This letter provides GAO's comments on the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, The Auditor's Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements. GAO promulgates generally accepted government auditing standards, which provide professional standards for auditors of government entities in the United States.

Why This Matters Since 2014, veterans who face challenges accessing timely health care at Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical facilities have been increasingly referred to community providers to receive care. As part of an organizational reform to address its progressively complex processes, VHA created the Office of Integrated Veteran Care (IVC) to improve coordination and provide seamless access to care. GAO Key Takeaways IVC combined oversight of the management of VHA medical facility and community care into one office. The office established national priorities and initiatives, such as expanding a new process for specialty care appointments. It is also responsible for developing national policy for VHA’s regional networks and medical facilities to guide implementation of initiatives to enhance access to care at medical facilities. IVC has made several changes to its organizational structure and priorities since it was established. In May 2025, officials said further changes are on hold as the Department of Veterans Affairs undergoes reorganization and workforce reduction that may affect IVC. Congressional stakeholders have raised questions about the potential effects on veteran health care delivery. The frequent changes have affected officials’ ability to carry out the initiatives at some facilities. They reported that IVC did not clearly communicate changes to its organizational structure, and they did not always know where to seek guidance. They also reported that communication was often one-way, and their input was not solicited when making changes. Clear two-way communication will help officials effectively implement initiatives to ensure veterans access timely care. VHA Organizational Chart as of January 2025 How GAO Did This Study We evaluated VHA’s efforts against selected leading agency reform practices identified in prior GAO work. We reviewed documents and interviewed VHA officials from national-level offices, three regional networks, and three medical facilities on IVC’s organizational structure and planned changes.

What GAO Found The Veteran Employment Through Technology Education Courses (VET TEC) program administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides financial support to veterans enrolled in high-tech programs through eligible training providers. VA data show more than 20,300 veteran enrollments during the 5-year VET TEC pilot, which began in April 2019. VA reported spending nearly $262 million on the program as of December 2024. GAO found that the VET TEC pilot did not fully align with leading practices for pilot design (see figure). VA officials said the agency did not have sufficient staff to fully address these practices. While VA initially determined it had sufficient staff to meet the pilot objectives, it did not continually assess staff resources. Given that a new VET TEC is authorized through 2027, assessing its human capital needs would help VA assure the program has appropriate resources. Alignment of the VET TEC Pilot Program with Leading Practices for Effective Pilot Design VA oversaw training providers by evaluating their applications. It denied 165 of 221 applications, suspended five provider facilities, conducted two on-site reviews, and referred one instance of potential provider fraud to its Office of Inspector General. GAO's analysis of VA data indicated about $4 million in potential overpayments in tuition and fees to providers, or about 2 percent of payments. VA officials said that providers sometimes submitted information after an initial payment, such as when a veteran never began training, creating a potential overpayment. VA did not have written procedures applicable to the pilot to detect certain potential overpayments. Such procedures would enhance VA's internal controls for the VET TEC payment process. Veterans reported multiple challenges with training providers, including recruiting, educational quality, and career placement services. However, VA did not explicitly collect or analyze ongoing feedback through the GI Bill School Feedback Tool, its primary feedback mechanism. Doing so would help VA obtain critical input and enable it to assess and inform its VET TEC implementation. Why GAO Did This Study The federal government helps veterans transition to the civilian workforce. The Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 (the “Forever GI Bill”) instructed VA to carry out a 5-year pilot to train veterans for high-tech jobs. VA created VET TEC to support veterans who enrolled in high-tech courses through VA-approved training providers. In January 2025, legislation was enacted to establish a new program through September 2027. The Forever GI Bill included a provision for GAO to assess VET TEC. GAO issued an initial report on VET TEC in October 2022. This report builds on GAO's prior work and examines (1) VET TEC's alignment with leading practices for effective pilot design, (2) VA's oversight of training providers, and (3) challenges reported by participants. GAO compared VA's efforts to leading practices for effective pilot design and analyzed VA program data from April 1, 2019-August 19, 2024, the most recent available. GAO also analyzed 124 VET TEC comments submitted through the GI Bill Feedback Tool from July 2, 2019–January 5, 2024. GAO reviewed relevant VA documents, federal laws, and regulations and interviewed officials.

