What GAO Found In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System authorized 13 emergency lending programs—with lending facilities to implement the programs—to ensure the flow of credit across the economy. To improve oversight of these programs, the Federal Reserve evaluated program internal processes and controls and identified 20 opportunities to enhance internal controls. GAO found that Federal Reserve Banks, which manage the facilities, have implemented processes to address all 20 opportunities. In addition, the Federal Reserve has completed its review of all 20 opportunities. GAO also found that the Federal Reserve’s plans for ongoing monitoring of the facilities are generally aligned with federal internal control standards. The five facilities under the Main Street Lending Program targeted small and midsize businesses and nonprofits. Of the 1,830 loans made through this program, 70 percent (1,277 loans) were fully repaid as of January 5, 2026, while 30 percent had experienced or were at risk of loss. Nearly 14 percent (251 loans) remained outstanding even though they should have closed by January 5, 2026. The other 16 percent resulted in losses to the program—$1.3 billion in charged-off loan amounts and $1.4 billion in authorized loan amounts sold back to their lenders at a net loss. Main Street Lending Program Loan Status as of January 5, 2026 Loans to larger borrowers and those made by larger lenders had higher payoff rates and lower default rates. For example, loans to the largest businesses in the program (those with more than $42.1 million in revenue) had the highest percentage of repaid loans and the lowest percentage of impaired loans by number. Additionally, about 87 percent of loans made by the largest lenders (with revenue greater than $250 billion at program intake) were fully repaid, outperforming loans made by lenders of other sizes. Loan outcomes also varied by sector. About 70 percent of borrowers with loans outstanding through their scheduled maturity date were unable to make the loan’s final balloon payment (remaining principal) on time, leaving nearly $2 billion in authorized loan amounts at risk of non-repayment. Elevated interest rates through the duration of the program and the timing of principal payment milestones generally were associated with a decreased likelihood of full loan repayment and increased likelihood of loan impairment. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has approved some loan modifications, and officials explained that they will continue to provide borrowers with the opportunity to modify their loans and make payments toward their remaining balance. Why GAO Did This Study As of January 2026, three of the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending facilities, all part of the Main Street Lending Program, continued to hold outstanding loans. As of that date, these facilities had approximately $672 million in outstanding loans. The three facilities were among the nine that received funds appropriated through the CARES Act (section 4003). The Federal Reserve plans to monitor and report on the status of the facilities until they no longer hold outstanding assets or loans. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to annually report on section 4003 loans, loan guarantees, and investments. This report examines (1) the Federal Reserve’s oversight and monitoring of the CARES Act facilities and (2) the status and performance of Main Street Lending Program loans, including factors associated with losses. GAO conducted loan-level analysis of Main Street Lending Program loan performance covering July 2020 through January 2026, reviewed Federal Reserve documentation, and interviewed Federal Reserve officials. For more information, contact Michael E. Clements at ClementsM@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The military services may offer monetary incentives to help recruit and retain child care workers on an ongoing basis. In 2024, the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps collectively provided 4,955 recruitment bonuses and retention allowances to child care workers who are paid using nonappropriated funds (i.e., child care fees), according to the military services. Most of these incentives (about 4,000) were provided by the Air Force. The three military services provided more retention allowances than recruitment bonuses, and none provided relocation bonuses. GAO did not include Navy data in the analysis. In July 2025, Navy officials explained they track recruitment bonuses and retention allowances together with performance awards, and could not readily separate them. As a result, GAO determined that these data were not reliable for the purpose of quantifying the types of incentives the Navy provided to child care workers. Number of Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps Provided to Child Care Workers, 2024 Military service Number of recruitment bonuses provided Number of retention allowances provided Number of relocation bonuses provided Total number of incentives provided Number of child care workers Air Forcea 429 3,645 0 4,074 4,820 Army 56 399 0 455 7,419 Marine Corps 20 406 0 426 2,307 Total 505 4,450 0 4,955 14,546 Source: GAO analysis of summary data from the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. | GAO-26-107831 Note: The information in this table covers all child care workers employed by the three military services at any point during 2024. aThe Air Force oversees the Space Force’s child care program. Air Force officials said the Air Force employs 354 child care workers who work at Space Force child development centers and are included in the Air Force data. They also said the Space Force does not have its own child care workforce. In 2024, the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps collectively provided the most recruitment and retention incentives to child care workers in California, Florida, Colorado, Texas, and Virginia, based on GAO’s analysis of the services’ data. In addition, the military services provide benefits and workplace initiatives to recruit and retain child care workers. Benefits include child care fee discounts, such as a 100 percent fee discount for the first child enrolled at a DOD child development center. Military services’ workplace initiatives include those that help develop child care workers’ skills and improve the classroom environment. For example, the Army’s classroom assessment system aims to create a positive learning environment and enhance learning by focusing on child and teacher interactions and providing feedback to workers. This system has helped improve workers’ classroom management, which has helped with retention, according to Army officials. Military service officials said they have the flexibility to combine recruitment and retention incentives, benefits, and workplace initiatives differently to meet the needs of each military service. For example, Army and Marine Corps officials said that workers have different needs and preferences, and recruitment and retention needs vary across installations. Why GAO Did This Study The Department of Defense (DOD) operates the largest employer-sponsored child care program in the United States. DOD employs about 19,000 child care workers who are paid using nonappropriated funds. These workers care for nearly 172,000 children of service members and DOD civilian employees (as of fiscal year 2024). The military services face challenges recruiting and retaining child care workers, contributing to lengthy waitlists and wait times for child care. GAO previously reported on these challenges in 2024 (GAO-24-106524). To help mitigate these challenges, the military services may offer incentives to child care workers including recruitment bonuses and retention allowances. House Report 118-529 accompanying H.R. 8070, the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, includes a provision for GAO to review recruitment and retention incentives for nonappropriated fund child care workers in