What GAO Found A former employee of a Department of Defense (DOD) contractor alleged sexual assault by her colleagues while overseas during the Iraq War. The employee sought to bring these claims in court but her employer required arbitration, as the employee had signed an agreement to do so as a condition of employment. DOD contracting officers correctly included a clause, provided in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, restricting contractors' use of mandatory arbitration for certain disputes in 12 of the 14 contracts that GAO reviewed. The clause applies to contracts for noncommercial products and services over $1 million, among other criteria. Additionally, GAO found that the contractors for the 12 selected contracts that included the clause limited their use of mandatory arbitration appropriately. Nine contractors generally provided documentation showing that they did not incorporate mandatory arbitration in any of their workplace policies for resolving employee claims. The remaining three contractors provided workforce policies that included the use of mandatory arbitration for resolving some claims, but not for those claims covered by the clause. Inclusion of the Mandatory Arbitration Clause in DOD Contracts Reviewed by GAO The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) did not include the clause in two of its three contracts that GAO reviewed. The contracting officer overseeing the two contracts told GAO they misinterpreted the effective date of the clause. Furthermore, the contract writing system used to award both contracts recommended, but did not require, that contracting officers include the clause in contracts that met the criteria for inclusion. During GAO's review, DLA revised the contract writing system so that the clause would be included as required in future contracts. However, DLA's actions will not affect its ongoing contracts that have already been awarded, including the two that GAO identified. For context, during fiscal year 2023, DLA awarded at least 900 contracts that met the criteria for inclusion of the clause. Without an assessment of ongoing contracts, DLA will not know the extent to which the clause was not included or be able to determine appropriate action. Why GAO Did This Study Some employers require arbitration—in which disputes are resolved by a neutral third party—as a condition of employment. In 2010, Congress prohibited DOD's use of appropriated funds unless DOD contractors agreed that they would not require arbitration of claims related to sexual assault or harassment, or certain civil rights violations. Instead, covered contractors must allow employees to seek relief in a court of law for such claims. A House report includes a provision for GAO to examine the use of mandatory arbitration agreements by government contractors. GAO examined the extent to which DOD and its contractors implemented the restriction on the use of mandatory arbitration in selected contracts. GAO selected and analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 14 contracts from the DOD components with the highest contract obligations in fiscal year 2023 (the Army, Navy, Air Force, and DLA). The estimated contract value of these contracts ranged from $3.7 million to several valued at more than $100 million. GAO also interviewed contracting officials and contractor representatives; and analyzed relevant contractor documents.

What GAO Found The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for leading the federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and other incidents. HHS relies on national guidance—such as the National Response Framework—and some interagency agreements to coordinate the response to public health emergencies, according to HHS officials. The National Response Framework provides a structure for coordinating federal support during a national response. According to HHS officials, the department has not used its statutory authority to establish an agreement under which HHS assumes operational control of other agencies' emergency public health and medical response assets. It also has not used its statutory authority to coordinate with federal departments and agencies primarily because, according to HHS officials, the national guidance is sufficient to coordinate a response. Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, GAO and others have expressed concerns about HHS's leadership and coordination of public health emergencies. GAO added this area to our High-Risk List in 2022, citing the critical need for the nation to be prepared for, and effectively respond to, future public health threats and emergencies. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to report on HHS's interagency agreements and efforts to coordinate with other relevant federal agencies. For more information, contact Mary Denigan-Macauley at (202) 512-7114 or DeniganMacauleyM@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Every year the U.S. engages in billions of dollars in defense trade with countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. To facilitate this trade, DOD and 28 partner countries have signed Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) Agreements, which include similar provisions to open opportunities and waive “buy national” laws. For the U.S., the Secretary of Defense waives the Buy American Act—which generally requires U.S. federal agencies to buy U.S. goods and services—for RDP partner countries. As a result, these agreements may have significant trade implications for defense markets. Most RDP Agreements have been in place for decades and include automatic extension provisions. Map of Reciprocal Defense Procurement Partner Countries Since 2018, DOD has skipped important due diligence steps for entering into and renewing RDP Agreements. For example, for three agreements DOD did not solicit input from industry and for another agreement, DOD did not seek analysis from Commerce, as required. Industry input and Commerce's analysis are important to determine if the agreements help or hurt U.S. industry. U.S. agencies' efforts to monitor and assess the economic effects of RDP Agreements are limited. DOD is required to monitor and assess the effects of RDP Agreements on U.S. defense technology and industry and to solicit input from Commerce. However, the information and methods agencies rely on to evaluate the effects of RDP Agreements have limitations. Specifically, DOD has done little to monitor and assess the effects of RDP Agreements on U.S. defense technology and the U.S. industrial base. Commerce's methodology to assess RDP Agreements has several weaknesses. For instance, it does not cover the effects of RDP Agreements on services, even though 49 percent of the value of DOD procurements was for services in fiscal 2022. Further, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had not developed a plan to facilitate its statutorily required reviews of RDP Agreements. Unless U.S. agencies improve methods to assess proposed agreements and do more to monitor existing agreements, the U.S. government cannot be sure whether these and future agreements, such as those proposed for Brazil, India, and the Republic of Korea, achieve their purposes. Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) has entered into RDP Agreements with 28 partner countries. The agreements are intended to create more favorable conditions for defense procurement. DOD is responsible for entering into and assessing RDP Agreements, including considering the effect of existing or proposed agreements on U.S. industry. The Department of Commerce and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also have roles for evaluating the effects on U.S industry. GAO was asked to review RDP Agreements and how they are initiated, monitored, and assessed. This report examines (1) the provisions of RDP Agreements and how the agreements vary, (2) the degree to which U.S. agencies have developed and followed processes to initiate and renew RDP Agreements, and (3) the extent to which U.S. agencies have assessed and monitored the effects of RDP Agreements on U.S. industry. GAO reviewed the 28 RDPs and analyzed additional documents and data from DOD and Commerce. GAO interviewed officials from these agencies, a U.S. defense industry association, and an association of RDP officials from several partner countries.

