What GAO Found The H-2A visa program was created to allow U.S. agricultural employers to fill jobs on a temporary basis provided that workers in the U.S. are not available for those jobs. From fiscal year (FY) 2018 through FY 2023, the number of approved H-2A jobs and visas increased by over 50 percent, with the Department of State issuing almost 310,000 H-2A visas in FY 2023. The vast majority of approved H-2A jobs (87 percent) were in the farmworkers and laborers, crop, nursery, and greenhouse occupation category. The majority of jobs (51 percent) were located in five states: California, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and Washington. H-2A workers were mostly male (97 percent), Mexican (92 percent), under 41 years old (83 percent), and married (60 percent). The Departments of Labor (DOL), Homeland Security (DHS), and State took steps—including prioritizing H-2A visa program applications—to keep application processing times constant from FY 2018 through FY 2023 as requests for H-2A workers increased. For example, although the number of applications DOL received increased by 72 percent, the average number of days to process an application remained between 27 and 29 days. However, DHS lacks full electronic processing of employer applications—known as petitions—for H-2A workers. Instead, employers must mail documents to DHS, and staff scan them into the agency's database. DHS is 3 years into a 5-year plan for full electronic processing of all petitions for immigration benefits but has not included the H-2A program on its current schedule. Agency officials said they have prioritized online filing of other nonimmigrant visa classifications and critical humanitarian initiatives. However, establishing a schedule for full electronic processing of H-2A petitions would provide DHS with an accountability mechanism for the H-2A program in working toward full electronic processing and greater efficiencies. From FY 2018 through FY 2023, 84 percent of DOL's investigations of employers found one or more violations, with the most common violations related to pay. DOL H-2A Investigations and Violations Uncovered, FYs 2018–2023 DOL uses several tools to remedy violations including recovering back wages. GAO found that H-2A violations accounted for 54 percent of back wages assessed to all agricultural employers during the 6-year period GAO reviewed. DOL has taken steps to return back wages but may not have timely access to complete contact information for workers who have returned to their home countries. DOL has not assessed how or whether it could more efficiently locate such workers. By evaluating the costs and benefits of options to better locate workers, DOL may be able to strengthen its efforts to return back wages. Why GAO Did This Study Hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals receive permission to work in the U.S. each year under the H-2A visa program. DOL, DHS, and State each have a role in administering the program. DOL has primary responsibility for enforcing compliance with H-2A laws and regulations. GAO was asked to review program trends and agencies' ability to administer and enforce the H-2A visa program. This report examines, among other things, (1) trends in the characteristics of H-2A employers, jobs, and workers; (2) the extent to which DOL, DHS, and State have taken steps to process applications in a timely manner; and (3) the extent to which DOL has taken steps to investigate and remedy employer violations. GAO analyzed DOL, DHS, and State data for FYs 2018–2023; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents; and interviewed agency officials, five organizations representing workers, and six organizations representing employers.

