What GAO Found When a new disease presents a public health emergency, isolation and quarantine are among the first measures available to limit disease spread. All seven selected jurisdictions (states and territories) GAO reviewed used isolation and quarantine for the COVID-19 pandemic. Officials from these jurisdictions identified considerations for implementing such measures for COVID-19, including difficulty with enforcement and isolation and quarantine facility logistics. Examples of Selected Jurisdictions' COVID-19 Isolation and Quarantine Actions The selected jurisdictions carried out some isolation and quarantine planning before the COVID-19 pandemic. Four had detailed plans based on past experiences with diseases such as H1N1 influenza, while the remaining three had high-level provisions within emergency plans. In response to COVID-19 experiences, the selected jurisdictions have taken steps to strengthen their isolation and quarantine planning, such as updating plans to identify potential facilities for isolation and quarantine. Federal agencies—primarily the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—provided guidance and awarded funding to jurisdictions during the COVID-19 pandemic that could be used to support isolation and quarantine efforts. However, CDC did not provide advance notice of isolation and quarantine guidance to jurisdictions before publication, which slowed jurisdictions' implementation of these measures. CDC has a new process for developing and sharing guidance, and officials told GAO the agency intends to provide advance notice to jurisdictions when possible. However, CDC has not documented its intentions to provide advance notice. Doing so will help ensure CDC implements its approach as planned and thereby help jurisdictions prepare for and effectively implement isolation and quarantine when needed. Additionally, CDC has not assessed jurisdictions' planning for isolation and quarantine. As a result, CDC is missing information to identify and address gaps in jurisdictions' planning, including the absence of such plans. The National Biodefense Strategy directs CDC to determine any gaps in disease mitigation preparedness, including for isolation and quarantine. By assessing jurisdictions' planning, CDC could better fulfill this responsibility and identify and help address any gaps in jurisdictional planning for future disease outbreaks. Why GAO Did This Study As of June 2024, over 1.1 million people in the United States have died from COVID-19, according to CDC. State and territorial (jurisdictional) governments have primary responsibility for leading the preparation for and response to public health emergencies, with federal support through guidance and funding awards. When jurisdictions' capabilities are insufficient, HHS is charged with leading the federal public health and medical response. GAO added HHS leadership of public health emergencies to its High-Risk List in 2022. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 included a provision for GAO to review selected jurisdictions' isolation and quarantine planning. Regarding isolation and quarantine, this report examines (1) selected jurisdictions' COVID-19 actions, (2) their planning, (3) federal agencies' support to jurisdictions, and (4) CDC's efforts to assess jurisdictional planning. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from seven jurisdictions selected for geographic variation and representatives from five national public health associations. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from HHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

What GAO Found Fraudulently induced payment scams can take many forms, but they generally involve scammers playing on victims' emotions to manipulate them into sending money. According to the U.S. Secret Service, financial regulators, and industry representatives, use of generative AI, which enables the creation of content and can be exploited to alter voices and images, is making these scams harder for victims to detect. While there is no complete measure or estimate of how widespread losses from fraudulently induced payments are, reported losses from one type of fraudulently induced payment scam—fake investment opportunities—rose from $3.31 billion in 2022 to $4.57 billion in 2023, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) 2023 Internet Crime Report on reported complaints. Financial institutions are generally not required under federal law to reimburse consumers for losses stemming from a fraudulently induced payment because such payments are authorized by a person with payment authority on the account (i.e., the owner of the account or other authorized person). To mitigate these types of scams, financial institutions and peer-to-peer payment companies provide consumer education and staff training to identify and avoid potential scams. Additionally, some institutions and payment apps have put in place additional measures to slow down payments to provide the consumer an opportunity to verify the legitimacy of the payment. In addition to these efforts, financial industry representatives GAO spoke with stated that to help further reduce the risk to consumers, a multisector approach involving the telecommunications sector, social media companies, and law enforcement is necessary to address fraudulently induce payments. GAO has continuing work examining federal agency efforts to address fraudulently induced payments, including efforts related to consumer education, and data collection and monitoring. Why GAO Did This Study Scams are a significant and growing problem for U.S. individuals and businesses. Some scams result in a fraudulently induced payment, which occurs when a person with payment authority is manipulated or deceived into making a payment for the benefit of the scammer. These scams succeed by playing on a victim's fears and exploiting vulnerabilities, often resulting in significant financial losses. The federal government has not reported on total losses associated with fraudulently induced payments, in part due to underreporting by victims. Even when victims do report such scams, it can be challenging to recover the funds. GAO was asked to review the characteristics of fraudulently induced payments and how financial institutions and peer-to-peer (P2P) payment companies mitigate the impacts of these scams. This report provides information on of fraudulently induced payment scams, including reported efforts by selected financial institutions to mitigate these scams. For more information, contact Rebecca Shea at (202) 512-6722 or shear@gao.gov, or Michael E. Clements a (202) 512-8678 or clementsm@gao.gov.