What GAO Found GAO could not fully assess the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) implementation of bonding for oil and gas leases because BIA does not collect and maintain comprehensive information on bonds. For example, BIA generally does not have bond amounts or information on bond claims readily available without examining files. Without a process to compile or maintain bond information, BIA does not know if bonds are sufficient to fulfill their purpose or how often bond claims occur. Agency guidance is not sufficient to ensure BIA can effectively manage bonding. Guidance to BIA staff is not detailed enough to direct key actions at certain points in the life cycle of a lease, including when setting initial bond amounts. As a result, BIA offices generally do the minimum to adhere to agency regulations and guidance—for example, setting bonds at the regulatory minimum. BIA's bond minimums are insufficient to cover the costs of plugging and reclaiming a typical well (restoring lands to as close to the original natural state as possible), according to many tribal, BIA and BLM officials GAO interviewed. These minimums are also significantly lower than Interior now requires for leases on federal lands. BIA still allows nationwide bonds—covering all a lessee's leases across the country—which Department of Interior no longer accepts for federal lands. However, Tribes in GAO's review had disparate views on increasing minimum bond amounts. Several Tribes expressed concern that increased bond amounts would discourage companies from leasing on their land. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Bond Minimums for Certain Oil and Gas Leases on Trust or Restricted Land and Federal Lands Bond type Standard leases on trust or restricted land Leases on federal lands Individual bond (covering one lease) No minimum $150,000 Statewide or collective bond (covering all leases in one state or reservation) $75,000 $500,000 Nationwide bond (covering all leases nationwide) $150,000 No longer allowed Source: GAO analysis of BIA and BLM documentation. | GAO-25-106307 Note: For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-25-106307. When a bond is not adequate to cover the costs, abandoned wells may remain unplugged. The number of abandoned wells is unknown. BIA is working on compiling an abandoned well inventory. Some states use funding mechanisms in addition to bonds to plug and reclaim wells on state or private land, such as collecting fees from industry. However, Interior does not collect fees from lessees of trust or restricted land. Consequently, if bonds are not adequate to cover the costs of abandoned wells, Tribes or the federal government will be left to fund plugging and reclamation or wells will remain unaddressed. Why GAO Did This Study About 15,000 active oil and gas wells on trust or restricted land contribute to the economies of some Tribes. Interior's BIA assists tribal governments and citizens in managing, protecting, and developing their land and natural resources. Interior requires lessees to provide bonds to help ensure they meet the responsibilities of their leases—including plugging wells and reclaiming the land. Lessees may not be able or willing to reclaim the well site at the end of a lease, despite the consequence of losing the bond. When well sites are not fully reclaimed, Tribes may face environmental impacts on their lands or health and safety risks to their people. GAO was asked to review the status of oil and gas bonding for trust or restricted land. This report examines (1) BIA's information about bonds and bond claims, (2) BIA's guidance and processes for managing bonding, (3) the sufficiency of bond minimums, and (4) funding mechanisms to plug and reclaim wells when bonds are inadequate. GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed agency policies and guidance related to bonds, conducted site visits, and interviewed tribal and Interior officials.

What GAO Found States have jurisdiction over formation and reporting requirements for partnerships and trusts operating within their borders. Partnerships and trusts can be used for a range of business purposes, although trusts are more typically used for wealth management. States collect limited information from these entities. They require registration and ownership information only from certain types of partnerships and trusts, and the required information varies by state and entity type. For example, most states do not require general partnerships to register with the state, but generally require other types—such as limited partnerships—to register and provide some partner information. Law enforcement officials told GAO that some investigations were halted by the inability to determine the beneficial owners of businesses using existing methods. A beneficial owner is an individual who owns 25 percent of an entity or exercises substantial control over its activities. In January 2025, federal law will require certain companies created by filing a document with the secretary of state to submit beneficial ownership information to the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) registry. The registry is likely to benefit law enforcement investigations, according to Treasury and law enforcement officials. But law enforcement officials said they still may face barriers obtaining information on certain trusts and partnerships not covered under the reporting requirement. Partnerships and trusts represented a small percentage of entities named in suspicious activity reports (SAR) during 2019–2023, according to GAO's analysis of available data. SARs are reports that financial institutions must file with FinCEN if they identify potential criminal activity. Types of Entities Named in Suspicious Activity Reports, 2019–2023 The Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 requires FinCEN to periodically report on threat patterns and trends from SARs. Treasury used SAR data in a 2022 report on financial activity of Russian oligarchs. However, it does not periodically analyze SARs for trends in illicit activity related to partnerships and trusts. Treasury stated in 2024 risk assessments that trusts can be misused for tax evasion and fraud, and little is known about them. Although few of these entities have been named in SARs, agency officials and experts told GAO that criminals could exploit registry gaps by creating entities not required to report ownership information. Illicit finance experts have noted this may have happened in the United Kingdom when it began requiring certain ownership information in 2016. By leveraging SAR data, Treasury would be better positioned to promptly identify any increase in illicit activity and target its efforts. Why GAO Did This Study Illicit actors can use companies and other legal entities to launder criminal proceeds. Entities such as partnerships and trusts offer a degree of anonymity because they can be created without naming the people who benefit from their activities. The Corporate Transparency Act includes a provision for GAO to review beneficial ownership information requirements for partnerships and trusts. This report describes state requirements for registering partnerships and trusts and collecting beneficial ownership information. It also addresses views of federal law enforcement officials on the benefits of beneficial ownership information for law enforcement, and the illicit use of partnerships and trusts in the financial system and the risks they present. GAO reviewed registration statutes and documents for the 50 states and the District of Columbia, reports from federal agencies and international organizations, and data from Treasury (FinCEN), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, and Internal Revenue Service. GAO also conducted a survey of state officials (45 responses), and interviewed federal agency officials, representatives of associations for secretaries of state, trust and business lawyers, and illicit finance experts.