What GAO Found In December 2021, the Department of Energy (DOE) established a new office—the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED)—to manage a historic amount of appropriated funding for clean energy demonstration projects. These projects are intended to help lower the investment risk of new technologies and allow for additional large-scale private investment and the commercialization of such technologies. Appropriated Funding for the Department of Energy's Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations by Portfolio Area, as of October 2024 OCED has developed programs across its portfolio areas. As of October 2024, OCED issued at least one funding opportunity announcement for all of its portfolios. OCED has also selected some projects for negotiation and finalized some awards in most of its portfolios. GAO found that OCED has been responsive to some of GAO’s prior relevant recommendations to DOE in areas such as program design and award negotiations. For example, in 2021, GAO reported that DOE used expedited time frames to negotiate some projects—fewer than 3 months as opposed to up to a year—based on DOE’s desire to begin spending funds quickly. GAO found that these actions reduced DOE’s ability to identify and mitigate technical and financial risks. GAO recommended that DOE allow adequate time for negotiations prior to entering into cooperative agreements. For the awards as of October 2024 for the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs and carbon capture projects, the time from project selection to award was from about 7 months to 13 months, according to OCED’s selection and award announcements. GAO also found that OCED’s efforts varied in the extent to which they aligned with leading practices related to coordination with other DOE offices, performance management, and workforce planning: Coordination. OCED’s activities generally follow six of eight leading practices that GAO had previously identified as effective in enhancing and sustaining federal agency coordination, such as bridging organizational cultures, including relevant participants, and leveraging resources and information. OCED’s activities partially aligned with the two remaining practices—defining common outcomes and ensuring accountability. Performance management. OCED activities partially align with two leading practices, and do not align with the third leading practice for performance management. Specifically, OCED has defined some goals and collected some performance information, but not for all of its activities—including related to its coordination with other DOE offices. Further, OCED has not developed a process to use performance information to inform decisions. OCED officials said their initial planning efforts were designed to introduce OCED’s role and vision and are not goal oriented because OCED had not finalized the details of its announcements soliciting proposals. Workforce planning. GAO found that OCED has taken actions to define its workforce needs, but has not followed all leading practices for workforce planning. As of August 2024, OCED had 250 employees and identified that it needed to fill 101 more positions to be fully staffed at 351 employees. GAO found that the office had defined its workforce needs but had not fully met leading practices of monitoring and evaluating its progress or developing a strategic workforce plan. Fully implementing leading practices for performance management, including related to OCED’s coordination with other DOE offices, and workforce planning would help OCED ensure its performance management activities are effective and that it has the appropriate workforce in place to help manage its about $27 billion portfolio of demonstrations, some of which are expected to be implemented into the next decade. Why GAO Did This Study The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act contain provisions appropriating about $27 billion to DOE to fund clean energy demonstration projects. These projects relate to technologies in various areas including carbon capture, hydrogen, and advanced nuclear energy. Within DOE, OCED supports such demonstration projects through grant or financial assistance awards. OCED also supports other DOE offices that are managing their own large-scale demonstration projects. Overall, the office seeks to provide oversight excellence to the project management of demonstration projects, according to OCED documents. The DOE Office of Inspector General and GAO have previously reported on risks related to DOE’s management of demonstration projects including how the agency selects projects and human capital issues. The IIJA includes a provision for GAO to review OCED. This report examines OCED’s establishment and its program development and proposal review process. GAO analyzed DOE and OCED policies, guidance, and documentation and compared OCED’s activities with leading practices related to coordination, performance management, and workforce planning. GAO also interviewed DOE and OCED officials, and a nongeneralizable sample of seven applicants.

What GAO Found The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is not fully addressing eight key statutory requirements contained in the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). Specifically, OMB is partially following four of the five requirements on IT portfolio reviews, and not following the three requirements on high-risk IT investments (see table). Until OMB adheres to FITARA's portfolio management requirements, its oversight of agencies' IT portfolios, including potentially troubled IT investments, will be limited. As a result, the federal government will continue to expend resources on IT investments that do not meet the needs of the government or the public. Extent to Which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Followed Statutory Requirements Requirement Assessment IT portfolio reviews Implement a process to assist agencies in reviewing their IT portfolios. ◐ Develop standardized cost savings/avoidance and performance metrics for agencies to implement the process. ◐ Carry out the Federal Chief Information Officer's (CIO) role in being involved in an annual review of each agencies' IT portfolio in conjunction with the agency's CIO and Chief Operating Officer or Deputy Secretary (or equivalent). ○ Submit a quarterly report on the cost savings/reductions in duplicative IT investment identified through this review process to key committees in Congress. ◐ Submit to Congress a report on the net program performance benefits achieved as a result of major capital investments made by agencies for information systems and how the benefits relate to the accomplishment of the goals of the agencies. ◐ High-risk IT investment reviews Carry out consultation responsibilities of the Federal CIO to agency CIOs and program managers of major IT investments that receive high-risk ratings for four consecutive