DOD child development centers. This report describes (1) the number of recruitment and retention incentives the military services provided to these workers in 2024, (2) the states in which they provided the most incentives in 2024, and (3) the benefits and workplace initiatives the services use to recruit and retain these child care workers. GAO reviewed relevant DOD and military service documents about recruitment and retention incentives, benefits, and workplace initiatives. GAO also analyzed Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps data on recruitment and retention incentives provided to child care workers in 2024 (the most recent available data at the time of this review). GAO interviewed DOD and military service officials about challenges recruiting and retaining child care workers and about how they implemented incentives. For more information, contact Kathryn A. Larin at larink@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified one priority recommendation for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) related to blockchain technology. Specifically, GAO recommended that SEC and other regulators jointly establish an ongoing coordination mechanism to identify and address risks posed by blockchain-related products and services. As of June 2026, SEC has not yet fully implemented this recommendation. Addressing GAO's open priority recommendation in this area could help SEC identify and respond to blockchain-related risks in a timely manner, thereby directly supporting SEC's mission. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at garciadiazd@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Over the course of 2025, federal agencies took steps to reduce the size of their workforces in response to presidential directives. These steps included offering incentives for employees to voluntarily resign or retire, implementing reductions in force, and restricting hiring for most positions. Data reported by 22 major federal agencies showed that nearly 378,000 employees separated from these agencies during 2025. About 65 percent of those separations came in the second half of the year as employees who had taken a deferred resignation offer departed their agencies. By contrast, these agencies reported they hired a total of about 127,000 employees, including temporary employees, during the year. As a result of these actions and other factors, the total workforce across these agencies declined by nearly 256,000 employees—or more than 11 percent—from December 2024 to January 2026. Figure: Total Civilian Workforce at 22 Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies The relative size of the declines varied across agencies—from about 1 percent at the Department of Homeland Security to over 45 percent at the Department of Education. However, 18 of the 22 agencies had declines greater than 10 percent. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has broad responsibilities for collecting and sharing federal workforce data and has continued to update the website it launched in January 2026 to make such data available in various ways. For example, in May 2026, OPM added a tool to the website that allows users to create customized tables using data available through the site. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to provide updates with quarterly data on workforce changes at the federal Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies. This report builds on GAO’s February 2026 update (see GAO-26-108719), and (1) provides information on workforce changes at CFO Act agencies during 2025, including more detailed data from the second half of the year; and (2) describes OPM’s continued efforts to update how it makes federal workforce data available. To address these objectives, GAO collected data from CFO Act agencies on workforce changes during 2025, and information from OPM on updates to how it collects and presents agency workforce data. The Small Business Administration and U.S. Agency for International Development did not provide requested data. For more information, contact Dawn G. Locke at LockeD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Use of the Department of Defense (DOD) child care fee assistance program grew across the military services between fiscal year (FY) 2019 and FY 2024. Both the number of community-based providers and the number of children participating increased, according to GAO’s analysis of military service data. Most of this growth occurred after FY 2021 with military service officials citing additional program spending and efforts to expand the program to more states. GAO’s analysis of program data also indicated that DOD granted numerous exceptions to children to allow them to attend providers that do not meet some program requirements, such as obtaining national accreditation. From FY 2019 through FY 2024, the proportion of such providers ranged from about one-quarter to two-thirds of the providers across the military services. Military service officials said that they grant children exceptions to attend these providers on a case-by-case basis, for example, when no participating providers are near the family’s home. Selected child care providers GAO interviewed said that participating in the fee assistance program could be challenging. Challenges included meeting initial eligibility requirements, keeping up with administrative tasks to remain eligible, and understanding information from DOD about certain eligibility-related decisions. Selected child care providers and national accreditation organizations GAO interviewed said that achieving national accreditation or state quality ratings can be costly and time consuming for providers. Providers also said that ensuring families correctly complete and submit their required paperwork can sometimes be difficult. In addition, one provider with over 1,500 participating centers nationwide said their centers sometimes received unclear information from DOD in ineligibility letters sent to providers facing probation, suspension, or termination. While some reasons for ineligibility involve health or safety, in other cases the reason is relatively minor, such as a late state inspection report. GAO reviewed letter templates from the military services and found that they did not state that providers could request additional information about the decision or an additional review. DOD’s forthcoming Business Rule Guidance for the military services does not require this notification. Without including this information, providers with relatively minor issues may not be aware that they can follow up to resolve the issue. As a result, child care for military families may be unnecessarily disrupted, potentially harming DOD’s mission readiness. Challenges Community-Based Child Care Providers Face Why GAO Did This Study Many military service members need child care to perform their jobs, and DOD considers child care essential to overall mission readiness, efficiency, and retention. When U.S. on-base child care is not available, DOD's fee assistance program provides subsidies for families to use at eligible civilian child care providers in their community. H.R. Rep. No. 118-529 (2024), includes a provision for GAO to review the DOD child care fee assistance program. This report addresses what available data show about recent participation trends in the DOD fee assistance program, and the challenges providers face participating in the program, among other objectives. GAO analyzed DOD and military service data on program participation from FY 2019 through FY 2024 (the most recent available), and reviewed DOD program documents. GAO interviewed DOD and military service officials and staff from DOD’s program administrators. GAO also interviewed three participating providers and four national child care organizations about the program. GAO selected the national child care organizations based on DOD information and the participating child care providers based on recommendations from the national child care organizations.

