What GAO Found In June 2024, GAO identified 90 priority open recommendations for the Department of Defense (DOD). Since then, DOD has implemented 15 of those recommendations, leading to improvements in preventing helicopter training accidents, clarifying barracks health and safety standards, and improving the quality of financial reporting, among other areas. Further, GAO removed the priority status from two other recommendations. In May 2025, GAO identified 6 new priority recommendations for DOD, bringing the total number to 79. These recommendations involve the following areas: Sustaining U.S. readiness and competitive advantage over adversaries; Improving financial management; Ensuring the health and safety of service members and their families; Strengthening infrastructure management; and Executing business reform. DOD's continued attention to these issues could lead to further improvements in the department's operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cathy A. Berrick at berrickc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs assets—including aircraft and vessels—and personnel across the U.S. and abroad to secure U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure maritime security and safety. Relevant DHS components include the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations. In prior work, GAO identified coordination challenges that hinder U.S. efforts to confront illicit maritime activities and recommended actions to improve oversight, measure effectiveness, and build organizational capacity. For example: In March 2025, GAO found that Homeland Security Investigations had not fully implemented certain training requirements due to disagreements over training content with the Drug Enforcement Administration, with whom they coordinate. Without doing so, the agencies cannot ensure that their agents are properly trained to collaborate effectively on counternarcotics investigations. In February 2024, GAO found that DHS had not developed targets for its coordinated efforts to combat complex threats like drug smuggling and terrorism—limiting its ability to assess the effectiveness of its efforts. In April 2024, GAO found that the Coast Guard had not assessed the type and number of helicopters it requires to meet its mission demands, as part of an analysis of its assets. Doing so could help ensure it has the necessary aircraft capability to execute its missions in the coming decades. Coast Guard Cocaine Seizure in the Caribbean Sea, September 2023 DHS components and their law enforcement missions are vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities. Addressing GAO's recommendations on setting targets and managing assets and personnel will help ensure that DHS efficiently uses its available resources to carry out its law enforcement missions to protect our maritime borders. Why GAO Did This Study Securing the nation's borders against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of DHS's mission. While there is increased attention to the southwest land border, criminal organizations continue to use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons into the United States. The U.S. government has identified transnational and domestic criminal organizations trafficking and smuggling illicit drugs as a significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national security. In March 2021, GAO added national efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from drug misuse to its High Risk List. This statement discusses (1) key DHS resources to counter illicit maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related to its efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement is based primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April 2025.

What GAO Found Since 2018, the Army's focus has shifted from counterinsurgency, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, to large-scale combat operations with near-peer adversaries. At that time, the Army began modernizing its major weapon systems, including the missiles and artillery known as long-range fires to counter the capabilities of near-peer adversaries. The Army identified four capability gaps to support modernization and developed corresponding requirements, such as increased range, for four new or upgraded long-range fires systems: the Extended Range Cannon Artillery, the Precision Strike Missile, the Mid-Range Capability missile system, and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon. Ranges of Existing Systems and Long-Range Fires Modernization Programs The Army had mixed success in rapidly developing and fielding its long-range fires systems. For instance, after extensive testing, the Army ended one system due to development challenges from immature technologies. For another system, it began production but missed its fielding goal. In contrast, for the other two systems, the Army successfully developed and tested one system, developed a prototype for the other, and it is fielding both. The Army did not consistently apply leading practices for iterative product development to its long-range fires efforts. For example, with Extended Range Cannon Artillery, the Army did not maintain a sound business case by re-evaluating the technical feasibility of the effort, which contributed to the Army not continuing the program. The Army is currently seeking a self-propelled howitzer to meet this requirement. The Army used a linear (versus iterative) approach for Precision Strike Missile. Adopting an iterative development approach, which includes digital engineering, could shorten development of future increments. Mid-Range Capability used some elements of an iterative approach, including establishing a sound business case with flexible requirements. Implementing other aspects, such as developing a virtual representation of the system, known as a digital twin, could aid future development and production. Why GAO Did This Study The Army is modernizing its artillery, rocket, and missile systems to provide long-range fires capabilities to counter advances by potential adversaries. With the Army's shift in focus from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations, it urgently needs artillery and missile systems that are more mobile, survivable, and lethal than existing systems. A House report and Senate report include provisions for GAO to review the Army's long-range fires modernization efforts. This report (1) describes capability gaps identified by the Army, (2) examines Army's progress in developing modernized systems for long-range fires, and (3) assesses the extent to which the Army applied leading practices for iterative product development in these efforts. GAO reviewed requirements documents, acquisition approaches and plans, schedules and program status updates, and budget requests. GAO conducted site visits to Army requirements and acquisition offices at Fort Sill in Oklahoma and Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. GAO compared acquisition plans and progress against leading practices for iterative product development.