What GAO Found The Department of Agriculture's Forest Service manages the National Forest System for multiple uses and provides sustained yields of various resources, including timber. The agency may also sell timber to achieve land management objectives and promote other national forest uses. For example, the Forest Service may sell timber to reduce the number of trees in an area, create openings to improve wildlife habitat, or reduce the risk of insects, diseases, or wildfires. The Forest Service sells timber through four mechanisms: timber sale contracts, stewardship contracts and agreements, Good Neighbor Authority (GNA) agreements, and permits. Through timber sale contracts, the Forest Service sells the right to harvest timber to a purchaser, generally through an open, competitive bidding process. Through stewardship contracts and agreements, the agency exchanges timber for services (e.g., habitat restoration) to help achieve its land management goals. Under GNA, the Forest Service enters into agreements with states to implement timber sales, called GNA agreements. The Forest Service also issues permits for the removal of timber for a nominal fee or free of charge. The Forest Service uses an iterative process, with headquarters officials working with the agency's regions, to set agencywide and regional targets for the amount of timber the agency aims to sell each year through all four mechanisms. The Forest Service's average timber target was about 6,281,000 hundred cubic feet (CCF) per year, and its average amount of timber sold was about 5,590,000 CCF per year, from fiscal years 2014 through 2023. The agency also reports its targets and sales in board feet (see table). Table: Forest Service's Timber Target and Volume of Timber Sold, Fiscal Years (FY) 2014–2023 FY Target (CCF) Sold (CCF)a Target (MBF) Sold (MBF)a 2014 5,600,000 5,361,643 2,936,700 2,831,587 2015 5,752,103 5,354,126 3,019,862 2,819,181 2016 6,039,700 5,594,698 3,175,959 2,962,767 2017 5,696,000 5,592,819 3,001,150 2,933,132 2018 6,457,000 5,936,894 3,407,590 3,155,548 2019 6,194,122 6,054,699 3,277,247 3,230,089 2020 6,980,250 5,989,082 3,686,722 3,223,145 2021 7,344,740 5,192,986 3,880,880 2,824,163 2022 6,247,698b 5,178,533 3,304,850b 2,801,400 2023 6,494,330 5,642,095c 3,448,849 3,008,885c Annual average 6,280,594 5,589,757 3,313,981 2,978,990 CCF = hundred cubic feet; MBF = thousand board feet Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service data. | GAO-25-107496 Note: These data are from the Forest Service's Timber Information Manager database and may differ from data the Forest Service reported in the past for various reasons. For example, this table includes timber volume added during contract execution in the fiscal year that the timber was sold, whereas past reports may not have included the added volume in that fiscal year. aThe Forest Service sets timber targets for the amount of timber the agency aims to sell each year. Thus, this table reports volume of timber sold; the final harvested volume may differ. The volume sold amounts include volume that is added to timber sales during contract execution. bThe target for FY 2022 was preliminary. According to headquarters officials, the Forest Service did not set a final target in FY 2022 for various reasons, including because the agency received its final appropriations late in the fiscal year. cBeginning in FY 2023, the Forest Service began counting the volume of timber provided free of charge via firewood permits toward its sold volume, which it had not done previously. The Forest Service may offer firewood to the public free of charge in designated areas if it is compatible with land management plans. From FY 2014–2023, the Forest Service counted firewood permits provided for a fee toward its target. The Forest Service did not meet its targets for the amount of timber sold for any of the years from fiscal years 2014–2023. The agency sold nearly 90 percent of its annual targets, on average, during this time frame. Headquarters officials told us there are several reasons why the agency might not meet its target, such as limited staff capacity to plan and implement timber sales and wildfires and other natural disasters that shifted priorities or affected areas where the agency had planned sales. The majority of timber the Forest Service sold from fiscal years 2014–2023 was through timber sale contracts, followed by stewardship contracts and agreements. The agency's use of GNA agreements to sell timber generally increased during this time frame, and the amount of timber sold through permits was variable. Why GAO Did This Study The Forest Service sells timber each year as part of its management of the National Forest System. GAO received multiple congressional requests to examine Forest Service timber sales. A House Report accompanying a bill for the Forest Service's appropriations for fiscal year 2024 also includes a provision for GAO to study timber harvest levels. (H.R. Rep. No. 118-155, at 83 (2023); 170 Cong. Rec. S1095, S1675 (Mar. 5, 2024)). This report discusses how the Forest Service offers timber for sale, how the agency sets targets for the amount of timber it aims to sell each year, and how much timber the agency sold from fiscal years 2014–2023. This is part one of a two-part review. The second part will further examine Forest Service timber sales, including agency and stakeholder perspectives on the timber sale process. For more information, contact Cardell Johnson at (202) 512-3841 or JohnsonCD1@gao.gov.

What GAO Found States and localities have generally implemented public campaign financing programs using one of three models: (1) grants—participating candidates receive lump-sum grants of public funds; (2) matching funds—participating candidates receive public funds matching certain private contributions they raise, at a set rate; and (3) vouchers—eligible residents receive a credit of public funds they can assign to one or more participating candidates. GAO selected five programs representing the three model types (Arizona; Los Angeles, California; Minnesota; Montgomery County, Maryland; and Seattle, Washington) and examined their characteristics. For example, all five programs have requirements for candidates to qualify for the program, and once qualified, to receive public funds. These requirements include, for example, collecting a specific number of contributions to qualify and then adhering to spending limits to receive public funds. Voting Booths The amount of public funding participating candidates received varied by office sought and location, among other things. For example, in Minnesota in the 2022 election, legislative candidates received an average of $4,716 in public funds, and the one participating gubernatorial candidate received $584,034 in public funds. In Los Angeles in the 2022 election, participating city council candidates received an average of $198,151 in public funds, and participating mayoral candidates received an average of $1,284,158 in public funds. GAO interviewed officials from the five selected programs and four additional programs (Albuquerque, New Mexico; Hawaii; Maine; and Washington, D.C.) to obtain perspectives on candidate participation. Officials from all nine programs said that many candidates are attracted to the public campaign financing programs because they provide an accessible source of funding. This may be particularly appealing for candidates with limited fundraising experience. Officials from eight of the nine programs said a key reason candidates may not participate is because they perceive the available public funding to be insufficient to run a competitive campaign. Why GAO Did This Study While most electoral campaigns are privately financed, 14 states and 26 localities offer programs through which candidates running for state or local offices can use public funds to finance their campaigns, according to a 2024 Brennan Center for Justice report. The House committee report accompanying the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Bill, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to revisit and update its 2010 report ( GAO-10-390 ) on public campaign financing programs. This report describes, among other things, (1) key characteristics of public campaign financing programs in selected states and localities; (2) what available data indicate about candidates' use of these programs; and (3) factors affecting candidate participation in these programs. GAO selected five locations with state and local public campaign financing programs that covered executive and legislative offices, were implemented for at least two election cycles, and represented a mix of program models, among other factors. GAO reviewed relevant laws and documents and interviewed officials to describe key characteristics of the selected programs. GAO also analyzed candidate participation and campaign finance data for these five programs for the two most recent election cycles. GAO interviewed officials from these five programs and four additional programs—selected using the same criteria—to obtain perspectives on public campaign financing programs. The findings from these interviews are not generalizable, but provide insight into state and local perspectives. For more information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of State spent about $3.1 billion on pay, benefits, and allowances for employees serving abroad in fiscal year (FY) 2023. As of September 30, 2023, State operated 279 foreign posts staffed by about 9,000 U.S. direct hire employees. Most of the amount State spent went to basic compensation, housing, and federal benefits, such as employer's contributions to retirement and health insurance. Cost-of-living allowances, which include reimbursement for dependents' education and extra pay in locations with high living costs, accounted for 10 percent of State's spending. State Spending on Pay, Benefits, and Allowances for