Why This Matters FraudNet’s primary mission is to facilitate the reporting of allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement of federal funds. It also supports GAO audits and investigations. This is a summary of FraudNet’s activities for fiscal year 2023. FraudNet Processed 4,044 Allegations in Fiscal Year 2023 The public, including government employees and contractors, submitted 4,044 allegations to FraudNet in fiscal year 2023. As shown in the figure below, the number of allegations processed in fiscal year 2023 was closer to fiscal year 2021 and substantially lower than fiscal year 2022. More than half of the allegations received in fiscal year 2022 were associated with social media campaigns that resulted in multiple complainants submitting form letters alleging the same fraud. This type of allegation was not prevalent in fiscal year 2023. Allegations in fiscal year 2023 included topics such as government subsidy fraud, ethics/conflict of interest/misconduct, and employee fraud. FraudNet’s Investigative Research Analysts review every allegation received. If it is determined a referral is appropriate, FraudNet makes referrals to federal Offices of Inspector General as well as to other federal, state, and local entities. Upon receipt of a referral, the receiving entity determines how it will address the allegation. Of the total allegations received in fiscal year 2023, FraudNet referred 2,042 complaints to approximately 50 other entities, including the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Department of the Treasury. For 201 allegations, complainants indicated that they had sent the same allegation to entities other than GAO. In such instances, FraudNet does not generally refer the allegation to those other entities to avoid duplicating efforts. FraudNet Analysts Provided Research Support to GAO Audits and Investigations FraudNet analysts supported approximately 60 requests from GAO teams conducting audits and investigations in fiscal year 2023. These requests involved analysts researching individuals and businesses in investigative databases. For example, FraudNet collected state court records and publicly available information in support of work related to unemployment insurance. This support assisted GAO in updating fraud flags and generating consolidated fraud risk scores. Report Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Mismanagement Anyone can contact FraudNet’s hotline to report suspected fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement of federal funds. The website is generally the preferred reporting method. However, GAO cannot accept classified information via the website – please call for further guidance for allegations involving classified information. GAO does not independently investigate allegations at the request of the individual(s) who reported them. FraudNet documents all allegations received and makes them available to any ongoing or future GAO work. As appropriate, FraudNet refers allegations to the relevant external agency for consideration of further action. The graphic below provides good practices to follow when filing an allegation with FraudNet. For more information, contact Howard Arp at (202) 512-6722 or ArpJ@gao.gov.

What GAO Found An estimated 23 percent of college students (3.8 million) experienced food insecurity in 2020, according to GAO's analysis of student data from the Department of Education's National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS). The U.S. Department of Agriculture defines the range of food security to include high, marginal, low, and very low, and it categorizes those with low or very low food security as food insecure. Among food insecure students in 2020, a majority (2.2 million) had very low food security, meaning they reported multiple instances of eating less than they should or skipping meals because they could not afford enough food. SNAP benefits are available to eligible low-income households to help them pay for food. For students to qualify for SNAP, they must meet additional student-specific criteria, such as working at least 20 hours a week at a paid job. Using available Education data, GAO estimated that fewer than two in five food insecure students met the criteria to be potentially eligible for SNAP. Of these students, 59 percent did not report receiving SNAP benefits in 2020. Estimated Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Receipt among Potentially Eligible College Students, 2020 aThe 95 percent confidence interval is within a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points. Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2023, the federal government spent approximately $31.4 billion dollars on Pell Grants to help over 6 million students with financial need go to college. This substantial federal investment in higher education is at risk of not serving its intended purpose if college students drop out because of limited or uncertain access to food. Some studies have found that food insecurity negatively affects students' academic success. Certain students are eligible for SNAP—the nation's largest nutrition assistance program available to low-income households. Given the substantial federal investment in higher education, GAO was asked to review newly available Education data on food insecurity among a nationally representative sample of college students. This report, which is the first of two reports on college student food insecurity, describes what Education's NPSAS data show about food insecurity among college students and their access to SNAP benefits. GAO's estimates are based on 2020 NPSAS data, which were the most recent available. For more information, contact Kathryn Larin at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The number of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests and removals declined from 2019 through 2021, and then increased in 2022, according to GAO's analysis of ICE data: The number of arrests varied from calendar years 2019 through 2022 but increased overall, from 133,541 arrests for 2019 to 154,204 arrests for 2022. While increasing slightly in 2022, since 2019 removals have declined significantly from 276,122 for 2019 to 81,547 for 2022. Regarding detentions, ICE's public reporting understates the total number of individuals detained, according to GAO's analysis. In its calculations, ICE excludes individuals who were first booked into certain temporary facilities but were subsequently detained in an ICE immigration detention facility. GAO's analysis shows that this exclusion amounts to tens of thousands of individuals (see fig.). In its annual reporting of detentions, ICE does not fully explain the rationale and basis for its methodology. Total Number of ICE Detentions Compared to ICE's Methodology for Public Reporting of Initial Book-ins, 2019-2022 Note: ICE uses a subset of detention data when reporting annual initial book-ins. GAO calculated the total number of initial detentions by identifying all initial “book-ins” for each year where an individual was recorded in ICE data as having been detained in an ICE detention facility for one day or more. From 2019 through 2022, ICE updated its policies for making enforcement decisions to reflect changing priorities. From 2019 to January 2021, DHS policy directed ICE to take enforcement action against all removable noncitizens. In September 2021, DHS updated its policy to prioritize action against noncitizens who are deemed a threat to national security, public safety, or border security. ICE's policy also establishes how its officers are to identify individuals within selected vulnerable populations such as those with a mental health condition. ICE collects detention data related to select vulnerable populations in accordance with agency guidance. GAO's analysis of ICE's data showed that generally detentions of select vulnerable populations varied across the years but were lower in 2020 through 2022 compared to 2019. The average length of stay decreased from 2019 to 2022 for these populations. Why GAO Did This Study ICE, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for enforcing the nation's immigration laws. Citing limited resources, ICE states that it cannot respond to all immigration violations or act on all persons determined to be removable from the U.S. It therefore prioritizes its enforcement actions. GAO was asked to review ICE immigration enforcement priorities. This report examines, among other things, (1) ICE data on immigration enforcement actions from 2019 through 2022, and the extent to which ICE is reporting data on all immigration detentions; (2) ICE's implementation of immigration enforcement policies; and (3) ICE data on detentions of select vulnerable populations. GAO analyzed ICE enforcement action data for calendar years 2019 through 2022 (2022 being the most recent year that data were available). GAO also reviewed ICE policies and procedures, and interviewed agency officials.