What GAO Found The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) did not complete actions to address sexual harassment at federally funded research institutions within the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act’s time frames. For example, OSTP was 15 months late in publishing its February 2024 required inventory of research agencies’ sexual harassment policies. This led to cascading delays in issuing required policy guidelines for agencies—January 2025 guidance was issued 20 months later than it should have been. GAO’s review of 17 research agencies found that none had policies that were fully consistent with the OSTP guidelines issued in January 2025. These agencies are now evaluating how to align their policies with the guidelines and expressed concern about meeting the current October 2025 deadline. OSTP is to monitor agencies’ development of policies. Such monitoring can ensure research agencies implement consistent policies, a goal specified in the act. However, OSTP does not have staff in place to lead this effort. OSTP officials stated they are recruiting to fill such positions, but the office had not yet hired staff as of July 2025, raising doubts about meeting the October deadline. Consistent with the act’s requirements, in August 2023 the National Science Foundation (NSF) announced its intention to make awards to study sexual harassment. In analyzing NSF’s awards database, GAO identified four such awards. However, these four awards were terminated as of May 2025. Timeline of Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and Research Agency Activities OSTP’s guidelines addressed most of the act’s requirements, but did not fully address sharing of harassment reports and reporting of investigative information. OSTP staff involved in developing the guidelines departed shortly after its release, which coincided with a change in administrations. Addressing these requirements can enhance research agencies’ awareness of recurring issues, a problem specified in the act. Why GAO Did This Study Academic science, engineering, and medicine are particularly susceptible to workplace sexual harassment, according to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Amid these concerns, the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act, enacted in 2022, identified various requirements for federal research agencies, OSTP, and NSF to combat sexual harassment at federally funded research institutions and increase consistency in research agencies’ policies. The act includes a provision for GAO to assess federal efforts to implement policies that address sexual harassment at research institutions. This report addresses: (1) the status of actions required of OSTP, NSF, and research agencies and (2) the extent to which the policy guidelines address the act’s requirements. GAO analyzed documentation and written responses from OSTP and 17 research agencies, including NSF, on their existing sexual harassment policies and the extent to which they were consistent with the January 2025 OSTP guidelines. GAO also compared these guidelines to the act’s requirements. In addition, GAO interviewed OSTP officials.

What GAO Found Over the next 2 decades, the United States plans to spend tens of billions of dollars to modernize its nuclear weapons stockpile and the research and production infrastructure on which its stockpile programs depend. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for managing these efforts. Since 2011, NNSA has been required by law to report on cost baselines and cost growth for certain construction projects and nuclear weapons acquisition programs. For example, NNSA must notify congressional defense committees when construction projects initially set cost baselines that exceed $65 million, and again if costs are expected to exceed baselines by 25 percent or more. Within 90 days of submitting a cost growth notification, NNSA must also provide additional information, including an assessment of the root causes of the cost growth. However, NNSA has not implemented effective processes to manage such notifications for construction projects, which has led to delays in notifications. GAO identified 14 NNSA construction projects that established a cost baseline that met the reporting criteria. All 14 provided notification of an initial baseline and seven are experiencing reportable cost growth. However, NNSA has not provided notifications in five of the seven instances. NNSA officials said that notifications were being prepared for some of the projects but has not provided them to congressional defense committees. Officials also acknowledged that NNSA had not sent root cause assessments in most cases. The two assessments that NNSA provided did not address legally required elements, such as the extent to which unrealistic performance expectations or immature technologies played a role in cost growth. Table: Status of Cost Growth Notifications for Ongoing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Projects Costing over $65 Million, as of April 2025 Number of projects Baseline notification letter sent Experienced reportable cost growth Provided cost growth notification Provided recertification and new cost baseline Provided assessment of root causes 14 14/14 (100%) 7/14 (50%) 2/7a (29%) 2/7a (29%) 2/7a (29%) Source: GAO analysis of Department of Energy project reporting data and NNSA documentation. | GAO-25-107767 aIn 2022, one project provided a cost growth notification, as well as notifications of recertification, a new baseline cost, and an assessment of root causes. However, it subsequently experienced additional reportable cost growth and established a new baseline in May 2025, but has not provided the additional notifications to date, which is not reflected in these figures. NNSA is also required to report on cost baselines for programs to acquire new nuclear weapons or life extension programs, and for programs to alter existing weapons where costs exceed $800 million. For three such programs that met the baseline reporting requirement, NNSA has used an existing reporting requirement to communicate initial cost and schedule baselines rather than provide separate notifications. At the time of GAO’s review, none of the three programs met the criteria for cost growth reporting in effect at the time—a total cost increase of at least 25 percent or a per unit increase of at least 50 percent. NNSA officials responsible for cost growth reporting told GAO that they planned to implement new processes with an initial focus on the process for construction projects, including the use of templates and root cause assessment guidance. However, officials said they were in the early stages and could not provide a timeline for completion. If implemented effectively, templates, guidance, and processes could help NNSA ensure it is providing accurate and timely information to congressional decision-makers Why GAO Did This Study House Report 118-529 includes a provision for us to review NNSA’s cost growth notification processes. GAO’s report assesses NNSA’s implementation of this provision and opportunities NNSA has identified to improve its cost growth notification requirements. GAO reviewed and analyzed provisions of law that relate to cost controls and reporting, NNSA directives and guidance, and NNSA documentation related to cost monitoring and notifications for construction projects and weapons programs. GAO also interviewed officials with NNSA and the Office of Management and Budget.