quarters. ○ Communicate the results of high-risk IT investment reviews to key committees in Congress. ○ Deny any request of additional development, modernization, or enhancement funding for a major investment that has been rated high-risk for a year after the high-risk IT investment review. Additional funding should be denied until the agency CIO determines that the root causes of the risk have been addressed, and there is capability to deliver the remaining increments within the planned cost and schedule.a ○ Legend: ◐ Partially followed = the agency demonstrated that it was following some, but not all, of the requirement; ○ Not followed = the agency did not demonstrate that it was following the requirement. Source: GAO analysis based on OMB data. | GAO-25-107041 aThis requirement does not apply to investments at the Department of Defense. Agencies have also not fully addressed FITARA requirements for IT portfolio management. Specifically, none of the 24 agencies fully met the requirements for annual IT portfolio reviews. In addition, eight agencies with major IT investments rated as high-risk for four consecutive quarters did not follow the FITARA requirements for performing high-risk IT investment reviews. Three of the eight agencies performed the reviews, but they did not address the specific requirements in law. The remaining five agencies did not perform the reviews. Not performing these required reviews can permit investments with substantial cost, schedule, and performance problems to continue unabated without necessary corrective actions. Why GAO Did This Study The executive branch has undertaken numerous initiatives to better manage the more than $100 billion that is annually invested in IT. However, federal IT investments too frequently fail to deliver capabilities in a timely manner. Recognizing the issues related to the government-wide management of IT, in December 2014, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation, commonly referred to as FITARA. GAO was asked to evaluate IT executive reviews. This report evaluates the extent to which OMB and agencies are following requirements for IT portfolio management oversight, including annual IT portfolio and high-risk investment reviews. To do so, GAO identified related requirements from FITARA. GAO then compared agency documentation from OMB and the 24 agencies to the requirements. GAO also interviewed OMB and agency officials regarding their IT portfolio management practices.

What GAO Found In November 2022, GAO reported that, from 2011 through 2020, enrollment in private health insurance plans was concentrated, meaning a small number of issuers of those plans enrolled most of the people in a given market (GAO-23-105672). Specifically, GAO considered a market concentrated in a state if three or fewer issuers held at least 80 percent of the market share of enrollment. For this report, GAO examined the individual (coverage primarily sold to individuals who lack access to group coverage), small-group (coverage offered by small employers), and large-group (coverage offered by large employers) health insurance markets from 2011 through 2022 and found that concentration generally increased. Specifically: The overall individual market became more concentrated from 2011 through 2022. Concentration in this market peaked in 2019 and became slightly less concentrated through 2022. The small-group market became more concentrated from 2011 through 2022, but the rate of increase slowed more recently. The large-group market remained concentrated with only slight increases from 2011 through 2022 (see figure). Number of States, including the District of Columbia, Where the Three Largest Issuers Had at least 80 Percent of Enrollment, 2011 through 2022 GAO also examined concentration across the individual insurance exchanges, which are part of the overall individual market. Individual exchanges, which are marketplaces where consumers can compare and select among insurance plans offered by participating issuers, were established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Similar to the overall individual insurance market, the individual exchanges became more concentrated from 2015 through 2020 and then generally less concentrated through 2022. The number of states where the individual exchanges were concentrated increased from 47 states in 2015 to a peak of 51 states in 2020, and then decreased to 47 states in 2022. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for review and comment. The department did not have any comments on the report. Why GAO Did This Study Private health insurance is the most common source of health insurance coverage in the United States. Individuals have various options for obtaining private health insurance, including through the individual, small-group, and large-group markets. A concentrated health insurance market may indicate less issuer competition and could affect consumers’ choices of issuers and the premiums they pay for insurance. PPACA included a provision for GAO to periodically study health insurance market concentration. This report describes changes in the concentration of enrollment among issuers in the overall individual, small-group, and large-group health insurance markets and in the individual insurance exchanges. GAO determined market share in each of the three overall markets and the individual insurance exchanges using enrollment data from 2011 through 2022 that issuers report to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and enrollment data that GAO collected from individual states from 2015 to 2017. For all analyses, GAO used the most recent data available at the time of its review. For more information, contact John E. Dicken at (202) 512-7114 or dickenj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO found (1) the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) financial statements as of and for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2024, and 2023, are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; (2) CFPB maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2024; and (3) no reportable noncompliance for fiscal year 2024 with provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements GAO tested. In commenting on a draft of this report, CFPB stated that it was pleased to receive an unmodified audit opinion on its fiscal years 2024 and 2023 financial statements and on its internal control over financial reporting. In addition, CFPB stated that it will continue to work to enhance its system of internal control and ensure the reliability of its financial reporting. Why GAO Did This Study Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, both require CFPB to prepare financial statements annually and require GAO to audit the agency's financial statements. This report responds to these requirements. For more information, contact James R. Dalkin at (202) 512-3133 or dalkinj@gao.gov.

