What GAO Found The Department of the Interior's Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) collected $74 billion in royalties on $600 billion total sales of oil and gas produced by companies on federal leases from 2012–2022. Royalties collected depended in large part on the price of oil and gas, which increased from 2012 through 2022. ONRR generated $600 million through compliance activities for 2012–2022. Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) Royalty and Compliance Collections, 2012–2022 ONRR has made progress developing new risk models for selecting cases for compliance. However, incomplete data and resource challenges have impeded ONRR's ability to analyze its compliance data. ONRR is developing its own risk models for case selection, which should increase its capacity to analyze data, officials said. However, ONRR does not have certain data that could be used to inform the risk models, such as complete data on violations. By assessing the need for complete compliance data, ONRR could better inform its compliance strategy. Additionally, ONRR has not prioritized hiring staff with data analysis skills. By assessing human capital needs, ONRR could better determine what skills and staff it needs to strengthen compliance efforts. ONRR last estimated a royalty gap of approximately $100 million for both 2010 and 2011. The royalty gap is the difference between the payments ONRR collects from companies and what it should collect. ONRR staff recommended improving the model to continue estimating the royalty gap. However, ONRR management did not continue this effort after 2011. GAO attempted to estimate a royalty gap for more recent years using a different model but was unable to do so due to limitations with ONRR's data. Rigorous and improved estimates of its royalty gap could help ONRR enhance its decision-making and strategic planning of compliance efforts on an ongoing basis. Why GAO Did This Study The federal government receives significant revenues from royalties paid on the sale of oil and gas extracted from leased federal lands and waters. Interior has faced challenges verifying the accuracy of royalty payments. In 2011, GAO added Interior's management of federal oil and gas resources to its High Risk List. Interior has since taken steps to operate more effectively. GAO was asked to examine ONRR's federal oil and gas royalty compliance efforts. This report (1) describes ONRR's royalties and compliance activities for 2012 through 2022, the most current data available at the time of our review; (2) examines how staffing resources affected its ability to analyze compliance data; and (3) examines ONRR's latest estimates of an oil and gas royalty gap, and what opportunities ONRR has to improve its royalty gap model. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, agency guidance, and Interior's annual performance documentation and budget justifications for the period. GAO also analyzed ONRR compliance data and interviewed ONRR officials.

GAO maintains the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM). The 2024 revision of FISCAM has gone through an extensive deliberative process, including focus groups; interviews with internal and external officials, stakeholders, and users; and the collection and incorporation of public comments. The views of all parties were thoroughly considered in finalizing the 2024 revision of FISCAM. For more information, please visit the main FISCAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at (202) 512-3406. Effective Date The 2024 revision of FISCAM is effective for engagements beginning on or after October 1, 2024.

Why GAO Did This Study GAO issued two reports on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Armed Overwatch Aircraft program. In our first report we found that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was limited in its ability to justify the acquisition of the Armed Overwatch aircraft for three reasons. First, because SOCOM decided on the size of the fleet before conducting required analyses. Second, SOCOM did not assess how changes in the aircraft's capabilities could affect the number needed for operations. And third, that SOCOM has not reevaluated its needs despite changes to operational missions. In our second report, which is classified, our findings highlighted concerns related to risks associated with the capabilities of the Armed Overwatch aircraft, concepts surrounding the types of operations the aircraft will conduct, deployment and operating challenges, and affordability.  What GAO Found House Report 117-118, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, included a provision that we assess SOCOM's Armed Overwatch program. Our reports address the extent to which the Department of Defense has 1) evaluated SOCOM's analysis to support the number of Armed Overwatch aircraft to acquire and 2) determined the capabilities Armed Overwatch needs to support special operations forces operations and meet mission needs.