Employees Serving Abroad in Fiscal Year 2023 Notes: For more details, see figure 1 in GAO-25-107098. Percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding. State spending per Foreign Service employee serving abroad in FY 2023 varied by rank, location, and family size. Rank: State spent an average of $159,500 per entry-level employee and $321,311 per executive employee in FY 2023, according to GAO analysis of payroll data, which excluded some costs, such as housing and dependent education. Location: State's average spending per employee ranged from $182,151 in Malta to $325,181 in the Central African Republic, according to GAO analysis of payroll data. Family size: As an illustrative example, State's spending on selected benefits and allowances for a mid-level employee serving in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in FY 2023 could have been $292,524 for a single employee with no dependents and $375,745 for an employee with a family of four, according to GAO estimates. Why GAO Did This Study Around the world, State employees play critical roles in achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. State offers a range of pay, benefits, and allowances to its employees. State employees serving abroad may be eligible for allowances in locations where they encounter harsh or dangerous living conditions. They also may be compensated for costs related to working abroad. For example, they may receive allowances for the cost of dependent education; relocating to a new post; or living in locations where the cost of living is substantially higher than in Washington, D.C. In addition, they may receive certain non-cash benefits, such as housing. GAO was asked to review the total compensation, including allowances and non-cash benefits, for State employees serving abroad. This report examines (1) how much State spent on pay, benefits, and allowances for employees serving abroad in FY 2023 and (2) how State's spending on pay, benefits, and allowances varied for Foreign Service employees serving abroad in FY 2023. GAO analyzed State accounting, payroll, and housing data and reviewed documents to calculate aggregate and average spending by rank and location. Since the payroll data did not contain certain benefits, allowances, and employee characteristics, GAO constructed illustrative examples of State spending for employees of different ranks and with different family sizes. For these examples, GAO selected posts in five countries in different regions with varying rent costs and allowance rates: Mali, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. For more information, contact Tatiana Winger at (202) 512-4128 or WingerT@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Research involving animals has contributed to a better understanding of human health and new treatments for diseases; for example, it has helped scientists to develop a COVID vaccine. However, concerns have been raised about the welfare of laboratory animals. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has a policy that addresses the welfare of animals in research conducted by its institutes and external institutions. NIH takes various steps to oversee this research. These include requiring institutions to report and address noncompliance with the policy at the institutional and project levels and monitoring compliance with the policy. Examples of Types of Animals Used in Animal Research Concerns have also been raised about whether the results of animal research can consistently be reproduced in subsequent animal studies (reproducibility) or translated into similar results for humans (translatability). Multiple challenges contribute to reported low success rates in reproducibility and translatability, according to NIH, scientific publications, and scientific researchers GAO interviewed. For example, researchers sometimes do not publish enough details about their study design and use of animals. As a result, other researchers attempting to reproduce the research may obtain different or inconsistent results. Also, animals' responses to experimental treatments and drugs do not necessarily resemble those of humans because of inherent biological differences. NIH has taken steps to enhance the reproducibility and translatability of animal research it conducts and supports. For example, NIH issued a policy in 2015 on enhancing reproducibility through rigor and transparency, issued guidelines, and provided resources for researchers. However, NIH has not fully implemented key practices that can help agencies assess whether their efforts have led to measurable improvements. For example, NIH has not defined short-term goals to help track progress toward improving reproducibility and translatability or collected evidence that would help the agency assess the effectiveness of its efforts. Such evidence could include agency-wide information on whether grant applicants are following its 2015 policy. Agency officials said they had not done so because variability among different fields of study would require setting field-specific goals and measures. However, GAO has reported that, in cases like this, agencies can set specific targets and time frames for different areas and assess the contributions of each area to an agency's long-term goals. Why GAO Did This Study NIH, within the Department of Health and Human Services, spends about $5.5 billion annually to support animal research. NIH supports research conducted by its own institutes and by external entities such as universities. In recent years, researchers have reported low success rates in reproducing and translating the results of animal experiments. Reproducibility of a study can reflect how reliable its results are, and translatability enables animal research to benefit human health. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 includes a provision for GAO to report on aspects of animal welfare, reproducibility, and translatability in research NIH conducts or supports. This report addresses (1) steps NIH takes to ensure animal welfare in research it conducts and supports, (2) challenges that limit the reproducibility and translatability of this research, and (3) steps NIH has taken to enhance reproducibility and translatability in animal research. GAO analyzed NIH documents and data; reviewed relevant scientific publications; conducted two site visits to labs that conduct animal research; and interviewed NIH officials, scientific researchers, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations.

What GAO Found The Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is responsible for conducting immigration court proceedings. If a respondent—a noncitizen who has been charged with violating immigration law—fails to appear for any of their hearings, an immigration judge may order them removed from the country in their absence (“in absentia”). A judge may also waive their appearance and otherwise resolve the case, depending on the facts and circumstances. However, EOIR does not track or report data on whether respondents appear at their hearings or whether their appearance was waived, because EOIR's case management system does not have a function to systematically record such information. EOIR officials stated that the system has other information that could indicate whether respondents appeared at hearings, such as data on in absentia removal orders and certain hearing adjournment codes. However, these data do not reliably track respondents' appearance at hearings. Developing and implementing a function in its system and publicly reporting on that data would better position EOIR to provide reliable information to Congress and others about the extent respondents appear for their hearings. According to EOIR data, from fiscal years 2016 through 2023, the total in absentia rate was 34 percent for removal cases of non-detained respondents. EOIR calculates the in absentia rate by dividing the number of in absentia removal orders by the number of immigration judges' initial decisions resolving cases. The rate varied by certain characteristics, such as court location, legal representation status, and demographic characteristics. Rates of Non-detained Respondent Cases Ordered Removed in Absentia Out of Initial Case Decisions Note: The fiscal year 2021 decrease in the rate may be associated with factors such as fewer hearings because of the COVID-19 pandemic and higher legal representation rates. Government officials and stakeholders stated that respondents may not appear for their court hearings for a variety of reasons, such as language barriers, not having transportation to court, or respondents choosing not to go to court because they fear that they will be detained upon appearing at their hearing. Why GAO Did This Study Each year, EOIR issues hundreds of thousands of decisions for cases involving noncitizens charged as removable under U.S. immigration law. As of July 2024, EOIR reported a backlog of nearly 3.5 million pending cases. GAO was asked to review EOIR's data on in absentia removal orders. This report examines (1) the extent to which EOIR tracks respondent hearing appearances, and (2) EOIR data related to in absentia removal orders, among other objectives. GAO analyzed EOIR documentation and data on immigration court removal cases that were opened or pending at any point from fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2023. This analysis comprised the in absentia rates for non-detained respondents and various respondent characteristics, including legal representation status. GAO interviewed EOIR officials and made virtual and in-person site visits to five immigration courts selected based on various factors, such as a range of in absentia rates. During these visits, GAO interviewed government officials (e.g., immigration judges) and nongovernmental stakeholders (e.g., private bar attorneys) to obtain their views on respondent hearing appearances, among other things.