The Big Picture The State Department’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (State) provides U.S. diplomatic facilities around the world. State is responsible for managing some 9,000 owned and 16,000 leased assets, supporting some 90,000 U.S. government personnel in about 290 locations worldwide. These assets represent a wide array of facilities including its embassy and consulate compounds (hereafter “embassies”). Since the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, State has built 99 embassies under its Capital Security Construction Program (CSCP), while prioritizing security, at a program cost of about $40 billion through fiscal year 2024. Since 2015, State has provided about $2 billion in annual funding for the CSCP for new embassy construction. Several embassies have cost State about $1 billion each to build, including in Kabul, Afghanistan; Mexico City, Mexico; and Beirut, Lebanon.   State also provides about $500 million annually for maintenance of its embassies, including repairs and major facility rehabilitations. Embassy resilience to hazards is increasingly important. Many cities hosting U.S. embassies are threatened by a variety of natural hazards (e.g. earthquakes) and climate change related hazards (e.g. coastal flooding). What GAO’s Work Shows Information Sharing Highlights How Inflation Increased Cost and Slowed Pace of Construction Program We have regularly monitored State’s embassy construction program, implemented in the aftermath of the 1998 embassy bombings. In 2018, we reported that State would not reach its stated construction goals, in part because funding for new construction has not kept pace with inflation. For completed embassies, later additions such as housing for U.S. Marine security guards have increased program costs and slowed the pace of construction. U.S. Embassy Construction: Fiscal Years 1999-2024 Note: The figure above excludes new embassies, consulates and facilities not built with Capital Security Construction Program funds, such as the embassy in London, United Kingdom, and the American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan, among others. The figure also excludes newly acquired buildings and new office buildings on existing compounds. We recommended that State determine the estimated effects of increased costs on planned embassy construction capacity and time frames and share this information with congressional stakeholders. State has addressed this recommendation. In January 2020, State reported that replacing all its remaining embassies (estimated at 160 at the time) would cost over $58 billion in 2020 dollars and construction would take 25 to 30 years to complete. Since that time, inflation has continued to erode State’s purchasing power. In its 2025 budget request, State estimates that since 2015, the capital construction program will have lost $1.1 billion in purchasing power. Because State is now providing information on projected pace of construction and the estimated effects of inflation, stakeholders can make more informed budget decisions regarding State’s construction resources and capacity. More Planning Could Help State Better Understand Deferred Maintenance Needs and Staff Skills In 2021, we reported State had difficulties in maintaining the condition of its embassies. We found that more than one-quarter of State’s assets were in poor condition according to State’s standards. Further, 20 percent (almost 400) of the assets that State identified as critical to its mission were in poor condition. State had set a single acceptable condition standard of “fair” for all assets and did not consider whether some assets were more critical when estimating its $3 billion deferred maintenance backlog, as last reported in 2023. In light of these findings, we recommended that State reassess its acceptable condition standard for all assets and develop a plan to address its deferred maintenance backlog. State has since determined that assets critical to its mission, such as embassy buildings and communications towers, warrant a higher acceptable condition standard, while less critical or more easily replaceable facilities can warrant a lower acceptable condition standard. Because of this and other changes to its methodology for determining deferred maintenance, State expects future estimates of deferred maintenance to be lower than last reported. While State has addressed our recommendation to reassess its acceptable condition standard for its assets, it still faces a substantial backlog, which it has not yet developed a plan to address. Developing and sharing a plan to address this backlog would help decision makers, including Congress, better evaluate State’s budget requests and understand how funding levels affect backlog reduction. In addition, we reported in 2023 that State has faced challenges hiring American and locally employed facilities staff to maintain U.S. embassies, and that State did not have inventories of the technical skills needed. Examples of Locally Employed Maintenance Staff At Work State has not yet implemented our recommendation to develop guidance for embassies to create and maintain such inventories for locally employed staff. Doing so could improve State’s workforce planning. Aligning Plans with Resources Will Help State Better Understand What Its Natural Hazard Resilience Program Can