What GAO Found GAO has identified three major IT acquisition and management challenges: (1) strengthening oversight and management of IT portfolios, (2) implementing mature IT acquisition and development practices, and (3) building federal IT capacity and capabilities. To address these challenges, it has identified nine critical actions that the federal government urgently needs to take. Nine Critical Actions Needed to Address Three Major IT Acquisition and Management Challenges GAO has made over 1,800 recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies aimed at improving their management of IT. However, many of these recommendations have not been implemented and many agencies continue to be challenged in effectively acquiring IT and managing IT projects. Of the 1,881 recommendations made since 2010 related to this high-risk area, 463 had not been implemented as of January 2025. GAO has also designated 69 as priority recommendations and, as of January 2025, 32 had not been implemented. Urgent actions are needed to address the ongoing challenges that the government faces in effective and efficient IT acquisition and management. Until OMB and federal agencies take the critical actions identified, they will continue to struggle with IT acquisitions that fail to consistently deliver capabilities in a timely manner, incur cost overruns and/or schedule slippages, and contribute little to mission-related outcomes. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies rely extensively on IT to carry out operations and fulfill their missions. Each year, the federal government invests more than $100 billion on IT. However, for several decades, GAO has reported that federal IT investments too frequently fail or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Because of these challenges, GAO added the federal government's management of IT acquisitions and operations to its high-risk list as a government-wide challenge in 2015 and continues to designate it as a high-risk area. Over time, this high-risk area has become increasingly more complex as technologies have matured and evolved. In addition, as technologies have changed, the skills needed to manage them have also changed. This report provides an update to the IT acquisitions and operations high-risk area. To do so, GAO identified three key IT acquisition and management areas in which federal agencies face continued challenges and nine critical actions that the agencies need to take to address those challenges. GAO reviewed its prior reports and prioritized reports that were government-wide and had open recommendations, among other things. Based on the results of its work, GAO is renaming this high-risk area to Improving IT Acquisitions and Management.

What GAO Found Improper payments are those that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount. The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) includes requirements that agencies must follow to estimate and report on improper payments. These include publishing improper payments estimates, corrective action plans, and reduction targets for certain programs and activities with their annual financial statements. PIIA also requires each agency’s inspector general (IG) to issue an annual report on the agency’s compliance with applicable criteria. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) plays a key role in developing guidance for agencies to estimate and report on improper payments. OMB guidance includes information for agency IGs on how to determine agency compliance with PIIA criteria. It also includes information on the corrective actions PIIA requires of agencies if they are found noncompliant. When IGs find agencies to be noncompliant with PIIA criteria in a fiscal year, the law requires agencies to report on their plans to come into compliance to the appropriate authorizing and appropriations committees of Congress. OMB has directed agencies to report their plans for coming into compliance on PaymentAccuracy.gov to meet this requirement. When an agency has been noncompliant for 2 or more consecutive fiscal years for the same program, the agency must propose to OMB additional program integrity proposals that would help the agency come into compliance. OMB guidance directs such agencies to include the program integrity proposals in their next annual budget submissions. In IG reports issued in 2023, 10 of the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies were found noncompliant with PIIA for fiscal year 2022 and reported their plans to come into compliance on PaymentAccuracy.gov. In addition, according to data reported on PaymentAccuracy.gov, nine CFO Act agencies were noncompliant with PIIA criteria for one or more of the same programs or activities for 2 consecutive years (fiscal years 2021 and 2022). OMB staff stated they would provide guidance on the process for submitting required program integrity proposals during development of the fiscal year 2026 President’s Budget. Timeline of Key Milestones in the Improper Payments Reporting Process OMB staff said they communicated with congressional staff when PIIA was being drafted, including discussions about using PaymentAccuracy.gov to report improper payment information from agencies to ensure that the website included information that would meet congressional needs. They stated that they have not received congressional feedback on the usefulness of PaymentAccuracy.gov for reporting payment integrity information since they made updates to the information and its display on the website from 2020 through 2023. OMB did not offer any current plans to actively seek additional feedback from Congress regarding the updates. Selected congressional committee staff GAO met with provided their perspectives about PaymentAcccuracy.gov and its role in providing information on improper payments for their