What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) does not request full funding of identified needs for installation maintenance or major improvement projects for facilities. This shortage has led to an estimated $285 billion of maintenance backlogs in fiscal year 2025. Due to competing budget priorities, DOD set a goal to fund 90 percent of its maintenance needs, but GAO found that the military services continue to fall short of this goal by funding about 80 percent of these needs. DOD has not fully determined the risks to its mission and to the quality of life of its personnel as a result of not meeting its funding goal. Fully determining and communicating these risks would provide better information to DOD and Congress to weigh budget priorities. Examples of Facility Deterioration at Selected Military Installations due to Deferred Maintenance, Resulting in Damage, Corrosion, and Suspected Mold DOD also faces challenges in hiring and retaining key maintenance workers, which are critical for maintaining facilities. According to officials, challenges include hiring in remote and isolated locations; employment competition with the private sector; and federal hiring, pay, and work eligibility practices, which have been exacerbated by recent workforce reductions and the subsequent hiring freeze. However, GAO found that the military departments have not fully identified the extent of maintenance workforce shortages or developed strategies to address these challenges. Doing so would better position department and service leadership to ensure that they have the skilled workforce to address maintenance needs. Reliable information is important for DOD to effectively prioritize needed maintenance and improvement projects in light of insufficient funding and workforce challenges. However, GAO found that standards for maintenance vary across the services, limiting effective department-wide decision-making. Additionally, installations rely on maintenance work order data systems to respond to identified maintenance needs. However, GAO found that tracking is limited and that the data within those systems are generally unreliable for determining the overall effectiveness of maintenance performed across installations and the services. With improved maintenance information, DOD would be better positioned to take steps to strengthen oversight to improve the department’s vast portfolio of infrastructure and ensure that risks to mission and quality of life are reduced. Why GAO Did This Study DOD had over 736,000 facilities worldwide, with an estimated value of $2.6 trillion as of fiscal year 2025. Managing real property has been on GAO’s High-Risk List since 2003. GAO has reported that better management of the federal government’s real property portfolio is needed to collect reliable real property information and improve the condition of federal facilities, including DOD facilities, and could save billions of dollars. Senate Report 118-58 and House Report 118-125 contained provisions for GAO to assess DOD’s installation maintenance practices. Specifically, this report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) fully funded its facility maintenance and improvement needs; (2) determined the sufficiency of its maintenance workforce; and (3) developed the needed standards, reliable information, and oversight to manage installation maintenance. GAO analyzed DOD policies, budgets, maintenance data, and other documentation; interviewed DOD officials, including installation officials and maintenance customers from a non-generalizable sample of eight installations.

What GAO Found As of August 2026, EXIM was not monitoring the end use of any dual-use export because all such transactions had been repaid in full. EXIM did not finance any new exports under its dual-use authority in fiscal year 2025, according to EXIM authorization data and EXIM officials. Why GAO Did This Study The mission of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) is to help support American jobs by facilitating the export of U.S. goods and services and financing imports. In 1994, Congress passed legislation authorizing EXIM to facilitate the financing of U.S. exports of defense articles and services with both civilian and military applications, provided that the bank determines such dual-use items are nonlethal and primarily meant for civilian end use. Included in the same act was a provision for GAO, in consultation with EXIM, to report annually on the end uses of dual-use exports financed by EXIM during the second preceding fiscal year. This report (1) examines the status of EXIM's monitoring of dual-use exports that it continued to finance in fiscal year 2024, as of August 2026, and (2) identifies any new dual-use exports that EXIM financed in fiscal year 2025. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed EXIM documentation and data on dual-use exports and interviewed EXIM officials. For more information, contact Nagla'a El-Hodiri at elhodirin@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is preserving a sufficient inventory of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to meet national security needs until the 2040s. Separately, the largest needs for civilian enriched uranium are fuel for light water and advanced reactors. Estimates from the Department of Energy (DOE) and others about LEU supply and demand are generally well established, but factors such as the ban on LEU imports from Russia could affect availability. Demand estimates for high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) vary, and estimated supply may not meet near-term demands. National Security and Civilian Use of Enriched Uranium NNSA has a plan to meet national security needs for enriched uranium that includes using current inventory until the 2040s while pursuing three enrichment efforts for long-term needs. NNSA estimates total program costs for these efforts