What GAO Found To secure federal facilities and protect employees and visitors, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) manages and oversees more than 13,000 contract guards, whose duties include controlling facility access and screening visitors to detect prohibited items. To determine if FPS was effectively protecting federal facilities, GAO investigators conducted 27 covert tests at 14 selected federal buildings in early 2024. During these tests, GAO investigators had a prohibited item—a baton, pepper spray, or a multi-purpose tool with a knife—inside a bag that they attempted to bring into the building. FPS contract guards failed to detect prohibited items in about half of GAO's tests. FPS conducts its own covert tests, the results of which were consistent with GAO's tests. While FPS determined that the specifics of its testing program are law enforcement sensitive, FPS officials said they have several reform efforts underway to improve contract guards' detection of prohibited items. Those efforts include (1) redesigning the initial training course for contract guards, (2) increasing on-the-job training, and (3) collecting covert testing data to identify common causes of covert test failures. Stakeholders identified data system challenges that undermine FPS's productivity and oversight of contract guards. FPS developed data systems to improve oversight of the contract guard workforce in response to previous GAO recommendations. The Post Tracking System, initially piloted in 2018, was expected to be the system of record for ensuring that every post was staffed by a qualified guard for the correct time frames, but it has yet to be fully implemented in any region. In addition, stakeholders said the system continues to face technology, data reliability, and interoperability challenges and has not delivered the promised capabilities. This negatively affects the productivity of FPS's oversight efforts, according to stakeholders. Some FPS officials also said they do not use the reports for billing the government because the data are inaccurate or incomplete. Consequently, even in areas that have deployed the system, FPS continues to use an old paper-based system for billing and oversight tasks. Why GAO Did This Study Federal real property has been on GAO's High-Risk List since 2003, in part due to threats to federal facilities. Past attacks on federal buildings demonstrate that the security of federal facilities remains a high-risk area. FPS, within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for protecting thousands of federal facilities. FPS employs contract guards at 2,500 federal facilities at a cost of almost $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2024. This testimony discusses the preliminary results of an ongoing GAO review that focuses on (1) how effective FPS contract guards are at detecting prohibited items and FPS's efforts to improve detection, and (2) stakeholders' views on whether FPS data systems have improved oversight of the contract guard program. To determine the effectiveness of FPS guards in detecting prohibited items, GAO conducted 27 covert tests at a nongeneralizable sample of 14 federal facilities and analyzed data from FPS's covert tests. To obtain stakeholders' views on FPS's data systems, GAO reviewed information on the systems and interviewed stakeholders, including FPS officials, federal tenants, guard unions, and security guard companies. GAO provided a draft of this statement to FPS. FPS determined that some information was law enforcement sensitive. We withheld that information from this statement and incorporated other comments as appropriate. GAO plans to complete its work and issue a report on these issues by the end of the year. For more information, contact David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure, at (202) 512-2834 or MarroniD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Transportation (DOT) added a new strategic goal in its fiscal year 2022-2026 strategic plan that aims to reduce inequities across the transportation system. DOT also established 14 performance goals to assess progress toward this equity strategic goal. DOT defines equity as the consistent and fair treatment of all individuals, including those who belong to underserved communities, among other things. These equity performance goals relate to a variety of DOT's activities, such as its discretionary grant programs, contract awards, and community outreach efforts. GAO found that DOT's equity performance goals are mostly consistent with six selected performance management practices (see figure). For example, each of the performance goals is consistent with the practices of describing linkage; identifying a goal leader; and being objective, quantifiable, and measurable. Number of DOT's 14 Equity Performance Goals Consistent with Selected Performance Management Practices However, some performance goals are inconsistent with the practices of identifying near-term targets; demonstrating clarity; and describing accuracy and reliability. For example, with regard to the practice of accuracy and reliability, DOT did not describe how it verified and validated data used to measure progress toward eight of its equity performance goals. Performance goals that are consistent with performance management practices could better position DOT, external stakeholders, and other decision-makers to assess progress toward DOT's equity strategic goal. DOT is taking steps to assess and use information to manage its equity efforts. These steps, which are ongoing, include assessing the sufficiency of its current performance information and using early information from its performance reviews to guide some programmatic decision-making. For example, one of DOT's equity performance goals is to increase transit grants for rural or tribal areas. DOT officials stated that they are using information related to this performance goal to help improve outreach to those areas. Why GAO Did This Study DOT's mission is to deliver a transportation system that serves the American people. The Biden administration has issued a series of executive orders to help advance equity, and DOT added equity as a department-wide strategic goal in response. House Report 117-99 includes a provision for GAO to examine DOT's equity-related efforts. This report examines (1) to what extent DOT's equity performance goals are consistent with selected federal performance management practices, and (2) how DOT assesses and uses information to manage its equity efforts. GAO analyzed DOT performance management documents, such as its fiscal year 2025 annual performance plan, fiscal year 2023 performance report, fiscal year 2022-2026 strategic plan, and 2023 equity action plan update, and interviewed DOT officials. GAO compared information in these documents to performance management practices GAO selected from relevant federal statutes and guidance, and prior GAO work.