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified nine open recommendations under the purview of the Department of Energy's Chief Information Officer (CIO) from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation and (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. In addition, GAO has designated two of the nine as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that the Department of Energy develop a cybersecurity risk management strategy to protect the department against cyber threats. GAO also recommended that the department implement procedures for comparing its inventories of active software licenses to purchased licenses to identify opportunities to reduce cost and improve investment decisions. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the department. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nicholas Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 54 open recommendations under the purview of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO), including seven that are directed to component-level CIOs, from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation, (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management, (3) DOD Business Systems Modernization, and (4) DOD Financial Management. In addition, GAO has designated four of the 54 as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that DOD assess whether senior leadership has sufficient information to make risk-based decisions, including on the implementation progress of cybersecurity initiatives. Further, GAO recommended that DOD take steps to implement planned software modernization and acquisition reforms. GAO also previously recommended that the department establish a road map to document current and future states of financial management systems as well as gaps, resource requirements, and planned solutions. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the department. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nicholas Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. Center for SafeSport (the Center) is a nonprofit organization that plays a key role in ensuring the safety of amateur athletes. The Center has jurisdiction over the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee (the Corporation) and its affiliated organizations (known as national governing bodies) with regard to safeguarding amateur athletes against abuse in sports. The Empowering Olympic, Paralympic, and Amateur Athletes Act of 2020 (the Act) contains several provisions related to the independence of the Center from the Corporation. Based on certification provisions in the Act and GAO's methodology, GAO certifies that the Center was independent from the Corporation during fiscal year 2024. GAO found no evidence that a former employee or board member of the Corporation worked for the Center during its fiscal year 2024 in violation of the cooling-off period in the Act. Further, for the Center's fiscal year 2024, GAO found no evidence of a Center executive or attorney also representing the Corporation, which the Act defines as an inappropriate conflict of interest. In addition, GAO's review of the Center's investigative process found no evidence of interference or influence by the Corporation. The scope of our work did not include examining the background or suitability of Center employees. Why GAO Did This Study The Act includes a provision for GAO to annually "make available to the public a certification relating to the Center's independence from the Corporation," including findings on whether: a violation of the prohibition on employment (2-year cooling-off period) of former employees or board members of the Corporation has occurred during the year preceding the certification; an executive or attorney for the Center has had an inappropriate conflict of interest during that year, as defined by the Act; and the Corporation has interfered in, or attempted to influence the outcome of, an investigation by the Center. GAO reviewed information provided by the Center about its employees and individuals who worked or volunteered for the Center at any point during its fiscal year 2024 (January 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024). This includes reviewing conflict-of-interest verification forms that the Center requires of all such individuals. GAO cross-checked the information provided by the Center with information received from the Corporation about its employees, such as information about attorneys employed, hired, or retained. GAO reviewed the Center's written responses to questions. GAO also reviewed various documents, such as the Center's employee handbook, confidentiality policy, standard operating procedures, and the SafeSport Code, which establishes acceptable standards of conduct for all individuals who participate in U.S. Olympic and Paralympic events and training. For more information, contact Kathryn Larin at larink@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Federal law and Department of Defense (DOD) policy require health exams for service members separating from active duty. DOD administers most exams for these service members. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers these exams for service members filing for disability benefits at separation, such as those with an illness or injury caused by military service. To help coordinate efforts, VA and DOD developed a joint separation health assessment with mental health screens not included in DOD's existing separation exam. VA implemented the joint assessment in April 2023. As of May 2025, DOD had not implemented the joint assessment but had completed a pilot of it at three sites. The joint assessment includes five mental health screens for 1) depression, 2) suicide risk, 3) alcohol use, 4) post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 5) violence risk. GAO found that two of these mental health screens are validated tools. This means that they have been tested and determined to be both effective at identifying individuals at risk for a specific condition and reliable at yielding consistent results if administered to the same individual more than once. Two of the other mental health screens are based on validated tools, but VA and DOD modified the screens without validating the changes. The remaining joint assessment screen for violence risk is not based on a validated tool. It was included for consistency with other DOD health assessment forms, according to officials. Research shows that violence screening may be useful for service members, but multiple subject matter experts GAO interviewed expressed concerns about the violence risk screen's effectiveness. The Joint Separation Health Assessment's Mental Health Screens, and the Extent to Which VA and DOD Based Them on Validated Screening Tools Research shows that without validation testing, VA and DOD cannot be sure about the effectiveness or reliability of the screening they are conducting for alcohol use, PTSD, and violence risk. Using validated mental health screens would provide VA and DOD with greater assurance that their efforts to identify service members needing mental health support at separation are effective. VA data show its contractors administered about 50,500 joint separation health assessments between May 2023 and April 2024 to service members being evaluated for disability benefits. Of those exams, about 67 percent of service members had at least one positive mental health screen. A positive screen indicates elevated risk for the specific mental health condition being assessed and can indicate a need for further evaluation or intervention. Total Joint Separation Health Assessments Administered by VA, May 2023 through April 2024 GAO found that VA's most common positive mental health screens on the joint assessment were for PTSD and depression. VA and DOD officials noted that overall, the joint assessment screening rates are higher than would be expected in a clinical setting or based on population prevalence for these disorders. In the case of screening for alcohol use and PTSD, VA and DOD modifications to these tools may have contributed to higher positive screening rates. Additionally, DOD officials said that many factors could increase the possibility of positive mental health screens among separating service members, including that this subgroup of service members intends to file disability claims. Mental Health Screening Results from Joint Separation Health Assessments Administered by VA, May 2023 Through April 2024 Clinicians administering the joint assessments are required to ensure that service members who screen positive are aware of available mental health care options and offer them a referral to DOD's inTransition program, which is to offer support with mental health services during transitions. GAO's analysis of VA's joint assessment data found that 48 percent of service members who were offered an inTransition referral accepted, and 52 percent declined. VA does not track service members' reasons for declining these referrals. However, VA officials noted that some service members might decline the referral if they are already involved in mental health treatment. Additionally, when service members screen positive for suicide risk on the joint assessment, clinicians are to assess their level of risk and take specific actions based on that determination. For example, clinicians are required to contact the Veterans Crisis Line for high-risk individuals, among other actions. Why GAO Did This Study Thousands of service members separate from the military each year, and research has shown that they are especially vulnerable during this transition to civilian life. A 2018 executive order directed VA and DOD to develop a joint action plan to ensure access to mental health care and suicide prevention services for separating service members. The resulting plan called for mental health screenings of all service members prior to separation, among other initiatives. The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review VA and DOD's implementation of mental health exams for service members transitioning out of the military. Among other topics, this report examines the extent to which VA and DOD based the joint separation health assessment's mental health screening questions on validated screening tools and the outcomes of VA's mental health screening using the joint assessment. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed selected scientific studies to determine the effectiveness and reliability of the joint assessment's specific mental health screens. GAO also reviewed validated screening tool recommendations in relevant clinical practice guidelines issued by organizations including VA and DOD. GAO interviewed VA and DOD officials, as well as mental health subject matter experts identified by professional associations such as the American Psychiatric Association. GAO reviewed available mental health screening data from joint separation health assessments completed by VA contractors between May 2023—the month following its implementation— and April 2024. GAO also reviewed VA guidance for administering the joint assessments, including the process to be followed when a service member screens positive for mental health concerns, including their risk for suicide. Finally, GAO interviewed VA officials and representatives of the three contractors that administer the joint assessments about what steps they take if someone screens positive on the mental health screening questions.

