be a big advantage to them and will help them improve. Cade Massey, one of my former students, he and I wrote a paper showing that the first pick is actually not the most valuable because the league has a salary. E the first player gets paid the most, and you can trade the first pick for the seventh and eighth picks or for five second round picks. And what we showed is, if, if you trade the first pick for lower picks, you get more value.

01:02:48 [Speaker Changed] So now this is known like the Arco engineers publishing the paper, and yet there still seems to be this frenetic war for top, top one, top three, top five picks. Has the NFL learned any lessons from the research?

01:03:07 [Speaker Changed] Almost nothing. They, so they have learned that you should, they only trade up to get the first pick to pick a quarterback. So that’s smart because the quarterbacks are more valuable than any other player.

01:03:26 [Speaker Changed] Well of course you want that first pick. So you could get a Tom Brady. Yeah. Except,

01:03:31 [Speaker Changed] Except Tom Brady was taken with 190 ninth pick. And all the listeners who are football fans can have their list of people who were taken with the first pick and turned out to be busts. The Chicago Bears seemed to specialize in that, although let’s hope this current guy

01:03:53 [Speaker Changed] Is a new one. So, so how much of this, like, I’m seeing this through the lens of my book, which I don’t want to talk about, but how much of this is just how difficult it is to predict the future, to, to have truly expert judgment about these very complex, very variable. So selecting quarterbacks, identifying oil leases, like it seems that supposed expert advice ain’t all that expert. How much of this is, aren’t we better off just being a little more humble about our, let’s give up the top pick and have five second round. Somebody in that five is likely to be half decent, right? Yeah.

01:04:37 [Speaker Changed] So let, let, let, let me stick to the sports for one second because there’s one statistic from our paper and we’ve just, we’re coincidentally, we’ve been in a process of replicating that study. So I have the new data, but here’s the statistic. Take all the players at a given position, say quarterback or cornerback or running back, rank them in the order in which they’re picked. And now ask the fourth guy, what’s the chance he’s better than the fifth guy? So for the, for the whole thing. So what’s the chance the earlier player is better than the next one?

01:05:19 [Speaker Changed] One over two, 10 over 11, five over six.

01:05:22 [Speaker Changed] Right Now if they’re perfect, it’ll be a hundred percent. If they’re coin flipping, it’ll be 50%. What do you think it is? I think

01:05:32 [Speaker Changed] It’s less than 50%. I think it’s probably,

01:05:34 [Speaker Changed] You think negative Carl, they ha they know less than nothing,

01:05:37 [Speaker Changed] Right? That’s right. I I think it’s in the thirties or forties.

01:05:40 [Speaker Changed] Well, they’re not that bad. All right. I mean, because if they were then you could just, you know, flip a coin What you No, no. You’d want it what the George Costanza you wanted the opposite. Opposite, right? That’s right. So, so no, they don’t have negative knowledge. They have a tiny little, it’s 53%. Okay. So, but that’s your point really, which is they think they know this guy is the next Tom Brady and there’s only a 53% chance that he is better than the next one. And you know, Patrick Mahomes, Josh Allen, think none of these were first picks,

01:06:24 [Speaker Changed] Right? That’s

01:06:25 [Speaker Changed] Right. Right. So this

01:06:26 [Speaker Changed] Mahomes kid is gonna be pretty good one. I think

01:06:28 [Speaker Changed] He might make it. Yeah.

01:06:29 [Speaker Changed] He’s got some potential, right.

01:06:31 [Speaker Changed] So, and I think that is, so getting off of sports, I think that your general point is exactly right, that people are look overconfidence. Danny Kahneman used to say that’s the mother of all biases. And it, we fall into these traps because we think we know more than we do. And if we had some humility, maybe if we listen to our spouses more often, because at least in my house, my wife doesn’t think that I know anything, so she’s always bringing me back to 50%. Right? And, and she’s usually right.

01:07:20 [Speaker Changed] My, my wife is from the same cut, from the same cloth. So, so I wanna bring Alex back into this. So when we’re thinking about the future of behavioral economics and, and what this means for investors or regular people making financial decisions or in significant decisions, what direction are, are we moving in? Are, are we learning from all of this knowledge that’s been accumulated? Or are we just destined to make the same mistakes over and over again?