What GAO Found The National Institute on Aging's (NIA) Real-World Data Platform was to improve research into Alzheimer's disease and related dementias by compiling and analyzing real-world data. However, during the course of GAO's work in April 2024, NIA decided not to fund the data platform. Prior to NIA's decision not to fund the platform, the institute had not fully implemented key leading practices for the Real-World Data Platform's cost estimate or project management (see table). Extent to Which NIA Implemented Key Leading Practices for the Real-World Data Platform’s Cost Estimate and Project Management Key Leading Practices Assessment Characteristics of a reliable cost estimate (comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible) ◔ Minimally implemented Project management practice areas (governance, planning, requirements development and management, and risk management) ◔ Minimally implemented Source: GAO analysis of National Institute on Aging (NIA) information.  |  GAO-24-106886 NIA's cost estimate for the Real-World Data Platform, which was anticipated at $312 million over 6 years, minimally met the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. For example, while some cost estimate documentation for the project was updated during development, the documentation did not include all costs, describe how the current estimate was developed, or provide sufficient information about the source data used. Further, NIA did not fully implement leading project management practices for the Real-World Data Platform. For example, while NIA described high-level milestones and risks for the project and created a federal staffing plan, it did not establish a governance structure for achieving the Real-World Data Platform's objectives and providing oversight for its planned development. Moreover, NIA did not develop a plan that included a detailed schedule, budget, and stakeholders needed for the project; record detailed requirements for the development of the core components; or create a risk management plan. NIA officials stated that the agency was not required to implement leading practices for cost estimating and project management, since the project was to be funded through a cooperative agreement with an awardee and these would have been the awardee's responsibilities. In addition to Congress' concerns related to GAO's findings on cost estimating and project management, NIA officials stated that the decision not to fund the data platform was, in part, due to the presence of other federal large-scale health data efforts. They also cited an increased number of proposed solutions in the field of Alzheimer's disease and related dementias research. NIA officials stated there were lessons learned, which included the need for staff with a broad range of expertise, open collaboration with federal and non-federal partners, and other key considerations, such as data ownership and costs, when funding health data projects with the size and scope of the Real-World Data Platform. Because NIA made the decision not to fund the Real-World Data Platform, GAO is making no recommendations. Nonetheless, GAO's analyses demonstrate the importance of developing reliable cost estimates and implementing effective project management practices. In commenting on a draft of our report, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) noted its concerns with the criteria we used in our analysis and the potential impact of these criteria on other HHS annual awards. We continue to believe that we appropriately applied the criteria used to review NIA's efforts to develop the data platform and that our findings were limited in scope to that project. The department also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. Why GAO Did This Study NIA leads the federal government in conducting and supporting research on aging and the health and well-being of the older population under the leadership of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). This includes research on Alzheimer's disease, which is the seventh leading cause of death in the United States. To enhance research on Alzheimer's disease and related dementias, in March 2023, NIA proposed a multiyear project called the Real-World Data Platform, a large-scale health research project that would compile and analyze real-world Alzheimer's data using emerging technologies such as machine learning and artificial intelligence. However, in April 2024, NIA decided not to fund the project. GAO was asked to review NIA's management of the data platform. This report (1) examines the extent to which NIA implemented leading practices for the cost estimate and project management for the Real-World Data Platform, and (2) describes NIA's decision not to fund the Real-World Data Platform and lessons learned. GAO analyzed NIA documentation, including plans and lessons learned; leading practices for cost estimating and project management; NIH policies and procedures; and requirements governing grants and cooperative agreements. GAO also interviewed NIA and NIH officials responsible for the project. For more information, contact David B. Hinchman at (214) 777-5719 or hinchmand@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Total annual U.S. electricity generation from onshore and offshore wind energy increased from about 6 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 2000 to about 430 billion kWh in 2023, an increase of over 7,000 percent and resulting in wind energy generation providing about 10.2 percent of the electricity in the United States in 2023. Because a continued scale-up in deployment of wind energy facilities could increase the potential environmental effects of these facilities, GAO identified technologies and approaches to address potential effects of wind energy to the physical environment, animals, or humans across a facility’s life cycle. These technologies and approaches can be used individually or in combination to address environmental effects. For example, visual monitoring technologies can be placed on uncrewed vehicles to gather data on animal presence and abundance in challenging environments. Select technologies or approaches in use or under development to help support data collection to address environmental effects However, challenges may limit the use of technologies and approaches to address environmental effects. Some technologies and approaches may incur additional direct costs for a wind energy developer, potentially creating a barrier for use by making the facility's electricity less cost-competitive in the electricity marketplace. Technologies and approaches have to maintain quality assurance during the operation and lifetime of a turbine. Meanwhile, knowledge gaps about projects can