of about $140 billion through 2105. NNSA has not yet conveyed those costs in a biennial report required by Congress because the estimates are new. Providing this information would inform Congress of future costs for any future production options being considered. On the civilian side, DOE awarded $900 million to one company to expand LEU enrichment in the U.S. to support the existing commercial reactor fleet. DOE also issued $1.8 billion in awards to two companies to build HALEU capacity in the U.S. to support development of advanced reactors. However, DOE did not document an analysis to determine whether its actions are sufficient to induce expansion of commercial LEU and HALEU production in the U.S. According to agency documents and stakeholders, a range of challenges may affect NNSA’s and DOE’s goals to increase domestic enriched uranium production, but both agencies are working to mitigate challenges. For example, limitations in domestic fuel cycle infrastructure could challenge NNSA and DOE in achieving their goals. In 2025, DOE entered into an agreement to increase conversion capacity, to address one of the limitations in the domestic fuel cycle. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. needs enriched uranium for national security and civilian purposes. NNSA provides enriched uranium to support missions such as tritium production for nuclear weapons and fuel for naval reactors. Civilian needs include fuel for commercial nuclear power, medical isotope production, and research reactors. Current law and policy restrict the U.S. from using imported uranium or uranium enriched through foreign technology to meet national security needs and the U.S. does not have a fully domestic enrichment capability. Civilian nuclear fuel can be sourced domestically or internationally. Federal laws direct DOE to support domestic development of advanced nuclear reactors and LEU and HALEU fuels. The fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act and two congressional committee reports provide for GAO to address NNSA’s and DOE’s management and development of enriched uranium in the U.S. This report describes estimates of enriched uranium supplies and demands, examines agency plans to meet enriched uranium needs, and describes potential challenges to agency enriched uranium supply goals. GAO reviewed NNSA and DOE documents and plans, and interviewed DOE, NNSA, other agency officials, and industry representatives.

What GAO Found The Army’s two efforts to modernize its battlefield networks—the nearer-term Command and Control Fix (C2 Fix) and the longer-term Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2)—seek to make command and control more adaptive, survivable, and better suited for modern large-scale combat operations. Representation of Evolution of Battlefield Network Through Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) The Army’s approach to developing C2 Fix and NGC2 incorporates some key elements of an iterative business case. For example, the Army is using a flexible acquisition approach that collects user feedback and makes changes based on evolving market conditions and product capabilities. However, the Army has not taken important steps to implement other key elements that could position the Army to assess the scalability of these efforts. Specifically: The Army developed short-term schedules for NGC2 through fiscal year 2027 with a tentative goal of fielding NGC2’s full technology stack across 11 divisions and four corps by the end of fiscal year 2032. However, the Army is not well positioned to assess its ability to meet this timeline because it has not developed a detailed schedule that identifies the specific units, by fiscal year, that will receive the modernized capabilities. The Army identified NGC2 costs through fiscal year 2026 in documentation supporting the President’s fiscal year 2026 budget submission totaling approximately $3.3 billion. However, the Army has limited visibility into long-term costs because it has not completed an initial cost estimate for the life cycle of the collective effort. The absence of a detailed schedule and long-term cost data limits the Army’s ability to assess whether it has the time and resources it needs to meet its tentative goal for fielding NGC2 across the service by 2032. This gap risks access to secure and reliable communications that soldiers in the field need for modern large-scale combat operations. This information would also better position the Army and Congress to be able to make informed decisions about how to proceed with this effort. Why GAO Did This Study The Army’s modernization strategy seeks to provide soldiers with network technologies to command and control forces across vast terrain and multiple domains (i.e., land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace). As part of this strategy, the Army is focusing its modernization efforts on developing a mobile system of hardware, software, and infrastructure for reliable and secure communications. Senate Report 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to review the Army’s battlefield network modernization efforts. This report addresses (1) how the Army’s modernization approach for battlefield command, control, and communications networks enables it to meet evolving user needs and clearly specify the product to be provided; and (2) the extent to which the Army assessed its ability to scale NGC2 across the military service. GAO reviewed Department of Defense policy and guidance, requirements and planning documents, and Army budget requests. GAO evaluated if, and how, the Army developed cost and schedule estimates; and compared the Army’s two battlefield network modernization efforts against GAO’s leading practices for innovative product development, specifically the key elements of an iterative business case for target schedule and internal value. GAO also spoke with Army officials.