01:07:55 [Speaker Changed] I don’t think we’re destined to do anything. I think it’s a choice to look, take, you know, read papers and look at papers on kind of published in financial journals where people are making mistakes. And then to choose to say like, look, I actually can correct this by having a particular decision aid or asking my spouse what to do or something like that. So you know what a paper you mentioned earlier, we published this actually just last year called Selling Fast and Buying Slow. And in that paper, basically we look at institutional investors. So thinking about who in the economy are least likely to be exhibiting behavioral biases. You know, maybe retail traders, they’re like, you know, drinking beer in their basement while trading stocks on Robinhood. Maybe the, this is not the sophisticated people we want to be looking at, but, you know, institutional investors, the average portfolio in the dataset was like 600 million, $700 million or something like that.

01:08:52 We had a data set where we actually saw every single day thing they did over a, something like a 12 or 13 year period as far as what they’re buying and what they’re selling. And what we found is because the data’s so rich, we can actually construct these counterfactual portfolios. We can say, look, I see what you’re buying. What if you bought something else? So it could be something else from your portfolio. You can top something up or you can buy something new from the, from the universe. On the other hand, we could say, look, same thing for for selling. I saw you sold Apple. You, I saw you sold Samsung. Let me sell something else instead. How, how would that perform relative to what you actually did? And what we found is that on the buying side, people actually did really well. I mean, these guys are in, they have Oh,

01:09:37 [Speaker Changed] Really? Well, but better, better than random fund managers create some value in their stock selection when they’re making purchases. Yes. Right? Yes. But the flip side of that, not so much.

01:09:48 [Speaker Changed] No, not so much. We had, we really wanted to be conservative. We didn’t want to, you know, say compare them to the benchmark or something like that. We said, let’s throw a dart at your portfolio and sell that instead of what you

01:10:00 [Speaker Changed] Actually sold. So instead of selling what the manager wants to sell, you would sell something else randomly from the rest of the portfolio.

01:10:06 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. A random selling

01:10:08 [Speaker Changed] Strategy. And the performance difference was how significant,

01:10:10 [Speaker Changed] Basically. Same difference, but in the opposite direction, meaning, so they were losing a ton of money.

01:10:17 [Speaker Changed] So a hundred, 200 basis points on a random sell better.

01:10:21 [Speaker Changed] Yes.

01:10:21 [Speaker Changed] Performance.

01:10:21 [Speaker Changed] Exactly.

01:10:22 [Speaker Changed] And you know, the way when I read that paper and wrote about it, the way I rationalized it or tried to conceptualize it, was they’re bringing a very objective quantitative approach to the stock selection issue, but it seems that their cells are filled with biases and squishy decision making. Is that a, a fair description?

01:10:45 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, exactly. So the, we found no evidence for heuristics on their buying decision. Like we couldn’t find anything. Like they just seemed to be very disciplined and no, no, and, and principled about what they’re buying. But on the selling side, we found literally the same biases that we found in the lab.

01:11:01 [Speaker Changed] Has, has there been any evolution or improvement in this recently? That’s the question that I keep coming back to. It seems that you, Richard, you figured a lot of these things out 25, 35 years ago. Are we any better at making unbiased decisions or are we still subject to the same foibles?

01:11:23 [Speaker Changed] I think you need something extra, right? You can’t just say, I am not gonna do this, and I have decided not to listen to my psychology. That’s what it would look like to

01:11:31 [Speaker Changed] Be better. Well choice architecture or building Exactly. Some guardrails. And, but this is defaults,

01:11:37 [Speaker Changed] This is where overconfidence comes in. When you read a paper about somebody doing something silly, your first reaction is not me.

01:11:44 [Speaker Changed] Right?

01:11:45 [Speaker Changed] That’s them. That’s not me. The blind

01:11:46 [Speaker Changed] Spot. This

01:11:47 [Speaker Changed] Is called the bias blind spot. Exactly. So this is a well replicated finding. When you ask people, to what extent do you exhibit a bias? I don’t, obviously I’m a smart person, but to what extent do other people, of course, you know, other people are bad at selling, I’m really good. But in order to adopt choice architecture to help you out when, when making decisions, you actually have to be, have some, you have to have a lot of humility to say, look, these institutional investors to say, look, looks like I’m not really doing so well on selling. I’m going to adopt some choice architecture so I don’t suffer from these biases. Maybe I’ll hire somebody else to help me out. Maybe I’ll think longer. Or use the same sort of a research technology for my selling as I’m doing for my buying. And because that requires humility, which most people don’t have a lot of, that’s, that’s really hard to do. So I think that’s why we’re seeing a lot of these biases just be perpetuated forward to the point where we’re, you know, running the same analyses now as we did 30 years ago and finding the exact same thing.