oversight work. Some said they were unfamiliar with PaymentAccuracy.gov and relied on other sources of payment integrity information, while others said they used it in their oversight work and expressed appreciation for the website and its utility. Some noted technical challenges to accessing or analyzing information. Taking steps to clarify where key payment integrity information, such as noncompliant agencies’ plans for coming into compliance, is reported could increase transparency of payment integrity information and facilitate congressional oversight. Why GAO Did This Study Improper payments are a long-standing and significant problem in the federal government. Since fiscal year 2003, executive branch agencies have reported cumulative improper payment estimates of about $2.8 trillion, including $161.5 billion for fiscal year 2024. PIIA requires agencies to manage improper payments by identifying risks, taking corrective actions, and estimating and reporting on improper payments in programs they administer. Agencies’ understanding of the requirements and related key concepts of and proper oversight of compliance with PIIA criteria is important to more effective detection and prevention of improper payments. House Report 117-389, which accompanied the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to provide quarterly reports on improper payments. This is GAO’s eighth such report. It examines OMB’s and IGs’ roles in implementing PIIA and how agencies report payment integrity information, including instances of noncompliance and related plans to come into compliance that PIIA requires and OMB guidance reflects. GAO reviewed federal statutes, standards, and guidance and GAO reports related to improper payments. GAO also reviewed agency financial reports and IG PIIA compliance reviews for the 24 CFO Act agencies for fiscal years 2021, 2022, and 2023 and reviewed PaymentAccuracy.gov to confirm the process for accessing reported payment integrity information. Additionally, GAO interviewed OMB staff and selected congressional staff.

What GAO Found Under the systemic risk exception, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can provide certain emergency assistance when resolving a failed bank if, upon the recommendation of FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and in consultation with the President, the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury determines that it would avoid or mitigate serious adverse effects on the economy or financial stability. FDIC and the Federal Reserve established six bases (see figure) to support their recommendations to invoke the exception for Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, which failed in March 2023. The two regulators coordinated to gather information from market participants and corporate firms. They also analyzed financial markets and economic conditions, such as bank liquidity. FDIC and the Federal Reserve Established Six Bases for Recommending the Systemic Risk Exception in 2023 GAO's analysis found that the Treasury Secretary invoked the systemic risk exception for each of the banks after taking into consideration the regulators' recommendations and consultations with the President. The decision was also informed by a review of Treasury staff analysis of public financial filings data and views of external parties, such as asset management firms. The decision allowed FDIC to protect all deposits at the two failed banks, including uninsured deposits. GAO's analysis of selected financial and economic indicators suggests that FDIC's actions likely helped prevent further financial instability. For example, deposit outflows from commercial banks other than the 25 largest banks slowed in the week after the bank failures and stabilized the following week. How these indicators would have performed without the systemic risk exception is unclear. Protecting all deposits can create moral hazard by reducing bank and depositor incentives to manage risk, as they may expect future bailouts, according to selected literature. Financial regulatory reforms proposed by regulators and introduced in Congress, including changes to deposit insurance and to capital requirements, may help address these concerns. Why GAO Did This Study In March 2023, the federal government worked to stabilize the banking sector following the failure of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank. Based on recommendations from FDIC and the Federal Reserve and in consultation with the President, the Treasury Secretary invoked the systemic risk exception in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. This decision allowed FDIC to protect all deposits, including uninsured deposits, at both failed banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act includes a provision for GAO to review Treasury's decision. This report examines (1) steps taken by FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and Treasury to invoke the systemic risk exception for Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank; (2) the likely effects of invoking the exception for these two banks; and (3) potential unintended consequences of the systemic risk exception on the incentives and conduct of insured depository institutions and uninsured depositors and proposals that may help mitigate such effects. GAO reviewed agency documentation; analyzed financial market and banking data; and reviewed relevant laws, proposed regulatory reforms, proposed legislation, and prior GAO reports. GAO also reviewed 18 academic articles or research studies related to the potential effects of the systemic risk exception. Additionally, GAO interviewed agency staff and four academics (selected for their expertise in financial markets and regulation). For more information, contact Michael E. Clements at (202) 512-8678 or clementsm@gao.gov.