What GAO Found Facing the retirement of the International Space Station (ISS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is planning to replace it with one or more commercially owned and operated space stations. NASA’s goal is to transition from the ISS, a government-owned platform, to commercial space stations to ensure the U.S. maintains a continuous presence in low-Earth orbit (LEO). NASA is working with six U.S. companies to develop and certify commercial space stations that NASA and other customers could use in LEO. NASA has been working with the companies to mature their initial space station designs. NASA’s Commercial Providers’ Space Station Concepts As of May 2026, NASA has not yet finalized the acquisition approach for this transition. Under the current approach, NASA plans to award one or more Space Act Agreements in 2026 to build stations. Subsequently, NASA anticipates that it will award a contract for certifying that the commercial space stations are safe for NASA crew and for buying mission services. Timeline of Key Events in the Transition from Using the ISS to Commercial Stations in Low Earth Orbit In March 2026, NASA also introduced an alternative approach that would include the use of a government-owned core module for a station onto which commercial companies could then attach their modules. As of May 2026, NASA officials were evaluating options for how to proceed. NASA faces several risks that could lead to a gap in human presence in LEO. For example, there would be a gap if the commercial stations are not available before NASA retires the ISS. NASA historical data suggest that developing the commercial stations might take longer than currently planned. NASA also faces an overall risk of a potential gap in LEO. However, it has not yet assessed the likelihood or duration of a gap since undergoing several changes such as revising its acquisition approach. Assessing the likelihood of a potential gap would help NASA make more informed decisions on how to mitigate this risk. NASA is approaching a critical juncture when it must assess readiness and decide whether to pursue the retirement of the ISS and transition to the use of commercial space stations. If the commercial space stations are not assessed to be ready in time, NASA may need to consider other options, such as extending ISS operations beyond 2030, which would have budget implications. According to NASA officials, the assessment will need to occur in 2027 based on several factors. These factors include sufficient time for NASA to secure funding for additional transportation vehicles to support ongoing ISS operations. Documenting the assessment process and factors—such as key assumptions, risks, and uncertainties—would better position officials to make this decision and improve the transparency of NASA’s assessment. Why GAO Did This Study For 25 years, crews aboard the ISS contributed to scientific research and technology development not possible on Earth. U.S. policy calls for an uninterrupted capability for human space flight and operations in LEO to ensure continued U.S. participation and leadership in space. To continue to meet the policy, NASA plans to buy services from companies developing commercially owned and operated space stations. NASA’s ultimate goal is to be one of many customers buying these services. NASA created the Commercial LEO Development Program to work with companies to develop and certify space stations for its crews and to stimulate and foster the development of a commercial space economy in LEO. GAO was asked to review NASA’s plans for transitioning from the ISS to commercial space stations and plans to retire the ISS. This report identifies upcoming key decision points for NASA leadership related to the transition and examines the implications of a potential gap in human presence in LEO. To do this work, GAO reviewed NASA, commercial space station development, and ISS documentation and interviewed relevant officials.

What GAO Found Since fiscal year 2020, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have used an interagency proposal process to allocate funding for countering Chinese influence projects. An interagency working group has overseen the process and drafted annual guidance for bureaus and posts around the world to submit proposals for funding. The guidance specifies that proposals should address specific lines of effort, which include issue areas such as economic coercion and military exports. However, the proposal process does not require bureaus and posts to seek input from key stakeholders with issue area or regional expertise. Providing documented input on proposals could help the working group better assess the feasibility of proposed projects and ensure approved proposals are designed to effectively address priorities for countering Chinese influence. Examples of Fiscal Year 2024 Countering Chinese Influence Lines of Effort State and USAID reported funding an estimated 470 projects valued at about $1.2 billion from fiscal years 2020 to 2023, but working group officials do not have readily available and reliable data on the types and status of these projects. In response to GAO’s request, officials stated they had to ask the bureaus and overseas posts managing the projects to compile data from various sources, resulting in incomplete data and errors. For example, of the estimated 470 projects, officials did not provide data on time frames for 129 and lines of effort for 38. Officials also lacked data on the specific projects funded from nearly a third of the approved proposals. As a result, working group officials lack critical information to track how funds were used and determine whether the funding ultimately supports the activities described in approved proposals. The working group has not assessed the results of efforts to counter Chinese influence across the portfolio of projects. Although State and USAID began developing a framework to do so in 2023, the agencies were still in the early stages of developing it when a January 2025 executive order paused obligations of foreign assistance funds. As of March 2026, officials said that State is uncertain about whether it would resume developing the framework. Without a process for assessing results across the portfolio of funded projects, working group officials and other stakeholders lack evidence to determine the effectiveness of projects, which could help inform future funding decisions. Why GAO Did This Study The People’s Republic of China and the U.S. are engaged in economic and geopolitical competition spanning trade, security, and the development of advanced technology. Since fiscal year 2020, Congress has directed expenditure of at least $1.6 billion from specified appropriations accounts to counter Chinese influence. State and USAID administered this funding. The Senate report accompanying legislation that became the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review this funding. This report examines (1) State and USAID’s decision-making processes for the use of the funds, (2) the extent State and USAID maintained reliable data on the use of the funds, and (3) State and USAID’s efforts to assess results of projects countering Chinese influence. GAO reviewed agency documents, interviewed agency officials, and analyzed State and USAID project data from fiscal years 2020-2023, which are the latest data available on funded projects.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified nine priority recommendations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Since then, HUD has not implemented these recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified an additional two priority recommendations and removed the priority designation from one recommendation, bringing the total to 10. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Reducing fraud and fragmentation in federal disaster recovery and Improving financing and availability of manufactured housing. By addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas, HUD could improve service delivery to disaster survivors and communities, improve the effectiveness of recovery efforts, and reduce the federal government's fiscal exposure; and promote the availability and affordability of manufactured homes. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help HUD enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at GarciaDiazD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Labor's (DOL) Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS) closed 5,433 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) complaints from fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025, according to GAO’s analysis of USERRA complaint data. The number of complaints increased each year, reaching its highest level in fiscal year 2025 (1,380 complaints), the same year VETS experienced a 23 percent reduction in its complaint investigation staffing levels. During this period, VETS closed USERRA complaints within 90 days on average, the general time frame specified in statute. Most complaints were closed for administrative reasons, including a service member choosing not to pursue the complaint, or were not substantiated by the evidence. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) Complaints by Closure Types, Fiscal Years 2021–2025 VETS investigations staff expressed concern about the amount of time spent on complaints ineligible for USERRA coverage. VETS investigations staff also spent time on complaints that were not substantiated, which includes cases where an investigator determined an employer would have taken the same action (e.g., denied a promotion) against a service member regardless of uniformed service or protected activity. From fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025, “not eligible” and “not substantiated” complaints represented about 10 percent (540 of 5,433 complaints) and about 30 percent (1,632 of 5,433 complaints) of total closed complaints, respectively. VETS provides numerous resources on its website to help educate service members, but investigations staff said the resources are inadequate because they are optional. Also, GAO found that navigating the large number of resources could be challenging for some service members. DOL’s Fiscal Year 2026–2030 Strategic Plan includes a strategy for VETS to educate service members and others on their employment rights. By reviewing existing resources and identifying and implementing options to streamline or modify them, VETS could help service members better understand their eligibility under USERRA before submitting complaints and the standards required to demonstrate that an adverse employer action constitutes a violation. VETS’s national office provides standardized training to new investigators, and regional offices provide additional training. VETS staff from two of the three selected regions GAO interviewed said they developed region-specific training because the recurring training from VETS’s national office does not meet their needs. These region-specific training activities have differed in focus and frequency. Assessing investigator training needs and addressing identified gaps would help VETS better identify and deliver training to its staff to support them in investigating USERRA complaints to better protect service members’ employment rights. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. military readiness depends on service members who are prepared to serve when called. USERRA seeks to protect the civilian careers of service members by ensuring that they are not disadvantaged in their employment because of their military obligations. Under USERRA, service members are entitled to be reemployed in the civilian jobs they left to serve in the uniformed service. However, some service members have faced challenges retaining or resuming their civilian employment. The Senator Elizabeth Dole 21st Century Veterans Healthcare and Benefits Improvement Act includes a provision for GAO to review VETS’s processing of service members’ complaints alleging their USERRA rights have been violated. This report examines, among other things, trends in USERRA complaint investigations data from fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025 and challenges in the investigation process. GAO reviewed VETS documentation and USERRA complaint data, and interviewed VETS national office officials and staff from three regions selected based on factors such as workload and number of staff.

What GAO Found Agencies can use more than 100 federal data sources—or a combination of them—to verify if recipients meet the eligibility criteria for federal programs throughout the award life cycle (which includes pre-award screening, post-award monitoring, and payment validation). As of September 2025, these included 28 data sources in the Do Not Pay working system (DNP) or designated for inclusion in DNP. However, weaknesses in data interoperability may hinder agencies’ ability to efficiently determine award and payment eligibility. Data interoperability is the ability to share and disseminate standardized data in a way that is efficient, consistent, and accessible across different systems and users, for which high-quality data are essential. Without it, the risk of improper awards or payments increases, and the potential use of artificial intelligence and advanced analytics to assist agencies in making eligibility determinations is limited. GAO found that, for more than 30 years, several laws and guidance have established general requirements related to data interoperability but have not established specific requirements for enforcing interoperability, such as for recipient eligibility data, throughout the federal government. Many of the data sources GAO identified, including those in DNP, were created to comply with legal requirements or to manage specific federal programs—not to support eligibility determinations for other agencies. GAO also found a variety of obstacles and challenges that can affect the interoperability of the nine selected data sources that agencies may use for eligibility determinations (see figure). Summary Comparison of Key Elements GAO Assessed to Eligibility Data Interoperability Needs and Observations GAO also found that insufficient or improperly documented validation rules contributed to data quality issues. All nine selected data sources had data quality issues (e.g., missing, invalid, and duplicate data), and seven data sources had inconsistences between them, such as overlap in mutually exclusive data. These data quality issues undermine data reliability and interoperability for agencies seeking to make eligibility determinations. To determine the extent to which eligibility and award data could be linked to help agencies identify whether potentially ineligible entities had received federal awards, GAO partially linked two data sources—System for Award Management (SAM) entity information and SAM Exclusion records—with USAspending.gov awards based on the unique entity identifiers (UEI). Most USAspending.gov award recipient UEIs could be linked to SAM entity information. However, most SAM Exclusion records, which identify parties excluded from receiving federal benefits and awards, such as contracts, did not have a UEI because this data source does not always require them. For the SAM Exclusion records with a UEI, GAO identified 2,074 awards to recipients that were listed in the data source at the time of the transaction. However, these matches by themselves do not indicate that the awards were improper or involved fraud, waste, or abuse. Making this determination requires specific evaluation of each case. The inability to fully analyze SAM Exclusions and USAspending.gov data is an example of government-wide issues with data matching for recipient eligibility determinations. While analysis based on