01:12:48 [Speaker Changed] So, so the, the question that, since we were talking about sports and, and lack of knowledge, and then you’ve mentioned Robinhood, one of the things that’s a little concerning is how some companies are putting our knowledge of biases and bad behavior to work for their own profit. So when we see the gamification of investing with Robinhood, or just the incredible rise, not just of sports books and gambling, but you could bet on every play, it’s reached a point where it’s ridiculous. And there is robust evidence that especially young men are having all sorts of, how can we, how can we deal with what seems to be not a good use of choice architecture, but a bad use of cho choice architecture, at least as far as the, the public is concerned? Yeah,

01:13:42 [Speaker Changed] It’s a very good question, Barry. And one to which I don’t have a pad answer. I mean, it’s tempting to say, look, the, all these sports betting apps and the gamification of of investing are bad for people. On the other hand, people like doing it. They’re mostly adults do. And, you know, prohibition basically didn’t work, right? So I, I think some disclosure would help it. It’s difficult to find out what the odds are in a lot of these things. I, but it’s, it’s a tough question. I had a conversation on this book when Nate Silver a couple weeks ago, and we talked a lot about sports gambling. He’s a professional gambler and he spent a year betting on NBA games and basically broke even, right? So, you know, if Nate can’t make money doing this, chances are you can’t. And you know, my advice would be, look, if you really think you like doing this, do it on a small scale. You know, don’t

01:15:06 [Speaker Changed] The house literally,

01:15:07 [Speaker Changed] It don’t, it don’t write. And the same with weekly options or daily.

01:15:12 [Speaker Changed] Yeah. That’s one of the most popular, one of our colleagues at the University of Chicago, she did an analysis of what retail traders are actually doing on Robinhood. And one of the most popular products, which because it’s pushed by Robinhood, is weekly options.

01:15:26 [Speaker Changed] And there’s now end of day options where it, it expires, right? You, you have till four o’clock Yeah. To either make money or not.

01:15:33 [Speaker Changed] So, you know, if you wanna risk one month’s pay on that, fine.

01:15:40 [Speaker Changed] Not just, not every month

01:15:41 [Speaker Changed] Not, and yes. Yeah. That’s your lifetime budget, right? And when it goes to zero switch to something else,

01:15:51 [Speaker Changed] I’m, I’m a big fan of the cowboy account where you take three or 4% of your portfolio and if you wanna fool around with options, whatever, knock yourself out. And if it makes money, great. But like we’ve seen, you mentioned Apple. Yeah. If it was your whole portfolio, you would never have been able to ride it to be a five X or a 10 x. Right. You would’ve taken, I’m up 20 bucks, I’m taking the money off the table.

01:16:13 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, you know, people long ago would adopt the strategy of bringing a certain amount of money to the casino. Right. And then of course, the casinos put ATMs right on the floor. So it’s a battle. But mental accounting, you have a gambling account, but that’s it. Yeah. I mean, it would be better if it were zero, right. But otherwise, set it up. That’s something you can afford to lose. And when you’ve lost it all, you’re

01:16:47 [Speaker Changed] Out Stop.

01:16:48 [Speaker Changed] That’s right. Don’t go to the ATM.

01:16:49 [Speaker Changed] That’s right. Right. So, so I only have you for a few more minutes. I want to ask two of my favorite questions that I, I want to ask each of you, that I ask all of my guests. Starting with, what sort of advice would you give a recent college grad interested in a career in either behavioral finance or economics? Alex, you’re, you’re the more recent grad. What, what would you, what would your advice be?

01:17:12 [Speaker Changed] Get teched up,

01:17:13 [Speaker Changed] Really

01:17:13 [Speaker Changed] Get teched up. I think that’s the biggest kind of difference between, even when I was in graduate school and what I’m seeing hiring pred docs and RAs, the sort of work that you’re doing in modern behavioral economics, modern finance. It just requires a different level of analysis. Like,

01:17:29 [Speaker Changed] So is this learning to code or is this learning to code becoming, to code a prompt engineer for ai? What

01:17:33 [Speaker Changed] I think you still gotta learn to code. I think, you know, we’re, I, I I, I work in the applied AI group at Booth, you know, you still gotta learn to code. And a lot of this sort of modern analysis that people are doing, particularly as behavioral finance, behavioral econ has moved out of the lab into the field. These data sets are huge machine learning AI tools, the type of people who are getting hired are doing sophisticated analysis. So it’s

01:17:59 [Speaker Changed] Still basically STEM groups, science, technology, engineering, and math for people who don’t know the acronym, but applied specifically to the field.