This is the Spanish language highlights associated with GAO-24-106670. Conclusiones de la GAO Los funcionarios de los cinco territorios permanentemente habitados de los Estados Unidos (Samoa Americana, la Mancomunidad de las Islas Marianas del Norte, Guam, el Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico y las Islas Vírgenes de los Estados Unidos) en total informaron que contaban con procesos para responder a los casos de niños desaparecidos y explotados y alertar al público, pero identificaron desafíos. Dos lugares en particular, el Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico y las Islas Vírgenes de los Estados Unidos, tienen un plan de alertas AMBER. En estos planes se describen las partes involucradas y los criterios para activar una alerta AMBER emitida a través de celulares, radio o televisión (ver la gráfica). Sin embargo, funcionarios de los cinco lugares reportaron desafíos relacionados con los conocimientos y la capacitación, los recursos, la conciencia pública y la ubicación geográfica. Ejemplo de alertas de emergencia emitidas por televisión y teléfonos celulares El Departamento de Justicia (DOJ, por sus siglas en inglés) se sirve del Fox Valley Technical College (Fox Valley), entidad receptora del acuerdo de cooperación del Programa de Asistencia Técnica y Capacitación sobre Alertas AMBER (programa de alertas AMBER) desde 2010, para ayudar a integrar los territorios estadounidenses en la red de alertas AMBER. Sin embargo, la interacción de Fox Valley con los territorios estadounidenses ha variado con el tiempo, con escasos contactos con la mayoría de los territorios antes de noviembre de 2023. Desde entonces, Fox Valley ha visitado o planea visitar todos los territorios estadounidenses para evaluar las necesidades existentes respecto a las alertas AMBER. Para ayudar a garantizar la coordinación con los territorios de EE. UU. en el futuro, en julio de 2024, el Departamento de Justicia exigió, y planea continuar exigir, que la entidad receptora llevara a cabo actividades de divulgación en los territorios de EE. UU. El DOJ y Fox Valley adoptaron varias medidas para cumplir ciertos requisitos legales vigentes en 2021 en relación con las alertas AMBER. Por ejemplo, Fox Valley celebró simposios para facilitar la coordinación y alentó a las tribus y territorios de EE. UU. a desarrollar planes de Alerta AMBER. Además, en julio de 2024, el DOJ exigió, y planea continuar exigir, a la entidad receptora que desarrollara un proceso para incluir tribus y territorios de EE. UU. en su informe anual sobre el plan de Alerta AMBER, ya que no lo había hecho en el pasado. Propósito de Este Estudio Las alertas AMBER transmiten rápidamente información al público sobre determinados casos de sustracción de menores. El DOJ supervisa la red de alertas AMBER de la cual forman parte personal de la aplicación de la ley y otras partes interesadas. El DOJ instituyó el programa de alertas AMBER para asistirle en el desempeño de sus responsabilidades respecto a este. La Ley de Autorización de Defensa Nacional para el ejercicio fiscal 2021 (NDAA de 2021) requirió al DOJ que tomara medidas adicionales relacionadas con la red de alertas AMBER. También incluye una disposición para la GAO con miras a evaluar hasta qué punto el DOJ aplicó estos requisitos e identificar retos o necesidades existentes en los territorios estadounidenses. El presente informe aborda (1) los procesos y desafíos de los territorios estadounidenses para responder a los casos de niños desaparecidos y explotados, incluida la emisión de alertas AMBER; (2) las acciones del DOJ para integrar a los territorios estadounidenses en la red de alertas AMBER; y (3) los esfuerzos del DOJ para cumplir ciertos requisitos de la NDAA de 2021 relacionados con la red de alertas AMBER, incluida la asistencia a tribus y territorios estadounidenses. Entre los métodos utilizados, la GAO analizó documentos del DOJ, como su documento sobre las mejores prácticas respecto a las alertas AMBER. La GAO entrevistó a funcionarios del DOJ y de Fox Valley, así como a funcionarios competentes de territorios estadounidenses. La GAO también entrevistó a funcionarios de una muestra no generalizable de seis tribus reconocidas a nivel federal. Para más información, contactar a Gretta Goodwin, (202) 512-8777, o GoodwinG@gao.gov.

Para la versión de esta página en español, ver a GAO-24-107464. What GAO Found Officials in all five permanently inhabited U.S. territories—American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands—reported having processes for responding to missing and exploited children's cases and alerting the public but identified challenges. Specifically, two locations—the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands—have an AMBER Alert plan. These plans outline the stakeholders involved and criteria for activating an AMBER Alert delivered through cell phones, radio, or television (see figure). However, officials from all five locations reported challenges related to knowledge and training, resources, public awareness, and geographic location. Example of Emergency Alerts Delivered to Televisions and Cellular Phones The Department of Justice (DOJ) leverages Fox Valley Technical College (Fox Valley)—the award recipient of its AMBER Alert Training and Technical Assistance Program (AMBER Alert program) cooperative agreement since 2010—to help integrate the U.S. territories into the AMBER Alert network. However, Fox Valley's interaction with the U.S. territories has varied over time—with limited contact with most territories prior to November 2023. Since then, Fox Valley has visited, or plans to visit, all the U.S. territories to assess their AMBER Alert-related needs. To help ensure coordination with the U.S. territories moving forward, in July 2024, DOJ required, and plans to continue to require, the award recipient to conduct outreach to the U.S. territories. DOJ and Fox Valley took various actions to address certain 2021 statutory requirements related to AMBER Alerts. For example, Fox Valley held symposiums to facilitate coordination and encouraged Tribes and U.S. territories to develop AMBER Alert plans. In addition, in July 2024, DOJ required, and plans to continue to require, the award recipient to develop a process to include Tribes and U.S. territories in its annual report on AMBER Alert plans—as it had not done so before. Why GAO Did This Study AMBER Alerts quickly communicate information to the public in certain child abduction cases. DOJ oversees the AMBER Alert network, which is made up of law enforcement and other involved stakeholders. DOJ created the AMBER Alert program to help carry out its AMBER Alert responsibilities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (2021 NDAA) required DOJ to take additional actions related to the AMBER Alert network. It also includes a provision for GAO to assess the extent to which DOJ implemented these requirements and identify any challenges or needs in the U.S. territories. This report addresses (1) U.S. territories' processes for and challenges in responding to missing and exploited children's cases, including issuing AMBER Alerts; (2) DOJ actions to integrate U.S. territories into the AMBER Alert network; and (3) DOJ efforts to address certain 2021 NDAA requirements related to the AMBER Alert network, including assisting Tribes and U.S. territories. Among other methods, GAO analyzed DOJ documents, such as its AMBER Alert Best Practices document. GAO interviewed DOJ and Fox Valley officials and relevant U.S. territory officials. GAO also interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable selection of six federally recognized Tribes. For more information, contact Gretta L. Goodwin at (202) 512-8777 or GoodwinG@gao.gov.