Accomplish In 2022, we assessed State’s efforts to address the threats to its embassies from natural hazards and weather events, which are becoming increasingly more frequent and severe. We reported that State identified and assessed the risks to its facilities presented by natural and climate hazards and the potential effects to each embassy’s mission should a natural disaster occur. As part of our review, we prepared an interactive map that shows the levels of risk embassy facilities face from the eight natural hazards for which State had collected data. Related to State’s risk assessments, in 2023, we reported that State’s Climate Security and Resilience (CS&R) program—responsible for helping embassies plan, fund, and implement facility resilience projects—had limited staffing to fully enact plans outlined in State’s 2021 Climate Adaptation and Resilience Plan. We recommended that State revisit the CS&R program plans, goals, and timeframes, and adjust them as appropriate. While State has increased its CS&R staff and is planning to add more, as of August 2024, it did not have sufficient staff to fully implement its resilience program plans nor had it revisited these plans. By aligning CS&R program plans with its available staffing, State can more clearly establish how the CS&R program can support State’s embassy climate resilience goals. Challenges and Opportunities U.S. government staff abroad and their families depend on safe, secure, and functional diplomatic facilities. State’s embassy management efforts are costly and time-intensive and these investments are affected by inflation, deferred maintenance, and the risk of natural hazards. To strengthen its efforts moving forward, State should implement open GAO recommendations. In addition, policymakers play an important oversight role as they continue to examine and consider State’s priorities for embassy construction, maintenance, and resilience, and how best to use available funding to protect past and future investments in U.S. embassies. For more information, contact Tatiana Winger at (617) 788-0572 or wingert@gao.gov or Brian Bothwell at (213) 830-1160 or bothwellb@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In March 2022, the Department of Transportation (DOT) announced over $1 billion available for award under its National Infrastructure Project Assistance (Mega) discretionary grant program. Mega provides grants on a competitive basis to support large, complex transportation projects. Of the 259 Mega applications received for fiscal year 2022, DOT advanced 128 for award consideration. Most of these applications were submitted by state governments. Approximately 70 percent of the applications requested a total of $18.1 billion for highway or bridge projects, and the remaining applications requested a total of approximately $10 billion primarily for intermodal, intercity passenger rail, or transit projects. The Secretary of Transportation selected nine applications for award. Locations of Projects That Received National Infrastructure Project Assistance (Mega) Program Awards, Fiscal Year 2022 GAO found that DOT's selection process for the Mega program generally aligned with specified DOT guidance and federal regulations for discretionary grant programs. For example, DOT followed up with applicants to obtain additional information as outlined in its evaluation guidelines. However, DOT did not fully document the rationale for key decisions, as required by DOT guidance. Specifically, DOT did not document how it determined some projects were “exemplary,” a designation that applications are highly recommended. According to DOT officials, “exemplary” means standing out among peers as a model. Yet, DOT's documentation only stated that applications deemed “exemplary” were strong in a particular area and did not explain what distinguished them from other applications. DOT officials stated that they believed DOT had documented its determinations and explained how they related to the program criteria. GAO previously recommended that DOT more fully document key decisions for other DOT discretionary grant programs and clearly define how a project may qualify as exemplary. By implementing these recommendations, DOT can improve the transparency of the selection process for the Mega program. Why GAO Did This Study The Mega program provides funding for large, complex projects that are difficult to fund by other means and likely to generate national or regional economic, mobility, or safety benefits. Mega projects include highways, bridges, intercity passenger rail, and transit. DOT awarded $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2022 funding to nine Mega applications. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act includes a provision for GAO to examine DOT's process for selecting Mega projects for award. This report discusses (1) the characteristics of Mega applications, and (2) the extent to which DOT's selection process aligned with specified DOT guidance and federal regulations for grants management. GAO reviewed DOT's Notice of Funding Opportunity, evaluation guidelines, and documentation of the Mega selection process for fiscal year 2022; analyzed application and award data; and interviewed DOT officials. GAO also compared DOT's selection process with DOT guidance and federal regulations for discretionary grant programs.