What GAO Found Five Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) teams are implementing the security cooperation workforce provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. Of the 66 provisions in the law we identified and reviewed, the agency has completed work on 46, is in progress on 15, and has not started implementing the remaining five. DSCA expects to complete work on all security cooperation workforce provisions in fiscal year 2028. For example: The Human Capital Initiative has completed work on 23 provisions and is in progress on 11 provisions. For example, the team has completed the provision to identify and code security cooperation workforce positions. It is in progress of implementing the provision to develop a management information system with the qualification, assignments, and tenure of security cooperation workforce personnel. The Defense Security Cooperation Service has completed work on two of four provisions related to ensuring that security cooperation workforce offices possess the requisite personnel, and that such personnel possess the skills needed to properly perform their missions. Status of Security Cooperation Workforce Provisions, by Defense Security Cooperation Agency Implementation Team, as of May 2026 Note: DSCU = the Defense Security Cooperation University DSCA officials implementing the security cooperation workforce provisions have identified and made plans to address personnel shortfalls and other challenges. For example, DSCA officials said that the federal civilian hiring freeze, implemented in January 2025, has been a factor in not being able to hire personnel to fill positions in the Human Capital Initiative. Officials are addressing this challenge by assigning key tasks and duties to other team members and leveraging other DSCA expertise to overcome critical skill gaps. As another example, officials identified challenges related to the development of a management information system. Officials said that DOD’s various security cooperation workforce components use different data systems to track positions and personnel. Until this management information system is in place, analysis of the security cooperation workforce position data is being done manually. Why GAO Did This Study To advance the U.S. national security strategy and foreign policy, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) security cooperation workforce works on activities that build the capacity of partner nations’ security forces through security assistance, including foreign military sales. This workforce includes military and civilian personnel in the U.S. and overseas who are responsible for planning, monitoring, or conducting these types of activities. DSCA, within DOD, plays a key role in planning and executing these programs. Congress included provisions to help modernize and professionalize the security cooperation workforce in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 The statute also includes a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD’s implementation of these provisions. GAO examined (1) the status of DSCA’s implementation of the Act’s security cooperation workforce provisions and (2) DSCA’s plans to address the challenges it identified in implementing the provisions. GAO reviewed and analyzed DSCA documents describing actions the agency is taking to implement the provisions. GAO identified a total of 66 provisions in the law. GAO assessed the status as “complete” if there was evidence of actions taken that addressed the provision with no significant identified actions remaining to implement it. “In progress” indicates there is some evidence of actions taken to address the provision, and “not started” means that, as of May 2026, DSCA had not taken any actions to address the provision. GAO also interviewed DSCA officials responsible for managing these efforts about these actions and challenges in implementing the provisions. For more information, contact James A. Reynolds at reynoldsj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In August 2025, GAO identified three priority recommendations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Since then, NASA has not implemented any priority recommendations. In July 2026, GAO identified an additional priority recommendation, bringing the total to four. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention:  Monitoring program costs,  Managing cybersecurity risks, and  Using federal contracting metrics. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would enhance NASA's efforts to improve transparency into Artemis program and mission costs; help NASA understand its cybersecurity risks by performing an organization-wide cybersecurity risk assessment to identify and mitigate the highest priority cyber threats across the enterprise; and position NASA to make more informed management decisions and potentially save millions of dollars in its procurements. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across NASA. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Timothy J. DiNapoli at dinapolit@gao.gov.`