What GAO Found A modular open systems approach (MOSA) is a strategy that can help the Department of Defense (DOD) design weapon systems that take less time and money to sustain and upgrade. Recent legislation requires acquisition programs to implement a MOSA to the maximum extent practicable. GAO found that 14 of the 20 programs it reviewed reported implementing a MOSA to at least some extent. Other programs cited barriers to doing so, such as added cost and time to conduct related design work. While a MOSA has potential benefits, it may also require programs to conduct additional planning, such as to ensure they address cybersecurity aspects related to a MOSA. Potential Benefits of a Modular Open Systems Approach However, none of the 20 programs GAO reviewed conducted a formal analysis of costs and benefits for a MOSA because DOD's policy does not explicitly require one. As GAO reported in March 2020, program officials often focus on reducing acquisition time and costs. Unless required to consider the costs and benefits of a MOSA, officials may overlook long-term MOSA benefits. Further, most programs did not address all key MOSA planning elements in acquisition documents, in part, because the military departments did not take effective steps to ensure they did so. As a result, programs may not be well-positioned to integrate a MOSA into key investment decisions early in the life of the program. Also, DOD's process for coordinating MOSAs across portfolios does not ensure the level of collaboration needed to achieve potential benefits such as lower costs from using common components across programs. The military departments are statutorily required to ensure availability of certain resources and expertise related to MOSA implementation. However, they have yet to assess their departments' MOSA needs or determine how resources should be aligned across their respective departments. Until they do this, programs risk having insufficient resources and expertise to achieve the potential benefits of a MOSA. DOD has updated some acquisition and engineering policies and is drafting regulations and guidance to address MOSAs. But gaps remain that could hinder MOSA implementation. For example, DOD policy does not address how MOSA requirements apply to programs using the middle tier of acquisition pathway—those intending to complete rapid prototyping or fielding in 5 years or less. Why GAO Did This Study A MOSA enables weapon programs to better respond to changing threats by allowing them to replace components more easily. Further, a MOSA can help address concerns like high weapon system sustainment costs that GAO has reported on. House and Senate reports include provisions for GAO to review DOD's use of MOSAs. This report assesses the extent to which (1) programs implemented MOSAs and why; (2) programs and portfolios planned for MOSAs; (3) the military departments invested in necessary resources for MOSAs; and (4) DOD developed policy, regulations, and guidance for MOSAs. GAO reviewed planning documents for 20 acquisition programs that started after relevant laws were passed in 2016. GAO selected the programs based on their acquisition approach and military service. GAO also reviewed policy and guidance documents and interviewed DOD and military department officials.

What GAO Found Representatives from 19 manufacturers GAO interviewed identified a range of challenges, strengths, and potential improvements for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) new chemicals review process. For example, most (16 of 19) representatives told GAO they experienced review delays and described effects of these delays on their businesses. Effects manufacturers cited included harming customer relations, creating a competitive advantage for existing chemical alternatives at the expense of new chemicals, and hindering market participation. Representatives also identified strengths in how EPA implements the program and potential process improvements. For example, almost all (18 of 19) representatives found EPA's public information sources somewhat or very helpful. Representatives suggested that EPA improve the new chemicals review process by clarifying review requirements, providing realistic time frames for completing reviews, and improving communication, among other improvements. EPA's New Chemicals Division (NCD) has taken some important initial planning steps, but NCD does not follow most key practices for managing and assessing the results of its New Chemicals Program. Extent to Which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Follows Key Management and Assessment Practices for Its New Chemicals Program For example, in August 2024, NCD drafted a strategic plan that identifies five strategic goals and how to achieve them. However, NCD did not follow some relevant key practices in developing the plan, including involving external stakeholders and identifying resources needed to achieve each draft goal. Moreover, NCD officials told GAO that they had not developed a systematic process to ensure that it consistently follows all key practices. Addressing relevant key practices—including involving stakeholders and identifying resources—as NCD finalizes its strategic plan could position the division to better manage and assess the program. Further, implementing a systematic performance process could better position NCD to ensure that it achieves program goals, such as improving the timeliness of reviews. Why GAO Did This Study The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), as amended, directs EPA to make a formal determination on the risk of injury to health or the environment on each new chemical before it can be manufactured. However, GAO reported in February 2023 (GAO-23-105728) that EPA typically made its determination within the 90-day TSCA review period less than 10 percent of the time. GAO was asked to review EPA's implementation of its TSCA New Chemicals Program. This report (1) summarizes the perspectives of selected manufacturers on EPA's review process and (2) evaluates the extent to which EPA follows key practices for managing and assessing the program. GAO identified a random, nongeneralizable sample of notices submitted to EPA from October 2021 to April 2024 and interviewed 19 manufacturers that submitted these notices. GAO also compared EPA's management and assessment activities to key practices it developed based on federal laws, federal guidance, and prior GAO work.