unique identifiers can support eligibility determinations, such identifiers might not always be required or available. Improved data interoperability—including standardized data elements and increased interoperability of data elements, such as names and addresses across data sources and agencies—could enable more comprehensive and efficient data matching. This would improve the government’s ability to identify potentially ineligible recipients. In addition, several federal agencies and cross-agency groups support best practices for data management and interoperability. However, there is no data governance agency designated to establish and enforce mandatory data interoperability requirements to support recipient eligibility determinations. This has led to fragmented and inconsistent data management efforts that rely on agencies’ voluntary adoption. Congress could help improve government-wide data interoperability for recipient eligibility data by assigning a single agency a lead role in establishing and implementing data interoperability requirements for recipient eligibility data sources. Based on its role supporting agencies in their efforts to prevent and detect improper payments and operating systems that collect, validate, and use financial, award, spending, and payment data, the Department of the Treasury could be assigned the explicit authority to establish and implement mandatory government-wide data standards and interoperability requirements for recipient eligibility data sources. Treasury could then work with the Chief Data Officer (CDO) Council and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement the requirements. Not having a data governance agency will contribute to unreliable reporting and inefficiencies as agencies attempt to determine recipient eligibility, and it will limit the government’s ability to leverage artificial intelligence and advanced analytics to identify and prevent improper awards and payments. Why GAO Did This Study Government agencies are responsible for ensuring that data, including those needed to determine whether entities are eligible to receive federal awards and funds, are interoperable and reliable. Having interoperable data among agencies and data sources is crucial to improving the federal government’s efforts to detect and prevent improper payments. The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 requires executive agencies to take actions to reduce improper payments, such as using DNP to ensure that they make awards and payments only to eligible recipients. GAO was asked to review how the government can better leverage USAspending.gov and other data sources to help enhance monitoring of federal spending and potential fraud, waste, and abuse. This report describes (1) federal data sources agencies may use to verify award recipient’s eligibility, (2) the extent to which selected eligibility data sources are interoperable, and (3) the extent to which eligibility data can be matched with USAspending.gov post-award information to analyze potentially ineligible recipients. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed laws, regulations, OMB guidance, and relevant federal agencies’ websites and documentation to identify federal data sources that agencies can use to determine award recipients’ eligibility; reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and OMB guidance related to data interoperability to identify requirements; judgmentally selected nine eligibility data sources that were publicly available, in DNP or designated for inclusion in DNP, and included information about entities; reviewed agencies’ data dictionaries and documentation of validation processes about the selected eligibility data sources for consistency with interoperability practices GAO identified; tested data for fiscal years 2023 and 2024 for data quality issues, such as missing and invalid values, consistency, and comparability based on specifications established by the data owners and GAO’s professional judgment; interviewed officials at Treasury, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General because they own the selected data sources; and linked SAM data sources with USAspending.gov award information using UEI.

What GAO Found The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) Drug-Free Communities (DFC) Support Program provides grants for community-based coalitions focused on drug use prevention efforts for youth 18 and under. In the 2025 evaluation report, it is claimed that the DFC program is meeting its strategic goal of reducing substance use among youth. However, that report states that it is not possible to establish a causal relationship between substance use changes in communities and the DFC program. Selected statements on the Effectiveness of the Drug-Free Communities Support Program from the June 2025 National Cross-Site Evaluation Report GAO found significant limitations in the program data—inconsistencies and unclear data sources. By law, coalitions have certain flexibility in how they collect data. Moreover, ONDCP’s cross-site evaluations have not transparently described its methodologies. Including the complete methodology would allow one to better understand and assess the results of the evaluation. Researchers have long reported on thechallenges for documenting causality for community-based programs. However, available data provides insights on coalitions’ efforts to reduce substance use among youth. ONDCP has taken some steps to effectively administer the DFC program, including working to ensure new coalitions meet program requirements and have access to mandatory training. In addition, ONDCP has established an internal controls framework to help ensure grantee compliance. However, ONDCP has not consistently enforced compliance with the statutory requirement that DFC coalitions maintain the involvement of all community sectors. Establishing and maintaining community drug prevention partnerships is a critical factor to the success of the DFC program. Further, ONDCP lacks transparency in its budget process. Enhanced budget disclosures would allow appropriators and program decision-makers to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the DFC program’s financial position. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. faces multiple challenges related to illicit drugs and declared the opioid epidemic as a national public health emergency since 2017. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data indicated 1,413 drug overdose deaths occurred among those age 18 and under in 2023. The DFC program focuses on preventing and reducing youth substance use. In 2020, GAO designated drug misuse a high-risk issue and added it to the 2021 High-Risk Series. The SUPPORT Act includes a provision for GAO to review ONDCP’s programs and operations, including the DFC program, every 4 years. This report examines the extent to which (1) the DFC program has met key program goals; and (2) ONDCP has effectively managed the DFC program. For this report, GAO conducted a survey and site visits selected by geography and size, and analyzed annual evaluations of the DFC program, management protocols, and budget data for fiscal years 2018 through 2025. GAO also interviewed agency officials and contractors responsible for program evaluations.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified four priority recommendations for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Since then, FDIC has implemented one of those recommendations, bringing the total to three. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Strengthening bank supervision, and Addressing blockchain technology risks. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas could help FDIC mitigate threats to independence and ensure that supervisory escalation decisions are independent and evidence-based, and identify and respond to blockchain-related risks in a timely manner. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would directly support FDIC's mission. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at garciadiazd@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 17 priority recommendations for the Small Business Administration (SBA). Since then, SBA has implemented three of those recommendations, bringing the total to 14. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Improving oversight of COVID-19 pandemic programs Addressing cybersecurity and IT management challenges Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would help SBA more strategically manage program fraud risks and respond to cybersecurity and IT management risks. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across SBA. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at GarciadiazD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East prove that robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) are disrupting naval warfare and challenging traditional naval superiority. To provide more adaptable, dispersed operations, the Navy intends to shift away from its World War II-era operating model, which was based on closely knit battle groups comprised of several traditional platforms, such as planes, ships and submarines. According to Navy strategic documents, a hybrid fleet is necessary to enable this shift and would incorporate smaller, more numerous, and distributed capabilities—including RAS capabilities—as a complement to larger, more individually powerful, traditional capabilities. In this context, RAS capabilities could allow naval forces to take on greater operational risk while maintaining a tactical and strategic advantage. The Navy plans to spend billions of dollars on researching and developing enabling technologies for RAS. In March 2025, GAO found that the Navy had not taken steps to address key challenges to developing RAS capabilities quickly despite critical needs for RAS implementation. For example: Inconsistent leadership and priorities impeded RAS investments. Inconsistent senior leadership and shifting priorities impeded the Navy’s progress establishing an organizational structure for RAS and making efficient investments to achieve goals. Domain- and platform-centric approaches impeded progress of RAS. Without consistent leadership to advocate for RAS investments, the Navy’s organizational structure and processes for requirements, resourcing, and acquisition generally remained siloed by domain and focused on traditional platform approaches. Under this approach, RAS compete for resources with traditional ships, submarines, and aircraft carriers—many of which are priority major weapons acquisition programs—leaving little funding available to develop and field RAS. Navy’s Existing Domain- and Platform-centric Approach and Challenges to Developing RAS Capabilities. Iterative approaches could accelerate RAS development. Commercial companies are driving a rapid pace of RAS development that greatly outpaces development timelines of traditional Navy platforms. In 2021, Navy leadership published the Unmanned Campaign Framework to address organizational barriers and adapt its development processes to expedite development of RAS capabilities. The Framework identified a desired shift to development processes to expedite development that could help the Navy promote iterative development approaches in line with leading practices. However, as of March 2025, the Navy had yet to implement these changes. Portfolio management and formalized stakeholder roles could improve coordination. To better position itself to get RAS capabilities to the warfighter with speed, GAO found the Navy needs to optimize investments in RAS and enabling technologies by managing RAS capabilities as a portfolio. Navy officials also told us a lack of formalized RAS stakeholder responsibilities continued to create inefficiencies and confusion. Without rapid action from the Navy’s most senior leaders to address these challenges, the Navy risks not meeting the fleet’s urgent needs. Why GAO Did This Study A House Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review the Navy’s efforts to develop technologies for autonomous surface vessels and autonomous undersea vessels. In response to this provision, GAO provided information in a classified report. This Snapshot summarizes GAO’s findings and recommendations from the March 2025 classified report and omits classified information related to the Navy’s strategic plans, RAS, and enabling technologies.

What GAO Found From fiscal year 2021 through the first half of fiscal year 2025, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)’s Integrity Committee (IC) received 16,245 complaints, resulting in 460 cases for review. The IC also completed 15 reports of investigations during that period. Integrity Committee’s Intake, Review, and Investigations Processes GAO found that IC intake processes did not consistently comply with documented policies. To the IC’s credit, GAO estimates that 97 percent of complainants received an immediate response acknowledging complaint receipt. However, although required by policy, GAO found the IC lacked a process for legal counsel to conduct secondary reviews of program manager decisions on potentially frivolous complaints. Without such reviews, cases with merit could go uninvestigated, thereby undermining the IC’s work. GAO also estimates that 24 percent of cases met all time frame requirements for opening and review. The remaining 76 percent did not always meet timeliness requirements for, among other things, providing legal analyses for IC member review before meetings. Additionally, the IC did not always document required information in case summaries, including recusals of members with conflicts of interest. Without adherence to time frame and documentation requirements, members risk inconsistently handling cases and not fully evaluating them due to reduced review time and incomplete information. GAO’s review of five investigations completed between October 2020 and March 2025 found that --none was completed within the 150-day time frame required by law. Instead, investigation length for the five reviewed investigations ranged from 427days to 1,246 days. Although mandated to do so, the IC did not provide updates to Congress in some instances when investigations exceeded 150 days; --the IC conducted limited oversight to ensure that assisting Offices of Inspectors General (OIG), who were responsible for performing investigations, complied with CIGIE’s Quality Standards for Investigations. This oversight was hampered by assisting OIGs not providing required monthly status updates to the IC in 37 of 90 instances; and --the IC’s final investigative reports did not always reflect the conclusions reached by the assisting OIG and lacked detailed explanations for differences. Why GAO Did This Study The Inspector General community serves a critical role across the federal government by detecting and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse in federal agencies and helping ensure integrity and effectiveness in agency programs. Given this important role, the leadership in each OIG is held to the highest standards of professional conduct. The Integrity Committee within CIGIE is responsible for investigating noncriminal allegations against senior-level OIG personnel. GAO was asked to assess the IC’s policies related to its processes. This report addresses the extent that the IC processes for (1) intake, (2) review, and (3) investigation of complaints comply with applicable policies and standards required by the IG Act of 1978, as amended. GAO reviewed the IC’s policies and procedures and interviewed IC personnel and personnel from two OIG offices. GAO also analyzed a generalizeable sample of opened cases and a judgmental, nongeneralizeable sample of completed investigations from fiscal years 2021 through the first half of fiscal year 2025.