What GAO Found The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) successfully piloted Direct File from February to April 2024 for taxpayers with simple tax situations residing in one of 12 states. Direct File used interview-style questions to guide taxpayers through preparing a return on an IRS website at no cost to the taxpayer. IRS accepted 140,803 Direct File returns which helped many taxpayers with lower incomes fulfill their filing obligations. Taxpayers reported that Direct File was an easier tax preparation method than they had previously used, a factor that contributed to IRS's decision to make Direct File permanent. Demographics of Direct File Taxpayers during the 2024 Filing Season GAO found that IRS followed leading practices in piloting Direct File. These included identifying learning objectives and collecting relevant data such as customer service requests. IRS also identified lessons learned, such as how to develop website content more efficiently. IRS continues to determine staffing needs for a newly established Direct File Office. IRS is planning to expand the scope of taxpayers who can use Direct File in 2025 by adding support for the premium tax credit for health insurance and other tax provisions and by allowing residents of an additional 12 states to use the federal Direct File system. However, GAO found that IRS is behind schedule in recruiting and training customer service representatives for the 2025 filing season due in part to insufficient coordination among IRS offices. Additionally, IRS limits participation in Direct File to taxpayers who live in certain states, which facilitates coordination between federal and state tax filing. However, GAO found that IRS could face challenges in reaching agreements with all states, which raises equity concerns for taxpayers unable to access Direct File due to where they live. GAO found that selected foreign and territorial revenue agencies prepopulate tax returns with information already on file, such as wages reported by employers. IRS began offering limited prepopulation in April 2024 during the pilot. IRS officials told GAO that they are considering additional prepopulation of taxpayer data but are still in the early stages of planning. Identifying additional data for prepopulation in Direct File and developing a plan for testing its accuracy could enable IRS to reduce taxpayer burden. Why GAO Did This Study IRS is offering a new online service called Direct File to assist individual taxpayers in preparing and filing a tax return. IRS intends for Direct File to make it easier to claim tax benefits and improve digital services consistent with legal authorities to provide taxpayer services. The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) directed IRS to study and report on a potential government-run online filing system. IRA also included a provision for GAO to oversee the use of IRA funds. GAO's objectives were to (1) describe IRS's Direct File pilot; (2) evaluate how IRS applied leading practices for pilot design to inform next steps; (3) evaluate IRS's efforts to expand the scope of Direct File; and (4) compare the online filing services provided by selected foreign and territorial taxing jurisdictions to IRS's. GAO reviewed IRS documents, interviewed IRS officials, and compiled case studies of online filing systems in six countries and Puerto Rico.

What GAO Found The U.S. Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), stated that it needs more polar icebreakers to meet its missions in the Arctic and Antarctic. This is, in part, because it currently has insufficient capacity to assure U.S. presence and reliable access to the Arctic. Given the Arctic’s increased importance, the Coast Guard is working to maintain and expand its polar icebreaking fleet to meet its mission needs. It already studied and analyzed its needs for more than a decade. However, the Coast Guard faces challenges and open questions on its plans. Maintaining the polar icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard plans to continue using its two operational polar icebreakers, the Healy and the Polar Star, until it can design and build replacements. Both icebreakers are near or beyond their planned service lives, respectively, and require extensive maintenance. So, the Coast Guard is investing $172 million total in service life extension programs for both icebreakers. The Coast Guard’s Polar Icebreakers, the Healy and Polar Star Expanding the polar icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard plans to expand the polar icebreaker fleet via near-term and long-term acquisitions to reach eight or nine new polar icebreakers to fill its Arctic capability gaps in the coming decades. Near term – To add another cutter to the Arctic sooner, the Coast Guard plans to purchase an existing, commercially available medium polar icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s goal is to be able to deploy it within 2 years from receiving funding, or by March 2026, after making some initial modifications. Coast Guard officials said that they do not have information on the current condition of the ship or the modifications it will make to reach full operational capability, such as potentially reconfiguring the helicopter pad. Before receiving $125 million to purchase the icebreaker in fiscal year 2024, the Coast Guard developed two rough estimates and found that it would cost over $1 billion to purchase and convert a ship, prepare its permanent homeport in Alaska, and operate it for the first 7 years. However, the Coast Guard has yet to develop a detailed cost estimate including what modifications it will make to reach full operational capability to inform future budget requests. Coast Guard officials said they do not plan to develop one before purchasing it. Without a more robust cost estimate for converting the commercially available polar icebreaker, the Coast Guard may be committing resources without knowing the full cost of its commitment.  Long term – The Coast Guard is acquiring up to three heavy polar icebreakers as a part of the Polar Security Cutter program. After significant delays maturing the design, the soonest the lead cutter may be operational is 2030. Coast Guard officials said that they are considering expanding the program by buying up to two more cutters. The Coast Guard is also considering whether to start another program to build a new class of medium polar icebreakers, known as Arctic Security Cutters. Combined, these two programs and near-term efforts will help the Coast Guard transition from two to the eight or nine total polar icebreakers it seeks. However, the Coast Guard has open questions to answer such as the mix of cutters it will build and what buying, operating, and homeporting all of these new ships will cost. Further, the Coast Guard continues to lack a polar icebreaker fleet analysis that examines the cost and sequencing of programs including how these efforts are affordable within its larger acquisition portfolio. Such an analysis would allow the Coast Guard to make informed decisions about initiating or expanding programs in the context of its larger acquisition portfolio. GAO previously identified that the Coast Guard needs to improve how it makes investment decisions. Why GAO Did This Study As GAO reported in July 2023, to begin addressing gaps in its polar icebreaker fleet, the Coast Guard is partnering with the Navy to procure three heavy polar icebreakers, known as Polar Security Cutters. The Coast Guard must complete other efforts and determine their costs to expand the polar fleet, such as for a new medium polar icebreaker program. GAO was asked to examine the status of the Coast Guard’s efforts to address its near- and long-term gaps in polar icebreakers. This report discusses how the Coast Guard analyzed its polar icebreaking needs, options it considered to expand the future fleet, and open questions about the polar fleet expansion that the Coast Guard has yet to address. For this report, GAO reviewed Coast Guard and DHS documentation as well as interviewed Coast Guard, DHS, and other agency officials with Arctic interests.