What Participants Said Digital technology presents opportunities for greater access and customization of financial education and products for consumers but may pose risks as well. Participants highlighted the following themes during the forum: Digital products can generally increase access to financial services. Low-income and minority consumers that may have different cultural norms around finances and banking may benefit from the increased flexibility offered by digital products and services. Participants also noted that digital investment platforms tend to attract younger consumers, who see new opportunities for wealth-building previously seen as out of reach. However, limited access to broadband may hinder accessibility for some consumers.   Digital products and services offer consumers improved experiences but also pose risks. These products and services enable personalized support, such as through advisers powered by artificial intelligence, to inform decision-making specific to a consumer’s financial situation. However, the ease and convenience of digital transactions can lead to risky behavior, such as investment in crypto assets. Additionally, participants said consumers face increased risks of fraud and scams, including phishing and unauthorized sharing of personal information. Consumers face challenges navigating the digital financial landscape. Consumers need both technical skills and traditional financial knowledge to make informed decisions about digital financial services—for example, to detect biased marketing and to avoid scams. Reliable financial information, such as information offered through government sources, is available online but is often underused. Participants noted that many financial technology (fintech) companies offering digital products and services are lightly regulated and consumer protections are limited. Digital technology expands options for financial education. It allows for more cost-effective and scalable financial education initiatives using digital channels. Digital technology also creates opportunities for just-in-time education personalized for the consumer. Digital platforms offer diverse formats, such as podcasts and infographics, and can include game-like features like achievement badges, all of which can enhance engagement with educational materials. However, the quality of digital financial education sources can vary, participants noted, ranging from social media influencers to trusted government resources. Traditional schools, a trusted source for education, can also help build financial literacy and related skills. More research is needed. Participants agreed that to understand the effects of digital products on consumers, further evaluation of their use and outcomes is essential. However, researchers can face challenges collecting and analyzing data controlled by private companies. Data-sharing agreements between researchers and service providers can mitigate these challenges. Partnerships between the public and private sectors that allow for data sharing and monitoring could also improve efforts to evaluate products. Why GAO Convened This Forum Americans face various challenges in achieving and maintaining financial security, especially as digital products and information become more prevalent. The growth of these digital financial services, such as peer-to-peer payment methods, has significantly affected consumers’ financial choices, opportunities, and risks. These developments also underscore the need for digital financial literacy—that is, the knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely use digitally delivered products and services to make informed financial decisions. On June 12, 2024, GAO convened a group of experts and stakeholders for a forum on how consumers’ financial literacy has been affected by the increased digital offering of products, services, and education. The participants discussed opportunities and risks of digital financial services,financial services, key skills for navigating the digital financial landscape, and digital delivery of financial literacy education. Participants were selected to represent a range of experience and viewpoints. Participants included 15 experts and stakeholders from the private sector, federal government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and academic institutions. Participants reviewed a draft of this summary. Their comments were incorporated as appropriate. Views expressed during the proceedings do not necessarily represent the opinions of all participants, their affiliated organizations, or GAO. For more information, contact at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov or Tranchau (Kris) T. Nguyen, (202) 512-7215 or nguyentt@gao.gov.