make it difficult to determine how to most effectively use technologies and approaches to address challenging effects. Further, some technologies and approaches such as machine learning and modeling require large amounts of data and energy, and barriers to data access may limit the effectiveness of a technology or an approach. GAO identified five policy options that could help address these challenges or enhance the benefits to technologies and approaches for addressing potential environmental effects of wind energy. These policy options identify possible actions by policymakers, which include Congress, federal agencies, state and local governments, academia, research institutions, and industry. See below for a summary of the policy options and relevant opportunities and considerations. Policy Options to Help Enhance Benefits or Address Challenges Policy Option Opportunities Considerations Status quo (report p. 25). Policymakers could take no further intervention, allowing current activities to continue. Current efforts may address some of the challenges identified in this report without additional resources beyond those that have already been allocated. Resources and time that may be required in other policy options could instead be used for other priorities. Some challenges may remain unresolved or may take longer to resolve than with intervention. Maintaining the status quo may not be responsive to the wind industry or executive and legislative priorities and may not address unresolved environmental effects. Encourage innovation and research (report p. 25). Policymakers, such as Congress, academic institutions, industry organizations, or others, could encourage research and development of technologies and approaches to address potential environmental effects. Additional research could help to better understand wind energy facility sites and inform appropriate and necessary technologies and approaches to address potential environmental effects. Policymaker communication during research and development can reduce costs and improve access to information and resources. Innovation and research can require additional time, personnel, cost, and communication among policymakers. Data sharing (report p. 26). Academic institutions or other policymakers could facilitate improved data sharing about potential environmental effects, technologies, and approaches. Having data in a central database may encourage collaboration among policymakers who otherwise might not interact. Databases could also store other types of information about research alongside the raw data that may not otherwise be accessible. Establishing new or trusted data-sharing mechanisms may require additional maintenance, time, personnel, and other resources. Sharing research that includes proprietary or sensitive data may require investing in data security or removing the proprietary or sensitive information from the data Establish consistent methodologies (report p. 27). Policymakers such as academic institutions or industry could encourage the use of consistent methodologies to study wind energy facility sites and to address data and research limitations. Consistent data collection methods could help establish uniformity in data. The adaptive management process can encourage use of technologies and approaches to address potential environmental effects while researchers fill knowledge gaps. Policymakers may not easily accept voluntary methodologies that were developed by other groups. Incentives (report p. 28). Policymakers such as government entities could consider incentivizing the use of technologies and approaches to address environmental effects. Incentives can help operators and companies collaborate to develop and use approaches to address environmental effects that may not be economically viable otherwise. Incentives could lead to unintended outcomes for governing authorities or developers. Environmental and social costs and benefits could be difficult to quantify, making it challenging to set the appropriate level of incentives. Source: GAO. | GAO-24-106687 Why GAO Did This Study Wind energy is one of the fastest-growing renewable energy sources globally. Onshore and offshore wind energy provide an abundant source of electricity with significant environmental benefits, including lower atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions during electricity generation. However, the increases in the development of wind energy facilities increases the potential environmental effects of these facilities, including greater use of natural resources like critical materials and steel, decommissioning and recycling difficulties, and ecological effects such as wildlife harm. This report discusses (1) technologies or approaches to help reduce the potential environmental effects related to the life cycle of utility-scale wind energy projects, (2) challenges that might hinder implementation of these technologies or approaches, and (3) policy options to help address these challenges. To conduct this technology assessment, GAO reviewed evidence, including articles and other reports; interviewed government, industry, and academic stakeholders; conducted a site visit; and convened an expert meeting with the assistance of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. GAO is identifying policy options in this report. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD, at (202) 512-6888 or HowardK@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) programs temporarily expanded unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to populations, such as self-employed and certain gig economy workers, previously not covered by regular unemployment insurance. States had to rapidly implement these new programs following the passage of the CARES Act in March 2020. The CARES Act required states to allow applicants to self-certify their employment history and program eligibility; this requirement was amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. States' use of controls to manage fraud risks varied and evolved during the pandemic. However, as states added new controls, some applied them to new claims and not continuing claims that had been previously approved, thereby leaving the states vulnerable to fraud. In September 2023, GAO estimated that UI programs during the pandemic—including the PUA program—were subject to an estimated $100 billion to $135 billion in fraud from April 2020 through May 2023. GAO surveyed state officials to understand the controls they initially implemented in their PUA programs. The variety of controls used increased significantly in the first few months of PUA program implementation. Over time, states continued to increase the controls used as the pandemic further