What GAO Found Cloud seeding is a decades-old approach to modifying weather that uses a range of supporting technologies for research and operations. According to NOAA, the most common uses of cloud seeding are to increase precipitation or suppress hail, usually by adding tiny particles of silver iodide. Nine U.S. states are currently using it, while ten have banned or have considered banning cloud seeding or weather modification in general. Federal cloud seeding involvement and support is minimal. Cloud seeding may increase water availability and result in economic, environmental, and human health benefits. In the studies GAO reviewed, estimates of the additional precipitation ranged from 0 to 20 percent. However, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of cloud seeding due to limitations of effectiveness research. GAO identified challenges to the use and development of cloud seeding, including: Reliable information is lacking on the conduct of optimal, effective cloud seeding and its benefits and effects. Without such information, operations will be less effective and the return on funding investments is unclear. Cloud seeding operations can only enhance precipitation when the right kind of clouds are present, which limits opportunities for success. Existing research we reviewed, while limited to a handful of recent studies, suggests silver iodide does not pose an environmental or health concern at current levels. However, it is not known whether more widespread use of silver iodide would have an effect on public health or the environment. Federal reporting requirements may not include all information necessary to adequately monitor cloud seeding. As a result, opportunities to better evaluate the benefits and potential effects of cloud seeding may be missed. The public may not fully understand cloud seeding, including how it differs from geoengineering, which affects the climate on longer time scales. Figure: Cold season and warm season cloud seeding GAO identified five policy options that could help address these challenges or enhance potential benefits. These options are intended to inform policymakers of potential policy implementations. For the purposes of this report, ‘policymakers’ includes Congress, federal and state agencies, research institutions, industry, and other stakeholders. The status quo option illustrates a scenario in which current efforts proceed without intervention. Policy Options to Help Address Challenges to the Use and Development of Cloud Seeding Policy Option Opportunities Considerations Maintain status quo efforts (report p. 21)For example, cloud seeding operators, federal agencies, and researchers continue to apply technologies and approaches that are already tested and commercially available. Some current state programs may already be optimized for local conditions. Additional resources and time that may be required for other policy options could instead be used for other priorities. Current efforts are not likely to address all challenges described in this report. Encourage targeted research to reduce uncertainty (report p. 22)For example, government entities, researchers, and operators could promote and support research partnerships to address uncertainties. Partnerships could enable more coordination and focus on local needs and broader issues, such as basic cloud-physics questions while improving local commercial operations. More research could lead to better understanding of potential environmental and human health concerns of seeding. More awareness of benefits could improve use of funds and awareness of equity issues. The public and policymakers often face short-term pressures regarding water, but cloud seeding research is best done over the long-term. More research may not be enough to address some uncertainties. New partnerships may also require more deliberate planning and consultation across sectors to identify suitable groups. Support more evidence-based operations (report p. 22)For example, policymakers could use licensing and permitting requirements to ensure operations conduct evaluations. Ensuring evaluations are done consistently across cloud seeding operations could help address standardization challenges. Required funding and expertise for evaluations may not be available. Improve monitoring and oversight (report p. 23)For example, NOAA could use its existing authority to work with other government entities, researchers, and operators to update required data for reporting, and make changes to improve standardization of annual reports. Better quality and transparency of information would improve broad understanding of cloud seeding. NOAA’s weather modification reporting form could require more specific information (e.g., flare constituents and seeding yield statistics). Standardized federal data and reporting could improve data uniformity, making research and understanding generalizable and better support independent evaluations. Managing the increased volume and rate of data may become cost prohibitive. Some operators may not share some information on cloud seeding flares due to proprietary concerns. Various entities may lack incentives or awareness of reporting requirement. Groups may also vary in their ability to report information due to funding and operational constraints. Expand education and outreach (report p. 24)For example, government entities, industry associations, scientific societies, researchers, and operators could promote awareness of the distinction between long-term climate or geoengineering applications and short-term cloud seeding to alter local precipitation. Better understanding of definitions and differences can inform debate about potential risks and benefits of cloud seeding. Better understanding of definitions may not address some sources of negative public perception. Additional funding would likely be required for larger outreach initiatives. Source: GAO. | GAO-25-107328 Why GAO Did This Study According to the Fifth National Climate Assessment, demand for water is increasing and the frequency and intensity of drought are projected to worsen in the western U.S. The ability to increase precipitation through cloud seeding could help mitigate some of the water management challenges caused by drought. Cloud seeding has been practiced in the U.S. since the 1940s. Recently however, advances in radar and sensor technology have enabled research with enough precision to show that cloud seeding may be effective under certain conditions. This report discusses (1) the emerging and current technologies for cloud seeding (and weather modification generally), (2) the potential benefits of cloud seeding, (3) challenges surrounding the use and development of cloud seeding, and (4) policy options that may help address challenges or enhance benefits of cloud seeding. GAO reviewed cloud seeding technology across development and operational stages; interviewed a range of stakeholder groups, including government, industry, academia, and professional organizations; convened an expert meeting that included academics, state and federal agency officials, and representatives from industry organizations. We also reviewed key reports and scientific literature. GAO is identifying policy options in this report. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD, at (202) 512-6888 or HowardK@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System authorized 13 emergency lending programs—known as facilities—to ensure the flow of credit across the economy. To improve oversight of these programs, the Federal Reserve issued seven reports from December 2020 through June 2024 that evaluated its internal processes and controls, such as for risk management and cybersecurity. These reports identified 20 opportunities to enhance internal controls. GAO found that Federal Reserve Banks, which manage the facilities, have fully addressed 19 of the 20 opportunities. The remaining opportunity, which relates to a facility's evaluation model that monitors loans' credit quality, is currently under review. GAO also found that the Federal Reserve's plans for ongoing monitoring of the facilities are generally aligned with federal internal control standards. The five facilities under the Main Street Lending Program targeted small and midsize businesses and nonprofits. Of the 1,830 loans made through this program, 850 (or almost half) had been fully repaid as of August 31, 2024, the most recent data available. Further, 138 loans (or about 8 percent) had recorded a total of about $969 million in losses, a significant increase (about $781 million) year-over-year. About 46 percent (or 847 loans) remained outstanding. The program had collected about $1.89 billion in interest payments. Main Street Lending Program Loans, First Quarter 2021–Third Quarter 2024 Note: Numbers may not add to the total number of loans due to varying loan statuses. Loans to larger businesses have generally performed better than those to smaller ones. For example, businesses with annual revenues over $42.1 million at loan origination accounted for the largest share of repaid loans. In contrast, smaller businesses (annual revenues of $3.1 million or less) experienced higher rates of delinquencies and losses. Businesses in the construction sector have repaid a smaller proportion of loans and experienced higher delinquency rates compared with other sectors, such as the leisure and hospitality sector. The higher rates of delinquencies and losses partly reflect the effects of higher interest payments and the 15 percent of each loan's principal that came due for borrowers in the second half of 2023. Interest rates higher than those at loan origination have increased borrowers' payments, potentially creating financial strain for businesses. Another 15 percent of each loan's principal came due during 2024, and a balloon payment of the remaining 70 percent will come due beginning mid-2025, potentially further affecting loan performance. Why GAO Did This Study As of the end of fiscal year 2024, four of the Federal Reserve's 13 lending facilities, all part of the Main Street Lending Program, continued to hold significant outstanding assets and loans. These facilities had approximately $4.7 billion in outstanding assets and loans, which will not mature until July 2025 or later. About $10.4 billion in collateral was pledged to secure the loans. The four facilities were among the nine that received funds appropriated through the CARES Act (section 4003). The Federal Reserve is required to monitor and report on the status of the facilities until they no longer hold outstanding assets or loans. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to annually report on section 4003 loans, loan guarantees, and investments. This report examines (1) the Federal Reserve's oversight and monitoring of the CARES Act facilities and (2) the status and performance of Main Street Lending Program loans. GAO reviewed Federal Reserve documentation, conducted loan-level analysis of Main Street Lending Program loan performance covering July 2020 through August 2024, and interviewed Federal Reserve officials. For more information, contact Michael E. Clements at (202) 512-8678 or ClementsM@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Medical countermeasures, such as vaccines and drugs used to treat COVID-19, can save lives when there is a public health emergency or threat. Most people who receive a countermeasure have no serious problems, but like any medicine, there is a rare chance that some can cause serious injuries or deaths, according to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). To encourage the development of medical countermeasures, the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act limited the legal liability of manufacturers and others for losses related to the administration or use of covered countermeasures. It also authorized HHS to establish the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) to compensate individuals who die or suffer serious physical injuries directly caused by the administration or use of certain medical countermeasures. CICP is operated by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)—an agency within HHS. To be eligible for compensation, individuals must file a claim within one year of the administration or use of a covered countermeasure and provide medical documentation to support that the countermeasure directly caused a serious physical injury or death. HRSA data show that since CICP began accepting claims in October 2009, the program received about 27 times more claims in response to the COVID-19 pandemic than in the first decade of the program—13,333 compared to 491 claims, respectively. Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program Total Claim Submissions , by Fiscal Year, as of June 2024 HRSA made decisions on 25 percent of the total claims submitted as of June 2024 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO’s analysis); the remaining 75 percent of claims were under review or pending review. Of the claims that have completed HRSA’s adjudication process, about 3 percent (92) were found eligible to receive compensation. Fifty-six percent of the paid claims were COVID-19-related. HRSA data show that it took the agency 24 months on average to complete both the initial eligibility check and medical review needed to make a claim decision. For claims found ineligible after the initial eligibility check, HRSA took 14 months on average, as of June 2024. Missing the filing deadline was the most common reason for ineligible claim decisions. HRSA paid roughly $6.5 million in compensation for eligible claims as of June 2024, with most of that amount for serious injuries, such as Guillain-Barré syndrome, caused by the H1N1 vaccine. About $400,000 was paid for injuries related to COVID-19 countermeasures, such as myocarditis (inflammatory heart condition). Nearly all of the challenges HRSA experienced operating CICP stem from the large influx of claims related to COVID-19 medical countermeasures and limited resources to process and pay claims prior to fiscal year 2022, HRSA officials told GAO. Specifically: shortage of staff to adjudicate the large influx of claims; outdated information systems to process the large number of claims; and limited medical and scientific evidence to base decisions about injuries or deaths allegedly caused by novel COVID-19 countermeasures. To address these challenges, HRSA hired more staff and launched a web portal for online claims submissions, among other things. HRSA also started developing a COVID-19 Countermeasure Injury Table—a table that lists injuries that are presumed to be caused by COVID-19 countermeasures—to help streamline claims reviews. HRSA planned to publish the table in a proposed rule by November 2024, according to the most recent Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. Thirty-eight foreign countries operate medical injury compensation programs, nine of which began during COVID-19, according to research. There are also three international programs. According to program documents, these programs primarily focus on harm from vaccines. Officials from three of the four foreign countries’ medical injury compensation programs in GAO’s review said they have taken or plan to take actions in response to their experiences operating during the COVID-19 pandemic, such as creating contracts that allow programs to quickly hire staff to scale up capacity when needed. Why GAO Did This Study The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to report on the federal government’s ongoing monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report describes CICP, including its claims adjudication process, and similar programs in selected foreign countries. GAO analyzed HRSA data on CICP claims submitted from October 2009 (the date the program began accepting claims) through June 2024 (the most recent data available). GAO reviewed relevant HRSA documentation and interviewed agency officials. GAO further reviewed documents and interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of five foreign medical injury compensation programs—four from foreign countries (Canada, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland) and one international program (COVAX No-Fault Compensation Program for Advanced Market Commitment Eligible Economies). GAO selected these countries for variation in the length of program operation and the claim filing deadlines, and variation in the country’s COVID-19 vaccine administration rates. GAO selected the international program because it covered the largest number of countries. For more information, contact Mary Denigan-Macauley at (202) 512-7114 or DeniganMacauleyM@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Federal agencies with a lead role in protecting the nation's critical infrastructure sectors are referred to as sector risk management agencies. These agencies, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), were required to develop and submit initial risk assessments for each of the critical infrastructure sectors to DHS by January 2024. Although the agencies submitted the sector risk assessments to DHS as required, none fully addressed the six activities that establish a foundation for effective risk assessment and mitigation of potential artificial intelligence (AI) risks. For example, while all assessments identified AI use cases, such as monitoring and enhancing digital and physical surveillance, most did not fully identify potential risks, including the likelihood of a risk occurring. None of the assessments fully evaluated the level of risk in that they did not include a measurement that reflected both the magnitude of harm (level of impact) and the probability of an event occurring (likelihood of occurrence). Further, no agencies fully mapped mitigation strategies to risks because the level of risk was not evaluated. Extent to Which the Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMA) Have Addressed Six Activities in Their Sector Risk Assessments of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Lead agencies provided several reasons for their mixed progress, including being provided only 90 days to complete their initial assessments. A key contributing factor was that DHS's initial guidance to agencies on preparing the risk assessments did not fully address all the above activities. DHS and CISA have made various improvements, including issuing new guidance and a revised risk assessment template in August 2024. The template addresses some—but not all—of the gaps that GAO found. Specifically, the new template does not fully address the activities for identifying potential risks including the likelihood of a risk occurring. CISA officials stated that the agency plans to further update its guidance in November 2024 to address the remaining gaps. Doing so expeditiously would enable lead agencies to use the updated guidance for their required January 2025 AI risk assessments. Why GAO Did This Study AI has the potential to introduce improvements and rapidly change many areas. However, deploying AI may make critical infrastructure systems that support the nation's essential functions, such as supplying water, generating electricity, and producing food, more vulnerable. In October 2023, the President issued Executive Order 14110 for the responsible development and use of AI. The order requires lead federal agencies to evaluate and, beginning in 2024, annually report to DHS on AI risks to critical infrastructure sectors. GAO's report examines the extent to which lead agencies have evaluated potential risks related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure sectors and developed mitigation strategies to address the identified risks. To do so, GAO analyzed federal policies and guidance to identify activities and key factors for developing AI risk assessments. GAO analyzed lead agencies' 16 sector and one subsector risk assessments against these activities and key factors. GAO also interviewed officials to obtain information about the risk assessment process and plans for future templates and guidance.