What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is taking steps to implement the legal authority it was granted in fiscal year 2025 to reimburse management and operating (M&O) contractors for certain transportation services for their employees. According to NNSA, the new contractor commuting authority will help address recruitment and retention challenges and improve transportation safety and congestion at NNSA’s sites. Agency officials identified some potential challenges the agency faces in implementing the authority. NNSA is reviewing a proposed transportation services plan for fiscal years 2025 to 2030 from the M&O contractor for Los Alamos National Laboratory, one of NNSA’s eight sites that compose the nuclear security enterprise. As of July 2025, contractor representatives at NNSA’s other seven sites said they did not plan to submit proposed transportation plans for the contractor commuting authority. The Los Alamos contractor estimates total costs of transportation services for its employees, such as park-and-ride shuttles and public transit subsidies, at about $74.4 million over the 6-year period. Officials said NNSA plans to use its existing contractor and subcontractor oversight framework to oversee the services: The M&O contractor is expected to have primary oversight responsibility for these subcontracts. The transportation plan’s proposed subcontract costs are not expected to meet the minimum threshold for NNSA to review the subcontract prior to award. NNSA plans to ensure program integrity by taking certain steps to monitor the contractor’s reporting and performance, including reviewing the contractor’s costs and benefits of the transportation services on a monthly basis, as well as its annual reporting NNSA officials identified two challenges the agency could face in implementing the authority: assessing some of the intended benefits of proposed transportation services because of difficulties with obtaining quantifiable data on all benefits, and having sufficient capacity for oversight because of NNSA’s longstanding human capital constraints. Why GAO Did This Study NNSA faces significant challenges with recruiting and retaining qualified staff, including contractor employees, particularly as its nuclear modernization workload increases. To carry out its work, NNSA relies on and oversees about 70,000 M&O contractor employees who execute NNSA’s missions at its eight government-owned, contractor-operated sites. NNSA’s efforts to address these challenges include implementing its new legal authority to reimburse M&O contractors for transportation services for their employees. According to NNSA, this authority will also help address challenges related to transportation safety, traffic congestion, and worker productivity. The Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 provides NNSA authority to reimburse contractors for approved transportation services after reviewing proposed plans that include certain required information. Senate Report 118-188 accompanying a bill for the act includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA’s implementation of the contractor commuting authority through fiscal year 2027 and provide an annual briefing to the relevant congressional committees. This first report discusses NNSA’s actions to implement this authority and challenges the agency anticipates facing. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant statutes, agency requirements and guidance, the Los Alamos M&O contractor’s proposed transportation services plan, and prior GAO reports, among other documentation. GAO also interviewed NNSA officials and M&O contractor representatives. Figure 1: Traffic Congestion Driving to Los Alamos National Laboratory, June 2025