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) and its components—relevant DOD offices and the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force)—are taking steps to prevent and mitigate the brain health effects of blast exposure. In 2024, DOD established several blast overpressure requirements, including one requiring that brain health be monitored. Specifically, this requires that all high-risk active duty service members complete a baseline cognitive assessment in fiscal year 2025 and all new service members complete one during initial military training. DOD also required tracking service members’ exposures to blast overpressure. As of fiscal year 2025, components have begun to implement tracking requirements, including updating the centralized data system to be able to track exposures. Figure: Number of Cognitive Assessments Completed in Fiscal Year 2025 Note: For more details, see fig. 4 in GAO-26-107829. According to DOD documentation and interviews, DOD components faced resource challenges: Cognitive assessments. DOD component officials reported that implementation was hindered by resource constraints, such as insufficient staff and technology to conduct the assessments, and that these challenges may affect their ability to meet additional requirements going forward. Such requirements expand assessments to all active and reserve service members, along with the goal to repeat assessments every 5 years. Exposure tracking. DOD component officials reported a lack of industrial hygiene personnel to complete exposure tracking requirements. Required tracking includes information about weapons systems used and exposures from those weapons for any service members exposed. Such tracking creates a record of the hazards that a service member is exposed to during their military service. DOD officials said that because of the need to expeditiously begin cognitive assessments and start exposure tracking efforts, there was not an opportunity to fully evaluate and ensure they allocated the resources necessary, as required by DOD policy and guidance. Officials said a 1-year pilot starting summer 2026 of a new cognitive assessment tool may address resource issues, but DOD did not have documented plans to assess this. DOD officials said they also have efforts underway to assess industrial hygiene resources needed for exposure tracking but such efforts have not been finalized. These efforts are important first steps, but comprehensive assessments would provide a sound foundation for ensuring the resources needed to implement DOD’s requirements. Such assessments would ultimately strengthen DOD’s ability to identify and provide treatment to service members who may need medical care and help ensure vital records are maintained about their exposures during military service. Why GAO Did This Study There is growing evidence that using certain weapons that produce high levels of what is called blast overpressure (the sudden onset of a pressure wave) can affect service members’ brain health. Symptoms of blast overpressure exposure can include headaches, memory loss, and, most seriously, traumatic brain injury. DOD is responsible for management of blast overpressure effects and issued a key memo with requirements for DOD components in August 2024. The requirements include prevention efforts such as mandated stand-off distances when firing weapons and monitoring efforts such as conducting periodic cognitive assessments. A report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes a provision for GAO to examine DOD’s efforts related to blast overpressure. Among other things, this report examines the status of implementation of DOD’s requirements and challenges DOD encountered in implementation. GAO reviewed DOD policies and guidance and obtained DOD data on cognitive assessments completed in fiscal year 2025. GAO conducted interviews with DOD components and site visits to four military installations. The installations were selected to include an initial military training site, a site with special operations forces, and military department representation.

What the OIG Found GAO aims to provide Congress, the heads of executive agencies, and the public with timely, fact-based, non-partisan information that can be used to improve government and save taxpayers billions of dollars. To execute its mission, GAO relies on a highly-qualified workforce that includes employees in mission-critical occupations (MCO) such as contracting, human resources management, and information technology management. In FY 2024, GAO’s hiring of MCO employees took about 103 days on average, which is longer than its internal target of 98 or 101 days (depending on the application review process used), OPM’s goal of 80 days for executive branch agencies, and executive branch agencies’ reported time frames depicted on OPM’s public dashboard. GAO competes with the private sector and other federal agencies to hire highly-qualified employees. Hiring employees more quickly could decrease the risk of GAO losing qualified candidates to other opportunities and improve its ability to meet the needs of Congress. In addition, the agency’s internally-reported calculations on the timeliness of hiring excluded about 30 percent of the employees hired in MCOs and were based on inaccurate dates for when hiring actions began. Finally, GAO’s internal reporting and hiring guidance had different targets for how long the hiring process should take. By using reliable data and targets for the length of its hiring process, GAO may be better able to meet its hiring timeliness goals. Why the OIG Did This Evaluation The agency’s ability to provide timely, quality reports to Congress and to ensure the accountability of the federal government to the American people depends on hiring knowledgeable, skilled employees. In fiscal year 2024, GAO highlighted managing a quality workforce—including hiring—as one of its top management challenges. The OIG conducted this evaluation to assess the timeliness of GAO’s hiring process.