01:18:09 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, yeah. And like, you know, you take your economics courses, you take your finance courses, take some CS courses on the side. Those are, this is what I wished I would’ve done right when I was getting my PhD. It wasn’t on my radar to take, you know, a coding class in the CS department, people coming out. Now, the ones who are really successful, you have to have good ideas. That’s a necessary condition. It’s not a sufficient condition. You still, you got you, you need to be teched up to a level that I, I don’t think we were seeing back when I was graduating. Really

01:18:40 [Speaker Changed] Interesting.

01:18:40 [Speaker Changed] And I’ll reinforce that with the following. I think you, you need some practical experience. Yeah. Because the part that you don’t learn in a textbook is you, you get this gigantic data set and it’s noisy and there are errors. And so learning how to clean up a data set, I, you gotta learn that through experience.

01:19:08 [Speaker Changed] Hmm. Really interesting. And our final question, what do you know about the world of behavioral economics today would’ve been useful back in the 1970s and eighties when you were getting started and in the two thousands when you were getting started?

01:19:24 [Speaker Changed] So I think if we go back, we talked about the changes that I helped make in the retirement plans. And what I wish I had been able to accomplish more of is making retirement saving at the workplace available to the possibly 40% of American workers whose firms don’t offer that option. And there, there were plans around and they didn’t get passed. The, I think the system they have in the UK is a reasonable model, which is, there’s a requirement that any firm with more than, I don’t, I’m not sure the number, say 20 employees has to offer a plan and automatically enroll people into the plan. And the government has like a generic plan they can use like the government thrift program. So there, and this is useful because big firms like Fidelity and Vanguard don’t really want tiny accounts, right? So make it easy for an employer.

01:20:46 They, they don’t have to do anything. They just have to let their employees enroll in this. And then when they change jobs, they can keep it there. Because the real problem is, w they go to work for a while at this firm and they worked there for a year and they’ve sub saved $600 and then they leave and they take the cash out. So we need automatic rollover. So that, that’s the p piece of the puzzle that I don’t know whether I could have done anything about, but it’s what I wish we could work on. Now.

01:21:24 [Speaker Changed] So related to that, what do you think of these new baby accounts? Every newborn in America next year gets a thousand dollars, has to be invested domestically, which, you know, we can have an argument. We were talking about home country bias, but still you’re starting every infant off with a portfolio. What are your thoughts on that?

01:21:45 [Speaker Changed] I don’t know the details of how that’s gonna work. You could, my friend and sometime colleague when I’m in Berkeley, Ika, mal Menier has made a similar proposal in Germany where she’s on the German Council of Economic Advisors. I think the idea is to give kids some experience with the stock market. And I think that could be useful. I, I, I don’t know how this is gonna wash out and all of these things end up being tilted toward the rich. Hmm. I mean, there were big reforms made recently to the retirement plans. One of the reforms was to let you wait longer to start making withdrawals. Who do you think that helps

01:22:40 [Speaker Changed] People who are wealthy, healthy, and gonna have a longer lifespan? Right.

01:22:45 [Speaker Changed] So most people start taking the money out at 59 and a half, raising the, the date at which you have to start from 70 to 72 doesn’t help anybody that’s in any trouble.

01:23:01 [Speaker Changed] Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. Alex, what, what do you know today about behavioral finance that you wish you knew when you were getting started?

01:23:10 [Speaker Changed] I think what I, when I was getting started, I wasn’t really thinking about kind of tar, being able to target these big institutional investors and thinking about getting data sets on

01:23:23 Smart money in the economy. So I think when I was starting out, I was really focused on lab experiments. I was really focused on kind of the data that’s a, that was available. And if I was starting out now, I would, I would start my PhD trying to get, trying to get data sets that I eventually was able to get. Because the types that, as far as like looking at my research, what has had the largest impact? What has had, you know, people in finance in, in the professional world calling me up and saying, Hey, what do you think about this? Or that it’s been looking at the population that people are actually interested in, which are, you know, the smart money in the economy. So I think, and this is, I think a, you know, you have this analogy of, of looking under the spot under the streetlight, where is a lot of behavioral finance

01:24:11 [Speaker Changed] For the missing car keys that jumped on the streetlight.