What GAO Found States generally have flexibility in determining the specific services offered to youth in the John H. Chafee Foster Care Program for Successful Transition to Adulthood. Selected state officials told GAO they decide on their service array by using data, participant feedback, and information from other states. Officials also reported offering youth services based on individual skills and needs. The most widely used services in selected states related to education, health, and housing. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF) provides resources to help states select effective Chafee services. These resources include technical assistance, a database on services provided and youth outcomes, and evaluations of independent living programs. Officials in all six selected states told GAO they found ACF technical assistance helpful, but their use of the database and findings from evaluations varied. ACF officials said they have plans to increase the usefulness of both resources. Officials in four selected states said state funds made up the majority of funding for Chafee services. Yet, states did not always spend all available federal funding, despite having unmet needs in serving youth. GAO's analysis showed that in fiscal year 2022, 12 of 51 states returned Chafee funds, and 28 states returned Chafee education voucher funds for a total of about $8.9 million. Annual Total Federal Chafee Program Funds Returned by States, Fiscal Years 2018–2022 Note: Chafee Education and Training Voucher (ETV) grants support youth attending an institution of higher education. The number of states includes the District of Columbia. Numbers may not sum due to rounding. ACF officials told GAO it is planning to send its regional offices information on which states return funds to facilitate conversations between regional staff and state officials on fully spending federal funds. ACF officials said they would begin this process soon but do not have a documented plan for this initiative, nor have they communicated this plan to regional offices. By documenting its plan and providing guidance to address barriers to spending, ACF can better ensure the Chafee program meets its objective to support youth as they transition from foster care to adulthood. Why GAO Did This Study The transition from adolescence to adulthood is a critical period and can be particularly difficult for youth aging out of foster care. Administered by ACF, the Chafee program supports youth in or formerly in foster care as they transition to adulthood. GAO was asked to report on how states use Chafee program funds to assist older youth. This report addresses: (1) how selected states support youth transitioning from foster care to adulthood, (2) ACF resources for states on effective Chafee services, and (3) the extent that state and federal funds are used to support services for older youth. GAO analyzed ACF expenditure data for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, the most recent available. GAO also reviewed federal Chafee allocations for fiscal year 2023. GAO also reviewed ACF's spending and program guidance for the Chafee program. In addition, GAO interviewed HHS officials and six state child welfare agencies selected for variation in federal Chafee funding, instances of returning unused funds, administrative structures (state vs. county), and geographic region.

What GAO Found Salmonella and Campylobacter are among the types of bacteria known to commonly cause foodborne illness in the United States, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In 2018, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) designated Salmonella in “not ready-to-eat” breaded stuffed chicken products an “adulterant”—a poisonous or deleterious substance—if present at certain levels. However, since that time, FSIS has not finalized any new or updated standards for Campylobacter and other illness-causing pathogens in meat and poultry products. It paused work on several standards to focus on a framework of standards for Salmonella in raw poultry. Status of Proposed Pathogen Standards as of January 2025 Proposed standard Year proposed Status Year last updated Salmonella in raw ground beef and beef trimmings 2019 Paused 1996 (when initial standard was set) Campylobacter in not ready-to-eat comminuted chicken 2019 Paused 2016 Campylobacter in not ready-to-eat comminuted turkey 2019 Paused 2011 (for carcasses) 2016 (for comminuted turkey) Salmonella in raw comminuted pork and pork cuts 2022 Paused No previous standards Framework of standards for Salmonella in raw poultry 2024 Ongoing 2016 Source: Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) information. │ GAO-25-107613 Note: Comminuted meat and poultry has been cut, chopped, or ground into small particles. According to FSIS, the term “not ready-to-eat” means that the product is heat treated but not fully cooked and is not shelf stable. Agency officials said that after finalizing the raw poultry Salmonella framework, FSIS plans to use a similar approach to developing the other standards. But they did not know when the framework would be finalized or have a prioritization plan or time frame for resuming work on the other standards. FSIS officials could not confirm that the agency had assessed whether focusing on this framework has caused gaps in its oversight of Salmonella in meat and Campylobacter in turkey products. By assessing any risks to human health that these gaps created and documenting how it is prioritizing its actions, FSIS will better understand