What GAO Found Many of the meaningful results the federal government seeks to achieve, such as providing homeland security and cybersecurity, are crosscutting in nature. Achieving results in these areas requires the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency, level of government, or sector. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) updated the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to create a more integrated, crosscutting performance planning and reporting framework to support the federal government’s achievement of results. GPRAMA requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to work with federal agencies to develop cross-agency priority (CAP) goals, 4-year outcome-oriented goals that address crosscutting mission areas as well as management challenges. GAO issued three reports on the 2022-2025 CAP goals, which included six recommendations to improve their implementation. Two of the six recommendations, both related to transparent reporting on CAP goal progress, have been implemented. Addressing the remaining recommendations would help ensure that future CAP goals are timely, address required management areas—such as IT—and are defined to allow assessment over time. Agencies and OMB have implemented most recommendations GAO made related to GPRAMA implementation since the law was enacted. Through their efforts, OMB and agencies have made greater use of performance information in decision-making, created clearer definitions of performance goals and responsibilities, and enhanced transparency through more consistent public reporting. Figure: Status of GAO Recommendations Related to Implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 from Fiscal Years 2012 to 2025, as of July 2025 Notes: Recommendations categorized as “Closed – not implemented” are those for which the intent has not been satisfied, but time or circumstances have rendered the recommendation no longer valid. Recommendations categorized as “Open – partially addressed” are those for which actions have been taken that partially satisfy the intent of the recommendation. OMB has yet to fully implement 18, more than one quarter of GAO’s 61 recommendations. Fifteen relate to crosscutting issues, such as efforts to create an inventory of federal programs. The remainder involve efforts to increase federal transparency and the improved use of performance information. Implementing the open recommendations would help OMB improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal agencies, programs, and activities. Why GAO Did This Study The performance and planning framework originally put into place by GPRA and enhanced by GPRAMA provides important tools that can help decision makers address challenges facing the federal government. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to periodically assess the act’s implementation, including the CAP goals. This report, GAO’s fifth periodic review of GPRAMA’s implementation, (1) discusses GAO’s prior work on the implementation of CAP goals from 2022 to 2025; and (2) examines progress made in implementing GAO’s past GPRAMA recommendations. GAO summarized three reports related to CAP goals issued during the 2022-2025 timeframe. GAO also reviewed related prior work and actions OMB and other federal agencies have taken to implement recommendations made since GPRAMA was enacted.

What GAO Found Between 2018 and 2024, 97 percent of counties across the contiguous U.S. were projected to reach at least level 3, a dangerous level of heat, by the National Weather Services’s HeatRisk, a 5-level index for potential heat-related effects. In addition, more than 319 million people lived under a forecast that was at a dangerous level for at least one day during this period of time. Average Days per Year at HeatRisk Level 3 and Above by County, 2018-2024 FEMA has provided limited assistance to tribal, state, and local governments for projects to mitigate against extreme heat. For example, less than 1 percent of the agency’s Building Resilient Infrastructure Communities (BRIC) 1,235 grant projects with obligations from fiscal years 2020 through 2023 primarily addressed extreme heat. Further, there has never been a presidentially declared major disaster for an extreme heat event, which would trigger federal assistance, such as damaged infrastructure, emergency protective measures for survivors, and mitigation assistance. According to FEMA, past extreme heat events have caused little infrastructure damage, a key criterion for approving federal assistance. FEMA officials told us that absent extraordinary circumstances, it was unlikely that a president would ever declare a major disaster for extreme heat. Agency officials reported providing some assistance for extreme heat when responding to other approved disasters, such as distributing commodities to Houston, Texas after Hurricane Beryl. However, FEMA has not evaluated its role in helping tribal, state, and local governments to plan for and implement activities that reduce or mitigate future disaster losses from extreme heat events. Moreover, FEMA has also not assessed how its potential decision to end BRIC may affect the agency’s ability to assist these entities. Evaluating FEMA’s role and its capabilities for assisting tribal, state, and local governments to prepare, respond, and recover from extreme heat events would help the agency to fully identify any gaps in assisting these governments and determine how to best address them. The evaluation’s results could also be incorporated into any upcoming changes to FEMA’s role or reform efforts. Why GAO Did This Study According to the National Weather Service, extreme heat is the leading weather-related cause of death in the U.S.—killing more people than floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes combined. These events are forecast to grow in intensity, frequency, and duration. GAO was asked to examine the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) support for states and localities experiencing extreme heat events. This report examines (1) where forecast data projected extreme heat could occur; (2) the extent FEMA assisted Tribes, states, and localities to mitigate extreme heat; and (3) the extent that FEMA helped these entities respond to and recover from extreme heat events. GAO reviewed FEMA documentation; analyzed heat index data from January 2018 through October 2024 and FEMA grant data from fiscal years 2020 through 2023; interviewed emergency management or public health officials, subject matter experts; and FEMA officials.