What GAO Found In 2016, Congress strengthened the role of an existing office within the Department of Defense (DOD) to oversee and advocate for training and equipping special operations forces assigned to the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). That office, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict known as ASD(SO/LIC), is also responsible for determining whether acquisition programs are within budget. ASD(SO/LIC) cannot effectively conduct program oversight, in part, because DOD policy has not fully enabled it to perform its acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, GAO found disagreement between ASD(SO/LIC) and SOCOM officials regarding the former’s access to some programs’ information and meetings. This resulted in ASD(SO/LIC) not getting information to help perform its responsibilities. Collaboration between ASD(SO/LIC) and SOCOM to document clear protocols for the former’s access to this information could enhance its ability to monitor acquisitions and fulfill its statutory role. Example of a Special Operations Forces Acquisition: AC-130J SOCOM reported mixed success meeting cost and schedule goals for its costliest acquisition programs. GAO found that, while one of nine selected programs reported cost growth, most reported delays, which can, over time, result in increased costs. SOCOM’s acquisition policy requires programs to report, in an online portal, current information—including cost estimates—relative to program goals. GAO found that officials for eight selected programs that must maintain such information did not do so, in part, because the command’s acquisition policy did not specify how frequently they needed to. Having ready access to current cost estimates in the portal could help support officials’ efforts to identify potential cost growth risks or opportunities to reallocate resources. Most SOCOM programs GAO reviewed that experienced delays reported using fewer leading practices for iterative product development than programs not experiencing delays. Opportunities exist for programs to more consistently adopt these practices. By updating acquisition policy to reflect and encourage adoption of the practices, SOCOM could further improve its programs’ ability to achieve the speed and innovation needed to meet the needs of special operations forces. Why GAO Did This Study SOCOM is a relatively small organization within DOD, accounting for under 2 percent of the defense budget. SOCOM is responsible for preparing and equipping special operations forces. A congressional committee report includes a provision for GAO to review ASD(SO/LIC)’s oversight of SOCOM acquisitions. This report examines (1) how ASD(SO/LIC) performs its acquisition oversight responsibilities and related challenges it faces, (2) the extent to which the costliest SOCOM weapons acquisition programs met cost and schedule goals, among other things, and (3) the extent to which these programs have taken steps to facilitate speed and innovation in product development. GAO reviewed ASD(SO/LIC) responsibilities in statute and policy; analyzed documentation for nine, of over 80, of SOCOM’s costliest weapons acquisition programs, including cost and schedule data; assessed program efforts to adopt leading product development practices; and interviewed relevant officials.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) offers menopause care—treatments to manage symptoms of menopause—at its medical facilities through a wide array of treatment options, including medications and medical services. Primary care and gynecology providers are the key clinicians for veterans seeking to address menopause symptoms and can refer to other specialists such as mental health and physical therapy as needed. Common Menopause Symptoms To assist those providing menopause care, VHA is developing a clinical practice guideline. It is intended to provide evidence-based recommendations for providers on how to assess, diagnose, and treat menopause. However, the guideline was not complete at the time of GAO’s review. As part of the guideline development process, VHA plans to identify related performance measures. However, officials from the Office of Women’s Health, the sponsoring office for the guideline, could not confirm whether or how they plan to monitor the performance measures. Officials said it is difficult to make plans for monitoring before the recommendations and measures have been identified. Using performance measures to monitor implementation of the guideline’s recommendations could help VHA better achieve the objective of providing equitable, high-quality, and comprehensive health care services at all VHA facilities. VHA has developed patient education about menopause care, which include brochures and a website to help educate women veterans on menopause care. However, this information may not be reaching many women veterans. More than half (60 percent) of the 348 women veterans who responded to GAO’s questionnaire reported that they had not encountered any VHA menopause resources. VHA facility officials reported challenges finding time to discuss menopause education and print brochures. VHA does not have a strategy to ensure that menopause education is regularly communicated to veterans. This information would help women become more knowledgeable about the changes occurring in their bodies and would help them be more empowered to approach their providers about their symptoms. Furthermore, this could help VHA better meet its goal of providing women veterans with comprehensive health care. Why GAO Did This Study Almost half of women veterans served by VHA are aged 45-64, the age range most likely to experience menopause, or the permanent cessation of menstruation. According to VHA research, veterans may experience worse menopause symptoms compared to non-veterans due to aspects of their service. GAO was asked to review VA’s provision of menopause care. This report examines how VHA offers menopause care and educates veterans about menopause, among other topics. GAO analyzed VHA data on menopause care from fiscal years 2019 through 2024. GAO interviewed VHA officials with roles related to menopause care and officials from six VHA medical facilities, selected to represent variation in geographic area, among other criteria. GAO also administered an online questionnaire and conducted discussion groups with women veterans about their experiences with VHA menopause care. Their responses are not generalizable to all women veterans but provide perspectives about VHA’s menopause education efforts and care offerings.

What GAO Found Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical facility officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their providers when concerns arise. GAO identified 104 providers with clinical care concerns (such as practicing in a manner that is unsafe or inconsistent with industry standards of care) at five selected VHA medical facilities between January 2020 and July 2024. GAO found these facilities did not consistently adhere to VHA policy when conducting quality reviews, or reporting providers to state licensing boards or the National Practitioner Data Bank. All five facilities also had missing or incomplete review documentation. As of March 2026, VHA has developed some mandatory training for facility staff related to credentialing providers, but not any on quality review and reporting processes. By failing to follow VHA policy, facilities increase the risk that these processes are conducted incorrectly and that these providers may continue to provide unsafe care to veterans. State Licensing Board Reporting Process for VHA Providers, as of July 2024 Related to reporting, GAO also found these five facilities did not initiate processes to determine whether seven providers should have been reported to state licensing boards or the National Practitioner Data Bank. Completing the review process for these providers will provide VHA assurance that any identified quality concerns will be properly assessed and that the providers who should be reported are reported. Timely reporting helps reduce the risk that other VHA facilities or community hospitals and clinics hire providers with unreported clinical care issues, thereby potentially putting patients at risk. In addition, GAO found that VHA oversight of review and reporting processes at medical facilities was limited in ensuring adherence to VHA policy requirements. Specifically, VHA’s oversight methods—which include a tracking tool and an annual facility self-assessment and audit—are not designed to assess adherence with all timeliness and documentation requirements. These limitations prevent VHA from comprehensively and consistently overseeing processes for monitoring provider clinical performance and ensuring safe, quality health care for veterans. Why GAO Did This Study VHA is responsible for ensuring providers deliver safe care to veterans at its more than 170 medical facilities. However, VHA has faced challenges ensuring providers with clinical care concerns undergo timely and documented reviews, and are reported to external entities when appropriate. GAO was asked to examine VHA processes for reviewing concerns about providers’ clinical care. This report assesses (1) selected VHA medical facilities’ adherence to VHA policies for reviewing and reporting providers with clinical care concerns; and (2) VHA’s oversight of quality review and reporting processes for providers with clinical care concerns. GAO reviewed VHA policy documents and interviewed VHA officials. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of five VHA medical facilities (based on factors such as facility complexity) and identified providers with clinical care concerns from January 2020 through July 2024. This time frame included the most recent facility meeting minutes and allowed for reviews and reporting to be completed. For each provider, GAO reviewed available documentation and interviewed local and regional VHA officials.