What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), provided over $3.8 billion in wildfire-related assistance from fiscal years 2019 through 2023. The agency obligated about $3.2 billion in Public Assistance grants for emergency work (such as debris removal and emergency protective measures), and permanent recovery work (repairing or replacing roads, utilities, and buildings). Example of How Wildfires Can Affect Landscapes GAO interviewed officials from 22 state, local, and tribal governments about their experiences obtaining FEMA assistance for wildfires. Examples of challenges officials cited included: Post-wildfire Mitigation. Wildfires destroy vegetation and damage soil, creating conditions that can increase immediate risks of flooding, erosion, and debris flows—fast-moving, destructive landslides that often strike without warning. GAO found that communities continue to face challenges addressing post-wildfire risks, in part because FEMA's assistance programs are too slow to support more timely post-wildfire mitigation. Taking steps to provide immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance could help foster more resilient communities and reduce future demand on federal resources. Fire Management and Assistance Grants (FMAG) management. State, local, and tribal officials GAO interviewed said they faced challenges associated with the FMAG program, including the quantity and complexity of required paperwork, and confusion over eligibility requirements. However, FEMA does not collect ongoing, nationwide feedback from state, local, and tribal FMAG recipients, as it does for other grant programs. Collecting, assessing, and incorporating such feedback into program policy, as appropriate, would help FEMA address challenges. Why GAO Did This Study In recent decades, much of the nation has witnessed an increase in the size and severity of wildfires. At the same time, development in and around wildland areas has increased. Demand for federal resources to mitigate against, respond to, and recover from these wildfires has increased. The FEMA Improvement, Reform, and Efficiency Act of 2022 includes a provision for GAO to examine FEMA wildfire assistance programs. This report examines (1) FEMA assistance to wildfire-affected communities from fiscal years 2019 through 2023, and (2) challenges communities face with this assistance and to what extent FEMA has taken steps to address them. GAO analyzed data from FEMA assistance programs from fiscal years 2019 through 2023 and reviewed agency policies, guidance, and assessments of FEMA's wildfire assistance. GAO interviewed officials from FEMA and a non-generalizable sample of seven state, 11 local, and four tribal governments that obtained FEMA assistance for wildfires during this period. GAO conducted site visits to Hawaii, Washington, and the Nez Perce Tribe.

What GAO Found From 2018 through 2023, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided $12.1 billion in total assistance to the top 10,000 agricultural producers—which we define as those that received the most federal financial assistance—who manage livestock feeding operations in the United States. A livestock feeding operation usually houses a single species in a confined setting, such as a building or open-air pen. Generally, livestock feeding operations, like other agricultural producers, must meet eligibility requirements to receive federal financial assistance from USDA programs. From 2018 through 2023, the top 10,000 livestock feeding operations received the majority of their assistance from four USDA programs: the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program, Market Facilitation Program, Dairy Margin Coverage Program, and the Federal Crop Insurance Program. Dairy, hogs, and beef cattle were the three largest commodities to receive livestock feeding assistance from 2018 through 2023. Total annual subsidies for insurance for livestock increased from $3.8 million in 2018 to $411.3 million in 2023. Insurance subsidies can help protect operations against financial losses from commodity price declines and production losses due to natural causes. The increase in these subsidies shows larger participation in insurance for livestock—from 717 to 4,651 policies earning premium during this period. The majority of livestock feeding operations out of the top 1,000 operations were located in California (209), Wisconsin (115), Minnesota (72), Iowa (70), and Texas (56), based on GAO’s review. Distribution of the Top 1,000 Livestock Feeding Operations by State, 2018 through 2023 Note: We define the top 1,000 operations as those that received the most federal financial assistance. The top 20 operations received $219.3 million in total assistance, with $164.4 million coming from insurance for livestock from 2018 through 2023. The average assistance for the top 20 operations was $11 million per operation over that time. Why GAO Did This Study The federal government provides agricultural producers tens of billions in financial assistance every year. This financial assistance covers revenue shortfalls related to commodity price declines or scarce harvests, among other things. From 2018 through 2023, programs administered by USDA increased the amount of assistance to agricultural producers who manage livestock feeding operations. Historically, the agency has provided most of its assistance to agricultural producers who grow crops. GAO was asked to report on federal support for livestock feeding operations, including the amount of federal financial assistance and the characteristics of those operations. This report provides information on the amount of assistance provided to livestock feeding operations from 2018 through 2023 and describes key characteristics of operations that received this assistance, such as the total estimated number of animals and other associated entities. GAO reviewed relevant laws and agency documentation, analyzed USDA program financial data, and interviewed agency officials. For more information, contact Steve Morris at (404) 679-3841 or morriss@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided $161 billion in financial assistance to agricultural producers from fiscal years (FY) 2019 through 2023, the last year for which data were available. Supplemental assistance programs during this time span—distributed financial assistance to producers affected by international trade disruptions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters—accounted for about 42 percent of all financial assistance distributed. USDA's crop insurance program provided 33 percent of the total financial assistance. From FYs 2019 through 2023, USDA provided financial assistance to an average of about 1 million agricultural producers each year. More than 90 percent of producers received a combined annual average of about $11.9 billion (or about $12,000 per producer) in financial assistance (see figure). However, less than 10 percent of producers received a combined annual average of $20.3 billion (or about $272,000 per producer) in financial assistance. In addition, the top 10 producers receiving the most financial assistance received about $18.0 million per year on average. Overall, USDA financial assistance ranged from a few dollars per year to $215.2 million to a single producer in 2022. Average Annual USDA Financial Assistance to Agricultural Producers, Fiscal Years 2019–2023 The number of historically underserved producers, along with livestock and poultry producers, participating in USDA financial assistance programs increased from about 84,000 to 183,000 and from about 76,000 to 243,000 producers respectively, over the 5-year period. According to agency officials, several factors contributed to the increase in participation for both groups of producers, including the expansion of programs in the 2018 farm bill that broadened the type of producers eligible to participate in programs, and an increase in the number of supplemental programs in recent years for which they were eligible. Why GAO Did This Study Agricultural producers have received USDA financial assistance through commodity, conservation, crop insurance, and disaster assistance programs authorized by the 2018 farm bill. In addition, Congress may provide additional support through supplemental assistance programs. These programs, designed to provide additional and temporary forms of financial assistance, address specific agricultural losses or needs. Financial assistance—in the form of direct payments or as payments on behalf of the producers to crop insurance companies—can go to individual producers directly, or to legal entities that producers operate. GAO was asked to review the total distribution of USDA financial assistance across the department's programs serving agricultural producers. This report provides information on USDA's distribution of financial assistance to agricultural producers by type of program and producer (including historically underserved producers), among other factors, from fiscal years 2019 through 2023. GAO analyzed USDA data on financial assistance to agricultural producers for 27 selected programs from fiscal years 2019 through 2023. USDA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. For more information, contact Steve D. Morris at (202) 512-3841 or Morriss@gao.gov.