progressed. For example, states increased their utilization of the Integrity Data Hub—a multistate data system with data cross-matching and analysis capability—to identify potential fraud in PUA and other programs within the unemployment insurance system. Table 1: Controls That States We Surveyed Reported Using Early in Their Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) Programs Control description Percentage of responding states that reported using the control by that month or earlier   April 2020 May 2020 June 2020 Peak montha Verification of government-issued ID 35.4b 54.2 58.3 85.4 Third-party vendor-provided identity verification service 18.8 25.0 29.2 79.2 National Association of State Workforce Agencies Integrity Data Hub 47.9 54.2 62.5 83.3 Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlement 72.9 89.6 93.8 97.9 Interstate Connection Network 54.2 58.3 62.5 70.8 State Information Data Exchange System 41.7 43.8 43.8 45.8 Social Security Administration cross-match 52.1 66.7 66.7 75.0 State Directory of New Hires cross-match 58.3 60.4 60.4 72.9 Internet Protocol address 47.9 60.4 68.8 87.5 Data analytics 43.8 54.2 58.3 91.7 Other fraud prevention toolsc 64.6 79.2 85.4 100 Source: GAO analysis of state survey responses. | GAO-24-107471 Note: In spring 2023, GAO surveyed the state workforce agencies in 50 states and the District of Columbia. Three states did not respond to the survey by the deadline. The results of the survey reflect responses from 47 states and the District of Columbia. For the purposes of this report, when GAO refers to states’ administration of the PUA program, it includes states, territories, and freely associated states.aPeak month refers to the month in which the highest number of states surveyed responded that they used a control in their PUA program. The specific month may vary by control.bThe percents displayed refer to the percentage of responding states and the District of Columbia that reported using the control at any point in the specified month for their PUA programs. GAO did not independently verify the information that states reported on when controls were used or whether controls were used on all PUA claims, or only a subset of claims.cOther fraud prevention tools include, but are not limited to, additional controls. such as the Social Security Administration’s death cross-match, Vital Statistics cross-match, Department of Motor Vehicles cross-match, fictitious employer cross-matches, and other comparisons that detect shared applicant characteristics (e.g., phone numbers or banking information) on multiple claims. While each state's PUA program varied to meet the needs of that state's population and any related state regulations, states used some common controls to manage fraud risk in their PUA programs. For example, almost all the states GAO surveyed reported using the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlement program to confirm citizenship and immigration status prior to granting benefits to applicants. While less than 48 percent of states GAO surveyed reported using Internet Protocol (IP) address verification in their PUA programs in April 2020, over 85 percent reported using this control at some point while the PUA program was active. The Department of Labor Office of Inspector General identified many cases of fraudulent UI activity where hundreds of false UI claims were filed from a single IP address. As reported by the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) in April 2024, understanding how UI fraud occurred during the pandemic is important to better prepare for future emergencies. Also, in November 2023, GAO testified that agencies have the opportunity to learn from the experiences during the pandemic and ensure that they are strategically managing their fraud risks in the future. Consistent with the PRAC's reporting and GAO's testimony, states may take lessons from the PUA program when considering future temporary UI programs. One lesson is that failing to apply a new control to continuing claims may leave a state vulnerable to fraud and lessen the efficacy of the control at mitigating fraud risk in the program. Why GAO Did This Study Fraud poses a significant risk to the integrity of federal programs and erodes public trust in government. The UI system has faced long-standing challenges with effective service delivery and program integrity, which worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic because of historic levels of job loss. As a result of these long-standing challenges, in June 2022 GAO designated the UI system as a high-risk area. Program integrity is a shared responsibility between the federal and state governments. The Department of Labor oversees UI, and states design and administer their own UI programs within federal parameters. The CARES Act, enacted in March 2020, created three new federally funded temporary UI programs—including PUA—that expanded benefit eligibility, enhanced benefits, and extended benefit duration. The unprecedented demand for UI benefits and the need to quickly implement the new programs increased the risk of fraud. GAO's analysis in September 2023 found higher fraud rates for PUA payments than for other UI program payments. GAO was asked to follow up on its September 2023 work. This report provides information on the controls that states used to prevent and detect fraud in their PUA programs. For more information, contact: Seto J. Bagdoyan, Director, at (202) 512-6722 or BagdoyanS@gao.gov and Jared B. Smith at (202) 512-2700 or SmithJB@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is responsible for administering benefit programs for veterans, their families, and their survivors. These programs include those for pensions, education, disability compensation, home loans, life insurance, vocational rehabilitation, survivor support, medical care, and burial benefits. In 2016, VA established the Financial Management Business Transformation program (the program) to replace its aging financial and acquisition systems with one integrated system to meet financial management goals and comply with legislation and directives. VA's new integrated system is to allow VA to track and report how funds are used to deliver benefits, care, and services. The program's October 2023 life cycle cost estimate shows total program costs are estimated at $7.7 billion, which is an increase of approximately $200 million over the 2022 estimate. Additionally, this is an increase of approximately $5 billion more than its 2019 estimate of $2.5 billion. Nearly half the cost increase from 2019 to 2022 is due to including 18 years of additional operations and support costs for the system's full projected useful life. GAO previously recommended that VA