What GAO Found The full extent of fraud affecting the Department of Defense (DOD) is not known but is potentially significant. DOD reported almost $11 billion in confirmed fraud over 7 years, an amount that reflects a small fraction of DOD's potential fraud exposure. GAO has previously reported on fraud at DOD, including cases where: a shell company fraudulently provided defective parts to DOD, leading to the grounding of 47 fighter aircraft; and a contractor bribed officials for classified information and preferential treatment, ultimately defrauding DOD of tens of millions of dollars. DOD has taken initial steps to implement a fraud risk management approach that aligns with leading practices in GAO's Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). In accordance with statutory requirements, the Office of Management and Budget requires agencies to implement the leading practices from the Fraud Risk Framework. DOD's initial steps include designating a dedicated entity to oversee fraud risk management activities. DOD also requires military components to identify and report fraud risks, providing guidance, tools, and training for them to do so. However, the department needs sustained effort to effectively prevent, detect, and respond to fraud. DOD leadership has not demonstrated a strong commitment to fraud risk management and should take action in three key areas (see figure). DOD Should Take Action in Key Areas to Manage Fraud Risks GAO has made 17 recommendations across three DOD fraud risk management reports since 2019. Thirteen of these recommendations have not been implemented as of May 2025, including two that will be designated as priority recommendations—recommendations that can save money, help Congress make decisions, and substantially improve or transform government agencies. For example, GAO found that DOD could save $100 million or more by implementing fraud risk management recommendations related to using data analytics to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud. Despite taking some actions to close or implement GAO's recommendations, DOD has repeatedly delayed implementing several of these recommendations. For example, DOD has delayed updating its antifraud strategy five times over 7 months. Without a comprehensive antifraud strategy that effectively aligns with leading practices, DOD remains at substantial risk of fraud against its vast resources. Why GAO Did This Study DOD is responsible for almost half of the federal government's discretionary spending and spends more on contracting than all other federal agencies combined. The scope and scale of this activity makes DOD inherently susceptible to fraud that can threaten DOD's financial position and put the warfighter in increased danger. In February 2025, GAO expanded DOD's financial management area on GAO's High Risk List to include fraud risk management at DOD. An effective system of internal controls can help DOD produce reliable, useful, and timely financial information and prevent and detect fraud. This testimony discusses the status of DOD's efforts to implement fraud risk management leading practices, as well as DOD's response to prior GAO recommendations. It is based primarily on GAO work from 2019 through 2024 related to DOD fraud risk management. Details on GAO's methodology can be found in each of the reports cited in this statement. For more information, contact Seto J. Bagdoyan at bagdoyans@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Infectious diseases with pandemic potential—such as avian influenza—pose a threat to American lives, national security, and economic interests. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) leads federal diagnostic testing efforts related to such diseases. It must work with public and private stakeholders who, among other things, administer tests and collect data. An expert roundtable GAO convened suggested nearly 100 actions HHS should take to improve diagnostic testing development, deployment, guidance, and data collection for the future. Several actions also cut across these areas. HHS officials said they are taking some steps to improve diagnostic testing related to the actions suggested by experts. For example, to help expand the number of entities able to test during an emergency, HHS has developed guidance for non-traditional laboratories seeking approval to perform testing. Examples of Actions Experts Suggested to Improve Diagnostic Testing Note: The actions in this report are not listed in any specific rank or order, and their inclusion should not be interpreted as GAO endorsing any of them. Implementing any one action or a combination of actions listed in this report might require considerations such as implementation feasibility, resource and legal constraints, and tradeoffs between actions or taking no action at all. Experts coalesced around two of the suggested actions. These actions could guide a coordinated approach to testing, according to GAO's prior work, and help alleviate challenges. Specifically: A national diagnostic testing strategy would establish clear roles and responsibilities to improve collaboration during future public health threats. It would also help manage risks, such as conflicts arising from variation in jurisdictional resources and cooperation. A diagnostic testing coordinating group (forum) that includes all relevant partners would help coordinate diagnostic testing in preparation for, and in response to, public health threats. It would also help maintain and update a national testing strategy. However, HHS has not established either a national testing strategy or forum. Establishing these before the next emergency would strengthen HHS's ability to implement testing for pandemic threats and other related public health threats. Why GAO Did This Study Widespread diagnostic testing for diseases with pandemic potential can help reduce potential death rates. Diseases with pandemic potential are highly transmissible and virulent. During the COVID-19 public health emergency, HHS faced several challenges developing accurate tests quickly, deploying tests, developing clear guidance for test use, and collecting complete testing data. GAO placed HHS's leadership and coordination of public health emergencies on its High-Risk List in January 2022, in part, due to HHS's handling of COVID-19 testing. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to monitor and report on the federal pandemic response. This report identifies actions suggested by experts for HHS to improve diagnostic testing for infectious diseases with pandemic potential, and steps HHS has taken related to these actions. GAO convened a roundtable of 19 experts to discuss actions HHS should take to improve diagnostic testing. GAO contracted with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to help identify experts representing a range of perspectives. GAO also reviewed HHS documents and interviewed HHS officials.

What GAO Found The Departments of Commerce, Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) coordinate the Manufacturing USA Program and sponsor its institutes. Institute members, such as manufacturers and universities, help fund the institutes and conduct advanced manufacturing research and development (R&D) and workforce training. Key changes to the Program since FY 2019 included establishing new institutes—expanding the network from 14 to 17, as of December 2024. Also, Commerce formed a task team with DOD and DOE to continue implementing GAO's prior recommendations to develop networkwide performance metrics. Another task team has begun developing common policies on membership by entities from China or other countries of concern. Commerce led the update of the strategic plan for the Manufacturing USA Program released in October 2024. However, Commerce officials described challenges. Specifically, the planning cycle required in statute does not align with mandatory 4-year updates to the National Strategy for Advanced Manufacturing. Aligning the strategic planning timeframes could better ensure the Manufacturing USA Program plan reflects the priorities of the national strategy. The 17 institutes generally increased their overall funding, memberships, technical capabilities, and activity on R&D and workforce training projects. In general, the institutes diversified their funding sources away from sponsoring agency baseline funding by also obtaining other federal funding, such as federal awards for certain projects, and nonfederal funds, like membership dues. Change in Manufacturing USA Institute Funding Sources, by Sponsoring Federal Agency, Fiscal Years (FY) 2019 and 2023 The six selected institutes and 22 members GAO interviewed described institutes' progress toward developing new technologies, building supply chain resilience, or other advanced manufacturing goals. However, they identified challenges, including long, uncertain timeframes for DOD and DOE to review some institutes' requests to fund new projects or membership applications. By not tracking review times, DOD and DOE could delay institutes' progress toward advanced manufacturing goals or discourage members' participation. Why GAO Did This Study Advanced manufacturing uses cutting-edge tools, methods, and materials to create high-value products, such as 3-D-printed aircraft parts. Congress established the Manufacturing USA Program in 2014 to stimulate U.S. leadership in advanced manufacturing, mainly through a national network of public-private partnership institutes. Congress included a provision for GAO to report periodically on the Manufacturing USA Program. This report examines Program changes since fiscal year (FY) 2019, including in institute funding, and the extent to which institutes helped achieve advanced manufacturing goals. GAO reviewed documents and data from the agencies and 17 institutes and interviewed agency officials and representatives of six institutes and 22 members. GAO selected agencies' oldest institutes, as they had the most time to achieve the goals.