the tradeoffs of its approach to reducing pathogens and associated illnesses. FSIS faces two ongoing challenges to reducing food pathogens: (1) developing and updating standards, as described above, and (2) its limited control outside of the slaughter and processing plants it oversees. USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has jurisdiction over farms, where animals can become contaminated with pathogens before they are sent to slaughter and processing. FSIS and APHIS's 2014 memorandum of understanding (MOU) for coordinating responses to foodborne illness outbreaks does not identify or detail the agencies' responsibilities in addressing and responding to specific pathogens that occur on farms and can subsequently enter plants. Updating their MOU, or developing a new agreement, will better position FSIS and APHIS to reduce pathogens in meat and poultry products. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. food supply is generally considered safe, but foodborne illness remains a common and costly public health problem. Each year, foodborne illnesses sicken one in six Americans, and thousands die, according to CDC's most recent estimates. A July 2024 outbreak of Listeria monocytogenes made at least 61 people in 19 states sick and had caused 10 deaths, as of November 21, 2024. Improving federal oversight of food safety has been on GAO's High Risk List since 2007. In September 2014 and March 2018, GAO reported on USDA actions to reduce foodborne pathogens and challenges that FSIS faced. In the 2018 report, GAO found that FSIS implemented recommendations from the 2014 report but had not set pathogen standards for many widely available products. This report provides an update on the status of USDA's efforts. It examines (1) the extent to which FSIS has developed pathogen standards for meat and poultry products and (2) challenges FSIS faces in reducing food pathogens and steps it has taken to address them. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and USDA documents. GAO also interviewed agency officials and food safety and industry organizations and visited a FSIS laboratory.

What GAO Found When a community loses its Head Start provider, the Office of Head Start (OHS) deploys its interim manager to temporarily operate this federally funded early childhood education program. Since 2000, OHS has placed more than 200 programs under interim management. As of September 2024, 18 of 1,600 Head Start programs nationwide were under interim management. However, GAO found that OHS skipped crucial monitoring steps and did not enforce certain standards for programs under interim management for at least the last 5 school years. For example, it did not monitor half of the 28 programs due for monitoring between January 2020 and June 2024—leaving it unaware of documented and potential child safety incidents and other concerns. Further, OHS had neither assessed classroom quality nor monitored finances for all programs under interim management—both of which are required under the Head Start Act. Lastly, OHS officials stated that they had never enforced enrollment standards or required Head Start funds to be returned for children not served. In the 2022-2023 school year, GAO found that fewer than half of the nearly 4,000 Head Start seats available in programs under interim management were filled. Local staff from all three Head Start programs GAO visited shared concerns about their experiences during interim management, including unqualified staff, unsafe facilities, and poor fiscal stewardship (see fig). Staff at all three programs told GAO that unqualified staff were put in classrooms to teach. Staff at two programs said facility hazards, including mold, were not properly remediated. Staff at all three programs expressed concerns about fiscal management—from expensive and unnecessary equipment orders in one program to a lack of essential supplies, like diapers and wipes, in another. Interim Management Experiences from Selected Local Head Start Staff OHS officials said they work closely with the interim manager to keep Head Start programs open under challenging circumstances. However, OHS has not consistently monitored programs under interim management or enforced enrollment standards for these programs. Without taking these required steps, OHS leaves children vulnerable to low quality services and jeopardizes their school readiness. Further, it exposes federal Head Start funds to potential waste. Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Health and Human Services’ OHS has used the same interim manager for nearly 25 years to temporarily run programs in communities that have lost their provider. GAO was asked to review OHS’s oversight of programs under interim management. This report examines the extent to which OHS’s monitoring allows it to assess whether programs under interim management meet Head Start standards related to service quality, child safety, finances, and enrollment, among other things. GAO compared OHS’s oversight to relevant federal laws, regulations, and OHS’s monitoring procedures; analyzed enrollment data from the 2017-2018 through 2022-2023 school years; and compared state licensing violations to OHS records. GAO interviewed OHS officials and interim manager representatives, visited three Head Start programs to interview staff who worked under interim management, and interviewed representatives of another four programs that exited interim management since 2018. GAO selected programs that varied in size and time under interim management.