improve its cost estimating practices. Implementing that recommendation could help VA to develop a more reliable cost estimate. Comparison of 2019 and 2022 Financial Management Business Transformation (FMBT) Program Life Cycle Cost Estimates Note: The 2019 program cost estimate includes 3 years of actual costs and 11 years of estimated costs through 2029. The 2022 program cost estimate includes an additional 18 years to cover all operations and support costs for the system’s projected useful life through 2047. According to VA's implementation schedule as of April 2024, the program's targeted completion date is 2030. However, this date is questionable since multiple deployments depend on other currently paused or delayed VA IT modernization efforts, such as Electronic Health Record Modernization and Supply Chain Modernization. GAO previously recommended that VA improve its scheduling practices. Implementing that recommendation could help VA develop a more reliable schedule. GAO found that the program has followed leading practices to collaborate with stakeholders. For example, the program has established a clear governance structure that identifies leadership, includes relevant stakeholders across VA, clarifies roles and responsibilities, and helps to ensure accountability. GAO also found that the program has followed leading practices to assess user satisfaction and address user concerns. After each deployment, the program conducted quarterly customer experience surveys to assess user satisfaction. The program also used multiple approaches to identify and resolve user concerns. VA's risk management policies and procedures were consistent with leading practices. However, GAO found that the program could develop more comprehensive risk response plans to help mitigate risks related to systems integration with other IT modernization projects. GAO's analysis found that 11 of the 13 plans did not include specific, detailed actions. Plans that do not include detailed, specific actions increase the likelihood that the program will not timely identify and take appropriate action to mitigate its identified risks, thus exposing the program to potential delays and additional costs. Why GAO Did This Study VA's core Financial Management System is more than 30 years old. According to VA, it is extremely difficult to maintain, results in inefficient operations, requires complex manual work-arounds, and does not provide real-time integration between financial and acquisition information across VA. As such, the program is implementing a new system called the Integrated Financial and Acquisition Management System, an enterprise resource planning cloud solution. VA says implementing this system will increase the transparency, accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of financial and acquisition information, helping to improve fiscal accountability and services. As of April 2024, the program has completed six incremental deployments. However, VA program leadership has not yet determined final implementation dates for multiple deployments at the Veterans Benefits Administration and Veterans Health Administration, which may further affect its timeline. GAO was asked to review the program's implementation of the integrated system. This report addresses key project management practices on collaborating with stakeholders on changes such as cost and schedule estimates, assessing user satisfaction and concerns, and managing program risks.

What GAO Found Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), as authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, enables the President to direct the drawdown of defense articles and services from U.S. agencies' stocks to respond to foreign crises. Drawdown defense articles are primarily supplied by the Department of Defense (DOD) and may include articles such as ammunition, vehicles, clothing, and medical equipment. From August 2021 through March 2024, the President used PDA to authorize almost $24 billion in drawdowns for Ukraine. GAO found that DOD's efforts to properly value defense articles for drawdown are hampered because the Foreign Assistance Act does not clearly define certain terms and DOD lacks PDA-specific valuation guidance. First, the Foreign Assistance Act is not clear on the definition of “value” or the purpose of the maximum aggregate value as they relate to articles provided under PDA. This affects DOD's ability to establish clear guidance for valuing defense articles under PDA. Second, though DOD has accounting policy for valuing defense articles, it is not specific to valuation for PDA purposes. Not having specific guidance on methods for valuing articles provided under PDA affects the values given to those articles (see figure). As a result, DOD cannot have assurance that the articles will be valued accurately, which may result in a miscalculation of the remaining presidential determination authorization amount. Comparison of Values Derived from Different Valuation Methods At the DOD component level, GAO found that some components did not consistently follow DOD's accounting policy as instructed when valuing defense articles for PDA. GAO estimates that about 12 percent of all defense articles provided to Ukraine under PDA were valued using methods that did not comply with DOD guidance and may need to be revalued. Moreover, GAO estimates that about 61 percent of the reported values do not have appropriate supporting documentation, which leads to the inability to verify the valuation. Without component-specific procedures to ensure that the methods used comply with DOD guidance and are appropriately documented, DOD cannot ensure that the values are accurately calculated across the components for PDA purposes. Why GAO Did This Study In 2023, DOD notified Congress that it had misvalued certain defense articles provided under PDA to Ukraine by about $6.2 billion, in total. This amount was subsequently still available for use as PDA assistance. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 included a provision for GAO to conduct oversight, including audits and investigations, of amounts appropriated in response to the war-related situation in Ukraine. Also, we were asked to review DOD's accounting of all defense articles provided to Ukraine under PDA. This report examines the extent to which the methods DOD used to value defense articles provided to Ukraine under PDA have been consistent with DOD guidance, among other objectives. GAO reviewed DOD guidance and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also selected a statistical sample of line-item records of defense articles provided to Ukraine under PDA to estimate the extent to which the valuation methods used aligned with DOD guidance.