01:24:13 [Speaker Changed] You know, where are you looking? Oh, it’s where the dataset already are. So, you know, Terry Ode was, had this genius idea in 98 when he published his paper. What did he do? He made that be data set available. Now it’s easy to just, oh, I got an idea. Why don’t I look at Terry’s data set. Terry’s data set is great, but it’s three years in the nineties with, you know, a couple hundred retail traders and that tells you about that specific population. But you can’t have a field evolve looking at three years of retail traders with $10,000 portfolios. So I think if I was going to, going into the field now and thinking about, you know, what have I learned? It’s the power of getting data sets and running analyses on, on populations that are important for the economy and for finance. Huh.

01:24:59 [Speaker Changed] Really, really fascinating gentlemen, thank you so much for doing this. We have been speaking with Richard Tha and Alex Emos, both of the Booth School of Business, about their updated version of the Winner’s Curse Strong recommendation. If you enjoy this conversation, well check out any of the 592 we’ve done over the past 12 years. You can find those at iTunes, Spotify, Bloomberg, YouTube, wherever you get your favorite podcasts. And be sure to check out my new book, how Not to Invest the ideas, numbers, and behavior that destroys wealth and how to avoid them. I would be remiss if I didn’t not thank the Crack team that helps put these conversations together each week. Alexis Noriega is my video producer. Sean Russo is my researcher. Anna Luke is my producers. Bauman is the head of podcast here at Bloomberg. I’m Barry Ritholtz. You’ve been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

 

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10 Tuesday AM Reads

My back-to-work morning train reads:

Why This CEO Won’t Let Private Funds Near His Company’s 401(k): Untangling his father’s estate caused the executive to rethink the benefits of alternative investments.(Wall Street Journal)

America vs. the World: President Trump wants to return to the 19th century’s international order. He will leave America less prosperous—and the whole world less secure. (The Atlantic) see also Trump Is Risking a Global Catastrophe: His irrational fixation on Greenland could lead to widespread conflict. (The Atlantic)

With Powell, the Guardrails Are Holding:  Trump seems to always get his way, but limits are finally starting to catch up. (Bloomberg)

Tracking AI’s Contribution to GDP Growth: To measure how AI-related investment is showing up in GDP, we focus on components of nonresidential fixed investment that capture the infrastructure behind AI adoption and related investments in software and R&D. (St.Louis Fed)

• Buying a home is 150% more expensive than in 2019. The plan to shut out institutional investors could raise costs even more. The biggest part of the overall “affordability” problem is the explosion in the cost of housing. (Fortune) see also The Dream of a Florida Retirement Is Fading for the Middle Class: The Sunshine State used to be where all walks of life could afford to retire. That’s changing as it grows pricier. (Wall Street Journal)

The American Worker Is Becoming More Productive: U.S. workers are getting more done. That’s great for the economy—though not always great for workers. (Wall Street Journal)

The Fight on Capitol Hill to Make It Easier to Fix Your Car: As vehicles grow more software-dependent, repairing them has become harder than ever. A bill in the US House called the Repair Act would ease those restrictions, but it comes with caveats. (Wired)

How the White House is Losing the Fight on the ICE killing: New data shows the smear campaign of Renee Good is failing miserably (The Message Box) see also ICE is now a 70-30 issue — for Democrats: By using brutal force in public, ICE has given Democrats a chance to change how voters think about immigration policy. Will they take it? (Strength In Numbers)

What if the idea of the autism spectrum is completely wrong? For years, we’ve thought of autism as lying on a spectrum, but emerging evidence suggests that it comes in several distinct types. The implications for how we support autistic people could be profound (New Scientist)

Netflix’s $82.7 billion rags-to-riches story: How the DVD-by-mail company swallowed Hollywood. It’s a story so good it could have been a screenplay. In 2000, Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph sat down across from John Antioco, then CEO of video rental giant Blockbuster, and pitched him on acquiring their still unprofitable DVD-by-mail startup, Netflix, which at the time had around 300,000 subscribers. But when they told him their price—$50 million and the chance to develop and run Blockbuster’s online rental business—Antioco balked. It was a famously shortsighted business decision: By 2010, Blockbuster had filed for bankruptcy, and Netflix had stormed Hollywood with its entertainment streaming service.  (Fortune)

Be sure to check out our Masters in Business interview this weekend with Nobel laureate Richard Thaler and his University of Chicago Booth School colleague Alex Imas on the update and reissue of his classic book The Winner’s Curse.

 

New High of 45% in U.S. Identify as Political Independents

Source: Gallup

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