What GAO Found The National Guard Bureau (NGB) collects and tracks Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) data from all three National Guard components—NGB, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard. NGB reports FOIA data to the Department of Defense (DOD). NGB officials stated they provide Army National Guard and Air National Guard FOIA data to the Army and the Air Force, respectively. The National Guard tracks data on FOIA requests received, processed, and backlogged through various systems (see figure). Freedom of Information Act Tracking Systems GAO found discrepancies in the accuracy of reported data that officials responsible for reporting National Guard FOIA data were unable to explain. Specifically, GAO found that the numbers of FOIA requests received, processed, and backlogged by the Army National Guard differed between Army National Guard and NGB data for fiscal years 2016 through 2024, in part because there is no single, standardized process across the National Guard components for verifying the accuracy of FOIA data. Moreover, FOIA managers that improperly log FOIA requests and the absence of tools to verify data entries have affected the accuracy of reported data. Without a standardized process to verify the accuracy of National Guard FOIA data, such as the number of FOIA requests received and processed or the extent of backlogs, NGB may continue to inaccurately report FOIA data and hinder transparency for Congress and the public. National Guard FOIA officials identified challenges with insufficient staffing and inconsistent communication that have affected the timely processing of FOIA requests. However, NGB has not fully addressed these challenges. For example, NGB has not analyzed its headquarters workforce needs to know how many full-time equivalent staff are currently needed to process FOIA requests in a timely manner and address backlogs. NGB has not developed a plan to improve communication between NGB and officials responsible for processing FOIA requests in the field through a shared online environment. Addressing data discrepancies and identified challenges can help DOD and the NGB report data more accurately and process FOIA requests more efficiently. Why GAO Did This Study FOIA enables the public to request access to government records and information from any federal executive branch agency. Each year, hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests are filed. For example, NGB continues to face challenges processing such requests within the 20-day time frame that FOIA requires. House Report 118-529 includes a provision for GAO to review the National Guard’s FOIA program. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) NGB and DOD have taken steps to ensure the accuracy of reported FOIA data, including request backlogs; and (2) NGB has identified and addressed challenges associated with the processing of FOIA requests. GAO reviewed NGB and DOD policies on FOIA processing. It also analyzed National Guard FOIA data for fiscal years 2016 through 2024 and distributed a survey to Army and Air National Guard FOIA officials asking about policies and factors that affect timely processing of requests, among other issues. GAO also interviewed NGB and military service officials.

What GAO Found Given the trauma survivors of human trafficking have experienced, they may need behavioral health services, including mental health care services, such as therapy, or substance use disorder treatment. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) fund grant programs that help provide access to such services. In fiscal year 2025, HHS awarded approximately $7.5 million for two key trafficking survivor services programs and DOJ awarded approximately $45 million for two key programs. The programs assisted approximately 2,600 survivors and 11,300 survivors in that year, respectively, helping them access services. GAO’s review of HHS’s two key grant programs found that the agency followed leading practices in assessing how programs perform. HHS did this by, for instance, setting long-term and measurable near-term goals with targets and time frames that communicated what the agency expected the programs to achieve. For example, to assess its long-term goal to provide services for survivors, HHS set a near-term goal for a grantee to deliver services to 50 survivors in a given fiscal year. DOJ also followed leading practices for its minor survivor assistance program, but did not do so for its adult program. Specifically, DOJ did not set measurable near-term goals for what it expects its adult program to achieve. By setting such near-term goals with targets and time frames, DOJ would be better positioned to assess the effectiveness of its adult program and the progress it makes toward supporting the needs of adult human trafficking survivors. GAO’s analysis of literature and interviews with selected HHS and DOJ grantees and selected stakeholders identified factors that can affect human trafficking survivors’ access to behavioral health services. Such factors included shortages of providers specializing in treating survivors of human trafficking. These are longstanding and complex issues, some of which are beyond federal control. HHS and DOJ officials said they are aware of the factors and have taken actions—such as increasing human trafficking training for behavioral health providers—to help improve survivors’ access to services. Factors That Can Affect Access to Behavioral Health Services for Survivors of Human Trafficking Why GAO Did This Study Human trafficking is a crime that involves compelling or coercing a person to provide labor or engage in commercial sex acts. In 2024, the National Human Trafficking Hotline identified nearly 12,000 human trafficking cases in the United States. The Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2022 includes a provision for GAO to study the accessibility of behavioral health services for survivors of human trafficking in the United States. This report (1) describes the key HHS and DOJ programs that fund behavioral health services for trafficking survivors, (2) evaluates how HHS and DOJ assessed the performance of key programs, and (3) describes factors that can affect survivors’ access to services and federal efforts to improve access. GAO reviewed HHS and DOJ documentation and interviewed agency officials. GAO selected four key programs whose grantees reported providing the largest amount of behavioral health services in recent years and interviewed 15 grantees selected to obtain variation in the amount of services provided and location. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2025 grantee performance data for the four programs, the most recent available. GAO evaluated HHS and DOJ steps for assessing the performance of the programs. GAO also conducted a literature search and interviewed six selected stakeholders, including representatives from survivor organizations and a researcher.