What GAO Found Multiple programs offer financial and technical assistance that can support Tribes in the development of microgrids—electricity systems that can operate independently from a traditional electricity grid. Such programs operate within the Department of the Interior's Indian Affairs organization, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Denali Commission—an independent federal agency that provides assistance in Alaska. Some of these programs have existed for years, while recent legislation has created others. The programs provide assistance within the context of their unique missions and have specific eligibility and other program requirements that applicants must meet. Accordingly, the types of tribal microgrid development projects supported vary across programs. Tribes face a variety of challenges that may affect their ability to successfully develop microgrids. For example, Tribes face long-standing barriers to accessing federal assistance, such as limited capacity to develop complex grant applications and difficulties providing matching funds for federal grant awards. Tribes may also experience challenges with connecting microgrids to a traditional electricity grid. This can require expensive studies to demonstrate the safe and reliable connection to, and operation of, a Tribe's microgrid with utility infrastructure. Tribes in Alaska face unique challenges related to microgrids due to geographical and environmental conditions. For example, most remote communities reliant on microgrids are not connected to road systems, and barges can deliver materials only during summer months when waters are not frozen. The federal government has recently taken actions that could foster tribal microgrid development by helping address barriers Tribes face to accessing federal assistance. For example, a December 2023 Executive Order directed federal agencies to take certain actions to increase program accessibility. Such actions include reducing administrative burdens associated with program applications, eliminating requirements to provide matching funds, and establishing tribal set-asides or other measures to prioritize funding to Tribes. Recent federal actions could also help address broader challenges that Tribes face in their energy development efforts. For example, Indian Affairs launched an initiative to better understand challenges Tribes face with respect to these efforts—including efforts to develop microgrids—and how the federal government could better support them. Indian Affairs plans to take actions throughout fiscal year 2024 to address findings from this initiative. While these and other recent federal actions have significant potential, it is too soon to assess the extent to which they will successfully address the barriers and challenges that Tribes face with microgrid development. Why GAO Did This Study Tribes and their citizens often experience difficulties obtaining reliable and affordable electricity or may not be connected to a traditional electricity grid at all. Additionally, inadequate electrical infrastructure or severe weather events can leave Tribes and their citizens without power for critical buildings and emergency services. Microgrids provide Tribes opportunities to deliver power to their communities and improve resilience to grid disruptions. However, developing a microgrid can be a costly and complex endeavor that poses financial, technical, and other challenges. As a result, Tribes may need financial and technical assistance to develop one. GAO was asked to examine tribal microgrid development. This report provides information on the federal programs available to support such efforts, the challenges Tribes face with microgrid development—including unique challenges with microgrids in Alaska—and actions the federal government has taken to address some of these challenges. GAO reviewed relevant laws and agency documentation, analyzed grant award data, and interviewed agency officials as well as selected Tribes and non-federal stakeholders familiar with different aspects of tribal microgrids. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at (202) 512-3841 or ortiza@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In a June 2021 report, GAO found that the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) had not applied many leading practices for federal training efforts for its program to train new and experienced disability claims processors. Training is a key strategy to help ensure claims processors have the needed skills to make quality decisions on veterans' claims. GAO made 10 recommendations related to design, implementation, planning, and evaluation of VBA's training program. VBA has addressed six recommendations as of June 2024, but work remains to fully address those related to planning and evaluation. Design. VBA has taken steps to fully implement GAO's recommendation on design. In 2021, GAO reported that VBA used a variety of training delivery mechanisms, including computer-based and classroom training, consistent with leading practices. However, VBA had not established criteria to determine the most appropriate delivery mechanism. In December 2021, VBA reported creating a tool for VBA training staff to use in determining the delivery mechanism. VBA identified about a dozen courses for which staff applied this tool to develop or modify the delivery mechanism. Implementation. VBA has taken steps to fully implement all recommendations GAO made related to implementing its training program. Specifically, GAO previously found that VBA had taken steps to enhance available training for instructors, but according to VBA officials, it had not developed minimum training requirements. In 2023, VBA established training requirements for all instructors. In May 2024, VBA established a procedure to monitor instructors' training completion. In addition, GAO previously found that VBA had no requirement to monitor claims processors' completion of all required training. In December 2021, VBA established a standard operating procedure and set up a process to monitor training completion, in line with GAO's recommendation. Planning. VBA has taken some steps to develop a strategic approach to its training efforts but has not yet fully implemented two of three related GAO recommendations. In March 2024, VBA established a governance structure to coordinate training activities across three key VBA offices that help administer training. However, a fiscal year 2025 plan for the training program did not have comprehensive goals and other elements, including how program activities will be prioritized to meet goals, as called for in GAO's recommendations. Evaluation. VBA has not fully implemented two of three recommendations on evaluation. In 2021, GAO found that VBA collected and incorporated some stakeholder feedback about training and finalized plans to evaluate certain training, but these efforts were not comprehensive or systematic. The agency also had not completed an evaluation of its training program in recent years. Later in 2021, VBA established a policy for evaluating VBA training and created a process to review and incorporate feedback, as called for by GAO's recommendations. However, VBA has not yet demonstrated how it incorporates feedback from relevant stakeholders, as GAO recommended, or completed a plan to evaluate training for experienced claims processors. GAO is continuing to monitor VBA's implementation of these recommendations. Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2023, VBA processed over 2.2 million claims for disability compensation and provided about $136 billion in benefits to veterans with service-connected disabilities. VBA provides training each year to thousands of claims processors. Training is particularly important as VBA hires more staff and implements new initiatives. VA has been on GAO's High-Risk List since 2003 due in part to challenges with managing disability claims workloads. This statement discusses the status of recommendations from GAO's June 2021 report (GAO-21-348) that compared VBA's training program for claims processors with leading practices for training in the federal government.