What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses a layered maritime security approach to identify potentially high-risk, U.S.-bound vessels and cargo shipments. Within DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are the lead agencies that manage programs that screen, target, and examine these vessels and shipments. Both agencies conduct these activities before vessels and cargo depart foreign seaports, in transit, and upon their arrival at U.S. seaports. For example, both agencies have intelligence programs to screen and target these vessels and cargo across the supply chain. U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Programs to Secure U.S.-Bound Vessels and Cargo in the Maritime Supply Chain GAO found that Coast Guard and CBP at the 16 selected field units generally followed five selected leading practices for interagency collaboration in their efforts to secure U.S.-bound vessels and maritime cargo from national security risks. For example, officials from all selected field units we interviewed reported leveraging resources and information to collaborate with their counterpart. Specifically, Coast Guard officials at one location said they leveraged the staff of other federal agencies, such as CBP, to help with vessel boardings due to their own staffing challenges. GAO also found that DHS had not fully assessed the effectiveness of its approach for securing vessels and maritime cargo. The Coast Guard and Transportation Systems Sector partners—including federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, and nongovernmental organizations—identified a strategic goal with activities relevant to securing vessels and maritime cargo. However, they have not developed objective, measurable, and quantifiable performance goals and performance measures to fully assess progress towards this goal. Doing so would better position the agency and its partners to regularly use performance information to assess the effectiveness of their approach and help inform decisions, such as determining how to best allocate resources. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. economy depends on the quick and efficient flow of millions of tons of cargo each day throughout the global supply chain. However, U.S.-bound vessels and maritime cargo shipments are vulnerable to criminal activity or terrorist attacks that could disrupt operations and limit global economic growth and productivity. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to assess federal efforts to secure U.S.-bound vessels and maritime cargo from national security-related risks. This report addresses (1) how DHS secures these vessels and cargo from supply chain risks, (2) the extent that DHS used selected leading collaboration practices, and (3) the extent that DHS assessed its approach. GAO reviewed agency policies, procedures, and collaboration efforts and government-wide strategy documents, and assessed DHS collaboration efforts against five relevant leading practices identified in prior GAO work. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard and CBP officials from 16 field locations at a non-generalizable sample of eight U.S. seaports selected for varying volumes of cargo and diversity of geographic regions.

What GAO Found U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) formal equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints have decreased from 506 in fiscal year 2015 to 306 in fiscal year 2023. USDA attributes fewer complaints to a range of factors, such as its use of mediation and other conflict resolution efforts. However, a decrease in complaints may not always indicate improvement. For example, fear of retaliation could prevent complaint filing. Of the formal complaints filed, on average, retaliation was the most frequent basis for these complaints. USDA agencies primarily use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which uses mediation and facilitation techniques, to address discrimination complaints according to officials from USDA's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights (OASCR). OASCR has not consistently monitored agencies' use of ADR, since a 2018 reorganization eliminated its monitoring staff and realigned responsibilities to the agencies, according to OASCR officials. USDA has more than doubled its EEO staff since fiscal year 2022 according to a USDA 2023 report but has not resumed monitoring. By resuming monitoring, OASCR could better ensure these programs are meeting departmental standards such as using ADR at the first sign of conflict. Opportunities for USDA to Address Workplace Discrimination USDA's efforts to address discrimination in the workplace include mandatory civil rights training. USDA agencies also develop civil rights training plans, which departmental regulation requires OASCR to review. Prior GAO work found an agency's evaluation of its training program is important in demonstrating how its efforts are improving agency performance. However, OASCR does not review training plans, according to OASCR officials, who said they are updating a policy to provide criteria for these reviews. By updating its policy and resuming the reviews, OASCR could better assist agencies with their efforts to increase awareness of discrimination and employee rights. OASCR officials were not aware of USDA having a method for consistently collecting anonymous employee perspectives on discrimination—an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promising practice. USDA uses an Office of Personnel Management survey. However, the survey's questions are not specific to USDA's or any other agency's workplace environment. By developing a department-wide tool to collect anonymous employee perspectives, USDA management could better understand where to target its efforts to help create a workplace free of discrimination for all employees. Why GAO Did This Study USDA made a commitment to ensuring compliance with EEO requirements and best practices. OASCR leads USDA's efforts to respond to EEO complaints and coordinate department-wide EEO efforts for nearly 100,000 employees across 29 USDA agencies and offices. The Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision for GAO to study, among other things, USDA's actions to decrease discrimination and civil rights complaints. This report (1) describes the nature of USDA employee discrimination complaints in fiscal years 2015 through 2023, (2) examines USDA's efforts to address EEO complaints, and (3) examines USDA's efforts to address discrimination in the workplace. GAO reviewed USDA's reports to Congress and EEOC, agency self-assessments, and strategic plans. GAO interviewed USDA and EEOC officials and representatives from 14 USDA employee groups. GAO compared USDA actions with federal and USDA regulations, EEOC management directives, and GAO's guide on effective training in the federal government.